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HEREDITY. 


BY    THE    SAME    AUTHOR. 


CONTEMPORARY     ENGLISH     PSYCHOLOGY. 
From  the  French  of  PROFESSOR  TH.  RIBOT. 

Large  I2mo.     Price,  $1.50. 

An  Analysis  of  the  Views  and  Opinions  of  the  fol- 
lowing Metaphysicians,  as  expressed  in  their  writings  : — 

JAMES  MILL  I          GEORGE  H.  LEWES 

ALEXANDER  BAIN  HERBERT  SPENCER 

JOHN  STUART  MILL          |  SAMUEL  BAILEY 

"The  task  which  M.  Ribot  set  himself  he  has  performed  with 
rery  great  success." — Examiner. 

"  We    can     cordially     recommend    the    volume."—  Journal  of 
Mental  Science. 


NEW  YORK:  D.  APPLETON  &  CO. 


HEREDITY: 


A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  ITS  PHENOMENA, 
LAWS,  CAUSES,  AND  CONSEQUENCES. 


FXOX  THE  FRENCH  OP 

TH.  KIBOT, 

ACTHOtt  O*   "  CONTEMPORARY   ENGLISH  PSYCHOLOGY." 


NEW  YORK: 
D.    APPLETON    AND    COMPANY, 

I,  a,  AJW  5  BOND  STfiEET. 

188Y. 


CONTENTS. 


INTRODUCTION. 

PHYSIOLOGICAL  HEREDITY 


PART    FIRST. 
THE   FACTS. 

CHAPTER  L 
HEREDITY  OF  INSTINCTS. 

I.  Heredity  of  Natural  Instincts  ...  ...  ...  ..;  13 

II.  Heredity  of  Acquired  Instincts  ...  ...  ...  ...  16 

III.  What  is  Instinct  ?  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  19 

IV.  Origin  of  Instincts  :  sire  they  Hereditary  Habit  ?  ...  ...  26 

CHAPTER  II. 
HEREDITY  OF  THE  SENSORIAL  QUALITIES. 

I.  Heredity  of  Touch  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  36 

IL  Heredity  of  Sight  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  38 

III.  Heredity  of  Hearing  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  41 

IV.  Heredity  of  SmeU  and  Taste  ...  ...  ...  ...  43 


vi  Contents. 

CHAPTER  III. 
HEREDITY  OF  THE  MEMORY. 

PACE 

L    Memory  referred  to  Habit,  and  to  the  Law  of  the  Indestructi- 
bility of  Force  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  •       46 

II.    Heredity,  Specific  Memory  ;  Heredity  of  Memory        ...  ...      52 

CHAPTER  IV. 

HEREDITY  OF  THE  IMAGINATION. 

I.  The  Esthetic  Imagination    ...         f    ...  ...  ...  ...  54 

II.  Heredity  of  Imagination  in  Poets       ...  ...  ...  ...  56 

III.  Heredity  of  Imagination  in  Painters  ...  ...  ...  ...  60 

IV.  Heredity  of  Imagination  in  Musicians  ...  ...  ...  63 

CHAPTER  V. 
HEREDITY  OF  THE  INTELLECT. 

L    Is  Intelligence  in  its  highest  form  Heritable  ?      Empiricism  and 

Idealism  in  accord          ...            ...            ...            ...  ...  65 

II.    Heredity  in  Men  of  Science,  Philosophers,  and  Economists  ...  72 

III.     Heredity  in  Authors  and  Men  of  Letters         ...            ...  ...  77 

CHAPTER  VI. 

HEREDITY  OF  THE  SENTIMENTS  AND  THE  PASSIONS. 

I.    Psychological  Study  of  Sentiment      ...  ...  ...  ...       80 

II.    Physical  Tendencies :  Heredity  of  General   Sensibility ;  of  Anti- 
pathy;  of  the  Sexual  Appetite ;  of  Dipsomania       ...  ...       83 

III.    Moral    Tendencies :    their    Heredity  ;    Gaming,   Avarice,    Theft, 

Homicide.     Relations  between  Passion  and  Insanity ...  ...      90 

CHAPTER  VII. 
HEREDITY  OF  THE  WILL. 

I.    Active  and  C  oatemplative  Minds         ..  ...  ...  ...      <j4 

If.    Heredity  of  Active  Faculties  in  Statesmen         ...  ...  ...      98 

III.    Heredity  of  Active  Faculties  in  Soldiers  ...  ...  ...     105 


Contents.  vii 

CHAPTER  VIII. 
HEREDITY  AND  NATIONAL  CHARACTER. 

PAGE 

I.    Permanence  of  the  Character  of  Nations          ...  ...  ...  107 

IL    Jews,  Gypsies,  Cagots          ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  Ill 

CHAPTER  IX. 

MORBID  PSYCHOLOGICAL  HEREDITY. 

L    Insanity  is  always  produced  by  Organic  Causes  ...  ...  1 19 

II.    Heredity    of    Hallucination,    Suicide,    Homicidal     Monomania, 

Demoniacal  Possession,  Hypochondria,  Presentiments  ...  122 

III.    Heredity  of  Mania,  Dementia,  General  Paralysis.     Statistics        ...  124 


PART     SECOND. 
THE   LAWS. 

CHAPTER  I. 
ARE  THERE  LAWS  OF  HEREDITY? 

I.    Facts  and  Laws     ...            ...            ...             ...            ...  ...  135 

II.    Objections     against     Psychological     Heredity :  Buckle  and 

Maupertuis       ...            ...            ...            ...            ...  ...  137 

III.    Heredity  is  the  Law,  Non-heredity  the  Exception           ...  ...  143 

CHAPTER    II. 
THE  LAWS  OF  HEREDITY. 

I.    Four  Principal  Forms  of  Heredity     ...  ...  ...  ...     145 

Section  I. — Direct  Heredity.     Influence  of  Parents  :  Doctrines 
on  this  Subject     Hybridism.     Instances  of  Heredity  from 
Mother  to  Son,  Father  to  Daughter,  Father  to  Son,  Mother 
to  Daughter  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...     148 

Section  2. — Atavism        ...  ...  ...  ...  ...     166 

Section  3. — Indirect  or  Collateral  Heredity  ...  ...     170 

Section  4. — Heredity  of   Influence.     Heredity  compared  with 
Alternate  Generation  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...     174 


viii  Contents. 

CHAPTER  III. 
ESSAYS  IN  STATISTICS. 

MM 

I.    Quantitative  and  Qualitative  Science ...  ...  ...     182 

II.  Gallon's  Statistics     ...  ...  ...     *86 

IIL    Value  of  Statistical  Documents  ...  ...     190 

CHAPTER    IV. 
EXCEPTIONS  TO  THE  LAW  OF  HEREDITY. 

I.    Facts  contrary  to  Heredity  ...  ...  ...  ...     194 

II.    Is  there  a  Law  of  Spontaneity  ?         ...  ...  ...  ...     198 

III.  Causes  of  Anomalies  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...     202 

IV.  Disproportion  between  Causes  and  their  E.Tects  ...  ...     205 

V.    The  Metamorphoses  of  Heredity        ...  ...  ...  ...     209 


PART    THIRD. 
THE   CAUSES. 


CHAPTER  I. 

GENERAL  RELATIONS  BETWEEN  THE  PHYSICAL  AND  THE 
MORAL. 

I.    Heredity  one  Aspect  of  these.    The  Present  State  of  the  Question. 

The  Opposition  between  Physics  and  Morals  ...  ...     217 

II.    Phenomena  of  Unconsciousness ;    the   Spinal   Cord    and   Reflex 
Actions ;   Automatism  of  the  various  Nerve-Centres ;   Auto- 
matism of  the  Brain  ;  Unconscious  Cerebration.    The  Uncon- 
scious in  Psychological  Phenomena :  Instinct,  Habit,  Perception, 
Imagination,  Reasoning,  Character,  Language          ...  ...     220 

IIL  Phenomena  of  Consciousness.  The  Fact  of  Consciousness  referred 
to  Nerve  Shock.  Velocity  of  Thought :  how  Measured.  Is 
Consciousness  Simple  or  Complex,  Cause  or  Effect  ?  Impossi- 
bility of  conceiving  of  the  Ego  without  Phenomena,  or  Pheno- 
mena without  the  Ego  ...  ..  ...  ...  ...  2J« 


Contents. 


PACK 


IV.    Two    Contemporaneous    Doctrines:    Mechanism,    which    reduces 
Thought  to  Movement ;   and  Idealism,  which  refers  Movement 
to  Thought      ...  ...  ...  —     242 

V.    Is  the  Problem  of  the  Relations  between  Physics  and  Morals  a 

Case  of  the  Law  of  Correlation  of  Forces  ?  ...  ...  ...     252 

CHAPTER  II. 

THE  RELATIONS  BETWEEN  THE  PHYSICAL  AND  THE  MORAL: 
A  PARTICULAR  CASE. 

I.     Has  every  Psychological  State  its  Antecedent  in  a  Physiological 

State?  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  259 

II.     Examples  drawn  from  the  so-called  Ideal  Passions         ...  ...  261 

III.     Examples  drawn  from  the  Intellectual  States  ...  ...  264 

CHAPTER  III. 

PSYCHOLOGICAL  AND  PHYSIOLOGICAL  HEREDITY. 

I.     Possible   Hypotheses  as   to   the   Relations  between    these    two 
Heredities.    Is  Psychological   Heredity    the    Cause   of    Phy- 
siological Heredity?    Is   Physiological  Heredity  the  Cause  of 
Psychological  Heredity  ?      Agreement   of  the  Empirical  and 
Idealistic  Solutions         ...  ...  ...  ...  ...     267 

1L     Can  Heredity  be  explained  ?  Darwin  and  Pangenesis.  Heredity  is 

Identity  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...    276 


PART    FOURTH. 
THE    CONSEQUENCES. 

CHAPTER  I. 
HEREDITY  AND  THE  LAW  OF  EVOLUTION. 

I.     The  Hypothesis  of  Evolution  ...  ...  ...  ...     283 

II.     Can  Heredity   become  a  Means  of  Selection,  by  AccumulaHng 
Slight  Differences  ?    Consanguineous  Marriages.     Half-breeds  : 
Predominance  of  the  Superior  Race  ...  ...  ...     289 

HI,     Heredity  as  a  Cause  of  Decadence     ...  ...  ...  ...     301 


x  Contents. 

CHAPTER  II. 
THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  CONSEQUENCES  OF  HEREDITY. 

PACK 

I.    Part  played  by  Heredity  in  the  Genesis  of  Instincts       ...  ...  306 

II.     Part  played  by  Heredity  in  the  Genesis  of  Intelligence.    Are  the 
Forms  of  Thought  the  Result  of  Hereditary  Accumulation? 

New  Form  of  the  Problem  of  the  Origin  of  Ideas      ...  ...  307 

III.  Heredity  Perfects  Intelligence  :  Facts  in  Support  of  this  ...  319 

IV.  Part  played  by  Heredity  in  the  Genesis  of  Sentiments    ...  ...  328 

CHAPTER  III. 
MORAL  CONSEQUENCES  OF  HEREDITY. 

f.     Heredity  and  Liberty.     The  Personal  Factor.      Wundt  and  Bain. 

Character  and  Heredity ...  ...  ...  ...  ...     335 

II.     Heredity  and  Education      ...  ...  ...  ...  ...     346 

III.  Part  played  by  Heredity  in  the  Genesis  of  Moral  Ideas.  Morals 
and  the  Law  of  Evolution.  Heredity  and  the  Problem  of  the 
Origin  of  Evil  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  351 

CHAPTER  IV. 
SOCIAL  CONSEQUENCES  OF  HEREDITY. 

I.  Part  played  by  Heredity  in  Education  and  the  Family  ...  ...  361 

II.  Caste      ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  364 

III.  Nobility  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  360 

IV.  Sovereignty.    Constant  Opposition  in  the  Social  Order  between 

Liberty  and  Heredity.     The  Future  of  Humanity  according  to 
Spencer  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...     377 


CONCLUSION 


HEREDITY. 


INTRODUCTION, 

PHYSIOLOGICAL   HEREDITY. 

HEREDITY  is  that  biological  law  by  which  all  beings  endowed 
with  life  tend  to  repeat  themselves  in  their  descendants:  it 
is  for  the  species  what  personal  identity  is  for  the  individual. 
By  it  a  groundwork  remains  unchanged  amid  incessant  variation ; 
by  it  Nature  ever  copies  and  imitates  herself.  Ideally  con- 
sidered, heredity  would  simply  be  the  reproduction  of  like  by  like. 
But  this  conception  is  purely  theoretical,  for  the  phenomena  of 
life  do  not  lend  themselves  to  such  mathematical  precision : 
the  conditions  of  their  occurrence  grow  more  and  more  complex  in 
proportion  as  we  ascend  from  the  vegetable  world  to  the  higher 
animals,  and  thence  to  man. 

Man  may  be  regarded  either  in  his  organism  or  in  his 
dynamism:  in  the  functions  which  constitute  his  physical  life,  or 
in  the  operations  which  constitute  his  mental  life.  Are  both  of 
these  forms  of  life  subject  to  the  law  of  heredity?  are  they  subject 
to  it  wholly,  or  only  in  part  ?  and,  in  the  latter  case,  to  what  extent 
are  they  so  subject? 

The  physiological  side  of  this  question  has  been  diligently 
studied,  but  not  so  its  psychological  side.  We  propose  to  supply 
this  deficiency  in  the  present  work.  But  the  hereditary  trans- 
mission of  mental  faculties — considered  in  its  phenomena,  its  laws» 
its  consequences,  and  especially  in  its  causes — is  so  closely  con- 
nected with  physiological  heredity,  that  we  are  compelled  to 


2  Heredity. 

consider  this  latter  subject  at  the  outset  This  we  will  do  very 
briefly,  referring  the  reader  for  fuller  details  to  special  treatises. 
It  will  suffice  to  show,  by  means  of  a  few  definite  and  well-ascer- 
tained facts,  that  heredity  extends  over  all  the  elements  and 
functions  of  the  organism ;  to  its  external  and  internal  structure, 
its  maladies,  its  special  characteristics,  and  its  acquired  modifi- 
cations. 

The  first  thing  that  attracts  the  attention,  even  of  the  un- 
observant, is  the  heredity  of  the  external  structure.  This  is  a  fact 
of  everyday  experience,  and  nothing  is  more  common  than  to 
hear  that  such  and  such  a  child  is  the  image  of  its  father,  mother, 
or  grandparents.  Hereditary  influence  may  manifest  itself  in  the 
limbs,  the  trunk,  the  head,  even  in  the  nails  and  the  hair,  but 
especially  in  the  countenance,  expression,  or  characteristic  features. 
This  is  an  observation  made  by  the  ancients ;  hence  the  Romans 
had  their  Nasones,  Labeones,  Buccones,  Capifones,  and  other  names, 
derived  from  hereditary  peculiarities.  According  to  Haller,  the 
Bentivoglios  had  on  their  bodies  a  slightly  prominent  tumour, 
transmitted  from  father  to  son,  which  warned  them  of  changes 
in  the  weather,  and  which  grew  larger  whenever  a  moist  wind 
was  coming.  The  resemblance  may  be  so  close  as  to  give 
rise  to  doubts  concerning  personal  identity,  or  at  once  to  betray 
parentage.  Ten  years  before  his  death  a  singer  at  the  opera, 
named  Nourrit,  appeared  on  the  stage  with  one  of  his  sons, 
who  had  inherited  his  physical  constitution  as  well  as  his  pleasing 
voice ;  and  in  a  play  with  a  plot  like  that  of  the  Mencechmi,  the 
extraordinary  resemblance  of  the  son  to  the  father  added  a 
hundred-fold  interest  to  the  endless  misunderstandings  with  which 
the  play  was  filled.1  These  hereditary  resemblances  have  some- 
times led  to  the  most  unexpected  and  most  romantic  adventures, 
so  that  it  is  not  surprising  that  Marryat  has  turned  them  to 
account  in  his  novel,  'Japhcl  in  Search  of  a  Father.1 

It  is  still  more  singular  that  this  resemblance  between  parents 
and  children  may  undergo  such  metamorphoses  as  shall  cause  the 
child  to  resemble  at  one  time  the  father,  and  at  another  the 

1  P.    Lucas,    Traitf  Fhysiologique  et  Fhttosophiqite  de  nieredile 
vol.  i.  p.  195. 


Introduction. 


mother.  Girou  de  Buzareingues,  in  his  work  De  la  Genb-ation, 
containing  some  curious  facts  observed  by  him,  tells  us  that  he 
knew  two  brothers  who  in  early  life  resembled  their  mother,  while 
their  sister  resembled  the  father.  These  resemblances  were  such  as 
to  strike  all  who  saw  them.  '  But  now, '  says  he,  '  and  ever  since 
their  youth,  the  two  boys  resemble  the  father,  while  the  daughter 
has  ceased  to  be  like  him.'  This  same  author  was  led,  in  conse- 
quence of  numerous  observations,  to  believe  that  changes  of  this 
kind  are  more  frequent  and  more  thorough  in  the  case  of  boys 
than  in  that  of  girls. 

The  system  of  intentional  and  conscious  selection  has  been 
applied  even  to  man.  Frederick  William  I.,  the  father  of  Fred- 
erick the  Great,  who  was  noted  for  his  love  of  colossal  men,  dealt 
with  his  regiment  of  giants  as  stock-breeders  deal  with  their 
cattle.  He  would  not  allow  his  guards  to  marry  women  of  stature 
inferior  to  their  own.  Haller  used  to  boast  of  his  '  belonging  to 
one  of  those  races  whose  members,  by  reason  of  their  imposing 
stature,  seem  born  to  rule  other  men.' 

Heredity  may  be  also  traced  in  all  that  concerns  the  com- 
plexion of  the  skin,  and  the  shape  and  size  of  the  body.  Thus, 
so  truly  is  obesity  the  result  of  an  organic  predisposition,  that  it 
has  often  been  known  to  make  its  appearance  amid  privations, 
and  under  all  the  disadvantages  of  hard  labour  and  poverty. 

Heredity  influences  the  internal  conformation  no  less  than 
the  external  structure.  Nothing  is  more  undisputed  than  the 
heredity  of  the  form,  size,  and  anomalies  of  the  osseous  system ; 
and  universal  everyday  experience  proves  the  heredity  of  all  the 
proportions  of  the  cranium,  thorax,  pelvis,  vertebral  column,  and 
the  smallest  bones  of  the  skeleton.  Even  the  heredity  of  excess 
or  defect  in  the  number  of  the  vertebrae  and  the  teeth  has  been 
ascertained.  (Lucas.)  The  circulatory,  digestive,  and  muscular 
systems  obey  the  same  laws  which  govern  the  transmission  of  the 
other  internal  systems  of  the  organism.  There  are  some  families 
in  which  the  heart  and  the  size  of  the  principal  blood-vessels  are 
naturally  very  large ;  others  in  which  they  are  comparatively  small ; 
and  others,  again,  which  present  identical  faults  of  conform- 
ation. Lastly — and  this  is  a  point  that  more  nearly  concerns  us — 
heredity  regulates  the  proportions  of  the  nervous  system.  It  is 


4  Heredity. 

evident  in  the  general  dimensions  of  the  brain,  the  principal 
organ  of  that  system ;  it  is  very  often  apparent  in  the  size,  and 
even  in  the  form,  of  the  cerebral  convolutions.  This  fact  was 
observed  by  Gall,  who  thereby  accounted  for  the  transmission  of 
mental  faculties.  We  need  not  here  dwell  upon  this  point,  for  we 
shall  have  frequent  occasion  to  revert  to  it  in  the  course  of  the 
present  work. 

Heredity  of  the  internal  elements  occurs  in  the  fluids  of 
the  organism,  as  well  as  in  the  s<51id  parts  :  the  blood  is  more 
abundant  in  some  families  than  in  others,  and  this  superabundance 
transmits,  or  may  transmit,  to  the  members  of  such  families,  a  pre- 
disposition to  apoplexy,  hemorrhage,  and  inflammation.  Thus  there 
exists  in  some  families  such  a  liability  to  hemorrhage  that  even 
the  prick  of  a  pin  may  cause  in  them  a  flow  of  blood  that 
cannot  be  checked.  The  same  m?.y  be  said  with  regard  to  the 
bile  and  the  lymph. 

Nor  is  it  merely,  as  might  be  supposed,  the  structure,  whether 
internal  or  external,  that  is  thus  transmissible ;  some  quite 
peculiar  characteristics  of  the  mode  of  existence  pass  from  parent 
to  child.  Heredity  governs  the  subordinate  no  less  than  the  domi- 
nant characteristics.  Thus  fecundity,  length  of  life,  and  those 
purely  personal  characteristics  which  physicians  call  idiosyncrasies, 
are  hereditarily  transmitted.  A  few  facts  will  confirm  this. 

There  is  no  doubt  of  the  influence  of  heredity  on  the  repro- 
ductive power.  Some  families  are  noted  for  their  fecundity,  and 
this  fecundity  descends  either  through  the  father  or  through  the 
mother. 

A  mother  gave  birth  to  twenty-four  children,  among  them  five 
girls,  who  in  turn  gave  birth  to  forty-six  children  in  all  The 
daughter  of  this  woman's  son,  while  still  young,  was  brought  to  bed 
with  her  sixteenth  child.  (Girou.)  The  sons,  daughters,  and  grand- 
children of  a  couple  who  were  the  parents  of  nineteen  children 
were  nearly  all  gifted,  says  Lucas,  with  the  same  fecundity. 

Several  families  belonging  to  the  old  French  nobility  possessed 
extraordinary  powers  of  propagation.  Anne  de  Montmorency 
(who  when  over  seventy-five  years  of  age  was  still  able,  at  the 
battle  of  St  Denis,  to  break  with  his  sword  the  teeth  of  the 
Scotch  soldier  who  gave  him  his  death-blow)  was  the  father  of 


Introduction. 


twelve  children.  Three  of  his  ancestors — Mathieu  I.,  Mathieu  II., 
and  Mathieu  III. — had  altogether  eighteen  children,  of  whom 
fifteen  were  boys.  The  son  and  grandson  of  the  great  Conde 
reckoned  nineteen  children  between  them ;  and  their  great-grand- 
father, who  was  slain  at  Jarnac,  had  ten.  The  first  four  Guises 
had,  in  all,  forty-three  children,  thirty  of  them  boys.  Achille  de 
Harlay,  father  of  the  first  President,  had  nine  children ;  his  father, 
ten  ;  his  great-grandfather,  eighteen.  In  some  families  this  fecun- 
dity has  persisted  for  five  or  six  generations.1 

It  is  now  generally  understood  that  longevity  depends  far 
less  on  race,  climate,  profession,  mode  of  life  or  food,  than  on 
hereditary  transmission.  If  we  consult  special  treatises  on  this 
subject,  we  find  centenarians  as  well  among  blacks  as  among 
whites ;  in  Russia  and  Scotland  as  in  Italy  and  Spain ;  among 
those  who  take  the  greatest  care  of  their  health  as  among  those 
who  have  led  the  hardest  lives.  A  collier  in  Scotland  prolonged 
his  hard  and  dreary  existence  over  one  hundred  and  thirty-three 
years,  and  worked  in  the  mines  after  he  was  eighty. 

Similar  facts  are  to  be  met  with  among  prisoners,  and  even 
galley-slaves.  'The  average  of  life,'  says  Dr.  Lucas,  'plainly 
depends  on  locality,  hygiene,  and  civilization;  but  individual 
longevity  is  entirely  exempt  from  these  conditions.  Everything 
tends  to  show  that  long  life  is  the  result  of  an  internal  principle 
of  vitality,  which  privileged  individuals  receive  at  their  birth.  It 
is  so  deeply  imprinted  in  their  nature  as  to  make  itself  apparent 
in  every  part  of  their  organization.'  This  kind  of  heredity  has 
long  been  observed  in  England,  where  life-assurance  companies 
require  information  as  to  the  longevity  of  the  ancestors  of  those 
who  desire  to  eflect  an  insurance. 

There  are,  also,  on  the  other  hand,  many  families  in  which 
the  hair  turns  grey  in  early  youth,  and  in  which  the  vigour  of  the 
physical  and  intellectual  faculties  fails  prematurely.  In  others,  early 
death  is  of  such  common  occurrence  that  only  a  few  individuals 
can  escape  it  by  great  precaution.  In  the  Turgot  family  the 
fifty-ninth  year  was  rarely  passed.  The  man  who  made  that  family 


1  Benoiston  de  Chutcauneuf,  Memoire  sur  la  Durle  da  Families  Nobles  en 
France. 


6  Heredity. 

illustrious,  when  he  saw  that  fatal  term  approaching,  remarked — 
though  he  had  then  every  appearance  of  health  and  strength — that 
it  was  time  for  him  to  put  his  affairs  in  order,  and  to  finish  the 
work  he  had  then  in  hand,  because  in  his  family  it  was  usual  to 
die  at  that  age.  He  died  in  fact  at  the  age  of  fifty-three. 

The  immunity  from  contagious  diseases,  and  especially  from 
small-pox,  with  which  some  families  are  endowed,  is  a  well-estab- 
lished fact 

Heredity  may  transmit  muscular  strength,  and  the  various  forms 
of  motor  energy.  In  ancient  times  there  were  families  of 
athletes,  and  there  have  been  families  of  prize-fighters.  The 
recent  researches  of  Galton  as  to  wrestlers  and  oarsmen  show  that 
the  victors  generally  belong  to  a  small  number  of  families  among 
whom  strength  and  skill  are  hereditary.  As  for  motor  energy, 
a  point  of  special  importance  in  horses,  experience  long  ago  taught 
breeders  that  speed  on  the  turf — just  like  faulty  action,  or  crib- 
biting — is  transmitted.  Among  men  there  are  families  nearly  all 
of  whose  members  are  possessed  of  exquisite  dexterity  and  grace 
of  movement.  Heredity  has  oftentimes  transmitted  a  talent  for 
dancing,  of  which  the  celebrated  Vestris  family  is  an  example. 

It  is  the  same  with  regard  to  the  voice.  Every  animal  possesses 
the  voice  peculiar  to  its  kind ;  but  even  individual  characteristics 
are  transmitted ;  as,  for  instance,  stammering,  speaking  through  the 
nose,  and  lisping.  There  are  many  families  of  singers,  and  there 
are  also  families  that  have  no  ear  at  all  for  melody.  Loquacity,  too, 
is  hereditary : — '  Most  of  the  children  of  talkative  persons,'  says 
Dr.  Lucas,  '  are  chatterboxes  from  the  cradle.  Words — idealess, 
aimless,  and  unbridled — appear  in  them  to  be  prompted  by  a  sort  of 
elastic  spring  over  which  they  have  no  control.  We  once  saw  at  a 
friend's  house  a  servant-girl  of  irrepressible  loquacity.  She  would 
talk  to  people,  who  could  scarcely  get  in  a  word  edgewise ;  she 
would  talk  to  dumb  beasts  and  to  inanimate  things ;  she  would 
talk  aloud  to  herself.  She  had  to  be  sent  away.  "  But,"  said  she 
to  her  employer,  "  it  is  no  fault  of  mine :  it  comes  to  me  from 
my  father ;  the  same  fault  in  him  drove  my  mother  distracted  ; 
and  one  of  his  brothers  was  like  me." ' 

The  heredity  of  anomalies  of  organization  is  a  well-ascertained 
fact.  One  of  the  strangest  and  best  known  instances  of  this  is 


Introduction. 


the  case  of  Edward  Lambert,  whose  whole  body,  with  the  exception 
of  the  face,  the  palms  of  the  hands  and  the  soles  of  the  feet,  was 
covered  with  a  sort  of  carapace  of  horny  excrescences  which 
rattled  against  each  other.  He  was  the  father  of  six  children,  all 
of  whom,  from  the  age  of  six  weeks,  presented  the  same  singularity. 
The  only  one  of  these  who  survived  transmitted  it  to  all  his  sons ; 
and  this  transmission,  going  from  male  to  male,  was  kept  up 
during  five  generations.1  Albinism,  rickets,  lameness,  ectrodactylism 
and  polydactylism,  harelip — in  fact,  all  deviations  from  the  type, 
whether  they  be  the  result  of  an  excess  or  of  an  arrest  of  organic 
development — are  transmissible.  These  facts  are  of  great  interest, 
as  showing  that  the  individual  type  is  subject  to  the  law  of  heredity, 
no  less  than  the  specific  type. 

It  is  a  disputed  question  whether  we  must  conclude  that  de- 
viations from  the  specific  type,  anomalies  of  all  kinds — such  as 
strabismus,  myopia,  atrophy  and  hypertrophy  of  members — remain 
fixed  for  ever,  or  that  heredity  in  such  cases  is  only  of  a  restricted 
and  temporary  nature.  These  individual  deviations  from  law  are 
sometimes  transmitted,  sometimes  not  Experience  would  appear 
to  show  that  there  is  a  tendency  towards  a  return  to  the  primitive 
type.  Thus,  in  the  Colburn  family,  which  presented  one  of  the 
most  curious  instances  of  sexdigitism — the  members  of  this  family 
had  each  a  supernumerary  finger  and  toe — the  anomaly  continued 
through  four  generations;  but,  says  Burdach,*  the  normal  was 
steadily  gaining  on  the  abnormal. 
The  ratio  was — 

ist  generation,  as  i  to  35 

2nd        „  „  i  „  14 

3r<i         »  »  i  »     Z\ 

The  return,  therefore,  to  the  normal  type  took  place  rapidly. 
This  brings  us  to  the  important  and  difficult  question  of  the 
heredity  of  acquired  modifications.  All  of  which  we  have  spoken — 
the  transmission  of  internal  and  external  structure,  of  longevity, 
fecundity,  and  idiosyncrasies — is  involved  in  the  very  nature  of  the 
being  as  virtually  constituted  by  the  act  of  generation,  and  belongs 

1  Philosophical  Transactions,  vol.  xvii.  and  vol.  xluc. 
*  Physiolo°ie,  vol.  ii.  p.  251. 


Heredity. 

to  its  essence;  hence  it  is  perfectly  natural  that  all  these 
qualities  and  modifications  should  be  transmitted  to  its  descend- 
ants. But  man  cannot,  any  more  than  other  animals,  live  without 
contracting  habits ;  without  undergoing,  under  the  influence  of 
circumstances,  or  from  an  excess  or  deficiency  in  the  exercise  of 
each  organ,  modifications  of  all  kinds,  which  remain  fixed  in  him. 
Are  these  transmitted?  Are  they  destined  to  perish  with  the 
individual,  or  do  they  become  in  his  descendants  a  new,  an  ac- 
quired character  ?  The  brain,  for  example,  like  every  other  organ, 
is  developed  by  exercise.  If  this  increase,  whether  of  size  or 
of  energy,  is  transmissible,  some  important  consequences  for  the 
mental  faculties  must  be  the  result ;  progress  will  then  be  deter- 
mined, not  only  outwardly  and  traditionally,  but  inwardly  and 
organically. 

We  will  consider  this  question  in  the  course  of  the  work ;  for 
the  present  we  consider  only  the  physiological  phenomena. 

Habit  is  defined  to  be  an  acquired  disposition.  We  ask  if  any 
purely  individual  habits  are  transmitted.  Instances  of  this  are  cited. 
Girou  de  Buzareingues  observes  that  he  had  known  a  man  who 
had  the  habit,  when  in  bed,  of  lying  on  his  back  and  crossing  the 
right  leg  over  the  left.  One  of  his  daughters  had  the  same  habit 
from  birth;  she  constantly  assumed  that  posture  in  the  cradle, 
notwithstanding  the  resistance  offered  by  the  napkins.  '  I  know 
many  girls/  says  he,  'who  resemble  their  fathers,  and  who 
have  derived  from  them  extraordinary  habits,  which  cannot  be 
attributed  either  to  imitation  or  to  training,  and  boys  who  have 
habits  derived  from  their  mothers.1  But  it  is  impossible  to  enter 
upon  any  details  on  this  subject.'  Darwin  notes  the  following 
instance,  which  came  under  his  own  observation  : — a  boy  had  the 
singular  habit,  when  pleased,  of  rapidly  moving  his  fingers  parallel 
to  each  other;  and  when  much  excited,  of  raising  both  hands, 
with  the  fingers  still  moving,  to  the  sides  of  his  face  on  a  level  with 
the  eyes;  this  boy,  when  almost  an  old  man,  could  still  hardly 
resist  this  trick  when  much  pleased,  but,  from  its  absurdity,  con- 
cealed it.  He  had  eight  children.  Of  these,  a  girl,  when  pleased, 
at  the  age  of  four  and  a  half  years,  moved  her  fingers  in  exactly 

1  be  la  Generation,  282. 


Introduction, 


the  same  way ;  and,  what  is  still  odder,  when  much  excited  she 
raised  both  her  hands,  with  her  fingers  still  moving,  to  the  sides  of 
her  face,  in  exactly  the  same  way  as  her  father  had  done.  Hand- 
writing depends  on  several  physical  and  mental  habits,  and  we 
often  see  a  great  resemblance  between  the  handwriting  of  a  father 
and  a  son.  Even  those  who  have  no  great  powers  of  observation 
must  often  have  remarked  this.  'Hofacker,  in  Germany,  has 
remarked  that  handwriting  is  hereditary.'  The  same  remark  will 
apply  to  France;  'and  it  has  even  been  asserted  that  English 
boys,  when  taught  to  write  in  France,  naturally  cling  to  their 
English  manner  of  writing.' x 

What  is  true  of  habits  is  also  true  of  anomalies  accidentally 
acquired, — that  they  are  transmissible.  Thus  a  man  whose  right 
hand  had  suffered  an  injury  had  one  of  his  fingers  badly  set  He 
had  several  sons,  each  of  whom  had  that  same  finger  crooked. 
(Blumenbach.)  Artificial  deformities,  too,  are  transmissible. 
Three  tribes  in  Peru — the  Aymaras,  the  Huancas,  and  the 
Chinchas — had  each  their  own  peculiar  mode  of  deforming  the 
heads  of  their  children,  and  this  deformity  has  since  remained. 
The  Esquimaux,  says  M.  de  Quatrefages,  cut  off  the  tails  of  the 
dogs  they  harness  to  their  sledges;  the  pups  are  often  born 
tailless. 

Notwithstanding  these  facts,  the  transmission  of  acquired 
modifications  appears  to  be  very  restricted,  even  when  occurring 
in  both  of  the  parents.  A  deaf-mute  married  to  a  deaf-mute  has 
children  who  can  both  hear  and  speak.  The  necessity  of  perform- 
ing circumcision  on  Jews  shows  that  an  acquired  modification,  often 
repeated,  is  not  therefore  hereditary.  Deviations  from  a  type, 
alter  having  subsisted  for  generations,  return  to  the  normal  state  ; 
so  that  many  naturalists  hold  it  as  a  rule  that  accidental  modifi- 
cations are  not  perpetuated. 

This  is  very  different  to  the  law  formulated  by  Lamarck : — 
'Whatever  Nature  has  enabled  individuals  to  gain  or  to  lose, 
under  the  influence  of  circumstances  to  which  their  race  has  been 
long  exposed,  is  preserved,  by  generation,  for  the  new  individuals 


1  Darwin,  Variation  of  Animals  and  Plants  under  Domestication,  vol.  ii.  p.  6. 
Edition.  1868. 


io  Heredity. 

which  descend  from  them,  provided  the  changes  acquired  are 
common  to  the  two  sexes,  or  to  those  which  have  produced  new 
individuals.' l 

Still,  these  two  opposite  opinions,  both  of  which  may  be  sup- 
ported hy  fads,  can  be  reconciled  if  we  bear  in  mind  that  there 
are  modifications  which,  by  their  very  nature,  are  in  antagonism 
with  everything  around  them,  and  for  which,  in  consequence,  the 
conditions  of  existence  grow  more  and  more  difficult ;  just  as  there 
are  others  which,  when  in  conformity  with  everything  around  them, 
may  become  permanent  by  either  natural  or  artificial  selection  : 
so  that  all  things  conspire  to  blot  out  the  former  class  of  modifi- 
cations, and  to  perpetuate  the  latter.  We  shall  meet  this  difficulty 
again,  when  treating  of  psychological  heredity,  and  will  there 
consider  it  more  fully. 

We  have  now  to  speak  of  the  last  form  of  heredity — that  of 
disease.  This  seems  to  have  been  observed  from  the  foundation 
of  the  art  of  medicine — in  all  times,  in  every  land,  and  in  every 
nation.  Even  the  Greek  physicians  recognized  hereditary  diseases 
(vo'ffot  K\r]povofUKai).  And  yet  in  modern  times  the  heredity  of 
disease  has  given  rise  to  all  manner  of  debates  among  medical 
men.  It  would  be  beyond  our  subject,  and  beyond  our 
power,  to  discuss  this  point  It  is  enough  to  say  that  the 
question  appears  to  be  substantially  settled  by  the  fact  that  the 
sturdiest  opponents  of  morbid  heredity  admit,  if  not  the  heredity 
of  disease  itself,  at  least  the  heredity  of  a  disposition  to  it  In 
Dr.  Lucas's  work  on  Heredity  will  be  found  facts  of  all  kinds, 
sufficiently  numerous  and  sufficiently  clear  to  warrant  a  conclusion. 

This    hasty  physiological    sketch  will   show  that  the  law  of 
heredity  influences  every  form  of  vital  energy — a  fact  which  is 
generally  known  and  admitted.      Is  the  same  to  be  said  with 
regard  to  the  psychological  aspect  of  the  question?    This  we  pro 
pose  now  to  consider,  and  to  begin  with  the  study  of  the  facts. 

1  In  regard  to  the  physiological  side  of  this  controversy,  see  the  Bulletins 
Je  la  Soctitt  d1  Anthropologie,  tome  L  p.  339,  and  particularly  p.  551,  seq.j 
toine  ii.,  De  f 'Iliriditt  da  Anomalies. 


PART    FIRST. 

THE   FACTS. 
Haseemblous  des  fails  pour  nous  donner  des  idces. — 


CHAPTER  I. 

HEREDITY   OF   INSTINCTS. 
I. 

WHEN  we  speak  of  instinct,  our  first  difficulty  is  to  define  the 
term.  Not  to  enumerate  here  all  the  various  significations  of 
the  word  as  used  in  ordinary  language,  it  is  employed  in  at  least 
three  different  senses  even  by  naturalists  and  philosophers,  whose 
language  has  to  be  more  precise  than  that  of  other  people.  Some- 
times instinct  is  intended  to  signify  the  automatic,  almost  mechan- 
ical, and  probably  unconscious  action  of  animals,  in  pursuance  of 
an  object  determined  by  their  organization,  and  specific  characters. 
Again,  instinct  is  made  synonymous  with  desire,  inclination,  pro- 
pensity ;  as  when  we  speak  of  good  or  evil  instincts,  a  thievish  or 
murderous  instinct  Finally,  we  sometimes  comprise  under  the  term 
instinct  all  the  psychological  phenomena  occurring  in  animals,  and 
all  forms  of  mental  activity  inferior  to  those  of  man.  This  latter 
signification  of  the  word  is  plainly  the  result  of  our  unwillingness 
to  attribute  intellect  to  brutes ;  and  thus,  contrary  to  all  reason, 
we  confound  with  blind  and  unconscious  impulses  the  conscious 
acts  which  every  animal  performs  under  the  guidance  of  its  indi- 
vidual experience,1  and  which,  consequently,  are  analogous  to  those 
which,  in  our  own  case,  we  call  intelligent  or  intellectual  acts. 

Although,  in  our  opinion,  instinct  and  intelligence  are  one  and 
the  same,  as  we  will  try  hereafter  to  show,  and  though  the  differ- 
ence between  them  is  one  not  of  kind,  but  only  of  degree ;  still 
we  will  employ  the  word  instinct  here  in  its  first  signification  only 
which  alone  we  hold  to  be  exact  and  in  conformity  with  etymology. 
We  must,  for  the  sake  of  greater  precision,  begin  with  a  good  defi  • 
nition  of  this  term ;  but,  unfortunately,  no  such  definition  has  yet 

1  For  instance,  the  act  performed  by  a  dog  carried  far  from  his  home,  when 
from  among  a  score  of  roads  he  selects  the  one  which  will  bring  him  back. 


14  Heredity. 

been  found.  Still  we  may,  with  a  contemporary  German  philo- 
sopher, define  instinct  to  be  'an  act  conformed  to  an  end,  but 
without  consciousness  of  that  end  ; '  *  or  we  may  say,  with  Darwin, 
that  'an  action  which  we  ourselves  should  require  experience  to 
enable  us  to  perform,  when  performed  by  an  animal,  more  espe- 
cially by  a  very  young  one,  without  any  experience,  and  when 
performed  by  many  individuals  in  the  same  way  without  their 
knowing  for  what  purpose  it  is  performed,  is  usually  said  to  be 
instinctive.' 2 

If,  instead  of  defining  instinct,  we  endeavour  to  determine  its 
characteristics,  not  one  of  which  perhaps  is  absolutely  certain  and 
unquestioned,  we  find  a  general  agreement  as  to  the  following  : 

Instinct  is  innate,  i.e.  anterior  to  all  individual  experience. 
Whereas  intelligence  is  developed  slowly  by  accumulated  experi- 
ences, instinct  is  perfect  from  the  first  The  duckling  hatched  by 
a  hen  makes  straight  for  the  water ;  the  squirrel,  before  it  knows 
anything  of  winter,  lays  up  a  store  of  nuts.  A  bird  hatched  in  a 
cage  will,  when  given  its  freedom,  build  for  itself  a  nest  like  that 
of  its  parents,  out  of  the  same  materials,  and  of  the  same  shape. 

Intelligence  gropes  about,  tries  this  way  and  that,  misses  its 
object,  commits  mistakes  and  corrects  them :  instinct  advances  with 
a  mechanical  certainty.  Hence  comes  its  unconscious  character ; 
it  knows  nothing  either  of  ends,  or  of  the  means  of  attaining 
them ;  it  implies  no  comparison,  judgment,  or  choice.  All  seems 
directed  by  thought,  without  ever  arriving  at  thought ;  and  if  this 
phenomenon  appear  strange,  it  must  be  observed  that  analogous 
states  occur  in  ourselves.  All  that  we  do  from  habit — walking, 
writing,  or  practising  a  mechanical  art,  for  instance — all  these,  and 
many  other  very  complex  acts,  are  performed  without  consciousness. 

Instinct  appears  stationary.  It  does  not,  like  intelligence,  seem 
to  grow  and  decay,  to  gain  and  to  lose.  It  does  not  improve.  If 
it  does  not  remain  perfectly  invariable,  at  least  it  varies  only  within 
very  narrow  limits;  and  though  this  question  has  been  warmly 
debated  in  our  day,  and  is  yet  unsettled,  we  may  yet  say  that  in 
instinct  immutability  is  the  law,  variation  the  exception. 


1  Hartmann,  Philosophie  des  Unbewussten,  p.  54.     Berlin,  1869. 
8  Darwin,  Origin  of  Species,  p.  255.     Fifih  Edition,  1869. 


Heredity  of  Instincts.  1 5 

Such  are  the  admitted  characters  of  instinct  Though  none 
of  them  is  out  of  the  reach  of  minute  criticism ;  though  none 
of  them  is  absolutely  true,  still  they  are  sufficiently  exact  to  serve 
to  distinguish  instinct  from  all  other  psychological  phenomena. 

Instinct,  so  defined,  is,  beyond  all  question,  transmissible,  and 
subject  to  the  law  of  heredity.  The  animal  inherits  the  psychical 
dispositions,  no  less  than  the  physiological  constitutions  of  its 
parents.  The  naturalist  takes  account  of  the  former  character- 
istics, as  well  as  of  the  latter.  In  his  eyes  it  is  as  essential  for  the 
bee  to  extract  the  pollen  of  flowers,  construct  cells  and  in  them 
deposit  her  honey,  as  for  her  to  possess  mandibles,  six  feet,  and 
four  wings.  A  worker-bee  with  the  instincts  of  an  ant  would 
appear  to  him  as  strange  a  thing  as  a  bee  with  wing-sheaths  and 
eight  feet  Every  animal  has  two  chief  functions — one,  nutrition, 
which  preserves  the  individual ;  another,  generation,  which  pre- 
serves the  species.  The  latter  transmits  instincts  together  with 
physical  forms — generation  is  moral  as  well  as  material.  The 
beaver  transmits  to  its  young  its  anatomical  and  physiological 
characters  as  a  rodent  mammal,  its  constructive  instincts,  and 
architectural  talent. 

Thus  we  find  at  the  outset  a  vast  number  of  psychological  facts 
— instinctive  actions,  strictly  subject  to  the  laws  of  hereditary  trans- 
mission. It  needs  no  long  reflection  to  see  how  large  is  the 
domain  of  instinct :  the  Invertebrata  seem  to  be  completely  re- 
stricted to  this  form  of  mental  activity.  In  the  sub-kingdom  of  the 
Vertebrata,  the  inferior  classes,  such  as  the  Fishes,  Batrachians, 
Reptiles,  Birds,  have  oftentimes  no  other  means  save  instinct,  of 
supporting  life,  of  attack,  defence,  and  recognition  of  enemies. 
Finally,  among  Mammals,  and  even  in  Man,  instinct  gradually 
diminishes,  but  never  entirely  disappears.  Its  domain,  therefore, 
is  co-extensive  with  animal  life  ;  and  this  vast  domain  is  governed 
by  the  laws  of  heredity. 

Since  it  is  an  evident  fact,  universally  admitted,  that  heredity  is 
the  invariable  rule  of  the  transmission  of  instincts,  we  need  not 
cite  instances  to  confirm  our  position.  The  tenacity  of  instincts  is 
so  great,  and  their  hereditary  transmission  so  certain,  that  some- 
times they  are  found  to  outlive  for  centuries  the  conditions  of  life  to 
which  they  are  adapted.  '  We  have  reason  to  believe,'  says  Darwin, 
2 


1 6  Heredity. 

1  that  aboriginal  habits  are  long  retained  under  domestication. 
Thus  with  the  common  ass  we  see  signs  of  its  original  desert  life 
in  its  strong  dislike  to  cross  the  smallest  stream  of  water,  and  in  its 
pleasure  in  rolling  in  the  dust  The  same  strong  dislike  to  cross  a 
stream  is  common  to  the  camel,  which  has  been  domesticated  from 
a  very  ancient  period.  Young  pigs,  though  so  tame,  sometimes 
squat  when  frightened,  and  thus  try  to  conceal  themselves  even  in 
an  open  and  bare  place.  Young  turkeys,  and  occasionally  even 
young  fowls,  when  the  hen  gives  the  danger-cry,  run  away  and 
try  to  hide  themselves,  like  young  partridges  or  pheasants,  in 
order  that  their  mother  may  take  flight,  of  which  she  has  lost  the 
power.  The  musk-duck,  in  its  native  country,  often  perches  and 
roosts  on  trees,  and  our  domesticated  musk-ducks,  though  sluggish 
birds,  are  fond  of  perching  on  the  tops  of  barns,  walls,  etc.  .... 
We  know  that  the  dog,  however  well  and  regularly  fed,  often 
buries,  like  the  fox,  any  superfluous  food ;  we  see  him  turning 
round  and  round  on  a  carpet,  as  if  to  trample  down  grass  to  form 

a  bed In  the  delight  with  which  lambs  and  kids  crowd 

together  and  frisk  on  the  smallest  hillock,  we  see  a  vestige  of  their 
former  alpine  habits.' x 

n. 

Instead  of  dwelling  unnecessarily  on  the  heredity  of  natural  and 
primitive  instincts,  it  will  be  more  instructive  to  inquire  whether 
acquired  instincts  are  transmissible.  We  have  already  said,  when 
giving,  according  to  F.  Cuvier  and  Flourens,  the  characteristics 
generally  attributed  to  instinctive  acts,  that  none  of  them  are  abso- 
lutely true.  Thus,  instinct  is  not  always  invariable.  The  beaver 
changes,  according  to  circumstances,  the  site  and  form  of  his  house, 
and  from  being  a  builder  becomes  a  miner.  The  bee  can  modify 
her  plan  of  construction,  and  substitute  for  hexagonal  cells  penta- 
gonal cavities.  In  the  Island  of  Goree  the  swallows  remain  through 
the  whole  year,  because  the  warmth  of  the  climate  enables  them  to 
find  food  at  all  seasons.  In  many  species  the  mode  of  nest- 
building  varies  according  to  the  nature  of  the  soil,  the  locality,  and 
the  temperature  of  the  country.  Instinct  is  certainly  not  as  pliant 
an  instrument  as  intelligence ;  it  cannot,  like  intelligence,  adapt  itself 

1  Variation,  etc.,  vol.  L  p.  180. 


Heredity  of  Instincts.  1 7 

to  all  media,  conform  to  all  circumstances,  or  vary  and  modify  its 
actions  in  a  thousand  ways ;  yet  it  is  capable  of  modification  within 
certain  limits,  when  subjected  to  strong  and  lasting  influences. 

Two  causes  chiefly  produce  these  variations  :  external  conditions 
and  domestication.  Climate,  soil,  food;  the  dangers  which  habitually 
surround  the  animal,  and  the  impressions  it  receives,  modify  its 
organism  and  consequently  its  instincts.  The  action  of  man  is  still 
more  powerful  on  the  animal  than  that  of  Nature :  by  training,  man 
fashions  and  bends  it  to  his  needs  or  his  wishes.  It  is  not  for  us  to 
inquire  here  how  these  acquired  or  modified  instincts  are  produced. 
We  have  only  to  ask  whether  they  are  hereditary.  Experience 
answers  in  the  affirmative ;  many  facts  show  that  acquired  instincts, 
as  well  as  those  which  are  natural,  are  transmitted  by  heredity. 
Such  are  the  following : — 

G.  Leroy  observes  that  in  districts  where  a  sharp  war  is  waged 
against  the  fox,  the  cubs,  on  first  coming  out  of  their  earths,  and 
before  they  can  have  acquired  any  experience,  are  more  cautious, 
crafty,  and  suspicious  than  are  old  foxes  in  places  where  no  attempt 
is  made  to  trap  them.  This  he  explains  by  the  hypothesis  of  a 
language  among  animals.  F.  Cuvier  has  furnished  the  solution  of 
the  enigma  by  referring  the  fact  to  the  heredity  of  modifications 
which  are  acquired  by  instinct  There  is  no  doubt  that  the 
instinct  of  fear  is  acquired  in  many  wild  animals,  and  transmitted 
to  their  descendants.  Knight,  who  for  sixty  years  devoted 
himself  to  systematic  observation  of  this  class  of  facts,  says 
that  during  that  time  the  habits  of  the  English  woodcock  under- 
went great  changes,  and  that  its  fear  of  man  was  considerably 
increased  by  its  transmission  through  several  generations.  The 
same  author  discovered  similar  changes  of  habit,  even  in  bees. 
Darwin  has  established  the  fact  that  animals  living  in  desert 
islands  gradually  acquire  a  fear  of  man,  in  proportion  as  they 
become  acquainted  with  our  methods  of  destroying  them.  He 
says  that  in  England  large  birds  are  much  more  shy  than  small 
ones,  and  this,  no  doubt,  because  they  are  much  more  persecuted 
by  man.  The  proof  that  this  is  the  reason  of  the  difference  is 
found  in  the  fact  that  in  uninhabited  islands  large  birds  are  not 
any  more  timid  than  small  ones.1 


1  Origin  of  Species,  p.  260.     Fifth  Edition,  1869.     Lucas,  ii.  482. 


1 8  Heredity. 

When  an  animal  is  capable  of  education,  that  is,  when  its  original 
instincts  are  capable  of  modification,  it  usually  requires  three  01 
four  generations  to  fix  the  results  of  training  and  to  prevent  a 
return  to  the  instincts  of  the  wild  state.  If  we  try  to  hatch  the 
eggs  of  wild  ducks  under  tame  ducks,  the  ducklings  will  scarce  have 
left  the  egg  when  they  obey  the  instinct  of  their  race,  and  take  theii 
flight.  If  they  be  prevented  from  flying  away,  and  kept  for  repro- 
duction, it  will  be  several  generations  before  we  have  tame  ducks. 
The  same  may  be  said  of  free,  or  wild  herds  of  horses.  Their 
colts  are  broken  with  great  difficulty,  and  even  after  taming  they 
are  far  less  docile  than  horses  born  in  a  state  of  domestication. 
Nay,  even  the  mongrel  progeny  of  wild  and  domesticated  horses, 
or  of  wild  and  domesticated  reindeer,  take  three  or  four  genera- 
tions before  they  entirely  give  up  the  shy  habits  of  their  natural 
state.  On  the  other  hand,  colts  bred  of  a  well-broken  sire  and 
dam  oftentimes  come  into  the  world  with  a  marked  aptitude  for 
training;  and  some  horse-trainers  have  even  proposed  to  select 
brood  stock  exclusively  from  among  horses  that  have  been  prac- 
tised in  the  circus. 

Originally  man  had  considerable  trouble  in  taming  the  animals 
which  are  now  domesticated ;  and  his  work  would  have  been  in 
vain  had  not  heredity  come  to  his  aid.  It  may  be  said  that  after 
man  has  modified  a  wild  animal  to  his  will,  there  goes  on  in  its 
progeny  a  silent  conflict  between  two  heredities,  the  one  tending 
to  fix  the  acquired  modifications,  and  the  other  to  preserve  the 
primitive  instincts.  The  latter  often  get  the  mastery,  and  only 
after  several  generations  is  training  sure  of  victory.  But  we 
may  see  that  in  either  case  heredity  always  asserts  its  rights. 

Among  the  higher  animals,  which  are  possessed  not  only  of 
instinct  but  also  of  intelligence,  nothing  is  more  common  than  to 
see  mental  dispositions,  which  have  evidently  been  acquired,  so 
fixed  by  heredity  that  they  are  confounded  with  instinct,  so  spon- 
taneous and  so  automatic  do  they  become.  Young  pointers  have 
been  known  to  point  the  first  time  they  were  taken  out,  sometimes 
even  better  than  dogs  that  had  been  for  a  long  time  in  training. 
The  habit  of  saving  life  is  hereditary  in  breeds  that  have  been 
brought  up  to  it,  as  is  also  the  shepherd-dog's  habit  of  moving 
around  the  flock  and  guarding  it 


Heredity  of  Instincts.  19 

Knight  has  shown,  experimentally,  the  truth  of  the  proverb  "a 
good  hound  is  bred  so."  He  took  every  care  that  when  the  pups 
were  first  taken  into  the  field  they  should  receive  no  guidance  from 
older  dogs.  Yet  the  very  first  day  one  of  the  pups  stood  trem- 
bling with  anxiety,  having  his  eyes  fixed  and  all  his  muscles  strained 
at  the  partridges  which  their  parents  had  been  trained  to  point.  A 
spaniel,  belonging  to  a  breed  that  had  been  trained  to  woodcock- 
shooting,  knew  perfectly  well  from  the  first  how  to  act  like  an  old 
dog,  avoiding  places  where  the  soil  was  frozen,  and  where  it  was 
therefore  useless  to  seek  the  game,  as  in  such  places  there  is 
no  scent.  Finally,  a  young  polecat-terrier  was  thrown  into  a  state 
of  great  excitement  the  first  time  he  ever  saw  one  of  these  animals, 
while  a  spaniel  remained  perfectly  calm. 

In  South  America,  according  to  Roulin,  dogs  belonging  to  a 
breed  that  has  long  been  trained  to  the  dangerous  chase  of  the. 
peccary,  when  taken  for  the  first  time  into  the  woods,  know  the 
tactics  to  adopt  quite  as  well  as  the  old  dogs,  and  that  without  any 
instruction.  Dogs  of  other  races,  and  unacquainted  with  the 
tactics,  are  killed  at  once,  no  matter  how  strong  they  may  be. 
The  American  greyhound,  instead  of  leaping  at  the  throat  of  the 
stag,  attacks  him  by  the  belly  and  throws  him  over,  as  his  an- 
cestors had  been  trained  to  do  in  hunting  down  the  Indians. 

Thus,  then,  heredity  transmits  acquired  modification  no  less  than 
natural  instincts.  There  is,  however,  an  important  difference  to  be 
noted  :  the  heredity  of  instincts  admits  of  no  exceptions,  while  in 
that  of  modifications  there  are  many.  It  is  only  when  variations 
have  been  firmly  rooted ;  when,  having  become  organic,  they  con- 
stitute a  second  nature,  which  supplants  the  first ;  when,  like 
instinct,  they  have  assumed  a  mechanical  character,  that  they  can 
be  transmitted.  If  we  note  these  differences  in  passing,  we  shall 
find  them  lead  us  hereafter  to  important  conclusions. 

in. 

WE  have  just  shown,  from  indisputable  facts,  that  heredity  governs 
the  transmission  of  instincts,  whether  acquired  or  primitive.  It 
might  seem  that  in  this  portion  of  our  inquiry,  which  has  to  deal 
only  with  the  facts,  we  ought  to  be  content  with  that  exposition  of 
the  case.  But  certain  theories,  put  forth  by  distinguished  writers 


2O  Heredity. 

in  our  own  day,  attribute  to  heredity  so  important  a  part  in  the 
formation  of  instincts,  that  they  cannot  be  passed  by  in  silence. 
Indeed,  according  to  these  theories,  heredity  is  one  of  the  essential 
factors  of  psychological  development ;  and  so  mighty  and  supreme 
is  its  influence,  that  it  not  only  preserves  instincts,  but  also  creates 
them.  Hence  we  are  obliged  to  study  more  closely  the  nature  oi 
instinct,  and  to  abandon  the  domain  of  facts,  in  order  to  enter  into 
that  of  causes,  that  is,  of  hypotheses.  This  is  to  be  regretted,  for 
it  is  no  trifling  thing  to  attempt  cursorily  a  theory  of  instinct.  To 
us  it  seems  that  there  is  not  in  the  whole  field  of  psychology  a 
more  intricate  question  than  this;  and  Schelling  did  not  at  all 
exaggerate  when  he  said, — 'For  the  thinker  there  are  no  phe- 
nomena more  important  than  the  phenomena  of  animal  instinct, 
nor  is  there  any  better  criterion  of  true  philosophy.' 

We  will  restrict  our  brief  inquiry  into  this  subject  to  two 
questions — What  is  instinct  ?  and,  What  is  its  origin  ? 

To  the  first  question  we  reply :  Instinct  is  an  unconscious 
mode  of  intelligence.  To  the  second  :  It  is  possible  that  instincts 
are  only  habits  fixed  by  heredity. 

It  cannot  be  denied  that  it  is  only  within  the  past  hundred  years 
that  instinct  has  been  seriously  studied.  The  present  century 
especially  has  done  much.  In  past  times  we  find  only  confused 
views  and  ingenious  paradoxes :  but  naturalists  have  now  removed 
the  question  to  its  proper  sphere,  that  of  observation  and  experi- 
ment. But  when  we  study  instinct  from  the  naturalist's  standpoint, 
the  first  thing  that  strikes  us  is  the  perfect  adaptation  of  organs  to 
instinct.  '  An  animal's  form  corresponds  perfectly  with  its 
habits  ;  it  desires  only  what  it  can  attain  by  means  of  its  organs, 
and  its  organs  do  not  incite  it  to  anything  for  which  it  has  not 
a  propensity.  The  mole,  destined  by  its  needs  to  live  under- 
ground, has  in  its  organs  nothing  that  would  lead  it  aside  from 
that  disposition.  Although  it  can  see,  still  its  sight  lacks  precision, 
because  its  eyes  are  small,  and  surrounded  by  a  close  growth 
of  hairs.  Its  fore-paws  are  altogether  organized  for  burrowing, 
not  for  walking.  The  paw  is  so  formed  and  so  related  to  the 
fore-arm,  that  it  can  hardly  be  used  for  locomotion  without 
delving.  The  sloth,  which  walks  upon  the  outer  edge  of  the  feet 
with  the  toes  doubled  in,  is  extremely  tardy  of  movement  on  level 


Heredity  of  Instincts.  2 1 

ground,  a  circumstance  which  gave  rise  to  the  erroneous  idea  thrt 
nature's  treatment  of  the  animal  had  been  that  of  a  stepmother. 
But  this  is  not  the  case  :  the  sloth  is  as  perfect  in  its  kind 
as  all  other  animals ;  its  limbs  are  so  arranged  as  to  enable  it  to 
climb,  and  to  live  in  trees.  The  spider's  legs  are  so  arranged  and 
organized  that  it  moves  with  difficulty  over  a  plane  surface  :  these 
organs  are  intended  for  use  on  a  line  or  a  thread,  and  the  spider 
carries  about  the  materials  from  which  to  spin  such  thread.1  In 
general  we  might  say  :  As  is  the  organism,  so  are  the  instincts ; 
and  vice  versd.  Given  the  instincts  of  an  animal,  a  good  naturalist  I 
can  infer  its  organization ;  or,  given  its  organization,  he  can  infer  J 
its  instincts. 

This  intimate  correlation  between  the  physiological  and  the  mental 
constitution  leads  naturally  to  the  conclusion  that  the  instincts 
of  an  animal  result  from  its  organization.  Each  organ,  even  each 
tissue,  has  its  special  function  to  discharge,  and  this  tendency  to 
the  discharge  of  functions  constitutes  the  need  or  instinct;  the  same 
organ  or  the  same  tissue  communicates  to  the  being  in  which  it 
exists  this  same  need;  each  additional  organ  or  tissue  adds  a 
new  need  or  instinct.  Hence  the  instinct  of  an  animal  is  the  sum 
of  the  instincts  of  its  various  organs ;  it  is  their  necessary — their 
inevitable  consequence,  and  it  comes  into  play  under  influences 
to  which  the  animal  is  unconsciously  subject. 

This  explanation  is  simple  enough,  but  may  not  be  perfectly 
sound.  It  is  certain  that  instinct  depends  on  organization,  but  it 
is  very  questionable  whether  it  results  exclusively  from  it.  This  is 
a  region  where  the  phenomena  are  so  complex  that  physiology 
is  insufficient  to  explain  them  all,  for  here  evidently  occurs  the 
mysterious  transition  from  the  purely  organic  to  the  mental  life,  by 
means  of  reflex  action,  which  is  principally  physiological,  and  of 
instinct,  which  is  principally  psychological.  This  transition  is 
insensible  and  incomprehensible,  and  serves  well  to  show  that  any 
line  of  demarcation  drawn  between  psychology  and  physiology  is 
arbitrary,  and  that  mental  life  is  slowly  and  gradually  disengaged 
from  physical  life,  so  that  it  is  impossible  to  tell  where  or  how 
it  has  its  rise.  Neither  can  mechanism — which  seems  to  be  the 

1  Miillcr,  Physiologie,  iL  108. 


22  Heredity. 

ultimate,  the  irresolvable  character  of  all  vital  phenomena — prove 
sufficient  to  explain  instinct.  For  if  mechanism  explains  the  lower 
forms  of  spiritual  life,  it  must  also  explain  the  higher — the 
difference  is  one  only  of  degree  and  of  complexity ;  but  then,  also, 
if  mechanism  does  not  explain  the  higher,  neither  can  it  explain 
the  lower.  It  has  been  said  that  thought  is  only  translated 
motion,  and  that  it  is  but  the  highest  form  of  the  universal 
mechanism.  This  theory  is  no  doubt  very  alluring,  inasmuch  as 
it  enables  us  to  bring  under  one  law  all  the  phenomena  of  the 
universe,  from  simple  impact  up  to  the  most  complicated  events  of 
social  life  and  history.  But  it  is  only  an  hypothesis,  which  is 
rendered  doubtful  by  the  fact  that  we  can  perceive  no  equivalence 
between  thought  and  motion.  Each  appears  to  us  as  an  ultimate 
fact,  sui generis,  and  not  reducible  into  the  other. 

To  these  theoretic  considerations  we  may  add  others  drawn 
from  facts.  If  organization  is  the  cause  of  instincts,  then,  as  it 
varies,  so  must  they.  But  observation  shows  that  this  is  not 
the  case.  Observation  teaches  us  that  the  correlation  between 
instincts  and  organs  is  not  absolute ;  that  we  may  have  the  same 
organization  with  different  instincts,  and  the  same  instincts  with 
different  organizations.  Thus,  the  European  beaver,  which  is 
hardly  to  be  distinguished  from  the  American,  burrows  like  the 
mole,  whereas  the  other  builds  houses.  All  spiders  have  the  same 
apparatus  for  weaving  their  webs,  and  yet  one  spider  weaves  a 
circular  web,  another  weaves  a  web  of  irregular  form ;  a  third  weaves 
no  web,  but  inhabits  holes,  simply  making  a  door.  Birds  have  their 
beaks  and  feet  as  their  only  instruments  for  nest  building,  yet  how 
great  are  the  differences  of  the  form,  architecture,  and  position  of 
nests. 

Let  it  be  granted  for  the  moment  that  the  opinion  we  are 
discussing  is  correct,  although  in  the  present  state  of  our  knowledge 
it  is  a  mere  hypothesis.  Science  has  accustomed  us  to  revelations 
so  unexpected  that  it  may  be  rash  to  say  that  the  opinion  is 
untenable.  Assuming,  then,  that  instinct  is  not  the  result  of  the 
organization,  we  shall  still  have  to  study  its  nature;  for  this 
hypothesis  only  enlightens  us  as  to  its  cause.  It  tells  us  whence  it 
comes,  but  not  what  it  is.  The  reduction  of  all  physical  phenomena 
to  motion  does  not  bar  the  separate  study  of  electricity,  of  sound, 


Heredity  of  Instincts.  23 

heat,  and  light ;  nor  would  the  reduction  of  all  psychical  phenomena 
to  motion  bar  the  separate  study  of  instinct,  sensation,  imagination, 
will,  etc.  In  any  case,  therefore,  the  question  remains,  What  is 
instinct  ? 

Instinct  is  an  unconscious  form  of  intelligence,  determined  by 
the  organization. 

We  intend  to  give  in  another  place  (Part  III.  chap.  i.  §  2)  a 
detailed  exposition  of  unconscious  psychological  phenomena,  and 
to  insist  upon  a  class  of  facts  that  have  been  somewhat  overlooked, 
though  they  probably  contain  much  instruction  for  us.  For  the 
present,  we  would  merely  observe  that,  besides  the  conscious  action 
of  the  mind,  there  is  also  an  unconscious  action,  with  a  far  wider 
sphere ;  that  consciousness  is  an  habitual,  though  not  necessary, 
accompaniment  of  our  mental  life;  that  perhaps  every  one  of  these 
phenomena — instinct,  sensation,  perception,  memory,  etc. — is  by 
turns  conscious  and  unconscious.  This  consideration  will 
probably  aid  us  to  throw  light  on  the  problem  of  instinct. 

Suppose  a  highly  civilized  people,  among  whom  the  division  of 
labour  is  carried  to  great  lengths  ;  that  it  contains  architects,  poets, 
engineers,  musicians,  all  incapable  of  any  work  save  that  which 
constitutes  the  specialty  of  each ;  that  the  architect  can  only 
build  houses,  and  only  a  certain  kind  of  house  ;  the  engineer  only 
bridges,  and  such  or  such  a  kind  of  bridge  ;  that  the  poet  can  only 
make  verses  —  let  us  suppose,  further,  that  each  of  them  works 
unconsciously.  These  acts  will  certainly  be  regarded  as  instinctive, 
and  we  may  compare  the  architect  to  the  beaver,  the  engineer  to 
the  bee  and  the  ant,  the  weaver  to  the  spider,  the  carpenter  to 
the  termite.  The  only  characteristic  of  instinct  wanting  would 
be  innateness.  This  hypothesis  exhibits  the  metamorphosis  of 
intellectual  acts  into  instincts  :  we  had  only  to  restrict  intelligence 
within  narrow  limits  and  to  deprive  it  of  consciousness  ;  we  had  to 
take  away  its  suppleness  and  its  manifold  aptitudes,  to  impoverish, 
and,  so  to  speak,  to  prune  it 

But  this  is  only  an  hypothesis  which  might  properly  enough 
be  rejected.  To  look  more  closely  at  the  question,  we  take  a 
familiar  fact,  one  known  to  all — somnambulism.  The  sleep- 
walker walks,  runs,  waits  at  table,  like  Gassendi's  valet,  writes 
verses,  copies  music,  composes  and  revises  sermons,  solves  pro- 


24  Heredity. 

blems,  even  writes  pages  of  philosophy,  like  Condillac.  All  this  is 
done  as  well  as  and  even  better  than  in  the  waking  state,  and  with 
as  remarkable  steadiness  as  in  the  case  of  instinct  The  somnam- 
bulist, moreover,  during  the  crisis,  performs  only  acts  which  are 
habitual  with  him  :  the  poet  does  not  compose  music,  the  musician 
does  not  write  verses,  nor  did  Condillac  ever  awake  and  find 
himself  embroidering.  Finally,  it  also  resembles  instinct,  in  that 
all  its  acts  are  performed  unconsciously.  If  somnambulism  were 
permanent  and  innate,  it  would  be  impossible  to  distinguish  it 
from  instinct  The  resemblance  was  pointed  out  by  Cuvier. 
'We  can  gain  a  clear  notion  of  instinct,'  he  well  observes,  'only  by 
admitting  that  animals  have  in  their  sensorium  images,  or  constant 
sensations,  which  determine  their  action,  as  ordinary  and  accidental 
sensations  determine  action  in  general.  It  is  a  sort  of  dream  or 
vision,  which  haunts  them  constantly,  and,  so  far  as  concerns  their 
instinct,  animals  may  be  regarded  as  a  kind  of  somnambulists.' 
'  The  organization  of  animals,'  says  Miiller,  '  is  singularly  favour- 
able to  the  realization  of  the  images,  ideas,  and  inclinations  which 
appear  in  the  sensorium.  As  the  internal  and  the  external  depend 
upon  one  and  the  same  final  cause,  the  form  of  the  animal  perfectly 
corresponds  with  its  propensities.  Thus,  the  instinctive  pro- 
pensities of  the  spider  represent  to  it,  like  a  sort  of  dream,  the 
theme  of  its  actions — the  construction  of  its  web.' 

Here,  again,  in  the  case  of  somnambulism,  all  that  is  needed 
in  order  to  bring  about  the  metamorphosis  of  intellectual  into 
instinctive  acts  is,  that  intelligence  should  be  reduced  to  a  few 
special  acts  (making  verses,  composing  music,  or  the  like),  and 
that  it  should  become  unconscious.  The  phenomena  of  habit, 
which  have  been  so  justly  compared  with  those  of  instinct,  exhibit 
equally  the  transformation  of  intelligence  into  instinct  So  soon 
as  any  intellectual  operation,  by  repetition  (that  is  to  say,  by 
restricting  its  domain),  has  become  automatic  (that  is  to  say, 
unconscious),  then  the  act  is  habitual  or  instinctive. 

Hence  it  is  less  difficult  than  is  generally  supposed  to  conceive 
how  intelligence  may  become  instinct :  we  might  even  say  that, 
leaving  out  of  consideration  the  character  of  innateness,  to  which 
we  will  return,  we  have  seen  the  metamorphosis  take  place. 
There  can,  then,  be  no  ground  for  making  instinct  a  faculty  apart, 


Heredity  of  Instincts.  25 

tni  generis,  a  phenomenon  so  mysterious,  so  strange,  that  usually 
no  other  explanation  of  it  is  offered  but  that  of  attributing  it  to 
the  direct  act  of  the  Deity.  This  whole  mistake  is  the  result  of  a 
defective  psychology,  which  makes  no  account  of  the  unconscious 
activity  of  the  soul 

But  we  are  so  accustomed  to  contrast  the  characters  of  instinct 
with  those  of  intelligence — to  say  that  instinct  is  innate,  invariable, 
automatic,  while  intelligence  is  something  acquired,  variable,  spon- 
taneous— that  it  looks,  at  first,  paradoxical  to  assert  that  instinct 
and  intelligence  are  identical. 

It  is  said  that  instinct  is  innate.  But  if,  on  the  one  hand,  we 
bear  in  mind  that  many  instincts  are  acquired,  and  that,  accord- 
ing to  a  theory  to  be  afterwards  explained,  all  instincts  are 
only  hereditary  habits ;  if,  on  the  other  hand,  we  observe  that 
intelligence  is  in  some  sense  held  to  be  innate  by  all  modern 
schools  of  philosophy — which  agree  to  reject  the  hypothesis  of  the 
tabula  rasa,  and  to  accept  either  latent  ideas  or  a  priori  forms  of 
thought,  or  preordinations  of  the  nervous  system  and  of  the 
organism — it  will  be  seen  that  this  character  of  innateness  does  not 
constitute  an  absolute  distinction  between  instinct  and  intelligence. 

It  is  true  that  intelligence  is  variable  ;  but  so  also  is  instinct,  as 
we  have  seen.  In  winter,  the  Rhine  beaver  plasters  his  wall  to 
windward :  once  he  was  a  builder,  now  a  burrower ;  once  he  lived 
in  society,  now  he  is  solitary.1  Intelligence  can  scarcely  be  more 
variable.  Of  this  we  have  elsewhere  given  other  instances. 
Instinct  may  be  modified,  lost,  and  re-awakened. 

Although  intelligence  is,  as  a  rule,  conscious,  it  may  also  become 
unconscious  and  automatic,  without  losing  its  identity.  Neither 
is  instinct  always  so  blind,  so  mechanical,  as  is  supposed,  for  at 
times  it  is  at  fault  The  wasp  that  has  faultily  trimmed  a  leaf  of 
its  paper  begins  again.  The  bee  only  gives  the  hexagonal  form 
to  its  cell  after  many  attempts  and  alterations.  It  is  difficult  to 
believe  that  the  loftier  instincts  of  the  higher  animals  are  not 
accompanied  by  at  least  a  confused  consciousness.  There  is, 
therefore,  no  absolute  distinction  between  instinct  and  intelli- 
gence ;  there  is  not  a  single  characteristic  which,  seriously 

1  Bulletin  de  la  Soci&e  cTAnthropologie,  2*  Serie,  tome  I,  p.  307. 


26  Heredity. 

considered,  remains  the  exclusive  property  of  either.  The 
contrast  established  between  instinctive  acts  and  intellectual  acts 
is,  nevertheless,  perfectly  true,  but  only  when  we  compare  the 
extremes.  As  instinct  rises,  it  approaches  intelligence :  as  intelli- 
gence descends,  it  approaches  instinct  This  must  not  be 
forgotten ;  and  while  differences  are  borne  in  mind,  the  resem- 
blances also  must  be  noted. 

Intelligence  is  a  mirror  which  reflects  the  universe.  It  is  a 
wonderful  instrument,  and  is  in  some  sense  infinite  as  the  world 
itself,  which  it  encompasses  and  measures.  By  the  accumulated 
progress  of  generations  it  tends  to  correspond  more  perfectly 
with  its  object.  In  its  development  through  time  and  space,  and 
through  the  infinite  variety  of  living  creatures,  it  ever  pursues  its 
ideal,  that  is,  to  comprehend  all  things,  from  common  phe- 
nomena up  to  the  eternal  and  sovereign  laws  of  the  Cosmos. 
Instinct  is  much  more  humble  :  it  reflects  the  world  only  at  a 
small  angle  ;  its  relations  are  limited  ;  it  is  adapted  to  a  restricted 
medium  ;  it  is  fitted  only  to  a  small  number  of  circumstances. 
Instead  of  being  an  immense  palace,  whence  a  boundless  horizon 
may  be  seen,  it  is  a  lowly  cottage,  with  only  one  window.  But  if 
we  look  at  both  instinct  and  intelligence  from  without,  their 
processes  are  the  same. 

Nor  is  it  surprising  that  instinct  should  be  always  restricted  to 
the  same  order  of  phenomena,  since,  being  unconscious,  it  cannot 
compare,  deliberate,  select,  or  improve. 

We  have  still  to  inquire  whence  comes  the  infinite  variety  of 
instincts;  why  each  species  views  the  world  at  one  particular  angle, 
and  at  no  other.  These  differences  are,  no  doubt,  owing  to  the 
organization  ;  to  enter  on  such  inquiries  here  would  carry  us  too 
far  from  our  subject,  to  which  we  must  return. 

IV. 

A  far  more  difficult  question  than  that  of  the  nature  of  instincts 
is  the  question  of  their  origin.  Till  now  it  has  not  been  asked, 
and  is  only  now  logically  proposed  by  the  great  scientific  con- 
troversy on  the  origin  and  variations  of  species.  It  is  clear  that 
we  cannot  pretend  to  decide  an  open,  perhaps  unanswerable 
question,  warmly  disputed  by  great  authorities.  We  only  suggest 


Heredity  of  Instincts.  27 

an  hypothesis ;  but  as  it  is  founded  on  heredity,  and  assigns  to 
it  a  very  prominent  part,  it  is  impossible  not  to  state  it 

The  reader  is  aware  that  a  theory  sketched  by  De  Maillet, 
Robinet,  and  especially  Lamarck,  accepted  and  modified  by 
Darwin  and  Wallace  in  our  own  days,  has  gained  the  assent  of 
many  eminent  men  in  England,  Germany,  and  France.  -Accord- 
ing to  this  theory,  species  are  variable,  and  are  formed  by  the 
accumulation  of  slight  differences,  which  have  been  fixed  by  here- 
dity. The  genera  and  species  now  extant,  however  numerous 
they  may  be,  are  derived  from  three  or  four  primitive  types,  per- 
haps from  one  only.  It  was  only  necessary  that  some  variations 
should  occur  spontaneously.  If  these  variations  were  adapted  to 
new  conditions  of  existence ;  if  they  gave  to  the  individual  one 
more  weapon  to  fight  the  battle  of  life,  and  if  they  have  been 
transmitted  by  heredity,  then  a  new  species  has  been  formed, 
which,  under  the  continued  action  of  the  same  causes,  has 
departed  more  and  more  from  the  primordial  type.  Spontaneous 
variations,  the  struggle  for  life,  selection,  time,  and  heredity — these 
are  the  factors  by  the  aid  of  which  can  be  explained  the  evolution 
of  living  creatures,  the  formation  and  disappearance  of  species. 

This  bold  hypothesis  has  thrown  an  entirely  new  light  on 
instinct  Since  in  all  animals  the  physical  and  the  mental  con- 
stitution are,  as  we  have  seen,  correlated,  if  there  were  originally 
none  but  rudimentary  organisms,  instincts  must  then  have  been 
very  rude.  And  again,  since  instinct,  like  the  organism,  presents 
spontaneous  variations,  and  like  it  is  subject  to  the  laws  of  the 
struggle  for  life  and  heredity,  we  must  conclude  that  if  these 
causes  explain  the  formation  of  species,  they  will  also  explain  the 
formation  of  instincts.  If  a  physical  modification,  by  adapting  an 
animal  to  new  conditions,  produces  a  deviation  that  may  become 
fixed,  because  it  constitutes  a  progress  from  antecedent  states,  the 
same  will  be  true  of  mental  modifications.  Every  variation  of 
instinct  that  puts  the  animal  in  a  better  position  to  defend  itself 
against  new  enemies,  or  to  capture  some  new  prey,  will  make  it 
likely  to  survive  under  more  complicated  conditions. 

So  long  as  species  were  regarded  as  fixed,  the  question  of  the 
origin  of  instincts  could  not  be  even  raised.  The  matter  appeared 
very  simple :  the  species  was  sent  into  the  world  ready-made,  with 


28  Heredity. 

all  its  physical  and  moral  characteristics.  The  Evolutionists,  on 
the  other  hand,  hold  that  instincts,  as  they  now  exist,  are  very 
complex,  formed  by  the  gradual  accumulations  of  time  and  heredity. 
They  must  be  subjected  to  a  careful  analytical  process,  each 
stratum  must  be  taken  apart ;  by  comparison,  induction,  and 
analogy  we  must  determine  which  are  of  more  recent  formation, 
and  must  descend  from  these,  step  by  step,  to  the  more  ancient 
strata.  Proceeding  thus  from  the  complex  to  the  simple,  we  arrive 
at  certain  very  lowly  mental  manifestations,  which  we  may  regard 
as  the  source  from  which  the  entire  series  is  derived. 

Thus  we  have,  at  the  outset,  a  minimum  of  intelligence,  a  some- 
thing which  plays  in  mental  life  the  part  of  the  cell  in  physio- 
logical life ;  then  come  actions  and  reflex  actions,  which  by  con- 
stant repetition  are  changed  into  habits  and  fixed  by  heredity; 
next  we  have  variations,  also  passing  into  habits,  and  similarly  fixed 
by  heredity — in  short,  we  have  a  sum  of  hereditary  habits.  Such, 
according  to  the  Evolutionist  school,  is  the  genesis  of  instincts. 

Darwin  has  developed  this  theory  with  consummate  science  and 
ability.  He  has  boldly  addressed  himself  to  the  rro>t  complicated, 
the  most  wonderful,  and  the  most  inexplicable  instincts ;  those,  for 
instance,  of  the  ant  and  the  bee — has  striven  to  show  how  these 
singular  phenomena  may  have  arisen,  by  selection  and  heredity, 
out  of  a  few  very  simple  instincts. 

If  we  take  the  honey-bee  as  it  now  exists,  without  comparing 
it  to  any  other  animal ;  if  we  assume  that  from  the  first  it  con- 
structed cells,  as  it  does  now,  we  are  filled  with  astonishment,  but 
cannot  explain  the  fact  But  if  we  recur  to  the  principle  of 
gradual  transitions,  and  seek  to  establish  a  series  of  transitional 
steps,  *  Nature  will  perhaps  herself  reveal  to  us  her  method  of 
creation.'  Let  us,  then,  compare  the  bee  with  the  melipona  and 
the  humble-bee. 

The  humble-bee  exhibits  only  very  rude  instincts.  It  deposits 
its  honey  in  old  cocoons,  with  the  occasional  addition  of  short 
tubes  of  wax.  Sometimes  also  it  constructs  isolated  cells  of  an 
irregular  globose  shape. 

Between  the  perfect  cells  of  the  honey-bee  and  the  rude  sim- 
plicity of  those  of  the  humble-bee  stand  the  cells  of  the  domesticated 
melipona  of  Mexico,  as  an  intermediate  degree.  The  melipona 


Heredity  of  Instincts.  29 

itself  is,  by  its  structure,  intermediate  between  the  honey  and  the 
humble-bee,  though  more  closely  allied  to  the  latter.  It  constructs  a 
comb  of  wax,  almost  regular,  consisting  of  cylindrical  cells,  in  which 
the  larvae  are  hatched,  and  a  certain  number  of  large  cells  to  hold 
its  store  of  honey.  The  latter  cells  are  nearly  spherical,  and  situated 
at  a  considerable  distance  from  each  other.  Now,  it  has  been 
calculated  that  if  the  melipona  were  to  construct  these  cells  at 
equal  distances,  and  all  of  one  size,  if  she  were  to  arrange  them 
symmetrically  in  two  layers,  the  result  would  be  a  structure  as  per- 
fect as  the  hive  of  the  honey-bee.  '  Hence  we  may  safely  conclude,' 
says  Darwin,  '  that  if  we  could  slightly  modify  the  instincts  already 
possessed  by  the  melipona,  and  in  themselves  not  very  wonderful, 
this  bee  would  make  a  structure  as  wonderfully  perfect  as  that  of 
the  hive-bee.' 

Since  natural  selection  acts  only  by  accumulating  slight  varia- 
tions of  organization  or  of  instinct,  which  may  be  advantageous 
to  the  individual,  the  question  arises,  How  comes  it  that  the  succes- 
sive and  gradual  variations  of  the  constructive  instinct,  rather  than 
of  any  other  instinct,  should  have  by  degrees  formed  the  architec- 
tural talent  of  the  honey-bee  ?  Darwin's  answer  is — '  The  bee  must 
consume  a  great  amount  of  honey  in  order  to  secrete  a  small 
quantity  of  wax ;  and  during  the  winter  it  lives  on  its  honey. 
"Whatever  tends  to  make  a  saving  of  wax  will  also  tend  to  save 
honey,  and  so  will  be  of  service  to  the  future  of  the  hive.'  If,  now, 
we  suppose  that  the  humble-bee  hibernates,  it  will  need  a  great 
quantity  of  honey  ;  consequently  every  modification  of  instinct, 
which  would  lead  them  to  construct  cells  so  near  each  other  as  to 
have  a  parti-wall,  would  save  some  little  wax,  and  so  be  of  ad- 
vantage to  them.  Hence  it  would  continually  be  more  and  more 
advantageous  to  the  humble-bees  if  they  were  to  make  their  cells 
more  and  more  regular,  nearer  together,  and  aggregated  into  a 
mass,  like  the  cells  of  the  melipona.  '  So,  too,  it  would  be  advan- 
tageous to  the  melipona  if  she  were  to  make  her  cells  closer 
together,  thus  approaching  the  perfect  comb  of  the  honey-bee. 
Thus  the  most  wonderful  of  all  known  instincts,  that  of  the  hive- 1 
bee,  can  be  explained  by  natural  selection  having  taken ' 
advantage  of  numerous  successive  slight  modifications  of  simpler 
instincts.' l 

1  Origin  of  Species,  ch.  vii. 


3O  Heredity. 

Danvin  has  endeavoured  to  explain  in  the  same  manner  the 
slave-making  instincts  of  certain  ants.  From  P.  Hubert  famous 
observations,  we  know  that  female  ants  carry  off  the  larvae  of 
the  black  ants,  which  become  their  slaves.  Incapable  of 
any  other  work  save  that  of  warfare,  they  are  fed,  carried  about, 
cared  for,  and  even  governed  by  the  slave  ants.  In  England,  the 
formica  sanguined,  too,  has  slaves  ;  these  they  employ  in  the  labours 
of  the  ants'  nest,  but  they  also  work  themselves.  This  instinct 
may,  according  to  Darwin,  be  explained  as  follows.  First,  these 
ants  stole  some  eggs  from  a  foreign  nest  for  food ;  some  of  the 
eggs  were  hatched,  and  the  stranger  ants  did  some  service  to  the 
community  as  workers.  Hence  the  instinct  of  going  and  cap- 
turing eggs  with  a  view  to  having  slaves.  Then  the  masters, 
leaving  a  part  of  their  toil  to  their  slaves,  like  English  ants,  came 
finally  to  renounce  labour  altogether,  like  the  Swiss  ants. 

The  theory  which  refers  instincts  to  hereditary  habits  has  also 
been  maintained  in  France,  but  only  by  naturalists  who,  like 
Danvin,  have  given  special  attention  to  physiological  phenomena. 
The  only  author  who,  so  far  as  we  are  aware,  has  put  it  forward 
under  its  psychological  form  is  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer.  He  has 
endeavoured  to  show,  not  how  such  instincts — those  of  the  cuckoo, 
the  ant,  and  the  beaver,  for  instance — have  arisen,  but  to  discover 
and  describe,  in  a  general  way,  the  process  of  evolution  which  has 
deduced  complex  from  simple  instincts,  by  heredity  and  selection. 
Attacking  the  question  of  primal  origin,  which  had  been  avoided 
by  Danvin,  Spencer  has  attempted  to  give  the  true  and  complete 
genesis  of  instincts.  All  we  can  do  is  to  indicate  the  chief  points 
of  this  difficult  synthesis. 

In  the  first  place,  from  the  author's  special  point  of  view — that 
of  the  unity  of  composition  of  psychological  phenomena — instinct 
represents  one  of  the  first  stages  in  the  ascending  evolution  of 
mind.  In  the  faculties  of  instinct,  memory,  reason,  etc.,  as  they 
are  generally  accepted,  Mr.  H.  Spencer  sees  only  a  convenient  way 
of  grouping  and  naming  phenomena,  but  no  real  difference.  These 
phenomena  form  a  series,  in  which  there  are  only  insensible  tran- 
sitions from  class  to  class.  In  this  ascending  series,  instinct 
occupies  an  intermediate  place  between  reflex  action  and  memory  ; 
instinct  may  be  regarded  as  a  sort  of  organized  memory,  and 
memory  as  a  sort  of  nascent  instinct. 


Heredity  of  Instincts.  3 1 

Instinct  may  be  defined  to  be  *  composite  reflex  action,'  It 
springs  from  simple  reflex  action  by  successive  complications. 
While  in  simple  reflex  action  a  single  impression  is  followed  by  a 
single  contraction ;  while  in  the  most  highly  developed  forms  of 
reflex  action  a  simple  impression  is  followed  by  a  combination  of 
contractions,  in  those  which  we  distinguish  by  the  name  of  in- 
stinct a  combination  of  impressions  is  followed  by  a  combination 
of  contractions.  This  is  the  case  with  the  fly-catcher,  which, 
immediately  after  it  has  left  the  egg,  will  seize  an  insect  with  its 
beak.  The  question  of  instinct  is  therefore  reduced  to  this :  How 
can  reflex  actions,  which  grow  ever  more  and  more  complex,  spring 
from  simple  reflex  actions  ? 

In  order  to  understand  how  this  transition  may  be  effected  by 
means  of  an  accumulation  of  experiences,  let  us,  says  Mr.  Herbert 
Spencer,  take  some  aquatic  animal  of  a  low  order,  provided  with 
rudimentary  eyes.  This  nascent  vision  being  little  more  than 
anticipatory  touch,  the  animal  will  be  able  to  note  the  passage  of 
opaque  bodies  through  the  water  only  when  they  are  very  near  its 
eyes.  Consequently,  in  most  cases  these  bodies  will  come  in  con- 
tact with  its  organism,  and  will  so  produce  a  tactile  sensation, 
which  will  be  followed  by  contractions — the  necessary  effect  of  a 
mechanical  derangement  of  the  vital  force.  Hence  in  this  kind 
of  animals  there  constantly  occurs  this  succession,  viz.,  a  visual 
impression,  and  a  tactile  impression,  or  contraction.  'But  it 
psychical  states  which  follow  one  another  time  after  time  in 
a  certain  order,  become  every  time  more  closely  connected  in 
this  order,  so  as  eventually  to  become  inseparable,  then  it  must 
happen  that  if,  in  the  experience  of  any  species,  a  visual  impres- 
sion, a  tactile  impression,  and  a  contraction  are  continually 
repeated  in  this  succession,  the  several  nervous  states  produced 
will  become  so  consolidated  that  the  first  cannot  be  caused 
without  the  others  following.' 

If  we  now  assume  a  more  perfect  vision  in  the  animal,  it  will 
follow  that  the  same  bodies  will  be  visible  at  a  greater  distance, 
and  that  smaller  bodies  will  be  visible  at  a  less  distance.  In  such 
a  case,  there  will  be  no  collision,  or  it  will  be  slight,  and  only 
produced  by  the  small  and  nearer  object  Neither  will  there  be 
any  strong  contraction,  but  a  partial  tension  of  the  muscles,  like 


32  Heredity. 

that  of  an  animal  about  to  seize  his  prey.  There  will  therefore  be 
a  visual  impression,  a  tension  of  the  muscles  :  the  latter  condition 
allows  the  animal  either  to  seize  a  small  object,  if  close  to  it,  to 
retire  into  its  shell,  or  to  escape  from  an  enemy  by  convulsive 
movements. 

Let  us  go  further,  and  suppose  a  further  development  of  the 
animal's  eyes,  and  a  habit  of  moving  about  in  the  water.  Of  all 
the  bodies  in  its  vicinity  those  in  front  of  it  commonly  make  the 
strongest  impression  on  it  These  it  first  sees,  and  then  often 
touches ;  and  this  contact  often  brings  near  to  its  head  and  its 
tactile  organs  small  bodies  which  may  serve  as  food.  The  animal 
will  experience  the  recurring  succession  of  these  psychical  con- 
ditions :  slight  excitement  of  the  retinal  nerves ;  excitement  of 
the  nerves  of  the  prehensile  organs ;  excitement  of  a  special  set 
of  muscles.  These  conditions  must,  by  repetition  in  countless 
generations,  become  so  closely  combined  that  the  first  will  of 
necessity  call  forth  the  others. 

'  Here,  then,  we  see  how  one  of  the  simpler  instincts  will,  under 
the  requisite  conditions,  be  established  by  accumulated  experiences. 
Let  it  be  granted  that  the  more  frequently  psychical  states  occur 
in  a  certain  order,  the  stronger  becomes  their  tendency  to  cohere 
in  that  order,  until  they  at  last  become  inseparable ;  let  it  be 
granted  that  this  tendency  is,  in  however  slight  a  degree,  inherited, 
so  that,  if  the  experiences  remain  the  same  each  successive  gen- 
eration bequeaths  a  somewhat  increased  tendency ;  and  it  follows 
that,  in  cases  like  the  one  described,  there  must  eventually  result 
an  automatic  connection  of  nervous  actions,  corresponding  to  the 
external  relations  perpetually  experienced.  Similarly,  if,  from  some 
change  in  the  environment  of  any  species,  its  members  are  fre- 
quently brought  in  contact  with  a  relation  having  terms  a  little 
more  involved ;  if  the  organization  of  the  species  is  so  far  devel- 
oped as  to  be  impressible  by  these  terms  in  close  succession ;  then 
an  inner  relation  corresponding  to  this  new  outer  relation  will 
gradually  be  formed,  and  will  in  the  end  become  organic.  And 
so  on  in  subsequent  stages  of  progress.'  l 

It  is,  moreover,  clear,  as  the  author  remarks,  that  we  are  not  to 

*  Herbert  Spencer,  Principles  of  Psychology,  §  194 — 198,  Second  Edition. 


Heredity  of  Instincts.  33 

see  in  what  has  just  been  said  anything  more  than  a  probable 
outline  of  the  development  of  instincts.  It  will  always  be  impos- 
sible to  explain  instincts  as  they  are,  in  their  endless  varieties  and 
complications.  The  data  are  inaccessible,  and  even  were  they 
accessible,  it  would  be  impossible  to  grasp  them  in  their  entirety. 

We  need  not  here  pass  judgment  on  this  theory  of  the  origin  of 
instinct :  the  matter  is  beside  our  purpose,  as  well  as  beyond  our 
powers.  Evidently,  this  question  is  connected  with  the  origin  of 
species ;  and  science  has  not  yet  solved  it,  if  it  ever  will  be  solved. 
Should  Danvin's  doctrine  be  confirmed,  it  must  then  be  admitted 
that  all  instincts  have  been  acquired,  and  that  what  is  now  fixed 
was  at  first  variable ;  that  all  stability  comes  from  heredity,  which 
conserves  and  accumulates,  and  that  in  the  formation  of  instincts 
heredity  is  supreme. 

However  alluring  the  hypothesis  of  evolution  may  appear  by  its 
simplicity  and  breadth,  it  is  not  without  difficulties  in  the  region  of 
facts.  It  explains  many  of  these,  but  there  are  others  at  which  it 
stumbles.  We  need  only  consider  the  objection  drawn  from  the 
existence  of  neuter  insects,  which,  though  possessed  of  a  structure 
of  their  own,  and  of  peculiar  instincts,  still,  being  sterile,  cannot 
propagate  their  kind.  The  formation  of  the  wonderful  instinct  of 
working  ants  cannot,  on  this  hypothesis,  be  explained,  for  among 
neuters  this  instinct  cannot  have  been  developed  by  selection  and 
heredity.  Danvin  strives  to  explain  this  very  ingeniously,  while  he 
admits  that  at  first  the  facts  appeared  to  be  full  of  so  great  difficulty 
as  even  to  overturn  his  theory.  In  the  present  state  of  science,  it 
is  not  possible  to  say  whether  an  instinct  is  the  result  of  hereditary 
habit,  or  a  primitive,  natural,  and  irreducible  fact  There  is  no 
mark  whereby  we  might  make  a  distinction. 

Restricting  ourselves  within  the  bounds  of  the  question  which 
immediately  concerns  us,  we  would  remark  that  the  conventional 
saying,  that  '  instinct  is  hereditary  habit '  is  so  vague  and  incom- 
plete as  to  be  inaccurate.  Habit  is  a  disposition  acquired  through 
the  continuance  of  the  same  acts  ;  it  therefore  necessarily  pre- 
supposes a  primitive  act  or  state,  whereof  it  is  a  repetition.  I 
possess  the  habit  of  painting,  writing,  calculating,  only  because  at 
first  I  painted,  wrote  or  calculated  painfully  and  slowly,  and  by  a 
special  effort  of  my  will.  If  instinct  is  a  habit,  it  is  a  habit  of  some- 


34  Heredity. 

thing.  It  presupposes  a  primitive  state  anterior  to  the  habitual 
state,  and  this  evidently  is  one  of  the  lowliest  modes  of  mental 
activity ;  it  is  that  minimum  of  intelligence  of  which  we  have 
spoken  already — including  in  intelligence  sensibility  and  volition, 
which  are  confused  together  and  involved  in  instinct  Thus,  then, 
we  are  again  brought  back  to  our  conclusion  in  regard  to  the  nature 
of  instincts.  Here  is  need  of  caution  ;  if  intelligence  does  not  exist 
in  germ,  even  in  the  lowliest  psychological  act,  then  all  the  trans- 
formations and  evolutions  in  the  world  will  never  put  it  there  ;  or 
we  shall  be  the  dupes  of  continual  illusion  and  endless  trickery, 
which  will  make  us  suppose  that  we  may  produce  from  a  thing 
what  was  never  placed  in  it  If  we  admit  at  the  outset  ever  so 
small  an  amount  of  intelligence,  we  may  well  understand  how 
the  amount  may  afterwards  have  become  greater.  The  seed  may 
easily  enough  become  a  tree,  but  without  the  seed  there  will  be 
no  tree.  Hence  it  is  strictly  necessary  to  qualify  the  hereditary 
habit  from  which  instincts  spring  by  calling  it  a  mental  habit 

In  a  word,  according  to  the  hypothesis  which  regards  instincts 
as  either  fixed,  or  as  varying  only  within  narrow  limits,  heredity  is 
simply  conservative. 

In  the  hypothesis  of  evolution,  heredity  is  really  creative;  for 
since,  without  it,  it  is  impossible  for  any  acquired  modification  to 
be  transmitted,  the  formation  of  instincts,  properly  so  called,  how- 
ever slightly  complex,  would  be  impossible. 

Both  hypotheses  accord  equally  well  with  our  solution  of  the 
nature  of  instinct  It  matters  not  whether  it  be  the  minimum 
of  intelligence  developed  by  gradual  evolution,  or  an  inferior  form 
of  intelligence,  invariable  and  for  ever  fixed  and  determined  by  the 
organs.  And,  from  our  point  of  view,  it  might  be  said  that,  since 
the  heredity  of  instincts  is  established,  the  heredity  of  intelligence 
is  established  partially  and  in  advance.  But  this  we  will  consider 
more  closely  in  another  place. 


Heredity  of  the  Sensorial  Qualities.          35 


CHAPTER  II. 

HEREDITY  OF  THE   SENSORIAL   QUALITIES. 

PERCEPTION  is  a  fact  of  mixed  nature,  at  once  physiological  and 
mental ;  it  is  begun  in  the  organs,  is  perfected  in  the  consciousness. 
The  soundness  of  the  common  opinion  which  regards  our  sensa- 
tions as  simple,  irreducible,  ultimate  phenomena,  by  means  of  which 
we  know  the  material  world  as  it  is,  is  extremely  doubtful.  Setting 
aside  the  discussion  of  this  broad  question,  it  is  only  necessary 
to  say  that,  taking  for  their  basis  physical  and  physiological  dis- 
coveries, recent  works  on  psychology — notably  those  of  Bain  and 
Herbert  Spencer  in  England,  of  Helmholtz  and  Wundt  in  Ger- 
many, and  of  Taine  in  France  —  have  shown  that  sensations 
supposed  to  be  simple  must  be  dealt  with,  as  chemistry,  at  its  rise, 
dealt  with  bodies,  also  supposed  to  be  simple.  These  psycho- 
logists v  have  shown  that  neither  colours,  nor  sounds,  nor  heat, 
probably,  indeed,  none  of  the  qualities  of  the  external  world,  at  all 
resemble  the  ideas  vulgarly  entertained  with  regard  to  them ;  that 
perception  is  a  state  of  consciousness  that  corresponds  in  us  to 
realities  external  to  ourselves,  but  which  does  not  resemble  them  : 
so  that  this  totality  of  attributes  which  we  call  the  external  world, 
and  which,  by  a  universal  illusion,  we  think  we  see  as  it  is  in 
reality,  is  to  a  great  extent  the  product  of  our  own  mind — a  creation 
of  which  the  external  world  furnishes  only  the  raw  material,  which 
our  senses  then,  after  their  own  fashion,  work  up  and  complete. 

Though  we  cannot  have  the  slightest  hesitation  in  choosing 
between  these  recent  theories  and  the  current  opinion  in  regard  to 
the  perception  of  external  objects,  between  that  of  the  Scotch 
school  and  of  the  sensus  communis — whose  least  defect  is  that  it 
explains  nothing ;  yet,  so  far  as  the  subject  of  heredity  is  concerned, 
the  question  has  no  interest  Whether  the  material  world  is  per- 
ceived immediately  as  it  is,  or  otherwise  than  as  it  is,  by  a 
synthesis  of  consciousness,  matters  not  at  all.  The  only  problem 
we  have  to  solve  is  whether  the  perceptive  faculties,  the  modes  of 
sensorial  activity,  are  subject  to  heredity. 

We  will  observe,  in  the  first  place,  that,  as  regards  specific  quali- 
ties, the  reply  admits  of  no  doubt  If  we  examine  the  animal 


36  Heredity. 

scale,  from  the  lowest  organisms,  possessed  of  no  other  sense 
than  that  of  an  obtuse,  passive  touch,  up  to  those  most  highly 
sensitive,  we  see  at  once  that  each  animal  derives  a  certain 
number,  and  a  certain  kind  of  senses  from  its  parents.  Heredity 
governs  both  the  quantity  and  quality  of  the  perceptive  faculties, 
so  far  as  these  general  characters  are  concerned  which  we  call 
specific. 

Heredity  also  governs  all  that  concerns  race  or  variety.  Thus, 
the  dog  inherits  not  only  a  very  acute  scent,  but  also  the  variety  of 
scent  which  adapts  him  for  hunting  a  definite  kind  of  game.  In 
the  negro  the  acuteness  of  this  same  sense  characterizes  that 
variety  of  the  human  species. 

Doubt,  therefore,  can  arise  only  with  regard  to  individual 
differences,  and  thus  our  original  question  is  transformed  into  this: 
Is  the  transmission  of  secondary  and  individual  characters  governed 
by  the  same  heredity  which  governs  the  transmission  of  the  percep- 
tive faculties,  in  their  essential  and  fundamental  features?  The 
answer  can  only  be  given  by  facts ;  we  shall  see  that  heredity  is 
usually  the  rule,  even  with  what  is  individual,  anomalous,  and 
capricious. 

We  take,  then,  in  order,  the  five  senses  as  usually  accepted. 
There  is  now  a  general  agreement  to  recognize,  under  the  name 
of  vital  sense,  organic  sense,  or  internal  sense,  a  mode  of  sensa- 
tion, without  a  special  organ,  diffused  over  the  entire  body,  and 
which  is,  as  it  were,  an  internal  Touch,  whereby  we  are  sensible  of 
what  takes  place  within  us.  But  as  this  sense  is  entirely  personal, 
making  us  acquainted  with  our  own  body,  and  not  with  the 
external  world,  and  as  it  very  nearly  concerns  our  pleasures,  our 
pains,  our  instincts,  our  passions,  we  will  treat  of  it  in  another 
place,  when  discussing  the  modes  by  which  our  feelings  act,  and 
the  heredity  of  these  modes. 

I. — OF  TOUCH. 

Touch  is  the  universal,  primary  sense,  possessed  by  every 
sentient  animal.  All  the  other  senses  are  but  a  modification  of 
touch,  said  one  of  the  ancients.  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer  has  shown 
how,  by  evolution  and  specialization,  the  other  senses — sight,  hear- 
ing, smell,  taste — could  have  sprung  from  touch ;  and  how  touch 


Heredity  of  the  Sensor ial  Qualities.          37 

is  a  universal  language  into  which  the  other  senses,  which  are 
special  languages,  would  at  first  have  to  be  translated  in  order  to 
be  understood.  In  this  fundamental  sense,  which  is  at  once  the 
most  essential  and  the  most  material,  we  distinguish  tactile  sensa- 
tions, properly  so-called  (hardness,  softness,  elasticity,  etc.),  and 
sensations  of  temperature  (heat  and  cold).  Both  are  governed  by 
heredity. 

The  extreme  difference  of  tactile  sensibility  between  northern 
and  southern  races  has  often  been  remarked.  Among  the  latter 
it  is  exquisite  and  refined  ;  among  the  former,  obtuse,  or,  at  least, 
imperfect.  The  Lapp,  who  takes  tobacco  oil  for  colic,  has  a  skin 
as  little  irritable  as  his  stomach.  In  Lapland,  as  Montesquieu 
puts  it,  '  you  must  flay  a  man  to  make  him  feel.' 

It  has  been  observed,  says  P.  Lucas,  that  parents  transmit  to 
their  children  the  most  singular  perfections  and  imperfections  of 
touch.  There  are,  probably,  in  the  skin  no  modes  of  hyper-sesthesia 
or  of  anaesthesia  that  could  form  an  exception  to  this  rule.  A 
woman  whose  tactile  sensibility  was  so  exalted  that  for  her  the 
slightest  hurt  was  an  agony,  married  a  man  endowed  in  the  highest 
degree  with  the  opposite  quality.  He  did  not  lack  intelligence, 
but  his  heart  and  his  skin  were  impassible.  A  daughter  was  born 
to  them,  and  she  is  as  insensible  to  external  pain  as  her  father 
himself.  We  have  seen  her  endure  without  complaint,  and  even 
without  appearing  to  notice  it,  pain  which  would  have  been  very 
acute  for  ourselves. 

A  family  from  the  South,  says  the  same  author,  who  was 
acquainted  with  the  persons,  came  to  Paris  some  time  ago. 
Several  of  the  children  were  born  in  Paris;  but  those  born 
there,  as  well  as  those  brought  there  from  the  South,  were  in 
childhood  extremely  sensitive  to  cold.  One  of  the  daughters 
married  a  man  from  the  North,  who  is  insensible  to  cold,  pro- 
vided it  is  not  excessive.  The  child  born  of  this  union  is  more 
sensitive  to  cold  than  even  its  mother ;  like  her,  he  shivers  at  the 
slightest  fall  of  temperature,  and  so  soon  as  the  air  becomes  cold, 
he  is  afraid  of  leaving  the  house. 

One  of  the  most  familiar  forms  of  hyper-aesthesia  of  the  touch 
is  the  sensibility  to  tickling.  There  are  whole  families  that  are 
insensible  to  this,  while  others  are  so  sensible  to  it  that  the  slightest 
touch  will  produce  syncope. 


38  Heredity. 

Some  persons  cannot  bear  the  contact  or  even  the  near  presence 
of  certain  objects,  such  as  silk  or  cork.  This  morbid  sensibility 
is  often  transmitted  by  one  or  other  of  the  parents.  '  We  are 
acquainted  with  a  family,  several  members  of  which,  both  boys  and 
girls,  experience  instinctively,  on  touching  cork,  or  the  downy  skin 
of  a  peach,  such  an  internal  sensation  of  shuddering  repulsion  that 
the  very  sight  of  the  fruit  is  unendurable  to  them ;  which,  therefore, 
must  be  given  them  with  the  skin  removed.' l 

Here  we  may  refer,  in  passing,  to  certain  hereditary  anomalies, 
such  as  polydactylism,  and  the  warty  membrane  of  Edward 
Lambert  (of  which  we  have  already  spoken),  both  of  which  cases 
belong  rather  to  the  physiological  side  of  the  question. 

The  hand,  which  is  pre-eminently  the  organ  of  touch,  is  modified 
by  heredity.  '  That  large  hands  are  inherited  by  men  and  women 
whose  ancestors  led  laborious  lives ;  and  that  men  and  women 
whose  descent,  for  many  generations,  has  been  from  those  unused 
to  manual  labour  commonly  have  small  hands,  are  established 
opinions.'  2 

The  same  is  true  of  left-handed  persons.  There  are  families 
in  which  the  special  use  of  the  left  hand  is  hereditary.  Girou 
mentions  a  family  in  which  the  father,  the  children,  and  most  of 
the  grandchildren  were  left-handed.  One  of  the  latter  betrayed 
its  left-handedness  from  earliest  infancy,  nor  could  it  be  broken 
of  the  habit,  though  the  left  hand  was  bound  and  swathed. 

II. — OF   SIGHT. 

Sight  is  the  noblest,  the  most  intellectual,  of  all  tne  senses,  and 
the  most  important  for  science  and  aesthetics.  It  is  a  known  fact 
that  accidental  blindness  may  lead  to  insanity.  Congenital  blind- 
ness certainly  influences  the  mind  :  the  imagination  of  one  born 
blind,  which  possesses  only  tactile  sensations,  cannot  be  anything 
like  ours,  in  which  visual  sensations  predominate.  Hence,  from  a 
purely  psychological  point  of  view,  the  heredity  of  the  sensorial 
modes  of  vision  is  worth  studying. 

The  individual  varieties  of  this  sense  may  be  classed  under 
three  heads,  accordingly  as  they  depend  on  mechanical  causes,  or 

1  Lucas,  L  481.  *  Spencer,  Biology,  voL  L  §  82. 


Heredity  of  the  Sensor ial  Qualities.          39 

on  anaesthesia  or  hyper-sesthesia  of  the  nervous  element      All 
anomalies  are  transmissible  by  heredity. 

i.  The  peculiarities  of  vision  which  depend  on  mechanical 
causes  are  strabismus,  myopia,  and  presbyopia  The  transmission 
of  these  is  very  common.  In  general,  it  is  to  hereditary  causes 
that  we  are  indebted  for  the  conformation  of  our  visual  apparatus, 
and,  consequently,  for  our  being  far  or  near-sighted. 

Portal,  in  his  Considerations  sur  les  Maladies  de  Famille^  de- 
scribes an  imperfect  form  of  strabismus,  called  the  Montmorency 
sight,  with  which  nearly  all  the  members  of  that  family  were 
affected. 

Danvin  observed  that  the  Fuegians,  when  on  board  his  ship, 
could  see  distant  objects  far  more  distinctly   than  the   English  j 
sailors,  notwithstanding  their  long  practice.1    This  is  clearly  an 
acquired  faculty,  accumulated  and  fixed  by  heredity. 

One  of  the  most  striking  cases  of  heredity  of  vision  is  the  ever 
increasing  number  of  the  myopic  among  persons  given  to  in- 
tellectual work.  According  to  M.  Giraud  Teulon,  continual 
application  with  the  eyes  near  the  object  is  the  great  cause  of 
myopia.*  Professor  Bonders,  of  Utrecht,  while  studying  the 
statistical  reports,  was  surprised  to  find  that  myopia  is  a  disease  of 
the  wealthy  classes,  and  that  the  inhabitants  of  cities  are  specially 
liable  to  it,  while  those  of  the  country  are  almost  exempt.  In 
France  the  Conseils  de  Revision  have  noticed  the  same  fact  In 
England,  at  the  Chelsea  Military  School,  among  1,300  boys  only 
three  were  myopic.  In  the  Universities  of  Oxford  and  Cambridge, 
however,  the  number  of  myopic  subjects  was  considerable — at 
Oxford  32  in  127.  In  Germany  the  results  are  even  more 
decisive.  Dr.  Colin,  of  Breslau,  undertook  the  task  of  examining, 
in  the  schools  of  his  own  country,  the  eyes  of  10,000  scholars  or 
students.  Among  these  he  found  1,004  myopic — about  ten  per 
cent  In  village  schools  they  are  not  numerous — only  a  quarter 
per  cent.  In  the  town  schools  the  number  of  the  myopic  increases 
with  the  grade — primary  schools  it  is  67;  middle  schools,  10-3; 
normal  schools,  197  ;  gymnasia  and  universities  26^2  per  cent 

1  Variation,  etc.,  ii.  p.  223. 

*  Rev ue  (fes  Cour;  Scientifiques.     3  Sept.  1870. 

3 


40  Heredity. 

This  explains  why,  in  Germany,  myopia  is  not  a  reason  for 
rejection  by  the  examining  boards.  Since  constant  study  creates 
myopia,  and  heredity  most  frequently  perpetuates  it,  the  number 
of  short-sighted  persons  must  necessarily  increase  in  a  nation 
devoted  to  intellectual  pursuits. 

2.  Anaesthesia  of  the  nerves  of  sight  is  transmissible  in  all  its 
grades  and  in  all  its  forms.  It  is  a  well-known  fact  that  the 
sensibility  of  the  eye  to  light  is  very  different  in  different  persons. 
It  may  vary  as  much  as  200  per  cent,  and,  of  course,  will  pass 
through  all  the  intermediate  degrees.  Heredity  transmits  these 
inequalities,  from  partial  to  total  anaesthesia,  or  blindness,  when 
the  eye,  incapable  of  noting  form  or  colour,  has  only  an  indistinct 
perception  of  light. 

Congenital  blindness  may  run  in  families.  Blind  persons  will 
sometimes  beget  blind  children.  A  blind  beggar  was  the  father 
of  four  sons  and  a  daughter,  all  blind.1  Dufau,  in  his  work  on 
Blindness,  cites  the  cases  of  2 1  persons  blind  from  birth,  or  soon 
after,  whose  ancestors — father,  mother,  grandparents,  and  uncles — 
had  some  serious  affection  of  the  eyes. 

Amaurosis,  nyctalopia,  and  cataract  in  the  parents  may  become 
blindness  in  the  children ;  and  such  transformations  of  heredity 
are  not  rare  in  animals. 

The  incapacity  to  distinguish  colours,  known  under  the  name  of 
Daltonism,  or  colour-blindness  is  notoriously  hereditary.  The 
distinguished  English  chemist  Dalton  was  so  affected,  as  were 
also  two  of  his  brothers.  Sedgwick  discovered  that  colour-blind- 
ness occurs  oftener  in  men  than  in  women.  In  eight  families  akin 
to  each  other,  this  affection  lasted  through  five  generations,  and 
extended  to  7 1  persons.2 

It  is  readily  understood  that  such  an  anomaly  of  vision  is  not 
without  influence  on  the  mind,  at  least  from  the  aesthetic  point  of 
view.  An  old  man,  who  had  from  childhood  observed  that  he 
could  not  call  the  various  colours  by  their  names,  was  grieved 
because  he  saw  nothing  in  paintings  but  what  was  gray  and 
sombre — in  a  landscape  only  an  obscure  haze,  in  the  sunrise  and 

1  Lucas,  i.  404. 

8  Darwin,  Variation,  etc.,  ii.  p.  70. 


Heredity  of  the  Sensorial  Qualities  41 


sunset,  in  the  brightest  tints  of  the  rainbow,  and  in  the  grandest 
scenes  of  nature,  only  a  cold  and  dull  sameness. 

3.  There  are  some  persons  who  seem  gifted  with  extraordinary  --. 
• — almost  supernatural — powers  of  sight.  Some  cases  of  this 
kind  are  so  well  attested  as  scarcely  to  admit  of  doubt.  Thus, 
sight  at  great  distances  and  through  opaque  substances  appears, 
in  some  cases,  to  be  proved  beyond  the  possibility  of  fraud.  If 
there  is  any  explanation  of  this  and  other  like  phenomena,  it  can 
only  be  on  the  supposition  of  hyper-aesthesia  of  the  optic  nerve. 

P.  Lucas  gives  a  long  account  of  Hirsch  Daenemarck,  a  Polish    ~ 
Jew,  who,  about  the  year  1840,  travelled  over  Europe,  showing  by 
decisive  experiments  that  he  could  read   in  a  closed  book  any   / 
page  or  line  that  might  be  desired.1    This  man's  son  perceived,  at  I 
about  the  same  age  as  his  father  (ten  years),  that  he  possessed 
this  same  faculty,  and  perhaps  in  a  more  remarkable  degree. 

It  is  hardly  necessary  to  observe  that  heredity  always  governs 
vision  in  its  specific  form,  and  that  the  only  room  for  doubt 
would  be  with  regard  to  individual  varieties.  Thus,  all  species 
of  animals,  from  the  eagle  to  the  owl — from  the  earth-worm  with 
its  eye-points,  to  the  spider  with  its  facet-eyes — possess  a  visual 
apparatus  of  a  structure  and  optical  power  peculiar  to  them,  which 
is  preserved  and  transmitted  by  heredity  like  all  other  specific 
characters 

III. — OF   HEARING 

Though  hearing  does  not  possess  the  same  scientific  and 
aesthetic  importance  as  sight,  yet  it  is  one  of  our  principal  senses. 
It  is  the  basis  of  a  science — acoustics — and  of  an  art — music ; 
and,  what  is  still  more  important,  ori  it  depends  the  possibility  of 
articulate  language  or  speech,  and,  consequently,  of  deliberate 
thought.  If  there  be  no  hearing,  there  is  an  end  of  speech ;  / 
suppress  speech,  and  thought  also  is  suppressed,  with  all  results. 

Hearing,  like  sight,  can  have  its  hyper-aesthesia,  its  partial  and 
total  anaesthesia — deafness.  As  we  have  seen,  there  are  eyes  that 
cannot  distinguish  certain  colours ;  in  like  manner  there  are  ears 
that  cannot  hear  certain  sounds.  Wollaston  met  with  persons 

1  Lucas,  i.  pp.  413—419. 


42  Heredity. 

who  were  insensible  to  all  sounds  above  and  below  the  diatonic 
scale. 

To  be  congenitally  deaf  and  dumb  exerts  a  well-known  and 
unfortunate  influence  on  the  development  of  the  intellect,  for 
which  the  only  remedy  is  found  in  the  use  of  artificial  signs.  If 
this  infirmity  is  transmissible,  heredity  may  be  said  to  penetrate 
into  the  very  essence  of  intellect  But  this  form  of  heredity  has 
been  disputed. 

Dr.  Meniere,  in  a  special  work  on  this  question,  while  admitting 
that  in  a  certain  number  of  instances  the  direct  and  immediate 
heredity  of  deaf-muteness  has  been  established,  says  : — '  Never- 
theless, these  facts  must  be  held  to  constitute  a  rare  exception ; 
habitually  deaf-mutes  married  to  deaf-mutes  beget  children  who 
hear  and  speak.  This  is,  of  course,  still  more  the  case  where  the 
marriage  is  a  mixed  one,  that  is,  where  only  one  of  the  couple  is 
deaf  and  dumb — though  even  in  this  case  there  are  well-attested 
cases  of  heredity.' l  Darwin  also  says  : — '  When  a  male  or  a 
female  deaf-mute  marries  a  sound  person,  their  children  are  most 
rarely  affected ;  in  Ireland,  out  of  203  children  thus  produced 
only  one  was  mute.  Even  when  both  parents  have  been  deaf- 
mutes,  as  in  the  case  of  forty-one  marriages  in  the  United  States, 
and  of  six  in  Ireland,  only  two  deaf  and  dumb  children  were 
produced.' a 

We  would  remark  that  the  returns  of  the  Deaf  and  Dumb 
Institution  of  London,  from  its  foundation  to  the  present  time,  are 
conclusive  in  favour  of  heredity.  Among  148  pupils  in  that 
institution  at  one  time,  there  was  one  in  whose  family  were  five 
deaf-mutes  ;  another  in  whose  family  were  four.  In  the  families 
of  ii  of  the  pupils  there  were  three  each,  and  in  the  families  of  19, 
two  each. 

It  is  quite  possible  that,  in  the  case  under  consideration,  the 
law  of  heredity  is  not  so  much  at  fault  as  is  commonly  supposed. 
The  deaf-muteness  of  ascendants  may,  in  their  descendants,  be 
transformed  into  an  infirmity  of  some  other  description,  such 
as  hardness  of  hearing,  obtuseness  of  the  mental  faculties,  01 

1  Recherches  surfOrigine  de  la  Surdi-Mutiti,  par  le  Docteur  Meniere. 
*  Variation,  etc.,  ii.  p.  22. 


Heredity  of  the  Sensorial  Qualities.          43 

even  idiocy.  Of  this  the  distinguished  anatomist  Menckel  gives 
many  instances.  But  we  will  consider  hereafter  this  obscure  point 
of  the  metamorphoses  or  transformations  of  heredity. 

It  has  seemed  to  us  more  natural  to  discuss  the  heredity  of  the 
musical  faculty  under  the  head  of  imagination.  As  will  be  seen, 
there  is  perhaps  no  other  artistic  talent  that  presents  more  con- 
clusive instances  of  hereditary  transmission  (the  three  Mozarts,  the 
two  Beethovens,  the  more  than  120  members  of  the  Bach  family). 
Still,  however  important  the  part  we  assign  to  the  influence  of  the 
imagination  and  of  the  intellectual  faculties,  it  must  be  admitted 
that  there  can  be  no  musical  talent  without  a  certain  disposition  of 
the  organs  of  hearing.  Here  education  does  next  to  nothing,  for 
it  is  nature  that  gives  'a  good  ear.'  Hence  the  incontestable 
heredity  of  the  aptness  for  music  necessarily  implies  the  heredity  of 
certain  qualities  of  hearing.  This  conclusion  applies  to  performers 
as  well  as  to  composers. 

IV. — OF  SMELL  AND   TASTE. 

It  is  hardly  possible  to  separate  here  these  two  senses,  which  are 
so  closely  allied  that  smell  may  be  called  taste  acting  at  a 
distance. 

Man,  no  doubt,  ranks  below  other  animals  as  regards  fineness  of 
the  sense  of  smell.  Nowhere  among  the  human  family,  even 
among  the  negroes,  can  be  found  a  sense  of  smell  as  acute  as  that 
of  dogs,  of  carnivorous  animals  in  general,  and  of  certain  insects. 
Gratiolet,  in  his  Anatomic  Comparee  du  Systime  Nerveux,  states 
that  an  old  piece  of  wolf-skin,  with  the  hair  all  worn  away,  when  ; 
set  before  a  little  dog,  threw  the  animal  into  convulsions  of  fear  by  ' 
the  slight  scent  attaching  to  it.  The  dog  had  never  seen  a  wolf; 
and  we  can  only  explain  this  alarm  by  the  hereditary  transmission 
of  certain  sentiments,  coupled  with  a  certain  perception  of  the 
sense  of  smell. 

It  is  notorious  that,  to  a  great  extent,  the  value  of  the  canine 
race  depends  on  their  native,  and  therefore  hereditary,  subtlety  of 
scent 

If  in  animals  so  highly  endowed  in  this  respect  we  could 
note  individual  differences,  we  should  probably  see  them  trans- 


44  Heredity. 

mitted  by  heredity.  But,  unfortunately,  we  can  study  them  only 
under  the  specific  form.  There,  however,  there  is  no  room  for 
doubt,  for  heredity  transmits  them  all  without  exception. 

In  the  human  species,  savage  races  have  a  characteristic 
acuteness  of  smell  which  allies  them  to  animals.  In  North 
America  the  Indians  can  follow  their  enemies  or  their  game  by 
the  scent,  and  in  the  Antilles  the  maroon  negroes  distinguish 
by  the  scent  a  white  man's  trail  from  a  negro's.1  The  whole 
negro  race  has  this  sense  developed  to  an  extraordinary  degree. 
Whether  this  results  from  a  great  development  of  the  olfactive 
membrane,  or  from  the  more  frequent  exercise  of  this  sense,  in  any 
case,  this  innate  or  acquired  faculty  is  preserved  by  heredity. 

The  specific  and  individual  varieties  of  taste  are  transmissible, 
like  those  of  smell.  Hybridism  gives  curious  examples  of  this 
among  animals.  '  The  swine,'  says  Burdach,  '  has  a  very  strong 
liking  for  barley;  the  wild  boar  will  not  touch  it,  feeding  on 
herbage  and  leaves.  From  a  cross  between  a  domestic  sow  and  a 
wild  boar  come  young  some  of  which  have  an  aversion  for  barley, 
like  the  wild  boar,  while  the  others  have  a  taste  for  it,  like  the 
common  hog.' 

In  man,  anaesthesia  of  taste,  and  antipathy  for  certain  flavours, 
are  hereditary.  Schook,  the  author  of  a  treatise  entitled  De 
Aversions  Casei  belonged  to  a  family  to  nearly  all  the  members  of 
which  the  smell  of  cheese  was  unendurable,  and  some  of  whom 
were  thrown  into  convulsions  by  it2  Such  antipathy  is  very  often 
hereditary.  '  In  a  family  of  our  acquaintance,  the  father  and 
mother  like  cheese ;  the  grandmother  had  an  extreme  dislike  for  it. 
Four  of  the  children  share  in  the  same  dislike.'3 

An  exclusive  liking  for  vegetable  food  and  repugnance  to  flesh 
is  of  very  rare  occurrence,  but  it  is  transmissible.  '  A  soldier  of 
the  Engineers,  who  derived  from  his  father  an  invincible  repug- 
nance to  all  food  composed  of  animal  substances,  was  unable, 
during  the  18  months  he  spent  with  his  regiment,  to  overcome 
this  aversion,  and  was  obliged  to  quit  the  service.'4 

Finally,  P.  Lucas,  following  Zimmermann  and  Gall,  gives  the 

1  Dictionnaire  dcs  Sciences  Mcdicales.     Art   '  OdoraL '  •  Ibid. 

•Lucas,  L  389.  *  Gazette des  Tribunaux,  21  Mai, 


Heredity  of  the  Sensor ial  Qualities.          45 

following  surprising  case.  A  Scotchman  had  an  irresistible  longing 
for  human  flesh,  which  led  him  to  commit  several  murders.  He 
had  a  daughter,  who,  though  taken  from  her  parents,  who  were 
burned  at  the  stake,  before  she  was  a  year  old,  and  though  she  was 
brought  up  among  respectable  people,  still  succumbed,  like  her 
father,  to  the  inconceivable  desire  for  eating  human  flesh.1 

There  exists  in  some  families  a  sort  of  natural  hydrophobia. 
'  Three  members  of  a  family  with  which  we  are  acquainted — the 
grandmother,  the  mother,  and  a  daughter — eat  their  food  without 
taking  any  liquid ;  they  do  not  drink  at  all,  we  might  say.     Their  '. 
repugnance  to  liquids  is  so  great  that  they  refuse  to  drink  until  \ 
they  fall  into  a  feverish  state.' 8 

We  have  collected  sufficient  facts  enough  to  show  that  there  is 
such  a  thing  as  heredity  of  the  perceptive  faculties,  even  under  the 
individual  form.  Thus,  if  we  take  an  animal,  as  it  is  naturally  con- 
stituted, with  its  sensorial  organs,  through  which  it  comes  in  contact 
with  the  outer  world,  we  may  say  that  the  quantity  and  quality  of 
its  perceptive  faculties  will  be  certainly  transmitted  in  their  specific 
form,  and  very  probably  too  in  their  individual  form  j  therefore, 
heredity  is  the  rule. 

Sensation,  however,  presents  only  the  raw  material  of  cognition, 
which  the  mind's  own  activity  has  to  transform  and  elaborate.  To 
the  external  element  supplied  by  the  material  world  must  be  added 
the  internal  element  supplied  by  ourselves,  in  order  to  produce 
what  is  properly  called  cognition,  and  the  development  of  the 
mind.  Hence  it  might  be  said  that  the  heredity  of  the  perceptive 
faculties,  as  here  considered,  is  in  some  manner  external,  and  that 
our  having  established  It  is  a  physiological  rather  than  a  psycho- 
logical result.  In  our  opinion,  however,  this  is  not  the  case,  nor 
would  that  objection  be  made  if  it  were  borne  in  mind  that  per- 

1  We  state  this  case  with  great  reserve,  because  its  authenticity  does  not 
appear  to  be  beyond  question.  It  is  not,  however,  more  improbable  than 
other  cases  of  heredity.  It  is  notorious  that  the  inclination  to  cannibalism  is 
extremely  lasting.  A  New  Zealander  of  great  intelligence,  half-civilized 
by  a  protracted  sojourn  in  England,  while  admitting  that  it  was  wrong  to  eat 
a  fellow-man,  still  longed  for  the  time  to  come  when  be  could  have  that 
pleasure.  Lucas,  i.  p.  391. 

1  Lucas,  ibid.  388. 


46  Heredity. 

ception  is  an  act  essentially  active,  into  which  the  whole  mind 
enters.  But  we  need  not  dwell  upon  a  point  which  would  require 
a  lengthy  explanation,  carrying  us  beyond  the  limits  of  our  subject. 
We  shall  presently  see  whether  the  heredity  of  the  intellectual 
faculties,  in  their  highest  forms,  can  be  directly  established. 


CHAPTER  III. 

HEREDITY   OF  THE   MEMORY. 


IF,  in  treating  of  Memory,  we  confine  ourselves  to  a  description 
of  the  phenomena,  and  the  investigation  of  their  organic  conditions, 
our  task  is  simple.  Nothing  is  easier  than  to  attribute  recollection 
to  a  special  faculty  which  knows  the  past  as  consciousness  knows 
the  present  Unfortunately,  however,  this  supposed  faculty  adds 
nothing  to  our  knowledge,  and  with  it  Ave  are  in  possession  of  only 
what  the  phenomena  gave  us,  with  just  a  word  over.  On  the  other 
hand,  when  we  go  beyond  mere  description  and  verbal  explana- 
tions, the  problem  of  memory,  simple  as  it  appears,  becomes  very 
difficult  Yet  since,  in  order  to  understand  the  relation  between 
heredity  and  memory,  it  is  necessary  to  have  some  precise  notions 
about  this  subject,  the  problem  must  be  attempted. 

The  phenomena  of  memory,  considered  in  their  ultima  ratio,  are 
explained  by  the  law  of  the  indestructibility  of  force,  of  the  conser- 
vation of  energy,  which  is  one  of  the  most  important  laws  of  the 
universe.  Nothing  is  lost ;  nothing  that  exists  can  ever  cease 
to  be.  In  physics,  this  is  admitted  readily  enough ;  the  principle 
is  well-established,  and  confirmed  by  so  many  facts,  that  doubt 
is  impossible.  In  morals,  the  case  is  different :  we  are  commonly  so 
accustomed  to  regard  all  occurrences  as  the  results  of  chance,  and 
as  subject  to  no  laws,  that  many  at  least  implicitly  admit  the  annihila- 
tion of  that  which  once  was  a  state  of  consciousness  to  be  possible. 
I  Yet  annihilation  is  as  inadmissible  in  the  moral  as  it  is  in  the 
physical  world ;  and  but  little  reflection  is  needed  to  see  that  in 
all  orders  of  phenomena  it  is  alike  impossible  for  something  to 
become  nothing,  or  for  nothing  to  become  something.  Such  a 


Heredity  of  the  Memory.  47 

miracle  is  neither  conceived  by  reason  nor  justified  by  experience. 
We  may,  indeed,  state  such  a  proposition  verbally ;  but  so  soon  as 
we  pass  from  words  to  things,  from  vagueness  to  precision,  from 
the  imaginary  to  the  real,  we  cannot  form  an  idea  of  any  such 
annihilation  in  external  or  internal  experience. 

Nor  are  the  considerations  in  favour  of  the  indestructibility  of 
our  perceptions  and  ideas  merely  of  a  theoretical  nature ;  there 
axe  also  facts  which,  however  strange  they  may  appear  at  first, 
are  very  simple,  if  we  bear  in  mind  that  in  the  mental  world,  as 
elsewhere,  nothing  perishes.  Works  on  medicine  and  psychology 
cite  numerous  instances  where  languages  apparently  altogether 
forgotten,  or  memories  apparently  effaced,  are  suddenly  brought 
back  to  consciousness  by  a  nervous  disorder,  by  fever,  opium, 
hasheesh,  or  simply  by  intoxication.  Coleridge  tells  a  story  of  a  I 
servant-maid,  who,  in  a  fever,  spoke  Greek,  Hebrew,  and  Latin ;  \ 
Erasmus  mentions  an  Italian  who  spoke  German,  though  he  had 
forgotten  that  language  for  twenty  years ;  there  is  also  a  case 
recorded  of  a  butcher's  boy  who,  when  insane,  recited  passages 
from  the  Phedre  which  he  had  heard  only  once.  All  these  facts 
are  so  well  known  that  they  need  only  here  be  cited ;  they,  with 
many  others,  prove  that  in  the  depths  of  the  soul  there  exists  many 
a  memory  which  seemed  to  have  vanished  for  ever. 

The  physiological  study  of  perception  further  shows  that  the  pro- 
duction of  the  phenomena  of  consciousness  is  subject  to  the  law 
of  the  transformation  of  force.  Though  this  point  is  yet  beset 
with  difficulties,  the  works  of  Mateucci  and  of  Dubois-Reymond 
show  that  electric  currents  are  produced  in  the  nerves,  and  are 
there  in  continual  circulation.  When  sensation  takes  place,  and  in 
general  whenever  a  nerve  is  active,  there  is  produced  a  diminution 
of  its  special  current,  as  is  indicated  by  the  needle  of  a  galvano- 
meter connected  with  the  nerve.  This  diminution  takes  place 
because  a  molecular  change  is  produced  within  the  nerve,  which, 
on  reaching  the  muscles,  produces  a  contraction,  and  on  reaching 
the  brain  produces  a  sensation ; — in  other  words,  sensation  is  work, 
and  to  perform  work  a  certain  force  has  to  be  expended  and  trans- 
formed. The  electrical  forces  which  serve  to  produce  the  sensation 
could  not,  at  the  same  time,  either  give  motion  to  a  magnetic 
needle  or  produce  chemical  decomposition,  because,  while  per 


48  Heredity. 

forming  work  within  they  cannot,  at  the  same  time,  perform  work 
without;  and  'as  the  nerve  cannot  produce  electricity  without 
using  up  something,  the  ultimate  source  of  the  forces  which  the 
nerve  transforms  into  electricity  is  the  materials  furnished  by 
the  blood.  The  nerve  is  nourished  with  these  materials,  as  the 
pile  is  fed  with  zinc  and  acid.' l  Thus  perception — that  is  to  say, 
the  primary  phenomena  of  consciousness — comes  under  the  general 
law.  It  is  impossible  that  it  should  come  of  nothing.  We  daily 
experience  thousands  of  perceptions,  but  none  of  these,  however 
vague  and  insignificant,  can  perish  utterly.  After  thirty  years  some 
effort — some  chance  occurrence,  some  malady — may  bring  them 
back ;  it  may  even  be  without  recognition.  Every  experience  we 
have  had  lies  dormant  within  us :  the  human  soul  is  like  a  deep 
and  sombre  lake,  of  which  light  reveals  only  the  surface ;  beneath, 
there  lives  a  whole  world  of  animals  and  plants,  which  a  storm  or 
an  earthquake  may  suddenly  bring  to  light  before  the  astonished 
consciousness. 

Both  theory  and  fact,  then,  agree  in  showing  that  in  the  moral, 
no  less  than  in  the  physical  world,  nothing  is  lost  An  impression 
made  on  the  nervous  system  occasions  a  permanent  change  in  the 
cerebral  structure,  and  produces  a  like  effect  in  the  mind — whatever 
*  may  be  understood  by  that  term.  A  nervous  impression  is  no 
momentary  phenomenon  that  appears  and  disappears,  but  rather  a 
fact  which  leaves  behind  it  a  lasting  result — something  added  to 
previous  experience  and  attaching  to  it  ever  afterwards.  Not,  how- 
ever, that  the  perception  exists  continually  in  the  consciousness ; 
but  it  does  continue  to  exist  in  the  mind,  in  such  a  manner  that  it 
may  be  recalled  to  the  consciousness. 

It  is  not  easy  to  say  what  it  is  that  survives  our  perceptions  and 
ideas.  The  least  objectionable  name  for  it  is  residuum,  a  term 
which  does  not  imply  any  theory,  because  it  only  indicates  an 
unquestionable  fact  of  our  mental  life.  It  is  not  to  be  supposed 
that  these  residua  are  always  present  to  the  mind,  so  that  the 
attention  can  at  any  moment  be  voluntarily  directed  to  them. 
But  it  may  be  assumed  that  every  mental  act  leaves  in  our  physical 
and  mental  structure  a  tendency  to  reproduce  itself,  and  that  when- 

1  Wundt,  Menschen-  und  Thiersede,  5th  and  6th  Lectures, 


Heredity  of  the  Memory.  49 

ever  this  reproduction  occurs  the  tendency  is  thereby  strengthened  ; 
so  that  a  tendency  often  reproduced  becomes  almost  automatic. 
We  might  go  somewhat  further,  and  say  that  the  relation  subsisting 
between  the  actual  perception  and  the  residuum  is  the  relation 
between  the  conscious  and  the  unconscious.  In  the  perception  or 
the  idea  the  consciousness  perishes  j  or,  more  accurately,  there 
takes  place  a  transformation,  of  which  we  can  have  no  precise  idea, 
but  which  must  be  very  analogous  to  the  transformations  of  the 
physical  world  (heat  into  motion,  motion  in  light,  etc.).  Between 
these  two  worlds  of  consciousness  and  unconsciousness,  there 
must  exist  such  a  correlation  that  to  each  mode  of  the  one  a  mode 
of  the  other  corresponds.  Mental  life  is  a  constant  transformation, 
the  unconscious  becoming  conscious,  and  vice  versa;  but  this 
transformation  does  not  take  place  by  chance  :  though  the  laws  are 
unknown,  it  is  not  without  laws.  If  we  could  say  which  form  of 
the  unconscious  corresponds  to  each  form  of  consciousness,  we 
could  say  what  relation  subsists  between  a  perception  or  an  idea 
and  its  residuum. 

This  we  cannot  do.  Herbart,  and  after  him  Miiller,  the 
physiologist,  supposed  they  made  some  advance  in  the  explana- 
tion of  the  phenomena  by  comparing  ideas  to  forces  which  have 
their  statics  and  dynamics.  But,  in  the  first  place,  it  may  be 
remarked  that  consciousness  is  one,  and  that  therefore  it  can 
at  each  instant  hold  only  one  idea.  Its  form  is  that  of  a  simple 
series;  and  though  certain  states  of  consciousness  seem  to  be 
simultaneous,  they  are,  in  fact,  successive.  It  we  try  to  think 
simultaneously  cf  a  lion  and  a  mountain,  a  cube  and  a  sphere, 
it  will  be  seen  that  one  idea  excludes  the  other,  and  that  we  can 
think  of  them  only  successively  or  alternately.  From  this  it 
follows  : — 

That  an  idea  which  occupies  the  consciousness  can  be  displaced 
only  by  a  stronger  idea.  If  the  two  mental  forces  which  contend 
for  the  occupation  of  the  consciousness  are  alike,  and  act  in  one 
direction,  the  result  is  a  very  intense  state  of  consciousness.  If  the 
two  forces  are  equal  and  contrary,  they  will  be  in  equilibrium. 
If  they  are  unequal  and  contrary,  the  one  will  over-master  the 
other,  but  in  doing  so  loses  a  part  of  its  own  force  equivalent 
to  that  \vhich  it  displaces.  This  is  proved  by  the  fact  that  an 


50  Heredity. 

idea  is  perceived  all  the  more  vividly  in  proportion  as  the 
mind  is  less  occupied  at  the  same  moment  with  anything  else. 
When  a  person  is  deeply  occupied,  a  new  idea  makes  little  im- 
pression on  his  mind,  because  before  it  can  lay  hold  of  the  con- 
sciousness it  has  expended  all  its  force.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is 
well  known  that  persons  who  are  altogether  idle  interest  them- 
selves much  about  trifling  details,  and  that  an  empty  mind  breeds 
hypochondria. 

An  idea  that  has  passed  away  from  the  consciousness  is  not 
destroyed,  but  only  transformed.  Instead  of  being  a  present  idea, 
it  becomes  a  residuum,  representing  a  certain  tendency  of  the  mind 
exactly  proportioned  to  the  energy  of  the  original  idea.  The 
existence  of  ideas  in  the  unconscious  state  might,  therefore,  be 
regarded  as  a  state  of  perfect  equilibrium.  '  Forgetfulness  means 
that  the  idea  of  a  thing  is  in  equilibrium  with  other  ideas,  and 
recollection  that  this  idea  quits  the  state  of  equilibrium,  and  enters 
the  state  of  motion.  No  idea  is  lost ;  and  every  operation  of  the 
mind  in  virtue  of  which  a  latent  idea  passes  to  the  active  state 
is  a  state  of  recollection.' l 

Amid  all  these  hypotheses,  which  the  future,  perhaps,  will  show 
to  be  truths,  this  remains  certain  and  unquestionable, — that  the 
phenomena  of  recollection  are  to  be  referred  to  the  grand  law  of 
the  conservation  of  force,  of  which  it  is  only  a  particular  case.  If, 
\  now,  we  pass  from  this  very  general  law  to  one  that  is  less  general — 
from  a  formula  embracing  all  changes  which  occur  in  the  universe 
to  a  formula  restricted  to  the  domain  of  life — we  shall  see  memory 
under  another  aspect 

This  biological  law  is  habit.  In  the  first  place,  habit,  considered 
in  its  essence,  is  referable  to  the  law  of  the  conservation  of  force, 
for  its  cause  is  the  primordial  law  or  form  of  being — that  is,  the 
tendency  of  beings  to  persevere  in  the  act  which  constitutes  them. 
As  has  been  already  seen,  every  act  leaves  in  our  physical  and 
mental  constitution  a  tendency  to  reproduce  itself,  and  when- 
ever this  reproduction  occurs  the  tendency  is  strengthened ;  and 
thus  a  tendency,  often  repeated,  becomes  automatic.  This 
automatism  is  the  link  between  memory  and  habit,  and  gave  rise 

1  Miiller,  Psychologie,  ii.  p.  517. 


Heredity  of  the  Memory.  5 1 

to  the  saying  that  memory  is  only  a  form  of  habit — a  proposition 
which,  with  some  restrictions,  is  true. 

On  the  one  hand,  it  is  certain  that  the  association  of  ideas  (a 
current  expression,  but  inexact,  for  association  occurs  also  between 
perceptions,  sentiments,  motions,  etc.)  is  the  indispensable  condi- 
tion of  memory.  On  the  other  hand,  habit  consists  of  automatic 
associations :  an  act  does  not  become  a  habit  until  the  various 
terms  of  the  series  which  compose  it  are  perfectly  fused  and 
integrated,  so  that  one  necessitates  the  others  (as  drilling, 
dancing,  playing  the  piano).  Not  to  inquire  here  whether  associa- 
tion is  to  be  referred  to  habit,  or  habit  to  association,  it  is  clear  that 
he  who  does  not  see  the  fundamental  identity  of  these  two  modes 
of  activity,  and  consequently  of  habit  and  memory,  must  be  totally 
without  the  faculty  of  generalization. 

But  to  confound  them  absolutely  appears  to  us  incorrect,  for 
the  following  reasons.  Habit  is  altogether  unconscious  and 
automatic ;  memory  is  so  only  in  part.  We  do  not  attribute  to 
memory  those  psychic  states  which  are  so  well  organized,  and  so 
incorporated  in  us,^as  to  constitute  a  part  of  ourselves.  We  do 
not  say  we  remember  that  an  effect  has  a  cause,  that  a  body 
possesses  extension,  that  a  self-moving  body  is  an  animal.  It 
would,  therefore,  be  more  exact  to  say  that  memory  is  an  incipient 
habit  If  we  trace  the  evolution  of  mind — going  from  instinct, 
which  is  automatic,  to  reason,  which  is  so  no  longer — we  may  say 
that  memory  is  the  transition  from  perfect  to  imperfect  automatism. 
If  we  trace  it  in  the  reverse  direction,  then  memory  indicates  the 
moment  when  what  was  free  and  conscious  tends  to  become 
unconscious.  '  Memory,  then,  appertains  to  that  class  of  psychical 
states  which  are  in  process  of  being  organized.  It  continues  so 
long  as  the  organizing  of  them  continues,  and  disappears  when 
the  organization  of  them  is  complete.  In  the  advance  of  the 
correspondence,  each  more  complex  cluster  of  attributes  and 
relations  which  a  creature  acquires  the  power  of  recognizing  is 
responded  to,  at  first  irregularly  and  uncertainly;  and  there  is 
then  a  weak  remembrance.  By  multiplication  of  experiences  this 
remembrance  is  made  stronger — the  internal  cohesions  are  better 
adjusted  to  the  external  persistences ;  and  the  response  is  rendered 
more  appropriate.  By  further  multiplication  of  experiences,  the 


5  2  Heredity. 

internal  relations  are  at  last  structurally  registered  in  harmony 
with  the  external  ones ;  and  so  conscious  memory  passes  into 
unconscious  or  organic  memory.'  * 

n. 

The  foregoing  remarks  are  all  within  our  subject,  though  they 
may  not  seem  so  ;  for,  having  now  referred  memory  to  habit,  we 
will  endeavour,  in  the  conclusion  of  the  work,  to  refer  heredity 
also  to  habit,  and  to  show  that  both  are  but  one  form  of  the 
universal  mechanism — of  that  inflexible  necessity  which  rules  the 
world  of  life  and  even  of  thought,  and  of  which  memory  itself  is 
but  one  aspect  Without  forestalling  this  conclusion,  of  which  the 
value  can  only  be  appreciated  when  we  have  first  studied  the  facts, 
the  laws,  and  the  causes,  heredity  may  at  least  be  compared  with 
memory.  Heredity,  indeed,  is  a  specific  memory  :  it  is  to  the 
species  what  memory  is  to  the  individual.  Facts  will  hereafter 
show  that  this  is  no  metaphor,  but  a  positive  truth.  If  these  con- 
siderations seem  too  theoretical,  it  must  be  at  least  admitted  that, 
memory  being  as  closely  and  perhaps  even  more  closely  connected 
with  the  organism  than  any  other  faculty,  the  heredity  of  memory 
is  implied  in  physiological  heredity.  Some  recent  authors,  among 
them  Dr.  Maudsley,  attribute  a  memory  to  every  nerve-cell,  to 
every  organic  element  of  the  body.  '  The  permanent  effects  of 
a  particular  virus,  such  as  that  of  variola  or  of  syphilis,  in  the 
constitution,  show  that  the  organic  element  remembers,  for  the 
remainder  of  its  life,  certain  modifications  it  has  received.  The 
manner  in  which  a  cicatrix  in  a  child's  finger  grows  with  the 
growth  of  the  body  proves,  as  has  been  shown  by  Paget,  that  the 
organic  element  of  the  part  does  not  forget  the  impression  it  has 
received.  What  has  been  said  about  the  different  nervous  centres 
of  the  body  demonstrates  the  existence  of  a  memory  in  the  nerve- 
cells  diffused  through  the  heart  and  the  intestines  ;  in  those  of  the 
spinal  cord  ;  in  the  cells  of  the  motor  ganglia,  and  in  the  cells  of 
the  cortical  substance  of  the  cerebral  hemispheres.' ' 

Still,  when  we  search  history  or  medical  treatises  for  facts  to 


1  Herbert  Spencer,  Principles  of  Psychology,  2nd  Edition,  §  202. 
8  Maudsley,  Physiology  of  Mind,  ch.  ix. 


Heredity  of  the  Memory.  53 


establish  the  heredity  of  the  memory  in  its  individual  form,  we 
meet  with  little  success.  While  such  facts  are  numerous  in  refer- 
ence to  the  imagination,  the  intellect,  the  passions,  we  find  very 
few  in  favour  of  heredity  of  memory. 

There  is  a  mental  disorder,  however — idiocy — which  presents 
some  instances.  This  infirmity — an  hereditary  one,  as  we  shall 
see,  at  least  in  the  shape  of  atavism — presents,  among  other 
characteristics,  an  excessive  weakness  of  memory.  Idiots  generally 
recollect  only  what  concerns  their  tastes,  their  propensities,  their 
passions.  But,  as  this  is  doubtless  the  result  of  the  feebleness  of 
their  sensorial  impressions,  this  heredity  is  the  effect  of  a  more 
general  hereditary  transmission. 

Aphasia,  which  is  nearly  always  connected  with  paralysis  of  the 
right  side,  is  produced  by  lesion  of  the  anterior  lobes  of  the  brain 
(the  third  frontal  convolution  of  the  left  side,  according  to  Broca). 
Its  psychological  cause  appears  to  be  amnesia,  or  a  loss  of 
memory,  an  inability  to  find  words  in  general,  or  some  particular 
words.  Although  this  disease  has  been  studied  with  much  care, 
no  cases  of  heredity  are  cited. 

History  shows  the  same  scarcity  of  instances.  The  almost 
fabulous  powers  of  memory  that  are  recorded  (Mithradates, 
Hadrian,  Clement  VL,  Pico  de  la  Mirandola,  Scaliger,  Mezzofanti, 
etc)  seem  isolated  cases ;  at  least,  we  cannot  trace  them  up  or 
down  in  the  genealogical  line.  Yet  some  facts  may  be  noted.  The 
two  Senecas  were  famed  for  their  memory :  the  father,  Marcus 
Annaeus,  could  repeat  2000  words  in  the  o.rder  in  which  he  heard 
them ;  the  son,  Lucius  Annaeus,  was  also,  though  less  highly,  gifted 
in  this  respect.  According  to  Gallon,  in  the  family  of  Richard 
Person,  one  of  the  Englishmen  most  distinguished  as  a  Greek 
scholar,  this  faculty  was  so  extraordinary  as  to  become  proverbial 
— the  Porson  memory.  The  case  may  also  be  noticed  of  Lady 
Hester  Stanhope,  the  daughter  of  one  of  the  most  illustrious  English 
families,  who,  under  the  name  of  '  the  Sibyl  of  the  Libanus,'  led 
so  strange  and  adventurous  a  life.  Among  many  points  of  re- 
semblance between  herself  and  her  grandfather  she  herself  cites 
memory.  '  I  possess  my  grandfather's  eyes,  and  his  memory  of 
places.  If  he  saw  a  stone  on  the  road  he  remembered  it — it  is 
the  same  with  me ;  his  eye,  which  usually  was  dull  and  lustreless, 


54  Heredity. 

lighted  up,  like  mine,  with  a  wild  gleam  under  the  influence  of 
passion.' 

It  may  be  remarked  that  certain  determinate  forms  of  memory 
are  hereditary  in  artist-families.  It  will  be  seen  that  the  talents 
for  painting  and  for  music  are  very  often  transmitted.  Now  and 
then  they  persist  through  four  or  five  consecutive  generations ;  and 
it  is  evident  that  no  one  can  be  a  good  painter  without  possessing 
a  memory  for  forms  and  colours,  or  be  a  good  musical  composer 
without  memory  of  sounds. 

To  sum  up,  it  must  be  admitted  that  there  are  not  many  facts  to 
show  the  heredity  of  memory ;  but  the  conclusion  is  not  thereby 
justified  that  this  form  of  heredity  is  rarer  than  others.  The 
opposite  opinion  is  still  tenable,  and  the  lack  of  evidences  can  be 
explained. 

Memory,  with  all  its  undoubted  usefulness,  plays  in  human  life, 
and  consequently  in  history,  only  a  secondary  and  obscure  part. 
It  produces  no  works,  like  the  intellect  and  the  imagination ;  nor 
does  it  perform  any  brilliant  actions,  like  the  will.  It  does  not 
give  material  evidence  of  itself,  like  a  defect  of  the  senses.  It  does 
not  come  under  the  ken  of  the  law,  like  the  passions ;  nor  does  it 
enter  the  domain  of  medicine,  like  mental  disease.  Since,  then,  it 
is  so  little  tangible,  the  lack  of  evidences  need  not  surprise  us  ;  and 
there  is  still  reason  to  hope  that,  in  proportion  as  the  subject  of 
mental  heredity,  hitherto  much  overlooked,  is  better  studied,  atten- 
tion will  be  directed  to  this  matter,  and  will  abundantly  show  that 
here,  as  elsewhere,  heredity  is  the  rule. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

HEREDITY   OF   THE   IMAGINATION. 


ALL  psychologists  distinguish  two  kinds  of  imagination  :  one 
reproductive,  the  other  creative.  Both  of  these  are  alike  subject 
to  the  law  of  heredity ;  perhaps,  indeed,  apart  from  instinct  and 
perception,  there  is  no  faculty  of  which  the  transmission  is  so 
common.  This  is  not  surprising,  if  we  remember  the  close  relation 


Heredity  of  the  Imagination.  55 

between  perception  and  imagination ;  that  the  latter,  in  its  passive 
form,  depends  entirely  on  the  nervous  system  and  the  organs,  and 
in  its  active  form  is  closely  connected  with  them ;  and  that,  conse- 
quently, psychological  heredity  implies  mental  heredity. 

Passive  imagination  is  the  property  by  which  our  sensorial  im- 
pressions tend  to  reproduce  themselves,  though  in  less  vivid  shape, 
in  the  absence  of  their  object.  In  its  highest  degree  it  becomes 
hallucination,  which  makes  our  internal  states  objective,  and 
presents  them  to  us  as  external  realities;  and  this  gives  ground 
for  believing  that  passive  imagination  is,  in  its  mechanism,  a 
reversed  perception — perception  proceeding  from  without  inwards, 
imagination  from  within  outwards.  The  part  played  by  imagin- 
ation in  insanity,  sleep,  drunkenness,  hallucination,  ecstasy,  and 
various  states  called  miraculous,  has  been  profoundly  studied  in 
our  time,  in  wo'rks  on  mental  diseases.  In  these  works  are  many 
important  facts  in  the  study  of  heredity.  We  propose  to  discuss 
these  hereafter,  and  bring  under  one  head  all  the  phenomena  of 
morbid  heredity. 

At  present  we  deal  only  with  active  imagination — the  imagin- 
ation of  the  poet,  the  artist,  and  even  of  the  man  of  science ;  the 
imagination  which  creates  and  interprets  an  ideal  conception  by 
means  of  sensible  forms.  It  is  a  complex  faculty,  presupposing, 
at  least,  taste  and  sentiment;  yet,  at  bottom,  it  differs  less  than 
might  be  supposed  from  passive  imagination ;  nor  is  common 
parlance  at  fault  when  it  confounds  the  two  under  one  name. 
The  essential  characteristic  of  both  is  vivid  representation,  intense 
vision.1  Hence  it  is  that  great  artists  have  ever  come  so  near  to 
hallucination  and  madness,  and  hence  many  of  them  have  over- 
stepped the  limits  of  sanity. 

The  history  of  art  shows  that  creative  imagination  is  transmissible 
by  heredity.  We  often  find  families  of  poets,  musicians,  painters. 
Families  of  poets  are,  it  would  seem,  more  rare ;  nor  is  the  reason 
hard  to  find.  No  one  can  be  a  musician  without  an  exquisite 

1  At  the  close  of  a  conversation  about  family  affairs,  Balzac  said  to  Jules 
Sandeau,  '  Now  let  us  come  to  reality ' — meaning  his  novels.  G.  Flaubert, 
while  describing  the  poisoning  of  one  of  his  heroines,  felt,  as  he  himself  says, 
all  the  symptoms  of  poisoning — the  taste  of  arsenic,  indigestion,  and  vomiting. 
•— Taine,  L '  Intelligence^  i.  p.  94. 


56  Heredity. 

sensibility  of  ear,  nor  a  painter  without  an  innate  gift  for  colour 
and  form,  which  presupposes  a  certain  conformation  of  the  visual 
organ.  These  physiological  conditions  are  not  to  the  same  degree 
necessary  for  the  poetic  faculty.  Hence  we  may  say  that  musical 
or  plastic  talent  is  more  dependent  than  the  poetic  on  the  con- 
formation of  the  organs.  In  the  former  case,  psychological 
heredity  is  more  closely  connected  with  physiological  heredity, 
and  this  makes  its  transmission  more  certain  ;  for,  as  will  be  shown, 
heredity  is  a  form  of  necessity  (in  other  words,  of  mechanism) ;  and 
this  is  far  more  inflexible  in  the  domain  of  life  than  in  that  of 
thought 

In  the  following  list,  and  in  all  others  of  the  same  kind,  it  is, 
of  course,  not  intended  to  give  a  complete  enumeration  of  every 
case  of  heredity.  We  merely  wish  to  place  facts  before  the 
reader's  eyes ;  we  cite  only  well-known  names,  or  thoroughly  con- 
clusive cases,  judging  that  here,  as  in  every  experimental  study, 
the  important  thing  is  not  the  quantity  of  experiences,  but  their 
quality.  Although,  too,  much  is  to  be  allowed  for  education  and 
tradition,  in  considering  a  talent  hereditary  in  a  family,  we  must 
not  attempt  to  explain,  by  these  external  means,  what  we  attribute 
to  heredity.  The  creative  imagination  is  probably,  of  all  the 
faculties,  the  one  that  it  is  least  possible  to  produce  artificially. 
Perhaps  the  following  summaries  of  historical  facts  will  be  found  to 
embrace  enough  experimenta  lucifera  to  justify  the  assertion  that 
heredity  is  the  rule,  not  the  exception. 

II. — POETS. 

Poets  are  scarcely  slandered,  if  it  be  said  that  as  a  rule  they 
form  a  passionate,  ardent,  sensitive  race  ;  that  is  the  very  condition 
of  the  artistic  temperament  Hence  the  disorders,  extravagancies, 
and  singularities  of  their  lives.  These  conditions  are  not  favour- 
able to  the  foundation  of  a  family.  A  great  artist  is  only  so  by  a 
mixture  of  qualities,  which  are,  so  to  speak,  extra-natural.  This  is 
a  character  which  is  produced  only  by  a  happy  accident,  and 
therefore  its  heredity  must  be  very  unstable. 

And  yet,  in  examining  the  families  of  the  fifty-one  poets  named 
below,  there  will  be  found  twenty-two  who  have  had  one  or  more 
distinguished  relatives.  Their  names  are  given  in  CAPITALS. 


Heredity  of  the  Imagination.  5  7 


LIST  OF  POETS. 

Alfieri,  Anacreon,  ARIOSTO,  ARISTOPHANES,  BURNS,  BYRON, 
Calderon,  Camoens,  CHAUCER,  CHENIER,  COLERIDGE,  CORNEILLE, 
COWPER,  Dante,  Dryden,  AESCHYLUS,  EURIPIDES,  GOETHE, 
Goldoni,  Gray,  HEINE,  Horace,  HUGO,  Juvenal,  La  Fontaine, 
Lamartine,  Lucan,  Lucretius,  Metastasio,  MILTON,  MUSSET, 
Moliere,  Moore,  Ovid,  Petrarch,  Plautus,  Pope,  RACINE,  Sappho, 
SCHILLER,  Shakspere,  Shelley,  SOPHOCLES,  Southey,  Spencer,  TASSO, 
Terence,  TENNYSON,  LOPE  DE  VEGA,  Virgil,  WORDSWORTH. 

It  will  be  observed  that  in  this  list,  from  which  no  poet  of 
eminence  is  intentionally  omitted,  some  might  have  been  excepted 
whose  genealogies  are  quite  unknown — Sappho,  Terence,  and 
others,  who  left  no  family.  In  this  way  we  reach  the  conclusion 
that  upwards  of  twenty  out  of  fifty  poets  (or  forty  per  cent.)  had 
illustrious  relatives.  We  give  some  details  on  this  point : — 

ARIOSTO,  while  yet  a  child,  wrote  comedies.  In  his  family  we  find — 
His   brother  Gabriel,  a  poet  of  some  distinction,   who,  after 

Lodovico's  death,  finished  the  comedy  of  La  Scholastica; 
His  nephew  Horace,  Tasso's  intimate  friend,   author  of  the 

Argumentt,  and  other  works. 
ARISTOPHANES.     The  talent  of  this  famous  comic  poet  is  found  in 

a  minor  degree  in 
His  son  Araros,  author  of  five  comedies,  among  which  we  may 

name  the  '  Kokalos '  and  the  '  Ailosikon;1 
Another  son,  Nicostratos,  who  wrote  fifteen  comedies  j 
Perhaps  also  another  son,  Philippos. 
BURNS  appears  to  have  inherited  from  his  mother  that  excessive 

sensibility  which  made  him  one  of  the  first  poets  of  Britain. 
BYRON.     His  genealogy  is  interesting. 

His  mother  was  an  eccentric,  haughty,  passionate  woman,  and 
half  insane.  Hence  a  certain  English  author  has  said  that 
'  if  ever  there  was  a  case  wherein  hereditary  influences  could 
be  pleaded  as  an  excuse  for  eccentricity  of  character  and 
conduct,  that  case  was  Byron's.'  He  was  descended  of  a 
line  of  ancestors  in  whom,  on  both  sides,  was  to  be  found 
everything  that  could  destroy  the  harmony  of  character,  as 
well  as  all  peace  and  individual  happiness. 


58  Heredity. 

His  daughter  Ada,  Lady  Lovelace,  was  distinguished  for  her 

mathematical  abilities. 

His  grandfather,  Admiral  Byron,  author  of  Travels. 
His/at/ier,  Captain  Byron,  a  man  of  dissolute  habits. 
CHAUCER,  the  father  of  English  poetry. 

His  son,   Sir  Thomas,  speaker  of  the   House   of  Commons, 

ambassador  to  the  Court  of  France. 
CH£NIER,  Andre",  the  most  illustrious  of  his  family ; 
His  brother,  Marie-Joseph. 
Both  took  after  their  mother,  Santi  Lomaka,  a  Greek  by  descent, 

and  a  woman  of  distinguished  talent. 
COLERIDGE — poet   and  metaphysician.      The  following  abridged 

list  of  his  descendants  is  taken  from  Galton : — 
His  son  Hartley,  poet,  a  precocious  child,  whose  early  life  was 
characterized  by  visions.      His   imagination  was   singularly 
vivid,  and  of  a  morbid  character. 
His  son,  the  Rev.  Derwent,  author,  late  Principal  of  the  Chelsea 

Training  College,  the  only  survivor  of  the  poet's  children. 
His  daughter  Sara  possessed  all  her  father's  individual  character- 
istics, and  was  also  an  author.      Married   her  cousin,  and 
of  this  union  was  born  Herbert  Coleridge,  a  philologist 
CORNEILLE,  Pierre,  with  whom  may  be  placed 
His  brother  Thomas ; 
His   nephew   Fontenelle,   his    sister's   son.      From  this    sister 

descended,  in  direct  line,  the  celebrated  Charlotte  Corday. 
/ESCHYLUS  numbered  among  his  family 
His  brother  Kynegiros,  one  of  the  heroes  of  Marathon  ; 
His  brother  Aminyas,  who  commenced  the  battle  of  Salamis. 
His  son  Euphorion,  and  his  nephew  Philocles,  seem  to  have 
possessed  some  talent  as  tragic  poets.     Philocles  was  victor 
in  the  contest  at  which  Sophocles  brought  out  his  (Edipus 
Tyrannus. 

GOETHE    inherited    his    father's    physical    constitution,   but    his 
mother's  character.     As  poet  and  physiological  student,  he 
thus  notes  these  hereditary  influences : — 
Vom  Vater  hab'  ich  die  Statur, 
Des  Lebens  emstes  Fuhren  ; 
Von  Mlitterchen  die  Frohnnatur, 
Und  Lust  zu  fabuliren. 


Heredity  of  the  Imagination.  59 


Urahnherr  war  der  Schonsten  hold, 

Das  spukt  so  hin  und  wieder ; 
Urahn  frau  liebte  Smuck  und  Gold 
Das  zuckt  wohl  durch  die  Glieder. 
HEINE,  Heinrich. 
With  him  may  be  mentioned  his  utule,  Solomon  Heine,  the 

celebrated  German  philanthropist. 
HUGO,  Victor.     Without  noticing  what  he  may  have  derived  from 

his  father  or  mother,  may  be  named 
His  two  sons,  Charles- Victor  and  Francois- Victor ; 
His  two  brotJiers,  both  known  as  literary  men,   Eugene  (died 

1837),  and  Abel  (died  1855). 
LUCAN.     His  genealogy  is  given  under  the  name  of  SENECA,  his 

uncle. 
MILTON. 

His  father  was  a  man  of  great  musical  talent,  whose  songs  are 

still  known ; 

His  brother,  a  judge,  also  took  part  in  political  life. 
MUSSET,  Alfred  de.     His  talent  is  to  some  extent  reproduced  in 

His  brother  Paul,  novelist 
RACINE. 

His  son  Louis,  a  '  good  verse-maker.' 

SCHILLER,  like  Burns,  seems  to  have  derived  his  extreme  sensitive- 
ness from  his  mother,  who  was  a  very  extraordinary  woman. 
SOPHOCLES.     Part  of  his  tragic  genius  lived  in 

His  son  lophon,  of  whom  Aristophanes  had  a  high  opinion ; 
His  grandson,  Sophocles  the  younger,  twelve  times  crowned. 
TASSO,  Torquato,  who  wrote  his  first  poem,  Rinaldo,  at  the  age 

of  seventeen,  received  his  talent  from 
His  father,  Bernardo,  a  poet  of  merit,  author  of  the  Amadis, 

and  from 

His  mother,  Parzia  di  Rossi,  a  remarkable  woman. 
VEGA,  Lope  de,  after  a  long  life  of  adventure,  died  a  priest     By 

Marcela  he  had 

A  natural  son,  who,  at  fourteen,  had  already  gained  some  dis- 
tinction as  a  poet     As  fond  of  adventure  as  his  father,  he 
died  young  in  battle. 
WORDSWORTH,  poet  and  metaphysician; 
His  brother,  an  ecclesiastical  writer  j 


6o  Heredity. 

His  three  nephews,  all  distinguished  scholars;  one  of  them  was 
senior  classic  at  Cambridge  in  1830. 

III. — PAINTERS. 

A  glance  at  any  history  of  painting,  or  a  visit  to  a  few  museums, 
will  show  that  families  of  painters  are  not  rare.  In  England  you 
have  the  Landseers ;  in  France  the  Bonheurs.  Every  one  has 
heard  of  the  Bellinis,  Caraccios,  Teniers,  Van  Ostades,  Mieris, 
Van  der  Veldes.  In  a  list  of  forty-two  painters — Italian,  Spanish, 
and  Flemish — held  to  be  of  the  highest  rank,  Gallon  found 
twenty-one  that  had  illustrious  relatives. 

LIST   OF   PAINTERS. 

BASSANO,  BELLINI,  Buonarotti  (Michael  Angelo),  CAGLIARI  (Paul 
Veronese),  CARACCI,  Ludovico,andAnnibale;  Cimabue,  CORREGGIO, 
Domenichino,  Francia,  GELEE  (Claude  Lorrain),  Giorgione,  Giotto, 
Guido  Reni,  PARMEGIANO,  Perugino,  Sebastian  del  Piombo, 
Poussin,  ROBUSTI  (Tintoretto),  Salvator  Rosa,  RAFAEL,  Titian, 
Leonardo  da  Vinci. 

MURILLO,  Ribeira,  Spagnoletto,  Velasquez,  Gerard  Douw,  A. 
Durer,  the  two  VAN    EYCKS,  Holbein,  MIERIS,  VAN    OSTADE, 
POTTER,     Rembrandt,     Rubens,     RUYSDAEL,     TENIERS,    VAN 
DYCK,  VAN  DER  VELDE. 
BASSANO,  Giacomo  da  Ponte  (1510 — 1592),  the  greatest  of  his 

family  ; 
His  father,  Francisco,  founder  of  the  school  which  bore  his 

name; 

His  four  sons,   Francisco,  Giovanni,    Leandro,    Girolamo,   all 
distinguished  painters.     Francesco,  who  was  of  a  melancholy 
temperament,  committed  suicide  at  the  age  of  49. 
BELLINI,  Giovanni,  Venetian,  was  one  of  the  first  who  painted 

in  oils ; 

mis  fattier,  Jacopo,  a  celebrated  portrait-painter. 
His  brother.   Gentile,  one  of  the   favourites  of  the  Venetian 

senate. 
CAGLIARI  (Paul  Veronese) ; 

His  fattier,  Gabriele,  was  a  sculptor; 

His  maternal  uncle,  Antonio,  was  one  of  the  earliest  among  the 
Venetian  painters  who  abandoned  the  Gothic  style  ; 


Heredity  of  the  Imagination.  61 

His  son,  Carletto,  a  painter  of  great  promise,  died  at  the  age 

of  26; 

Another  son,  Gabriele,  attempted  painting,  but  without  success. 
CARACCI  (Ludovico),  founder  of  a  school  which  bears  his  family 

name; 

His  three  coiisins-german,  Agostino,  Annibale,  and  Francisco. 
Agostino  was  remarkable  as  an  artist,  man  of  science  and 
poet ; 
His  nephew,  Antonio,  was  also  a  distinguished  painter,  but  died 

young  ; 

Also  his  father,  Pietro,  a  painter  of  no  originality. 
CLAUDE  LORRAIN  (Gelde)  never  married. 
His  brother,  was  an  engraver  on  wood. 
CORREGIO,  Allegri,  died  young,  leaving 

An  only  son,  Pomponeo,  who  painted  fresco  in  his  father's  style. 
EYCK,   Jan  van,   and   Hubert,   two  brothers  whose   names  are 

inseparable ; 

Their  father  was  an  obscure  painter; 
Their  sister,  Margaret,  followed  painting  with  zeaL 
MIERIS,  FranQois,  called  the  old ; 

His  two  sons,  John  and  William,  the  latter  scarcely  inferior  to 

his  father  ; 

His  grandson,  Francois,  called  the  younger,  son  of  William. 
MURILLO,  Bartolome  Esteban,  was  pupil  of 

His  uncle,  Juan  of  Castille,  a  painter  of  great  merit     We  may 
also  name  his  uncle,  Augustino  del  Castillo,  and  his  cousin, 
Antonio  del  Castillo  y  Salvedra,  both  painters  of  merit 
OSTADE,  Adrian  van,  whose  name  is  almost  inseparable  from  that 

of  his  brother,  Isaac,  who  died  very  young. 
PARMEGIANO  (Mazzuoli),  a  great  colourist  '  into  whom '  according 

to  Vasari  '  Raffaelle's  soul  passed  ; ' 
His  father  Filippo,  and  his   two  uncles,  Michael  and  Pietro, 

painters  of  some  note. 
POTTER,  Paul,  the  most  celebrated  animal-painter  of  the  Dutch 

School ; 

His  father,  Peter,  a  landscape-painter. 
RAFAEL  SANZIO. 

\\\&  father,  Giovanni  San/.io. 


02  Heredity. 

ROBUSTI  (Tintoretto),  one  of  the  most  celebrated  painters  of  the 

Venetian  school ; 

His  daughter,  Marietta,  famous  as  a  portrait-painter; 
His  son,  Domenico,  a  good  portrait-painter. 
RUYSDAEL,   Jakob,   and  his  brother,   Salomon,   both   landscape- 
painters. 
TENIERS,  David,  called  the   younger,  the  most  celebrated  of 

his  family ; 

His  father,  David  the  elder; 
His  brother,  Abraham. 

TITIAN  (Vecellio).  In  his  family  were  nine  painters  of  merit, 
among  them  his  brother,  Francesco,  and  his  sons,  Pomponio 
and  Horatio.  The  following  is  his  genealogy  from  Galton. 


Francesco 


Titian 


Mario 


Tizianello        Tomaso 


Fabricio 


.esarc 


Pomponio 


Horatio 


VAN    DYCK,  Antony.     His  father  was  a  painter,  his  mother 

worked  landscapes  on  tapestry  with  wonderful  skill. 
VAN  DER  VELDE,  William  (the  younger),  a  master  of  marine  land- 
scape ; 

His  father,  Van  der  Velde  the  elder,  and 
His  son,  William,  both  marine  painters ; 

Probably  the  two  brothers,  Isaiah  and  Jan  van  der  Velde,  born 
at  Leyden,  and  Adrian,  a  native  of  Amsterdam,  were  of  this 
family. 


Heredity  of  the  Imagination.  63 

rv. — MUSICIANS. 
The  development  of  the  art  of  music  is  far  more  recent  than 

that  of  painting.     It  dates  back  no  more  than  three  centuries. 

Still  we  shall  find  that  the  heredity  of  this  art  is  not  rare :  the 

family  of  the  Bachs  alone  presents  us  with  most  singular  evidence. 

Of  great  musicians  who  constitute  exceptions  to  the  law  of  heredity 

I  find  only  Bellini,  Donizetti,  Rossini,  and  Halevy. 

ALLEGRI,  the  famous  composer  of   the  Sistine  Chapel  Miserere, 
was  of  the  same  family  as  Correggio  the  painter. 

AMATI,  Andrea,  the  most  illustrious  member  of  a  family  of  violinists 

at  Cremona ; 

His  brother,  Niccola,  his  two  sons,  Antonio  and  Girolamo,  and 
his  grandson. 

BACH,  Sebastian,  the  greatest  of  his  family. 

The  Bach  family  is,  perhaps,  the  most  distinguished  instance  of 
mental  heredity  on  record.     It  began  in  1550,  and  continued 
through  eight  generations,  the   last  known   member  being 
Regina  Susanna,  who  was  living  in  indigence  in  the  year  1800. 
*  During  a  period  of  nearly  200  years  this  family  produced  a 
multitude  of  artists  of  the  first  rank.      There  is  no  other 
instance  of  such  remarkable   talents  being  combined  in  a 
single  family.     Its  head  was  Weit  Bach,  a  baker  of  Presburg, 
who  used  to  seek  relaxation  from  labour  in  music  and  song. 
He  had  two  sons,  who  commenced  that  unbroken  line  of 
musicians  of  the  same  name  that  for  nearly  two  centuries 
overran  Thuringia,  Saxony,  and  Franconia.     They  were  all 
organists,  church  singers,  or  what  is  called  in  Germany  Stadt- 
Musiker.     When  they  had  become  too  numerous  to  live  near 
each  other,  and  the  members  of  the  family  were  scattered 
abroad,  they  resolved  to  meet  once  a  year,  on  a  stated  day, 
with  a  view  to  keep  up  a  sort  of  patriarchal  bond  of  union. 
This  custom  was  kept  up  until  nearly  the  middle  of  the  i8th 
century,  and  often  more  than  100  persons  bearing  the  name 
of  Bach — men,  women,  and  children — assembled.'     In  this 
family  are  reckoned  twenty-nine  eminent  musicians.     Fe'tis, 
in  his  Dictionnaire  Biographique,  mentions  fifty-seven  mem- 
bers of  this  family. 

BEETHOVEN,  Ludwig ; 
4 


64  Heredity. 

His  father,  Johannes,  was  tenor  in  the  choir  of  the  Elector  of 

Cologne ; 

His  grandfather,  Ludwig,  was  first   singer,  and   then  Kapell- 
meister in  the  same  choir. 

BELLINI,  son  and  grandson  of  musicians  of  no  great  mark. 
BENDA,    Francisco   (1709 — 1786),   the  principal   member    of   a 

remarkable  family  of  violinists  ; 
His  three  brotliers,  Giovanni,  Giuseppe,  and  Georgio  ; 
His  two  sons,  Federico  and  Carolo,  and  two  daughters; 
His  two  nepJiews,  Ernest,  son  of  Giuseppe,  and  Federico,  son 

of  Georgio. 
BONONCINI.  His  father,  Antonio,  and  his  son,  Giovanni ;  the  latter 

was  for  some  time  in  England,  and  the  rival  of  HandeL 
DONIZETTI,  Gaetano ; 

His  brother,  Giuseppe,  specially  cultivated  military  music, 
DUSSEK,  Ladislas,  a  noted  composer  and  performer  j 
His  brother,  Johannes,  an  organist  of  repute ; 
His  brother,  Franz,  a  good  violinist ; 
His  daughter,  Olivia,  inherited  her  father's  talent 
EICHHORN  and  his  two  sons,  who  from  their  earliest  years  showed 

great  talent  as  instrumentalists. 
GABRIELLI,  Andrea,  and  his  nephew  Giovanni. 
HALEVY.    Of  Jewish  origin — a  point  worthy  of  note,  to  which 

reference  will  again  be  made ; 
His  brother,  Ldon,  literary  man  and  poet 
HAYDN  and  his  brother,  who  was  a  good  organist  and  composer 

of  church  service. 
HILLIER,   Johann  Adam — musical    composition  and  works   on 

music ; 

His  son,  Friedrich  Adam  (1768 — 1812) ; 
His  grandson,  Ferdinand,  '  now  one  of  the  best  composers  in 

Germany '  in  the  opinion  of  Fdtis. 
KEISER,  Reinhard,  his  father  and  his  daughter. 
MENDELSSOHN,  of  a  Jewish  family; 

His  grandfather,  Moses,  philosopher,  wrote  works  on  aesthetics ; 
His  uncle,  an  author  ; 

His  sister,  a  distinguished  woman,  a  clever  pianist — she  had  a 
share  in  much  of  the  work  done  by  her  brother. 


Heredity  of  the  Intellect.  65 

MEYERBEER  (Jakob  Baer) ; 

His  two  brothers,  the  one,  Wilhelm,  an  astronomer,  noted  for  his 

lunar  chart,  the  other,  Michael,  a  poet,  who  died  young. 
MOZART. 

His  father,  Johann  Georg,  second  Kapellmeister  to  the  Prince- 
Bishop  of  Salzburg  ; 
His   sister,  whose  success  while  yet  a  child  seemed   to  give 

evidence  of  talent  not  realized  in  maturer  years ; 
His  son,  Carl,  was  an  amateur  musician ; 
His  son,  Wolfgang,  born  four  months  after  his  father's  death, 

gave  evidence  early  in  life  of  a  happy  turn  for  music. 
PALESTRINA.     His  sons,  Angelo,  Rodolfo,  and  Sylla,  who  all  died 
young,  seemed  to  have  inherited  some  of  their  father's  talent, 
if  we  may  judge  by  some  of  their  compositions  which  have 
been  preserved. 
ROSSINI.     His  father  and  mother  musicians  at  fairs. 


CHAPTER  V. 

HEREDITY   OF   THE    INTELLECT. 
I. 

THE  faculty  of  knowing  may  be  hypothetically  divided  into  two 
parts  :  the  one  includes  perception,  memory,  and  imagination,  of 
which  we  have  now  studied  the  heredity ;  there  will  remain  for 
the  other  a  certain  number  of  faculties  which  have  for  their  object 
abstract  and  general  conceptions,  which  we  will  here  call  intellect 
proper.  We  have  now  to  consider  if  these  last-named  modes  of 
knowing,  which  are  the  highest  of  all,  are  subject  to  the  law  of 
heredity. 

First,  it  is  evident  that  these  manifestations  of  thought  are 
indeed  the  higher  forms  of  the  human  intellect — that  is  to  say,  of 
the  highest  intellect  of  which  we  are  cognizant  Man  can  rise 
from  the  concrete  and  confused  sensation  to  the  simplicity  of 
abstract  notions ;  he  can  reduce  a  countless  mass  of  facts  to  one 
general  idea,  and  denote  it  by  an  arbitrary  sign ;  he  can,  by  ratiocin- 
ation, arrive  at  the  most  remote,  or  the  most  complicated  consc- 


66  Heredity. 

quences,  and  divine  the  future  from  the  past  It  is  because  man 
can  compare,  judge,  abstract,  generalize,  deduct,  and  form  induc- 
tions, that  sciences,  religion,  art,  morals,  social  and  political  life, 
have  sprung  into  being,  and  have  continued  their  incessant  evolu- 
tion. So  wonderful  are  these  faculties,  that,  by  their  accumulated 
results,  they  have  made  of  man,  as  it  were,  a  being  apart  from  all 
the  rest  of  nature. 

The  inquiry,  therefore,  whether  these  faculties  can  be  hereditary, 
is  an  inquiry  whether  psychological  life,  in  its  highest  form,  is 
subject  to  this  law  of  biology.  If  we  take  a  narrow  and  superficial 
point  of  view,  it  might  appear  as  if,  so  far,  we  had  at  most  proved 
the  heredity  of  the  lower  forms  of  intelligence,  and  as  if  we  had 
merely  touched  the  outer  margin  of  the  subject ;  and  it  might  be 
said  that  we  have  no  right  to  argue  from  the  less  to  the  greater, 
from  the  lower  to  the  higher.  Now,  however,  we  meet  the  diffi- 
culty face  to  face. 

It  cannot,  however,  be  said  that  the  controversy  with  regard  to 
this  point  has  been  very  keen.  It  could  only  have  been  maintained 
by  metaphysicians  who  have  for  the  most  part  shown  the  utmost 
indifference  for  this  subject  The  partisans  of  experience,  physio- 
logists and  others,  who  have  treated  of  heredity,  have  generally 
attributed  to  it  the  greatest  degree  of  influence.  Some,  carried 
away  by  misdirected  zeal,  and  more  concerned  about  the  hypo- 
thetical consequences  of  such  a  doctrine  than  about  its  intrinsic 
truth,  have  imagined  a  division  of  the  intellectual  faculties,  and 
have  withdrawn  one  portion  of  it  from  heredity.  According  to 
this  theory,  which  claims  the  authority  of  Aristotle,  we  have  two 
souls,  the  one  sensitive  or  animal,  transmissible  like  the  body,  and 
the  other  rational  or  human,  '  not  dependent  on  the  act  of 
generation,'  and  which  would,  therefore,  lie  wholly  beyond  the 
influence  of  heredity.  This  hypothesis,  now  wholly  obsolete,  needs 
no  discussion.  They  who  maintain  it,  and  Lordat  in  particular, 
have  shown  so  clearly  that  their  preconceived  opinion  would  not 
submit  to  facts,  that  criticism  is  quite  superfluous. 

The  problem  for  us  is  this :  Are  the  higher,  like  the  lower, 
modes  of  intellect  transmissible  ?  Are  our  faculties  of  abstraction, 
judgment,  ratiocination,  invention,  governed  by  heredity,  as  are 
our  perceptive  faculties  ?  Or,  in  plainer  terms,  and  in  common 


Heredity  of  the  Intellect.  67 

parlance, — Are  common  sense,  insanity,  genius,  talent,  subtlety, 
aptitude  for  abstract  studies,  hereditary  ? 

In  order  to  reply,  we  will  examine  the  question  from  the 
two-fold  standpoint  of  theory  and  fact,  of  metaphysics  and 
experience.  Reason  will  show  that  the  heredity  of  intellect  is 
possible,  experience  that  it  is  real. 

If  we  admit  the  heredity  of  the  lower  modes  of  intellect — and 
facts  are  here  decisive — logic  alone  ought  to  convince  us  that  it 
extends  to  all  intellect,  for  it  is  admitted  by  all  schools  of  thought 
that  this  faculty  is  essentially  one.  Psychology  has  always  dis- 
tinguished different  modes  of  the  faculty  of  knowing,  and,  indeed, 
the  analytical  study  of  intellect  is  only  possible  on  that  condition. 
But  these  are  but  differences  in  the  way  of  looking  at  them,  not 
specific  differences.  In  the  same  way,  phrenologists  have  thought 
that  they  could  assign  to  each  faculty  a  special  portion  of  the  brain ; 
but,  even  had  their  view  been  sustained,  such  localization  would  in 
no  degree  have  invalidated  the  unity  of  the  intellect  itself.  How- 
ever far  back  the  question  may  be  carried,  every  inquiry  into  the 
ultimate  nature  of  intellect  must  necessarily  issue  in  one  or  other 
of  these  two  conclusions :  either  it  is  an  effect,  of  which  the  cause  is 
the  organism ;  or  it  is  a  cause,  of  which  the  effect  is  all  that  exists 
or  can  be  known.  The  first  hypothesis  is  called  materialism,  the 
second  idealism.  We  shall  see,  taking  our  stand  on  reasoning 
only,  that  between  these  two  hypotheses  and  the  heredity  of  the 
higher  modes  of  intellect  there  exists  no  contradiction,  no  logical 
incompatibility. 

There  is  no  difficulty  in  the  materialistic  hypothesis;  for  if  it  be 
admitted  that  thought  is  only  a  property  of  living  matter,  then,  as 
heredity  is  one  of  the  laws  of  life,  it  must  therefore  be  also  one  of 
the  laws  of  thought.  Or,  in  more  precise  terms,  intellect  is  a 
function  whose  organ  is  the  brain ;  the  brain  is  transmissible,  as 
is  every  other  organ,  the  stomach,  the  lungs,  and  the  heart;  the 
function  is  transmissible  with  the  organ;  therefore  intellect  is 
transmissible  with  the  brain.  Physiological  heredity  involves,  as 
a  necessary  consequence,  psychological  heredity  in  all  its  forms. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  idealistic  hypothesis  seems  to  stand  in 
utter  opposition  to  heredity  of  intellect ;  but,  as  will  be  seen,  this 
opposition  is  not  so  radical  as  would  at  first  appear. 


68  Heredity. 

Idealism  has  recently  found  learned  and  able  advocates;  its 
details  will  hereafter  be  noticed.  Enough  here  to  explain,  in  a 
few  words,  that  idealism  is  that  metaphysical  system  which  holds 
thought  to  be  the  only  reality.  Sometimes,  regarding  thought  or 
intellect  as  a  secondary  and  derivative  mode  of  existence,  it  strives 
to  ascend  still  higher,  and  to  discover  in  will  the  first  cause  of  all 
things,  the  supreme  reality.  Such  is  the  position  of  Schopenhauer 
and  his  school,  that  is  to  say,  the  most  philosophic  form  of  con- 
temporary idealism.  Thus  exalted,  and  under  this  exceedingly 
abstract  form,  idealism  is  as  far  removed  as  it  well  can  be  from 
experience,  in  the  common  acceptation  of  that  term.  To  ex- 
perience, however,  it  must  come.  This  system,  like  all  others,  must 
account  for  the  world  of  sense,  for  nature,  and  her  phenomena  and 
laws.  There  being  no  other  absolute  existence  save  thought, 
matter  must  be  referred  to  thought  Matter,  according  to  Schel- 
ling,  can  be  nothing  else  but  '  extinct  or  exteriorized  mind.'  Hegel 
defines  it  to  be  idea  made  objective  to  itself.  It  matters  little 
what  these  theories  are  worth.  Idealism  has  never  explained  the 
transition  from  the  absolute  to  the  relative,  from  mind  to  matter, 
except  by  metaphors, — a  process,  moreover,  which  it  has  in  common 
with  every  other  metaphysical  system.  It  is  enough  that  it  admits 
the  material  world,  with  its  laws,  as  a  purely  phenomenal  existence. 
In  this  admission  we  find  the  basis  for  a  reconciliation  between 
idealism  and  heredity. 

For  if  we  hold,  with  Schopenhauer,  that  the  will  is  the  primitive 
element  in  everything  and  in  every  being,  then  intellect  will  be 
only  a  derived  faculty,  a  first  step  toward  materialization.  Hence 
it  will  be  subject  to  the  mechanism  of  logic,  emprisoned  in  the 
'  forms  of  thought,'  in  the  categories  discovered  and  analyzed  by 
Kant,  and,  like  all  the  rest  of  nature,  it  will  have  its  laws.  This 
admission  is  enough.  Henceforth,  between  the  idealists  and 
ourselves  there  exists  no  real  opposition.  Their  theory  is  that  there 
are  two  distinct  modes  of  existence  :  the  noumenon  in  the  will  and 
the  phenomenon  in  the  intellect  and  in  nature.  To  the  mind, 
regarded  as  noumenon,  none  of  our  conceptions  of  laws,  logical 
necessity,  or  categories  are  applicable;  for  all  this  only  pertains  to 
the  mind  considered  as  phenomenon.  Consequently,  since  we 
restrict  ourselves  to  the  studv  of  experience — that  is  to  say,  of 


Heredity  of  the  Intellect.  69 

facts  and  their  laws — there  can  be  no  disagreement  between  us 
and  the  idealists.  The  difference  between  us  springs,  not  from 
any  diametrical  opposition  of  doctrine,  but  from  the  fact  that  to 
the  study  of  phenomena  which  both  sides  pursue,  and  to  which 
we  strictly  confine  ourselves,  the  idealist  joins  a  metaphysical 
theory,  which,  in  our  eyes,  has  no  scientific  value,  since  it 
transcends  science. 

It  is  true  that  idealists  hold  that  the  laws  of  nature,  and,  gener- 
ally, of  internal  or  external  experience,  have  only  a  relative 
phenomenal  value ;  but  we  have  never  asserted  that  experience 
can  give  us  the  absolute.  If  the  idealist  admits,  as  he  does,  that 
in  the  order  of  physical,  chemical,  physiological,  and  psychological 
facts  there  are  coexistences  and  sequences  that  can  be  reduced  to 
fixed  formulas,  he  has  no  fair  grounds  for  refusing  to  concede  to 
heredity  a  place  among  these  empiric  laws,  though  he  may  deny 
that  it  applies  to  the  intellect  considered  as  noumenon. 

Thus  the  heredity  of  intellectual  faculties  can  be  reconciled 
with  the  most  transcendental  idealism.  If,  now,  we  examine  the 
question  in  our  own  way,  that  is,  without  transcending  experience, 
we  say  that  intellect,  in  its  inmost  nature,  appears  to  us  as  one  of 
the  manifestations  of  the  unknowable.  We  may,  indeed,  as 
psychology  and  the  sciences  advance,  determine  its  empiric  laws 
and  conditions  more  precisely ;  but  we  shall  not  arrive  at  its  essen- 
tial nature.  It  is  indisputable  that  within  the  last  thirty  years 
English  and  German  psychologists — and  particularly  Herbert 
Spencer,  Bain,  and  Wundt — have,  with  a  precision  previously 
unknown,  analyzed  the  modes  of  intellect  and  the  conditions  of  its 
development.  They  have  shown  that  all  intellectual  processes, 
from  the  highest  and  most  complex  down  to  the  most  elementary, 
consist  in  apprehending  resemblances  and  differences.  To  assimi- 
late and  dissimilate,  to  integrate  and  disintegrate,  to  combine 
and  differentiate — such  is  the  fundamental  process  of  the  intellect, 
and  it  is  found  in  all  its  operations,  as  well  in  the  simplest  as  in 
the  most  complex.  Yet  this  analysis,  while  it  discloses  to  us  in  a 
striking  way  the  '  unity  of  composition '  of  psychic  processes,  in 
reality  only  enables  us  to  understand  the  mechanism  of  intellect 
and  the  laws  of  its  empiric  development  We  may,  indeed,  reduce 
the  infinite  variety  of  the  facts  of  thought  to  two  simple  facts,  viz. 


7O  Heredity 

combination  and  differentiation ;  but  it  still  remains  true  that  these 
two  facts  themselves  exist  only  in  and  by  thought,  and  we  do  not 
know  what  thought  is.  If  we  add  that  these  phenomena  are  given 
us  under  the  form  of  a  sequence,  or  of  simple  series,  and  that  suc- 
cession is  the  essential  condition  of  consciousness,  we  do  but 
express  the  form  of  thought,  not  its  nature,  for  things  may  be 
successive  without  being  facts  of  consciousness.  Thought,  there- 
fore, is  still  impenetrable  to  us:  it  explains  all  things,  but  does  not 
explain  itself;  it  is  one  of  those  noumena  wherewith  we  solve  the 
enigma  of  the  universe,  but  it  is  itself  an  enigma. 

The  unity  of  the  intellect  is  an  indisputable  fact,  established  alike 
by  consciousness,  experience,  and  theory.  Nothing,  therefore,  could 
be  more  chimerical  that  to  suppose  that  given  intellectual  opera- 
tions are,  by  their  own  nature,  beyond  the  laws  of  heredity.  Logic 
rejects  any  such  conclusion,  and  it  is  no  less  contradicted  by  facts. 

It  will,  perhaps,  excite  surprise  that,  in  the  foregoing  remarks,  we 
have  not  named  that  highest  mode  of  intellect  which  metaphysi- 
cians call  reason.  This  faculty — whose  object,  according  to  some, 
is  the  absolute,  the  infinite,  the  perfect,  according  to  others,  the 
necessary  process  of  thought — is  pre-eminently  the  metaphysical 
faculty.  It  has  its  seat  in  that  region  of  the  impalpable  and  the 
invisible  where  we  look  for  the  ultimate  reasons  of  things.  It  lies 
so  far  above  experience  that,  in  a  study  on  experimental  psychology, 
we  are  almost  obliged  not  to  speak  of  it  We  need  only  declare 
our  position  with  regard  to  every  possible  theory  of  reason. 

Metaphysicians  are  by  no  means  agreed  as  to  the  nature  of 
this  faculty.  In  France,  a  theory,  borrowed  from  Leibnitz, 
broadened  and  deepened  by  idealists  in  our  own  day,  reduces 
reason  to  two  constituent  principles,  viz.  the  principle  of  contra- 
diction or  of  identity,  and  the  principle  of  raison  suffisante — both 
ultimately  reducible  to  one.  The  principle  of  identity,  the  last 
resort  of  logic  and  science,  is  subordinate  to  the  principle  of 
raison  suffisantc,  which  is  the  ultimate  principle  of  all  existences, 
because  the  latter  accounts  for  all  things,  is  not  limited  to  the 
declaration  that  a  thing  is,  but  why  it  is,  and  what  determined  its 
existence ;  and  this  ultimate  principle  itself  would  not  be  explic- 
able were  it  not  that  it  implies  the  summiim  intelligibile,  which  is 
identical  with  the  good.  All  things,  therefore,  would  be  reduced 


Heredity  of  the  Intellect.  71 

to  a  moral  principle.  Logic,  metaphysics,  and  morals  are  so 
thoroughly  blended  together,  that  the  endless  variety  of  human 
knowledge  and  of  human  actions  would  have  but  one  origin,  and, 
however  unlike  they  may  be  to  one  another  in  their  phenomenal 
multiplicity,  they  would  be  identical  in  their  rational  unity. 

This  coherent  theory  is,  by  its  own  nature,  placed  out  of  the 
reach  of  all  experience  and  all  verification.  Attractive  as  it  may 
be,  it  has  the  radical  defect  of  all  metaphysics,  that  we  cannot 
say  whether  it  has  any  objective,  absolute  value,  or  whether  it  is 
merely  subjective.  This,  however,  is  clear,  that  between  this 
theory  and  ours  no  opposition  is  possible,  since  each  occupies  a 
province  of  its  own,  and  the  world  of  pure  reason  begins  only 
where  the  world  of  phenomena  ends. 

If  from  this  strictly  metaphysical  theory  of  reason  we  descend 
to  the  usual  doctrine,  the  joint  product  of  the  Scotch  school  and 
of  French  eclecticism,  it  will  be  found  perfectly  reconcilable  with 
the  heredity  of  intellect,  even  in  its  highest  form.  The  one 
fixed  and  essential  point  in  the  vague,  loose,  and  often  contradictory 
system  of  Reid  and  Cousin  is  this,  that  reason  is  '  an  impersonal, 
universal,  and  necessary '  faculty.  But  it  would  hardly  be  possible 
to  name  any  characters  more  in  accordance  with  the  law  of  heredity. 
Without  stopping  to  inquire  how  the  infallible  transmission  of  these 
characters  is  explained — a  question  never  so  much  as  raised  by  the 
eclectic  school — whether  it  is  connected  with  some  permanent  state 
of  the  brain,  or  whether  it  results  from  some  mysterious  operation, 
it  is  enough  that  it  is  admitted  that  they  are  the  same,  everywhere, 
always,  and  in  all  men.  Hence  they  are  specific  characteristics; 
that  is  to  say,  it  is  as  much  a  contradiction  in  terms  to  think  of  a 
man  without  reason  as  of  a  vertebrate  animal  without  a  cerebro- 
spinal  axis.  But,  as  we  shall  see  later,  the  special  property  of 
heredity  is  precisely  this, — that  it  transmits,  without  exception,  all 
specific  characteristics.  Thus,  if  we  accept  Cousin's  theory,  there 
is  no  faculty  of  man  that  is  more  certainly  transmissible  than  the 
highest  form  of  intellect — reason.  For  heredity,  too,  is  impersonal, 
since  it  preserves  the  species ;  and  universal,  since  it  governs  the 
whole  domain  of  life ;  and  it  is  one  of  the  forms  of  inflexible 
necessity. 

Thus,  then,  either  we  place  intellect  and   reason,  ;ts   highest 


72  Heredity. 

form,  beyond  time  and  space,  and  then  they  have  nothing  in 
common  with  experience;  or  we  consider  them  in  their  pheno- 
menal manifestations,  and  then  there  is  no  logical  ground  for 
exempting  them  from  the  law  of  heredity. 

II. 

It  must  now  be  shown  from  facts  that  this  transmission  is  not 
only  possible,  but  actual.  Here  is  a  difficulty.  Intellect — that  is 
to  say,  the  faculty  of  comparing,  judging,  reasoning — is  found 
everywhere — in  science,  politics,  art,  industrial  inventions,  learning, 
history,  etc.  Is  it,  therefore,  necessary  to  class  under  the  head  of 
intellect  every  case  of  heredity  in  politics,  literature,  and  art  ?  We 
must  have  recourse  to  an  artificial  process,  and  divide  what  in 
nature  is  united.  Surrendering,  therefore,  to  imagination  all  that 
concerns  artists,  and  to  active  faculties  all  that  has  to  do  with 
politics,  we  here  treat  only  of  cases  in  which  pure  intellect — that  is 
to  say,  reflection,  taste,  or  criticism — predominates. 

Still  these  cases  are  sufficiently  numerous  to  make  two  catego- 
ries. In  the  first  we  place  men  of  science,  philosophers,  poli- 
tical economists,  etc. ;  in  the  second,  writers,  properly  so  called, 
historians,  critics,  and  novelists.  This  division  is,  of  course,  some- 
what arbitrary,  nor  should  any  great  stress  be  laid  on  it ;  but  it 
will  enable  us  to  introduce  more  order  into  our  arrangement 

MEN   OF   SCIENCE. 

Families  eminent  in  science  are  not  rare.  Many  scientific  men 
take  after  their  fathers.  The  atmosphere  of  free  inquiry  in  which 
they  were  brought  up  has  not  been  without  influence  on  their 
vocation.  Still,  education  does  not  constitute  genius ;  and  in  order 
to  have  a  turn  for  scientific  investigation,  something  more  is 
required  than  the  external  transmission  resulting  from  education. 
It  has  also  been  observed  that  the  mothers  or  grandmothers  of 
several  men  of  science  were  remarkable  women,  as  in  the  case  of 
Buffon,  Bacon,  Condorcet,  Cuvier,  d'Alembert,  Forbes,  Watt, 
Jussieu,  etc.1  Heredity  among  philosophers  is  somewhat  rare. 

1  Gallon,  who  notes  this  fact,  assigns  for  it  a  reason  which  to  us  seems  very 
questionable.  Women,  says  he,  are  blinder  partisans  and  more  servile  fol- 
lowers of  custom  than  men  ;  and  it  is  a  great  blessing  for  a  child  to  have  a  mother 


Heredity  of  tJu  Intellect.  73 

This  will  appear  less  surprising  when  we  bear  in  mind  that  few 
philosophers  have  left  any  posterity.  Thus,  in  modern  times,  Des- 
cartes, Leibnitz,  Malebranche,  Kant,  Spinoza,  Hume,  A.  Comte, 
Schopenhauer,  etc.,  either  never  married  or  had  no  children. 

The  exceptions,  real  or  apparent,  to  the  laws  of  heredity  are : 
Bacon  (Roger),  Berkeley,  Berzelius,  Blumenbach,  Brewster,  Comte, 
Copernicus,  Descartes,  Galen,  Galvani,  Hegel,  Hume,  Kant, 
Kepler,  Locke,  Malebranche,  Priestley,  Reaumur,  Rumford, 
Spinoza,  Young,  etc. 

AMpkRE,  Andrd-Marie,  mathematician,  physicist,  and  philosopher ; 

His  son,  Jean-Jacques,  traveller,  literary  man,  historian. 
ARAGO,  Frangois ; 
His   three  brothers,  Jean,  Jacques,  and  Etienne,  authors  and 

artists ; 

His  son,  Emmanuel,  lawyer,  politician. 
ARISTOTLE.     Though  ancient  genealogies  are  difficult  to  make 

out,  we  may  name 
His  father,  Nicomachos,  physician  to  Amyntas  II.,  and  author 

of  medical  works ; 
His  son,  Nicomachos,  held  by  some  to  be  the  author  of  the 

Ethics  which  bear  his  name ; 

His  nephew,  Callisthenes,  son  of  Hero,  a  cousin  of  Aristotle. 
BACON,  Francis ; 

His  father,  Nicholas,  Lord  Keeper  of  the  Great  Seal ; 
His  mother,  Ann  Cooke,  belorged  to  a  highly-gifted  family.   She 
was  a  distinguished  scholar,  and  was  very  well  versed  in 
Latin  and  Greek ; 
His  brothers  were  distinguished  men  ;  among  them,  Nathaniel, 

a  brother  by  another  mother,  who  was  a  clever  painter. 
BENTHAM,  Jeremy,  logist  and  moralist ; 

His  brother,  General  Samuel  Bentham,  a  distinguished  officer ; 
His   nephew,   George,  an   eminent  botanist,  president  of  the 

Linnaean  Society. 

BERNOUILLI,  Jacques,  of  Swiss  origin,  was  the  first  to  establish  the 
reputation  of  this  family,  which  is  famous  for  the  number  of 

that  approves  its  free  inquiry  into  truth.     We  will  come  back  to  this  poinl 
when  treating  of  the  Laws  of  Heredity. 


74  Heredity. 

mathematicians,  physicists,  and  naturalists  it  has  produced. 
The  following  is  a  list  of  this  family.  Each  of  the  members 
mentioned  was  distinguished  in  some  branch  of  science. 


Jacques  Jean 

I 

Nicolas,  Daniel,  Jean  Nicolas 


Jean  Jacques 

In  our  own  century  there  yet  remained  in  Switzerland  descend- 
ants of  this  family:  Christophe  Bernoulli  (1782 — 1863),  Pro- 
fessor of  Natural  Science  in  the  University  of  Bale ;  Jerome 
Bernouilli  (1745 — 1829),  chemist  and  mineralogist 
BOYLE,  Robert  In  his  family  we  count  no  less  than  seventeen 
notable  members,  most  of  whom  gained  distinction  in  political 
life. 

BRODIE,  Benjamin,  one  of  the  most  celebrated  surgeons  in  Eng- 
land.    His  family  reckons  six  distinguished  members. 
BUCKLAND,  William,  geologist ; 

His  son,  Frank,  naturalist,  well-known  for  his  popular  writings. 
BUFFON.     His  views  on  heredity  will  be  hereafter  stated.    He  used 
to  say  that  he  derived  all  his  mental  qualities  from  his  mother; 
His  son,  a  man  of  good  endowments,  guillotined  as  an  '  aristo- 
crat' 

CASSINI,   Jean-Dominique,   a    celebrated    astronomer,   the    first 
remarkable  member  of  a  family  which  might  be  compared 
with  that  of  the  Bernouillis  ; 
His  son,  Jacques  Cassini,  astronomer ; 

His  grandson,  Ce'sare-Franc.ois  Cassini  de  Thury,  became  a  mem- 
ber of  the  Academic  des  Sciences  at  the  age  of  twenty-two; 
His  great-grandson,  Jacques-Dominique,  Director  of  the  Observ- 
atory at  Paris,  completed  the  topographical  chart  of  France ; 
His  great-great-grandson,  Henri-Gabriel   (1781-1832),  naturalist 

and  philologist,  died  of  cholera. 
CONDORCET,   mathematician   and    philosopher,    seems   to    have 

derived  much  of  his  mental  qualities  from  his  mother; 
His  uncle,  a  bishop,  was  a  relative  of  the  Cardinal  de  Bernis. 


Heredity  of  the  Intellect.  75 

CUVIER,  Georges,  naturalist ; 

His  mother,  an  accomplished  woman,  took  great  pains  with  his 

education ; 

His  brother,  Fre'deric,  naturalist.     Researches  on  Instinct. 
D'ALEMBERT,  was   a  natural    son   of  Destouches,   inspector  of 

artillery,  and  of  Mdlle.  de  Tencin ; 

His  mother  was  noted  for  her  wit,  and  belonged  to  a  family 
that  counted  among  its  members  the  Cardinal  de  Tencin, 
Pont  de  Veyle,  a  dramatic  author,  and  d'Argental,  the  corres- 
pondent of  Voltaire. 
DARWIN,  Erasmus,  author  of  Zoonomia  ; 

His  two  sons,  Charles  and  Robert,  physicians  of  note,  of  whom 

Charles  died  very  young ; 
His  grandson,  Charles,  the  celebrated  author  of  the  Origin  of 

Species; 

In  this  family  we  mention  only  those  most  worthy  of  note. 
DAVY,  Humphrey,  chemist,  and  his  brother  John,  physiologist 
DE   CANDOLLE,   Augustin-Pyrame,  and  his  son,   Alphonse,  both 

celebrated  botanists. 
EULER,  Leonhard.     His  father  was  a  mathematician ; 

His   three  sons,   Johann,    Carl,   and    Christoph,   astronomers, 

physicists,  and  mathematicians. 
FRANKLIN,  Benjamin. 
Two  great-grandsons,  authors  of  works  on  the  natural  sciences, 

on  chemistry  and  on  medicine. 
GALILEO-GALILEI  ; 

His  father,  Vicenzo,  wrote  a  theory  of  music ; 

His  son,  Vicenzo,  was  the  first  to  apply  to  timepieces  his  father's 

discoveries  as  to  the  pendulum. 
GEOFFROY  SAINT-HILAIRE,  Etienne ; 

His  brother,  an  officer  highly  esteemed  by  Napoleon,  died  of 

fatigue  after  the  battle  of  Austerlitz ; 
His  son,  Isidore,  a  naturalist. 

GMELIN,  Johan  Friedrich.  The  father,  two  uncles,  a  cousin,  and  a 
son  of  this  famous  German  chemist,  were  known  by  their  works 
on  botany,  medicine,  and  chemistry. 

GREGORY,  James.  The  most  distinguished  of  a  family  of  mathe- 
maticians and  physicists,  which  reckons  no  less  than  fifteen 


J6  Heredity. 

remarkable  members,  among  them  his  son  and  his  two  grand' 
sons.     Thomas  Reid  was  the  son  of  one  of  his  nieces. 
HALLER,  Albrecht,  regarded  as  the  founder  of  modern  physiology  j 
His/tf//kr,  learned  in  the  law; 
His  son,  a  literary  man  and  historian. 
HARTLEY,  David,  philosopher  and  physician  ; 

His  son,  a  member  of  Parliament,  a  correspondent  of  Franklin, 

and  one  of  the  plenipotentiaries  at  the  Peace  of  Paris. 
HERSCHEL,  Sir  William ; 

His  father  and  brother  are  specially  noted  as  musicians — musical 

talent  was  hereditary  in  the  family; 
His  sister,  Caroline,  aided  him  in  his  astronomical  labours,  and 

received  a  gold  medal  from  the  Royal  Society ; 
His  son  JOHN,  one  of  the  greatest  astronomers  of  this  century ; 
Two  grandsons,  also  astronomers. 
HOOKER,  William,  and  his  son,  Joseph  D.,  botanists, 
HUMBOLDT,  Alexander,  and  his  brother  William. 
HUNTER,  John,  the  famous  English  anatomist ; 

His  brother  William,  and  his  nephew  Matthew,  were  also  dis- 
tinguished anatomists. 
HUYGHENS,  a  Dutch  astronomer; 

His  father,  a  mathematician  and  statesman  ; 

His  brother  was  engaged  in  public  life,  and  followed  William  IIL 

to  England. 

JUSSIEU,  Bernard  de,  may  be  regarded  as  the  most  eminent  of  a 
family  of  botanists,  whose  genealogy  is  as  follows  : — 

^  Antoine  Bernard  Joseph 

Laurent 

I 

Adrien 

LEIBNITZ.     His  grandfather  and  his  father  professors  of  jurispru- 
dence at  Leipzig. 

LINN^US.     The  talent  of  this  great  botanist  is  found,  though  in  a 
lower  degree,  in  his  son  Charles. 

MILL,  John  Stuart 

Hisfaf/ier,  James,  was  well-known  for  his  works  on  psychology 
and  political  economy. 


Heredity  of  the  Intellect.  77 

NEWTON,  like  many  men  of  genius,  stands  alone.  Galton,  however, 
thinks  Charles  Hutton,  the  mathematician,  and  James  Hutton, 
the  geologist,  were  his  remote  descendants. 
OERSTED,  Danish  physicist ; 

His  brother  and  his  nephew  were  statesmen ; 
His  son,  a  naturalist  and  traveller 
PLATO  left  no  children ; 

His  nephew,  Speusippos,  was  head  of  the  Platonic  school  after 

the  master's  death. 
PLINY  (the  Elder),  naturalist ; 

His  nephew,  Pliny  the  Younger. 
SAUSSURE,  Swiss  geologist  and  physicist  j 

His  father,  author  of  works  on  agriculture  and  statistics  ; 
His  son,  a  naturalist 
SAY,  Jean-Baptiste,  his  son,  Horace,  and  his  grandson,  Le'on,  a 

family  of  political  economists. 

STEPHENSON,  George,  and  his  son  Robert,  both  celebrated  en- 
gineers. 
WATT,   James.     His   mother,   Agnes  Muirhead,   was   a  superior 

woman  ; 

His  grandfather  was  a  humble  professor  of  mathematics  ; 
Hisfat/ier  was  baillie  of  Glasgow  for  twenty  years; 
One  of  his  sons,  who  died  at  the  age  of  twenty-seven,  gave  great 
promise  as  a  geologist,  and  was  the  friend  of  Sir  Humphrey 
Davy. 

AUTHORS   AND    MEN    OF   LETTERS. 

ADDISON,  one  of  the  best  prose  writers  of  England,  minister  in  the 

reign  of  George  I. ; 

His/0//&r,  a  very  learned  divine  and  author. 
ARNOLD,  Thomas,  Head-Master  of  Rugby  School,   one   of  the 

reformers  of  public  instruction  in  England ; 
His  son,  Matthew,  poet  and  critic. 
BOILEAU,  Nicolas,  falls  rather  under  this  category  than  under  that 

of  imagination ; 
His  two  brothers,  Jacques,  Doctor  of  the  Sorbonne,  and  Gilles, 

both  authors. 
BOSSUET.     We  may,  perhaps,  class  with  him 

His  nephew,  Bishop  of  Troyes,  who  edited  his  uncle's  works. 


78  Heredity. 

BRONTE,   Charlotte,  published,  under    the  name  'Currer    Bell,' 
Jane  Eyre  at  the  age  of  twenty-two.     Her  sisters,  under  the 
names  Ellis  and  Acton  Bell,  published  remarkable  novels. 
CASAUBON,  Isaac,  and  his  son  Me'ric,  scholars  and  philologists. 
CHAMPOLLION,  J.-Franc,ois,  the  earliest  interpreter  of  hieroglyphics; 

His  son,  Jean-Jacques,  historian  and  archaeologist. 
ETIENNE,  a  family  of  literary  men  and  scholars,  whose  principal 

members  were — Robert,  who  printed  the  Bible ; 
His  brother  Charles,  scholar  and  man  of  science ; 
His  son  Henri,  author  of  the  Greek  Lexicon; 
Another  son,  Robert 
FENELON,  Archbishop  of  Cambrai. 

His   nephew,   ambassador  in   Holland,   author   of   diplomatic 

memoirs.     Also  two  great-nephews  were  remarkable  men. 
GRAMMONT,  DE,  author  of  the  famous  Memoires ; 

His  father,  Philibert,  a  courtier  of  much  wit,  and  an  author; 
His  grand-uncle,  Richelieu  (vide  Richelieu). 
GROTIUS,  founder  of  international  law ; 
His  grandfather,  a  scholar; 
His  father,  curator  of  the  University  of  Leyden; 
His  uncle,  Cornelius,  professor  of  philosophy  and  jurisprudence ; 
His  son,  Petras,  diplomatist  and  scholar. 
HALLAM. 

His  father,  Dean  of  Bristol,  and  his  mother  are  both  spoken  of 

by  the  biographers  as  remarkable  persons  ; 
His  son  Arthur,  who  died  at  twenty-three ;  the  subject  of  Tenny- 
son's In  Memoriam; 
His  other  son,  Henry,  died  at  twenty-six ;  was  a  young  man  of 

great  promise. 
HELVETIUS,  author  and  philosopher; 

His  father  and  grandfather  were  distinguished  physicians,  and 

inspectors  general  of  the  hospitals  of  Paris. 
LAMB,  Charles,  whose  name  is  always  inseparable  from  that  of  his 

sister  Mary. 
LESSING,  Gottlieb  Ephraim,  had  two  brothers,  Karl  and  Johann, 

both  distinguished  as  men  of  letters. 
MACAULAY,  Thomas  Babington. 

His  grandfather,  minister  of  Inverary,  was  an  eloquent  preacher; 
His  father,  a  brilliant  writer  and  zealous  abolitionist ; 


Heredity  of  the  Intellect.  79 

Two  uncles,  one  of  them  a  general,  long  governed  a  portion  of 
the  Madras  Presidency ;  the  other  was  tutor  to  the  Princess 
Caroline  of  Brunswick. 
NIEBUHR,  the  Roman  historian ; 

Hisfat/ier,  traveller  and  author. 

PALGRAVE,  Sir  Francis,  author  of  erudite  works  on  Anglo-Saxon 
history.     Two  sons,  one  a  scholar,  the  other  a  traveller  and 
orientalist. 
PORSON.  A  family  of  classical  scholars.  We  have  already  mentioned 

the  '  Porson  memory.' 
ROSCOE,  well-known  by  his  historical  studies  on  the  period  of  the 

Renaissance,  had 

Three  sons,  political  writers  and  poets. 
LE  SAGE,  novelist.     With  him  may  be  named 

Two  sons,  dramatists  and  actors. 
SCAI.IGER,  Julius  Caesar,  first  made  his  mark  as  a  scholar  at  the  age 

of  forty-seven ; 

His  son  Joseph,  a  scholar,  like  his  father. 
SCHLEGEL,  Wilhelm,  and  his  brother,  Friedrich; 

Their  father  was  a  well-known  preacher,  who  also  wrote  some 

poems ; 
Two  uncles,  one  dramatic  poet  and  critic,  the  other  historian  to 

the  King  of  Denmark. 
SENECA,  Lucius  Annseus. 

His  father,  Marcus,  a  rhetorician,  had  a  prodigious  memory; 
His  brother,  Gallio,  Proconsul  of  Achaia,  considered  as  one  of 

the  most  accomplished  Romans  of  his  day ; 
His  nephew,  Marcus  Annaeus  Lucan,  the  poet. 
SEVIGNE,  the  Marquise  de  ; 

Her  son  was,  as  her  letters  show,  a  man,  though  dissipated,  of 

considerable  wit ; 

Her  cousin,  Bussy-Rubutin,  was  of  similar  character. 
STAEL,  Madame  de. 

Her  grandfather,  Charles  Fre'de'ric  Necker,  was  professor  of  law 

at  Geneva,  and  wrote  on  that  subject; 
Her  father,  minister  of  Louis  XVI.,  and  an  author ; 
Her  uncle,  Louis  Necker,  professor  of  mathematics  at  Geneva ; 
The  son  and  grandson  of  the  latter,  Jacques  and  Louis  Necker, 
professors  of  natural  science  at  Geneva. 


8o  Heredity* 

SWIFT.    The  poet  Dryden  was  his  grand-uncle. 
TROLLOPE,  Mrs.,  the  novelist; 

Two  sons,  Anthony  and  Thomas,  novelists, 

The  list  might  easily  have  been  extended,  but  the  names  here 
given  are  probably  sufficient  for  our  purpose. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

HEREDITY  OF  THE    SENTIMENTS   AND   THE   PASSIONS. 

L 

MAN  is  situated  in  the  midst  of  the  universe,  which  acts  upon 
him  only  by  its  properties.  Colours,  odours,  savours,  forms, 
resistances,  movements,  become  modes  of  our  organism,  producing 
therein  a  shock  to  the  nerves.  Then  all  these  peripheric  im- 
pressions pass  to  the  brain,  probably  into  the  optic  thalami ;  and, 
being  thence  transmitted  to  the  cortical  substance  of  the  brain, 
they  are  transformed,  we  know  not  how,  into  facts  of  consciousness : 
the  physiological  phenomenon  becomes  psychological,  consti- 
tuting that  state  of  the  mind  which  we  denominate  cognition. 
But  this  is  not  all.  The  nerve-vibrations  produced  by  material 
objects  not  only  make  us  acquainted  with  something  outside  of  us, 
but  they  also  produce  within  us  a  certain  agreeable  or  disagreeable 
state,  which  we  call  feeling.  If  there  were  no  such  reverberation 
of  pleasure  or  pain  within  us,  then  our  experiences  of  the  external 
world  would  be,  as  Bichat  says,  '  only  a  frigid  series  of  intellectual 
phenomena.' 

Those  phenomena  of  sensation  of  which  the  subjective  cha- 
racter is  opposed  to  the  objective  character  of  the  phenomena  of 
cognition  may  have  an  ideal  as  well  as  a  real  cause.  Experience 
shows  that  pure  concepts — simple  ideas — may  not  only  be  acts  of 
consciousness,  but  may  also  produce  in  us  agreeable  or  painful 
conditions.  Thus,  whoever  conceives  the  ideal  of  a  future  state  of 
society,  with  a  larger  measure  of  justice,  morality,  science,  and 
happiness,  simultaneously  with  his  perception  of  this  fair  vision 
is  pleasurably  affected  by  the  sight  of  what  might  be,  painfully  by 
the  sight  of  what  is. 

If  we  add  that  pleasure  and  pain  may  be  excited  in  us  either 


Heredity  of  the  Sentiments  and  the  Passions.     8 1 

by  some  state  of  our  organs  dependent  on  the  vital  processes,  or 
by  recollections  suggested  by  memory,  we  have  enumerated  every 
mode  of  cognition  which  can  produce  phenomena  of  sensation. 
Causes — real  and  ideal — present  and  past — all  these  elements  are 
added  to  each  other,  placed  in  juxtaposition  and  fusion,  and 
neutralize  each  other,  so  as  to  produce  these  complex  sensations, 
which  make  their  appearance  very  slowly,  both  in  the  individual 
and  in  the  species.  Thus,  the  sentiment  of  nature  in  a  poet  of 
the  nineteenth  century,  a  Byron  or  a  Goethe,  is  the  result  of  so 
great  a  number  of  actual  perceptions,  recollections,  and  ideas 
blended  together,  that  it  defies  the  analysis  of  the  most  accom- 
plished psychologist  The  psychology  of  the  sentiments,  more- 
over, is  far  from  being  as  advanced  as  that  of  the  intellect. 

In  studying  the  sentiments,  we  may  do  so  either  as  naturalists 
or  as  metaphysicians.  In  the  former  case,  we  describe  and  classify 
the  various  phenomena  of  sensibility;  this  is  the  work  of  the 
psychologist  In  the  other  case,  we  strive  to  reduce  all  these 
phenomena  to  their  law,  their  ultimate  cause ;  and  this  is  the  work 
of  the  philosopher. 

The  descriptive  method  is  much  indebted  to  contemporary 
physiologists  and  psychologists,  and  particularly  to  Mr.  Bain  in 
his  great  work,  The  Emotions  and  the  Will.  Still,  there  is  no 
definite  classification  of  phenomena  of  the  affections,  for  this  can 
only  be  founded  on  an  embryology  of  the  sentiments,  which  has,  as 
yet,  no  existence.  Every  naturalist  knows  that  a  natural  classi- 
fication is  based  on  anatomy,  physiology,  and  embryology.  So, 
too,  in  psychology,  until  we  have  investigated  and  described  the 
manifestations  of  sentiment  in  the  animal  kingdom,  and  in 
the  lower  races,  with  a  view  to  a  comparative  psychology; 
until  we  have  traced  the  evolution  of  the  sentiments,  in  the 
individual  and  in  the  species,  in  order  to  ascertain  its  genesis, 
it  will  be  impossible  to  arrive  at  a  natural,  objective,  stable  classi- 
fication. 

Since  Spinoza,  no  essential  contribution  has  been  made  to  a 
philosophical  study  of  the  ultimate  reason  of  sensible  phenomena. 
Physiologists — those,  at  least,  who  are  acquainted  with  philosophy — 
appear  to  have  the  same  opinion ;  for  Muller  copies  the  third 
book  of  Spinoza's  Ethics,  and  Dr.  Maudsley,  in  his  recent  work, 


82  Heredity. 

The  Physiology  and  Pathology  of  Mind,  says  'the  admirable 
explanation  of  the  passions  given  by  Spinoza  has  never  been 
surpassed,  and  certainly  it  will  not  be  easy  to  surpass  it' 

As  the  author  of  the  Ethics  profoundly  observes,  the  ultimate 
explanation  of  all  sensible  phenomena  is  found  in  the  fact  of  desire, 
'  desire  meaning  appetite  with  self-consciousness,'  and  appetite 
being  '  the  very  essence  of  man,  in  so  far  as  it  is  directed  to  acts 
which  tend  towards  his  conservation.'  Desire  is  the  physical  and 
moral  constitution  of  man,  inasmuch  as  it  strives  towards  being 
and  well-being,  towards  existence  and  development.  It  has  its 
ultimate  root  in  the  region  of  the  unconscious ;  nor  do  we  know 
how  it  becomes  conscious,  under  that  form  of  tendency  which 
characterizes  it  Desire  is,  like  thought,  one  of  the  forms  of  the 
unknowable  :  it  is  the  unknown  quantity,  the  x  which  serves  to 
explain  for  us  all  phenomena  of  the  affections.  We  may,  indeed, 
reduce  the  endless  variety  of  passions,  emotions,  and  sentiments  to 
two  very  broad  states,  viz.  pleasure  and  pain — that  is  to  say,  an 
augmentation  or  diminution  of  being — but  the  cause  of  the  two 
states  is  desire.  It  is  just  because  there  are  in  us  tendencies  that 
may  be  satisfied  or  opposed,  that  we  feel  pleasure  or  pain.  In 
fact,  when  we  experience  pleasure  or  pain,  we  wish  to  preserve 
the  one  and  to  destroy  the  other;  but  this  conscious  desire, 
sometimes  regarded  as  the  effect  of  the  primitive  unconscious 
desire,  is,  in  reality,  only  a  continuation  of  it  That  state  of 
tension  which  we  call  desire,  and  which  lasts  as  long  as  we  live, 
is  modified  each  instant — and  hence  our  joys  and  our  sorrows ; 
these  are  but  moments  of  a  continuous  process,  and  desire  is, 
as  it  were,  the  woof  on  which  the  chances  of  life  embroider  all  our 
emotions. 

In  sensibility  everything  tends  first  of  all  and  directly  towards 
ourselves  ;  later  and  indirectly  towards  others.  '  The  love  of  self 
is  the  root  of  all  the  passions  ;  it  is  the  supreme  law  of  sensibility, 
the  nature  of  which  is  to  look  only  to  its  own  good.'  We  love 
only  ourselves ;  or,  in  others,  that  which  is  like  ourselves.  Our 
sympathetic  tendencies,  manifold  and  strong  though  they  be,  are 
derived  from,  and  may  be  ultimately  reduced  to,  love  of  self 
without  egotism.  Sympathy  being,  in  its  genuine  sense,  '  the 
tendency  of  one  individual  to  fall  in  with  the  emotional  or  active 


Heredity  of  the  Sentiments  and  the  Passions.     83 

states  of  others,' *  to  have  a  community  of  sentiments  with  a  man 
or  an  animal  is  to  resemble  him  in  one  respect ;  it  means  being 
at  once  ourselves  and  another.  Our  selfish  and  our  sympathetic 
tendencies  are,  therefore,  both  equally  natural,  but  the  former  are 
based  upon  our  own  nature,  the  latter  on  an  analogy  with  it 
The  admirable  researches  of  physiologists  on  the  sympathetic 
contagion  of  nervous  diseases,  may  some  day  serve  as  the  basis 
for  new  studies  on  the  emotions.  This  is  not  the  place  to 
enter  on  them ;  we  would  merely  show  that  phenomena  of  the 
affections  pertain  to  our  inmost  being.  By  this  fact  of  cognition 
the  outer  world  is  let  in  upon  us,  and  is  reproduced  in  miniature, 
for  thought  is  nothing  but  existence  arriving  at  self-consciousness  ; 
but  our  feeble  personality  is  associated  with  this  impersonal  state 
by  the  pleasures  and  pains  it  produces  in  us ;  for  sensation  and 
volition  make  us  what  we  are.  The  modes  of  sensibility  are  so 
intimately  connected  with  the  organs,  and  with  the  whole  con- 
stitution, that,  a  priori,  we  might  conclude  that  they  are  transmitted 
by  heredity.  Experience  will  be  found  to  verify  this  hypothesis. 

II. 

We  can  cite  only  striking  facts — that  is  to  say,  passions  so  violent 
or  so  extravagant  as  to  attract  the  attention  of  the  physician  or 
the  historian ;  yet  any  one,  by  questioning  his  own  memory,  may 
easily  see  that  certain  modes  of  sensation,  and,  consequently,  of 
action,  may  be  preserved  hereditarily  in  families  too  obscure  for 
notice. 

First,  then,  in  animals  the  transmission  of  individual  character 
is  a  fact  so  common  as  scarcely  to  need  illustration.  '  A  horse 
that  is  naturally  vicious,  sulky,  and  restive,'  says  Buffon,  'will 
beget  foals  with  the  same  character.'  Every  horse-breeder  has 
verified  this  fact  in  regard  to  his  stud. 

'  Heredity,'  says  Girou  de  Buzareingues,  '  may,  even  in  animals, 
extend  to  their  most  whimsical  peculiarities.  A  hound  taken  from 
the  teat,  and  bred  far  away  from  either  parent,  was  incorrigibly 
obstinate  and  gun  shy  in  circumstances  where  other  dogs  were 


'Bain,  The  Emotions,  ch.  xii.,   'On  Sympathy.'   The  entire  chapter  should 
be  studied. 


84  Heredity. 

eagerly  excited.  When  a  bystander  expressed  his  surprise,  he 
was  told  that  there  was  nothing  remarkable,  "  his  father  was  the 
same." ' 

Nor  is  the  transmission  of  characters  less  striking  when  races  and 
species  are  crossed.  As  we  have  seen,  when  the  domestic  pig  and 
the  wild  boar,  or  the  wolf  and  the  dog  are  crossed,  some  of  the 
progeny  inherit  the  savage,  and  others  the  domestic  instincts. 
Similar  facts  have  been  observed  by  Girou  in  the  crossing  of 
different  races  of  dogs  and  cats.  '  Lord  Orford,  as  is  well  known,' 
says  Darwin,  'crossed  his  famous  greyhounds,  which  failed  in 
courage,  with  a  bull-dog — this  breed  being  chosen  from  being 
deficient  in  the  power  of  scent.  At  the  sixth  or  seventh  genera- 
tion there  was  not  a  vestige  left  of  the  form  of  the  bull  dog,  but 
his  courage  and  indomitable  perseverance  remained.' 1 

The  heredity  of  propensities,  instincts,  and  passions  in  animals 
is  very  good  evidence  for  this  form  of  heredity  in  man,  inasmuch 
as  it  does  away  with  all  superficial  explanations  drawn  from  edu- 
cation, example,  habit,  and  all  those  external  causes  which  are 
supposed  to  stand  in  lieu  of  heredity.  And  we  may  remark  that 
this  circumstance  shows  the  value  of  a  comparative  psychology. 

If,  now,  we  consider  man,  the  first  phenomena  of  the  affections 
with  which  we  meet  are  those  of  organic  sensibility,  or  coenaes- 
thesis,  a  kind  of  inner  sense  of  touch  whereby  we  are  cognizant  of 
the  state  of  our  organs,  of  the  tension  of  our  muscles,  and  of  all 
muscular  exertion  in  general,  of  the  state  of  weariness,  of  pleasure, 
etc.  This  universal  consciousness  of  existence,  this  Gcmeingefiihl, 
is  the  -result  of  an  infinite  number  of  internal  sensations  proceeding 
from  the  nerves,  the  muscles,  the  circulation,  the  nutrition — in  a 
word,  from  all  those  functions  the  sum  of  which  constitutes  what 
we  call  our  manner  of  being. 

It  cannot  be  doubted  that  heredity  transmits  these  sensa- 
tions ;  and  it  is  probably  in  them  that  we  must  look  for  the  true 
source  of  all  resemblances  of  character.  But  these  internal  states 
are  of  so  indeterminate  a  nature  that  it  is  almost  impossible  to 
prove  their  transmission.  Nevertheless,  we  believe  that  the 
heredity  of  certain  strange  propensities,  instincts,  and  dislikes,  may 

1  Variation,  etc.,  i.  57. 


Heredity  of  the  Sentiments  and  the  Passions.     85 

be  referred  to  these  unconscious  modes,  which  underlie  all  con- 
sciousness and  all  thought 

Thus,  families  have  been  known  in  the  members  of  which  the 
smallest  doses  of  opium  produce  a  convulsive  state.  Zimmermann 
speaks  of  a  family  on  whom  coffee  had  a  soporific  effect,  acting 
like  opium,  while  opium  itself  produced  no  effect.  Some  families 
can  hardly  endure  emetics,  others  purgative  medicines,  others 
blood-letting. 

Montaigne,  who  took  an  interest  in  the  question  of  heredity, 
because  he  derived  from  his  family  a  tendency  to  stone,  inherited 
also  an  invincible  repugnance  for  medicine.  'The  antipathy,' 
he  says,  '  is  hereditary.  My  father  lived  seventy-four  years,  my 
grandfather  sixty-nine,  and  my  great-grandfather  almost  eighty, 
and  never  tasted  nor  took  any  kind  of  physic,  and  for  them  any- 
thing not  in  common  use  was  a  drug.  My  ancestors,  by  some 
secret  instinct  and  natural  inclination,  have  ever  loathed  all 
manner  of  physic — the  very  sight  of  drugs  was  an  abomination 
to  my  father.  The  Seigneur  de  Gerviac,  my  paternal  uncle,  who 
was  an  ecclesiastic,  and  sickly  from  birth,  and  who,  notwith- 
standing, made  his  weak  life  to  hold  out  to  the  age  of  sixty-seven, 
falling  once  into  a  high  protracted  fever,  the  physicians  had  word 
sent  to  him  that  he  must  surely  die  if  he  would  not  take  some 
remedy.  The  good  soul,  affrighted  as  he  was  at  this  horrible 
sentence,  said,  '  Then  it  is  all  over  with  me.'  But  God  soon  after 
made  their  prognostications  to  prove  vain.  Possibly  I  have  re- 
ceived from  them  my  natural  antipathy  to  physic.' l 

When,  from  the  organic  sensations  diffused  over  the  whole  body, 
we  pass  to  the  wants  and  inclinations  which  have  their  seat  in  a 
special  organ,  it  is  easy  to  give  indisputable  instances  of  passions 
hereditarily  transmitted.  This  we  propose  to  show  with  regard  to 
the  three  chief  physical  wants,  viz.  thirst,  hunger,  and  the  sexual 
appetite. 

The  passion  known  as  dipsomania,  or  alcoholism,  is  so  frequently 
transmitted  that  all  are  agreed  in  considering  its  heredity  as  the 
rule.  Not,  however,  that  the  passion  for  drink  is  always  trans- 
mitted in  that  identical  form,  for  it  often  degenerates  into  mania, 

1  Montaigne,  Essavs,  ii.  37. 


86  Heredity. 

•  idiocy,  and  hallucination.  Conversely,  insanity  in  the  parents  may 
become  alcoholism  in  the  descendants.  This  continual  metamor- 
phosis plainly  shows  how  near  passion  comes  to  insanity,  how 
closely  the  successive  generations  are  connected,  and,  consequently, 
what  a  weight  of  responsibility  rests  on  each  individual.  'A 
frequent  effect  of  alcoholism,'  says  Dr.  Magnus  Huss,  '  is  partial  or 
total  atrophy  of  the  brain :  the  organ  is  reduced  in  volume,  so  that 
it  no  longer  fills  the  bony  case.  The  consequence  is  a  mental 
degeneration,  which  in  the  progeny  results  in  lunatics  and  idiots.' 

Gall  speaks  of  a  Russian  family  in  which  the  father  and  grand- 
father had  died  prematurely,  the  victims  of  this  taste  for  strong 
drink.  The  grandson,  at  the  age  of  five,  manifested  the  same 
liking  in  the  highest  degree. 

Girou  de  Buzareingues  knew  several  families  in  which  the  taste 
for  drink  was  transmitted  by  the  mother. 

In  our  own  times,  Magnus  Huss  and  Dr.  Morel  have  collected 
so  many  facts  bearing  on  the  heredity  of  alcoholism,  we  need  only 
select  a  few  instances : — 

A  man  belonging  to  the  educated  class,  and  charged  with 
important  functions,  succeeded  for  a  long  time  in  concealing  his 
alcoholic  habits  from  the  eyes  of  the  public ;  his  family  were  the  only 
sufferers  by  it  He  had  five  children,  only  one  of  whom  lived  to 
maturity.  Instincts  of  cruelty  were  manifested  in  this  child,  and 
from  an  early  age  its  sole  delight  was  to  torture  animals  in  every 
conceivable  way.  He  was  sent  to  school,  but  could  not  learn. 
In  the  proportions  of  the  head  he  presented  the  characters  ot 
microcephalism,  and  in  the  field  of  intellectual  acquisition  he  could 
only  reach  a  certain  low  stage,  beyond  which  further  progress  was 
impossible.  At  the  age  of  nineteen  he  had  to  be  sent  to  an  asylum 
for  the  insane. 

Charles  X ,  son  of  an  eccentric  and  intemperate  father,  mani- 
fested instincts  of  great  cruelty  from  infancy.  He  was  sent  at  an 
early  age  to  various  schools,  but  was  expelled  from  them  all.  Being 
forced  to  enlist  in  the  army,  he  sold  his  uniform  for  drink,  and 
only  escaped  a  sentence  of  death  on  the  testimony  of  physicians, 
who  declared  that  he  was  the  victim  of  an  irresistible  appetite. 
He  was  placed  under  restraint,  and  died  of  general  paralysis. 

A  man  of  an  excellent  family  of  labouring  people  was  early 


Heredity  of  the  Sentiments  and  the  Passions.     8  7 

addicted  to  drink,  and  died  of  chronic  alcoholism,  leaving  seven 
children.  The  first  two  of  these  died  at  an  early  age,  of  convul- 
sions. The  third  became  insane  at  twenty-two,  and  died  an  idiot 
The  fourth,  after  various  attempts  at  suicide,  fell  into  the  lowest 
grade  of  idiocy.  The  fifth,  of  passionate  and  misanthropic  temper, 
broke  off  all  relations  with  his  family.  His  sister  suffers  from 
nervous  disorder,  which  chiefly  takes  the  form  of  hysteria,  with 
intermittent  attacks  of  insanity.  The  seventh,  a  very  intelligent 
workman,  but  of  nervous  temperament,  freely  gives  expression  to 
the  gloomiest  forebodings  as  to  his  intellectual  future. 

Dr.  Morel  gives  the  history  of  a  family  living  in  the  Vosges,  in 
which  the  great-grandfather  was  a  drunkard,  and  died  from  the 
effects  of  intoxication ;  and  the  grandfather,  subject  to  the  same 
passion,  died  a  maniac.  He  had  a  son  far  more  sober  than  him- 
self, but  subject  to  hypochondria,  and  of  homicidal  tendencies;  the 
son  of  this  latter  was  stupid,  idiotic.  Here  we  see  in  the  first 
generation, alcoholic  excess;  in  the  second,  hereditary  dipsomania; 
in  the  third,  hypochondria ;  and  in  the  fourth,  idiocy,  and  probable 
extinction  of  the  race. 

TreTat,  in  his  work,  Folie  Lucide,  states  that  a  lady  of  regular  life 
and  economical  habits  was  subject  to  fits  of  uncontrollable  dipso- 
mania. Loathing  her  state,  she  called  herself  a  miserable  drunkard ; 
and  mixed  the  most  disgusting  substances  with  her  wine — but  all 
in  vain,  the  passion  was  stronger  than  her  wilL  The  mother  and 
the  uncle  of  this  lady  had  also  been  subject  to  dipsomania. 

Quite  recently,  Dr.  Morel  had  again  an  opportunity  of  proving 
the  hereditary  effects  of  alcoholism,  in  the  '  children  of  the  Com- 
mune.' He  inquired  into  the  mental  state  of  150  children,  ranging 
from  ten  to  seventeen  years  of  age,  most  of  whom  had  been  taken 
with  arms  in  their  hands  behind  the  barricades.  '  This  examina- 
tion,' he  says,  '  has  confirmed  me  in  my  previous  convictions  as  to 
the  baneful  effects  produced  by  alcohol,  not  only  in  the  individuals 
who  use  this  detestable  drink  to  excess,  but  also  in  their  descend- 
ants. On  their  depraved  physiognomy  is  impressed  the  threefold 
stamp  of  physical,  intellectual,  and  moral  degeneracy.' * 

1  For  all  the  facts  here  cited,  see  Morel,  Traiti  des  Dcgentrescentes,  p.  103  ; 

Dr.  Despine,  Psychologie  Naturelle,  tome  ii.  525 — 528  ;  tome  iii.  141  ;  see  also 
Lucas,  i.  476,  seq.,  and  ii.  776. 
5 


3 


88  Heredity. 

As  regards  those  passions  which  have  their  origin  in  the  desire 
of  eating,  it  is  impossible  to  cite  facts  to  prove  their  heredity  so 
remarkably.  Gluttony  and  voracity  seldom  lead  to  such  deplor- 
able results  as  alcoholism.  It  is  not,  however,  difficult  to  find 
families  in  which  voracity  is  inherited.  This  has  been  observed  in 
the  Bourbons.  Saint-Simon  informs  us  that  Louis  XIV.  was  a 
man  of  extraordinary  greediness,  and  the  same  was  the  case  with 
his  brother.  Nearly  all  this  king's  sons  were  gourmands  and  great 
eaters,  and  this  passion  has  been  transmitted  to  their  descendants. 

A  more  curious  case,  and  one  comparable  to  alcoholism,  owing 
to  its  morbid  character,  is  the  fact  of  cannibalism  which  we  have 
elsewhere  cited,  on  the  authority  of  Gall,  Lordat,  and  Prosper 
Lucas.  These  authors  tell  of  a  Scotch  family  possessed  of  an 
instinctive  propensity  to  cannibalism,  which  persisted  through 
several  generations  :  sundry  members  of  this  family  paid  the 
penalty  of  this  with  their  lives,  and  others  had  to  be  placed  under 
surveillance.1 

It  is  probable  that  the  children  of  cannibals,  brought  up  in 
Europe,  would  exhibit  the  like  tendencies  in  the  midst  of  our 
civilization.  Although  no  facts  of  this  kind  are  recorded,  it  must 
be  admitted  that  the  incurable  love  of  a  wandering  life  manifested 
by  these  civilized  savages,  and  their  inability  to  adapt  themselves 
to  our  usages — instances  of  which  will  elsewhere  be  given2 — some- 
what justify  these  presumptions. 

Earth-eating,  which  A.  von  Humboldt  met  with  in  all  tropical 
countries,  presents  a  curious  instance  of  morbid  heredity.  '  The 
people,'  says  this  naturalist,  '  have  an  odd  and  almost  irresistible 
liking  for  a  kind  of  greasy  potter's  clay  with  a  strong,  unpleasant 
smell.  The  children  have  often  to  be  locked  up  to  prevent  them 
from  running  out  after  recent  rain  and  eating  clay.'  He  states 
that  the  women  who  are  engaged  in  the  potteries  on  the  Rio 
Magdalena  swallow  great  lumps  of  clay.  At  the  mission  of  San 
Barjo,  he  saw  an  Indian  child  who,  according  to  the  statement  of 
its  mother,  would  hardly  eat  anything  but  earth  ;  the  child,  in  con- 
sequence, looked  like  a  skeleton.  The  negroes  of  Guinea  have 
the  same  propensity ;  they  swallow  a  yellowish  kind  of  earth  which 

,  i.  391,  497.  *  See  Part  Fourth,  ch.  H. 


Heredity  of  the  Sentiments  and  the  Passions.     89 

they  call  caouac,  and  when  transported  as  slaves  to  America  they 
try  to  procure  a  similar  clay. 

There  is  scarce  need  to  insist  on  the  heredity  of  all  that  is 
connected  with  the  sexual  appetite.  This  passion  is  associated 
with  an  organ  which  depends  on  the  law  of  heredity.  A  multitude 
of  names  famous  in  history  offer  themselves  in  support  of  our 
position.  Augustus  and  the  two  Julias;  Agrippina  and  Nero; 
Maroziaand  Benedict  IX. ;  Alexander  VI.  and  his  children;  Louise 
de  Savoie  and  Francis  I.,  etc.  In  all  classes  of  society  analogous 
facts  may  be  found,  and  any  one  may  know  families  in  which  this 
unfortunate  disposition  is  hereditary. 

1 1  knew,'  says  Prosper  Lucas,  '  a  very  handsome  man,  of  an 
excellent  constitution,  but  possessed  of  an  unbridled  passion  for 
wine  and  women.  He  had  a  son,  who,  while  yet  but  a  lad,  carried 
both  these  vices  to  excess.  He  carried  off  a  mistress  from  his 
father,  who  never  forgave  the  offence  to  the  day  of  his  death. 
This  was  the  outset  of  his  career ;  he  was  afterwards  ruined,  and 
reduced  to  the  utmost  penury  by  harlots.  His  son  died  young, 
but  incorrigible,  and  from  the  same  vices  as  his  father  and 
grandfather.' 

'  But  here,'  says  the  same  author,  '  is  a  fact  perhaps  still  more 
instructive.  A  man-cook,  of  great  talent  in  his  calling,  has  had  all 
his  life,  and  has  still,  at  the  age  of  sixty  years,  a  passion  for 
women.  To  this  passion  he  adds  unnatural  crime.  One  of  his 
natural  sons,  living  apart  from  him,  does  not  know  even  his  father, 
and,  though  not  yet  quite  nineteen,  has  from  childhood  given  all 
the  signs  of  extreme  lust,  and,  strange  to  say,  he,  like  his  father, 
is  equally  addicted  to  either  sex.'  l 

There  are  also  well-authenticated  instances  of  a  heredity  of  a 
propensity  for  rape.  The  Droit  (newspaper)  states  that  in  1846,  at 

Pontoise,  a  father,  named  Alexandre  de  M ,  was  so  unfortunate 

as  to  have  his  eldest  son,  barely  sixteen  years  of  age,  violate  and 
murder  his  cousin;  and  recently  his  second  son  attempted  to 
violate  a  little  girl.  The  punishment  of  these  youths  was  mitigated, 
because  it  was  proved  at  the  trial  that  they  were  under  the  in- 
fluence of  hereditary  insanity.2 

1  P.   T.ucns,   i.  479.  8  Ibid.  i.  504. 


9O  Heredity. 


in. 

If  from  propensities  which,  in  their  origin  at  least,  are  purely 
physical,  we  pass  to  the  consideration  of  more  complex  passions, 
independent,  or  rather  seemingly  so,  of  the  organism — for  example, 
gambling,  avarice,  theft,  and  murder — we  shall  find  these  also 
subject  to  the  law  of  heredity. 

The  passion  for  play  often  attains  such  a  pitch  of  madness  as 
to  be  a  form  of  insanity,  and,  like  it,  transmissible.  'A  lady  of  my 
acquaintance,'  says  Da  Gama  Machado,  'and  who  possessed  a 
large  fortune,  had  a  passion  for  gambling,  and  passed  whole  nights 
at  play.  She  died  young,  of  pulmonary  disease.  Her  eldest  son, 
who  was  very  like  his  mother,  had  the  same  passion  for  play.  He, 
too,  like  his  mother,  died  of  consumption,  and  at  about  the  same 
age.  His  daughter,  who  resembled  him,  inherited  the  same  taste, 
and  died  young.' l 

Avarice  produces  the  same  consequences.  'In  several  instances,' 
says  Maudsley,2  in  his  Physiology  and  Pathology  of  the  Mind,  '  in 
which  the  father  has  toiled  upwards  from  poverty  to  vast  wealth, 
with  the  aim  and  hope  of  founding  a  family,  I  have  witnessed 
the  results  in  a  mental  and  physical  and  mental  degeneracy,  which 
has  sometimes  gone  as  far  as  the  extinction  of  the  family  in  the 
third  or  fourth  generation.  When  the  evil  is  not  so  extreme  as 
madness  or  ruinous  vice,  the  savour  of  a  mother's  influence 
having  been  present,  it  may  still  be  manifest  in  an  instinctive 
cunning  and  duplicity,  and  an  extreme  selfishness  of  nature — a 
nature  not  having  the  capacity  of  a  true  moral  conception  or 
altruistic  feeling.  Whatever  opinion  other  experimental  observers 
may  hold,  I  cannot  but  think  that  the  extreme  passion  for  getting 
rich,  absorbing  the  whole  energies  of  a  life,  does  predispose  to 
mental  degeneration  in  the  offspring, — either  to  moral  defect,  or 
to  intellectual  and  moral  deficiency,  or  to  outbreaks  of  positive 
insanity  under  the  conditions  of  life.' 

The  heredity  of  the  tendency  to  thieving  is  so  generally  admitted 
that  it  would  be  superfluous  to  bring  together  here  facts  which 
abound  in  every  record  of  judicial  proceedings.  One,  but  that 
decisive,  may  be  cited  from  Dr.  Despine's  Psychologic  Naturdlc, 
the  genealogy  of  the  Chretien  family. 

1  Da  Gama  Machado,  p.  142.  *  Maudsley,  p.  234. 


Heredity  of  the  Sentiments  and  the  Passions.     9 1 

Jean  Chretien,  the  common  ancestor,  had  three  sons — Pierre, 
Thomas,  and  Jean-Baptiste.  i.  Pierre  had  a  son,  Jean-Francois, 
who  was  condemned  for  life  to  hard  labour  for  robbery  and 
murder.  2.  Thomas  had  two  sons :  (i)  Frangois,  condemned 
to  hard  labour  (travaux  fords)  for  murder,  and  (2)  Martin, 
condemned  to  death  for  murder.  Martin's  son  died  in  Cayenne, 
whither  he  had  been  transported  for  robbery.  3.  Jean-Baptiste 
had  a  son,  Jean-Frangois,  whose  wife  was  Marie  Taure  (belong- 
ing to  a  family  of  incendiaries).  This  Jean-Frangois  had  seven 
children :  (i)  Jean-Francois,  found  guilty  of  several  robberies, 
died  in  prison ;  (2)  Benoist,  fell  off  a  roof  which  he  had  scaled, 

and  was  killed ;  (3)  X ,  nicknamed  Clain,  found  guilty  of 

several  robberies,  died  at  the  age  of  twenty-five ;  (4)  Marie 
Reine,  died  in  prison,  whither  she  had  been  sent  for  theft;  (5) 
Marie-Rose,  same  fate,  same  deeds ;  (6)  Victor,  now  in  jail  for 
theft ;  (7)  Victorine,  married  one  Lemaire :  their  son  was  con- 
demned to  death  for  murder  and  robbery.1 

We  have  given  this  instance  because  it  cuts  short  all  explan- 
ations drawn  from  the  influence  of  education  and  example. 
Doubtless  it  is  difficult  in  many  cases  to  determine  what  is  due  to 
education,  and  what  to  nature ;  and  the  children  of  thieves  are  not 
very  likely  to  be  trained  to  honesty  by  their  parents ;  but  still 
nature  is  always  the  stronger  agency.  Sundry  authors,  and  among 
them  Gall,  have  given  instances  of  a  disposition  to  thieving,  where 
any  parental  influence  was  impossible.  He  gives  one  instance  still 
more  curious — that  of  two  conflicting  heredities :  one  good,  from 
the  mother,  and  one  bad,  from  the  father. 

In  1845,  tne  Cour  d'Assiscs  of  La  Seine  condemned  to  severe 
and  degrading  penalties  three  out  of  the  five  members  of  a  family 
of  thieves.  The  father  of  this  family  had  not  found  in  his  children 
the  dispositions  he  desired.  He  had  been  compelled  to  use  com- 
pulsion with  his  -wife  and  his  two  eldest  children,  but  they,  to  the 
last,  refused  to  obey  him.  His  eldest  daughter,  on  the  other  hand, 
trod  instinctively  in  her  father's  steps,  and  was  passionate  and 

1  Despine,  tome  ii.  p.  410.  Several  facts  of  a  like  kind  may  be  found  in 
this  work.  Observe  the  tendency  of  such  families  to  unite,  thus  conferring  the 
hereditary  transmission.  See  also  Lucas,  i.  p.  480,  seq. 


92  Heredity. 

violent  like  him.  She  took  after  her  father,  the  rest  of  the  children 
after  their  mother. 

We  may  apply  to  the  instinct  for  murder  what  we  have  just  said 
of  thieving.  Instances  of  hereditary  transmission  are  equally 
conclusive  and  equally  numerous.  We  have  already  seen  the 
heredity  of  homicide  added,  in  a  portion  of  a  family,  to  the 
heredity  of  theft ;  and  it  is  needless  to  cite  cases  that  may  be 
found  in  abundance  on  all  sides.1  Here,  however,  are  two 
instances,  in  which  the  circumstances  of  the  crime  remove  all 
doubt  as  to  its  hereditary  transmission. 

In  the  Annales  Medico-Psychologiques  for  1853  we  read  that  two 

girls,  Adele  and  Lucie  H ,  aged  thirteen  and  seventeen,  were 

bound  apprentices  at  Paris.  Adele  was  of  remarkably  gentle 
manners,  and  industrious ;  but  Lucie  was  of  an  unsociable  dis- 
position, and  disagreeable  to  her  mistress  and  her  companions. 
Enraged  at  her  state  of  isolation,  she  endeavoured  by  threats  and 
caresses  to  persuade  her  sister  to  murder  their  mistress.  As  Adele 
refused,  Lucie  passed  a  stay-lace  round  her  neck,  intending  to 
strangle  her.  Adele  cried  out,  and  the  mistress  came  to  the  spot 
Lucie,  disappointed  in  her  hope  of  an  accomplice,  resolved  to  take 
her  vengeance  herself.  She  collected  bits  of  glass  and  ground  them 
to  a  powder;  this  she  mixed  with  her  mistress's  dinner.  The  latter 
for  several  days  suffered  internal  pain,  the  cause  of  which  was 
unknown,  until  she  discovered  the  pounded  glass  in  Lucie's  hands. 
The  girl  was  arrested,  but  on  her  trial  it  was  proved  that  her 
grandfather  had,  during  his  life,  made  many  attempts  at  murder, 
and  at  last  strangled  his  wife.  His  children  never  showed  the 
least  symptoms  of  homicidal  mania ;  it  reappeared,  as  we  have 
seen,  in  the  second  generation. 

In  all  cases  where  hereditary  transmission  takes  the  form  of 
atavism,  it  is  clear  that  the  influence  of  education  has  no  weight 
The  same  may  be  said  of  all  precocious  homicidal  acts,  and  of 
those  committed  out  of  frivolous  motives,  like  the  following : — 

A  boy  of  fourteen,  one  of  a  family  in  bad  repute,  went,  armed 
with  his  bow,  to  a  neighbouring  village  feast  He  met  on  the  way 
a  little  girl  of  six,  who  had  in  her  hand  thirty  sous  to  buy  bread, 

1  See  Lucas,  i.  504,  520;  Despine,  ii.  281,  283;  Mireau,  Psychologie  MorbitU, 


Heredity  of  the  Sentiments  and  the  Passions.       93 

knocked  her  down,  strangled  her,  threw  her  body  into  a  field  at  a 
distance  from  the  road,  took  the  thirty  sous,  and  went  on  to  the 
village  feast  to  spend  the  money  and  enjoy  himself. 

The  innate,  incurable  taste  for  a  vagabond  life  shown  so 
strikingly  in  inferior  races,  and  in  the  gypsies,  is  also  unquestion- 
ably a  consequence  of  heredity.  These  facts  will  be  considered 
from  the  social  standpoint  in  the  fourth  part  of  this  work. 

The  conclusion,  perhaps  unexpected,  to  which  we  are  led  by  all 
the  foregoing  arguments,  is  this — that  insanity  very  much  resembles 
passion ;  and  this  statement  is  to  be  taken  in  the  strict  sense  of 
the  words.  The  common  opinion  readily  enough  admits  that 
both  obscure  the  intellect  and  paralyze  the  will,  but  is  loth  to 
admit  that  a  violent  passion  is,  in  its  generating  causes,  identical 
with  insanity.  When,  however,  we  read  judicial  records,  and 
especially  medical  annals,  in  search  of  facts  to  show  the  heredity 
of  homicide,  theft,  or  alcoholism,  then,  side  by  side,  with  the  some- 
what homogeneous  facts  wherein  we  see  the  passions  of  ancestors 
transmitted  in  identical  form  to  descendants,  we  find  other  hetero- 
geneous facts,  in  which  what  is  passion  in  the  former  becomes 
insanity  in  the  latter,  and  vice  versa.  Such  facts  are  very 
numerous.  We  have  not  cited  any  of  these,  though  they  are 
excellent  instances  of  heredity.  As  we  restrict  ourselves  to  facts 
that  are  absolutely  incontestable,  we  have  put  aside  from  con- 
sideration the  whole  question  of  heredity  by  metamorphosis, 

We  do  not  maintain  that  every  violent  passion  or  every  crime 
is  only  a  variety  of  insanity,  but  only  that  in  many  cases  the 
conditions  which  produce  both  are  identical.  '  Nothing  in  Nature 
is  limited  and  isolated  :  all  things  are  connected  together  by 
intermediate  links,  which  attentive  observation  sooner  or  later 
discovers,  where,  at  first  glance,  they  were  not  even  suspected.  It 
were  to  be  wished,  in  the  interest  of  science,  that  inquiries  should 
be  made  as  to  the  progenitors  of  criminals  for  at  least  two  or  three 
generations.  This  would  be  an  excellent  means  of  demonstrating 
the  kinship  which  exists  between  those  cerebral  infirmities  which 
produce  the  psychic  anomalies  leading  to  crime,  and  the  patho- 
logical affections  of  the  nerve  centres,  particularly  the  brain.  The 
fact,  demonstrated  by  Drs.  Ferrus  and  Lelut,  that  insanity  is  much 
more  frequent  among  criminals  than  other  persons,  goes  far  to 


94  Heredity. 

prove  that  crime  and  insanity  are  closely  connected.'1  The 
number  of  criminals  whose  ancestors  have  given  signs  of  insanity 
is  very  great  Verger,  the  assassin  of  the  Archbishop  of  Paris,  was 
of  this  number.  His  mother  and  one  of  his  brothers  perished, 
prior  to  his  crime,  the  victims  of  suicidal  mania. 

Dr.  Bruce  Thompson,  in  his  recent  work  on  The  Hereditary  Nature 
of  Crime,  adopts  this  conclusion,  and  supports  it  by  figures.  Of 
5,432  prisoners,  he  found  673  whose  mental  state  appeared  to  him 
to  be  unsound,  though,  according  to  the  general  opinion,  they 
were  not  subjects  for  a  lunatic  asylum.  Out  of  904  convicts  in 
prison  at  Perth,  440  were  recommitted,  thus  showing  the  fatal 
power  of  the  passions.  In  a  house  of  detention  there  were  109 
prisoners  belonging  to  only  50  families ;  among  them  were  eight 
members  of  one  family,  and  several  families  were  represented  by 
two  or  three  members. 

It  is  beyond  our  purpose  to  inquire  to  what  extent  passion 
shares  in  the  fatal  character  of  insanity,  or  to  ascertain  the 
practical  consequences  of  this.  The  argument  simply  shows  that 
(i)  passions  which  are  inexplicable,  so  long  as  they  are  studied  in 
the  isolated  individual,  find  their  explanation  so  soon  as  we  have 
studied  them  in  their  metamorphoses  through  generations,  and 
brought  them  under  the  great  law  of  heredity ;  (2)  that  passion  is 
so  near  insanity  that  the  two  forms  of  heredity  are  really  one :  so 
that  the  preceding  section  is,  as  it  were,  a  chapter,  detached  and 
in  advance,  on  morbid  heredity. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

HEREDITY  OF  THE  WILL. 

L 

THE  title  given  to  this  chapter  is  hardly  exact,  and  is  only 
selected  for  want  of  a  better.  Yet  it  seems  to  us  that  in  the 
statesmen  and  great  soldiers  of  whom  we  are  about  to  speak,  the 
will  must  be  regarded  as  the  dominant  faculty.  They  must,  no 

1  Despine,  Psychologic  Naturelle,  ii.  983. 


^Heredity  of  the  Will.  95 

doubt,  furthermore,  possess  a  broad  and  penetrating  intellect, 
passion  to  rouse  men  and  enforce  obedience ;  but  their  distin- 
guishing characteristic  is  action,  and  that  strong,  bold  nature 
which  commands.  It  is  only  through  the  will  one  man  gains  an 
irresistible  influence  over  others.  A  lofty  intellect  excites  admira- 
tion, but  it  is  only  a  strong  will  that  demands  obedience. 

The  word  '  will '  is  here  used,  of  course,  in  its  ordinary  sense, 
and  as  commonly  employed.  We  lay  aside  for  the  moment  all 
those  philosophical  discussions  about  free-will  and  its  relations  to 
heredity,1  and  here  consider  the  will  only  as  the  active  faculty, 
without  inquiring  whether  th<e  tendency  to  action  be  the  result  of 
individual  inclination,  of  a  fixed  idea,  or  of  an  invincible  passion. 

The  ancient  moralists  distinguished  three  kinds  of  life,  according 
as  pleasure,  action,  or  contemplation  was  looked  on  as  the  end  of 
man ;  they  thought  that  a  choice  must  be  made  between  the  three. 
They  all,  or  nearly  all,  agreed  in  placing  the  life  of  pleasure  in 
the  lowest  rank ;  but  they  long  discussed  the  question  whether  the 
active  life  or  the  contemplative  were  preferable  This  discussion 
is  infinite,  for  every  man  decides  according  to  his  tastes,  his  tem- 
perament, and  his  habits.  Men  cf  action  and  men  of  thought 
contribute,  each  in  his  own  way,  to  the  common  weal — the  former 
sway  the  present,  the  latter  prepare  the  future.  The  distinction, 
however,  which  lies  at  the  base  of  this  discussion  is  founded  on  a 
true  observation  of  human  nature.  Except  the  mere  sensualist, 
every  man,  from  the  highest  to  the  lowest,  is  either  active  or 
contemplative :  every  one  is  a  Csesar  or  a  Plato,  as  far  as  his 
intellect  will  allow.  He  who  in  some  obscure  village,  in  some 
remote  land,  takes  trouble  to  conduct  some  small  business,  is  akin 
to  those  who  govern  great  states,  or  who  win  great  battles.  He 
who  prefers  leisure,  who  loves  to  dream  and  meditate,  who  aspires 
to  some  rude  education  as  his  ideal,  is  akin  to  great  thinkers  and 
great  poets.  The  more  closely  we  study  men,  the  better  we  see 
that  they  may  be  brought  under  these  two  categories.  Even 
where  the  contrast  is  not  striking,  it  still  exists,  and  we  detect  it 
when  we  observe  more  deeply.  '  The  keener  the  mind,  the  more 
men  of  originality  will  it  discover.' 

1  See  Part  Second,  ch.  iii. 


96  Heredity. 

We  have  already  seen  that  the  contemplative  faculties — imagina- 
tion and  simple  intellect — are  transmissible  by  heredity.  History 
must  answer  whether  it  is  the  same  with  the  active  faculties.  How- 
ever, we  must  first  consider  what  is  meant  by  active  faculties. 

So  far,  we  have  employed  a  method  of  analysis,  which, 
though  really  artificial,  was  necessary  and  sufficiently  exact  We 
have  been  enabled  to  examine  instinct,  perception,  imagination, 
memory,  intellect,  sentiments,  and  have  inquired  whether  each  of 
these  modes  of  mental  life,  taken  separately,  is  hereditary.  In  the 
present  instance,  the  analytical  method  is  impossible.  With  the 
statesman,  the  soldier,  and,  generally,  with  those  who  are  called  men 
of  action,  the  play  of  the  various  faculties  must  be  simultaneous. 
Their  processes  are  essentially  synthetic.  In  them,  the  work  of 
each  faculty  counts  only  in  so  far  as  it  concurs  in  the  general 
result ;  the  aim  to  which  all  means  are  subordinate.  In  the 
statesman,  moreover,  the  mental  activity  must  be  exerted  in  every 
direction.  M.  Guizot  somewhere  observes  that  public  life  is  '  the 
highest  occupation  of  man's  faculties.'  If  we  reflect  on  the  con- 
ditions it  demands,  and  the  faculties  it  requires,  we  may,  perhaps, 
agree  with  him.  The  great  advantage  of  public  life  is  that  it 
develops  simultaneously  our  various  faculties,  and  that 'it  is,  as  has 
been  said,  of  a  synthetic  nature.  A  thinker,  a  man  of  science, 
may  isolate  himself  in  the  highest  regions  of  intellect,  but  may  be 
without  sentiment,  and  unsuited  for  action.  An  artist  may,  by 
his  imagination,  be  enchanted  with  the  most  delightful  dreams, 
and  yet  know  nothing  of  the  real  world.  For  politics,  on  the 
other  hand,  is  required  an  intellect  capable  of  grasping  at  once 
the  universal  and  the  particular,  the  abstract  and  the  concrete.  Is 
a  statesman  incapable  of  generalization  ? — he  can  have  no  broad 
views,  and  is  the  slave  of  routine.  He  cannot,  moreover,  like  the 
man  of  science,  content  himself  with  general  results  :  he  must 
decide  particular  and  definite  cases ;  hence  he  must  be  able  to 
grasp  at  once  the  whole,  and  its  details.  Furthermore,  his  re- 
flections must  of  necessity  result  in  acts.  He  is  no  speculative 
theorizer :  for  him  theory  is  but  a  means,  action  alone  is  his  end. 
Hence  he  is  characterized  by  a  strong  power  of  will,  always  exer- 
cised, as  also  by  the  qualities  which  this  implies ;  viz.  boldness, 
courage,  self-confidence,  and  mastery  over  the  timid  and  irresolute 


Heredity  of  the   Will.  97 

Thus,  a  talent  for  observation  at  once  minute,  broad,  and  rapid ; 
a  ready  and  faithful  memory,  recalling  with  exactitude  and 
without  hesitation  the  results  of  theory ;  a  great  presence  of  mind, 
not  to  be  disconcerted  by  unforeseen  circumstances ;  an  energetic 
will ;  and,  as  a  basis,  physical  strength,  and  certain  bodily  qualities 
— such  are  the  faculties  which  must  be  combined,  and  act  simulta- 
neously, with  the  rapidity  and  certainty  of  instinct. 

History  shows  that  this  sum  of  qualities  is  transmissible,  as  a 
whole  or  in  part — for  it  sometimes  happens  that  the  original  com- 
bination is  broken  up  in  passing  to  the  descendants,  who  can 
collect  but  fragments  (as  Pitt  and  his  grand-daughter).  Like  every 
other  faculty,  strength  of  will  may  be  hereditary.  This  was  ob- 
served by  Voltaire  with  regard  to  the  Guises.  'The  physical, 
which  is  "  father  of  the  moral,"  transmits  the  same  character  from 
father  to  son  for  ages.  The  Appii  were  ever  proud  and  inflexible ; 
the  Catos  always  austere.  The  whole  line  of  the  Guises  was  bold, 
rash,  factious,  full  of  the  most  insolent  pride,  and  of  the  most 
winning  politeness.  From  Francois  de  Guise  down  to  that  one 
who,  all  alone,  and  unexpectedly,  put  himself  at  the  head  of  the 
people  of  Naples,  they  were  all — in  look,  courage,  and  character — 
above  ordinary  men.  I  have  seen  full-length  portraits  of  Francois 
de  Guise,  of  Balafre  and  his  son :  they  were  all  six  feet  high,  and 
they  all  possess  the  same  features — there  is  the  same  courage,  the 
same  audacity  on  the  brow,  in  the  eyes,  and  in  the  attitude.' 1  We 
know  not  how  the  will  is  thus  transmitted ;  but  when  we  see  that  its 
energy  and  its  weakness  are  connected  with  certain  states  of  the 
organism,  and  that  physical  strength  commonly  renders  men  bold 
and  courageous,  while  physical  weakness  makes  them  timid,  we 
can  scarcely  doubt  that  this  transmission  takes  place  by  means  of 
the  organs,  and  that  it  is,  in  fact,  physiological.2 

Not  to  dwell  on  this  point,  we  now  proceed  to  note  the  most 
important  cases  of  the  heredity  of  the  active  faculties,  quoting 
historical  facts.  These  fall  naturally  vmder  the  two  categories  of 
statesmen  and  soldiers,  though  many  men  have  been  both.  Here 


1  Voltaire,  Dictionnaire  Philosophiqite,  Art.  '  Caton.' 

*  Concerning  the  will  as  groundwork  of  the  personality  and  character,  se« 
Part  Fourth,  ch.  iii. 


98  Heredity. 

we  must  guard  against  the  error  of  taking  high  official  position  as 
a  proof  of  personal  merit.  In  letters,  science,  or  art,  where  every 
one  is  judged  directly  by  his  works,  this  illusion  is  impossible.  In 
political  life,  the  fame  of  ancestors,  alliances,  and  power  previously 
acquired,  count  for  much,  and  sometimes  supply  the  lack  of  all 
else.  To  avoid  the  danger  of  confounding  an  external  and  con- 
ventional heredity  with  that  which  is  internal  and  natural,  we  cite 
none  but  the' most  indisputable  cases. 

II. — STATESMEN. 

ADAMS,  John  (1785, 1826),  second  President  of  the  United  States; 
His  son,  John  Quincey,  sixth  President  of  the  United  States ; 
His  grandson,  Charles  Francis,  American  Minister  to  England, 

author  of  a  Life  of  John  Adams. 

ANTONIA   (the    Gens  Antonia)   reckoned    among  its   most  dis- 
tinguished members   Marcus  Antonius,  the  orator,  Marcus 
Antonius,  the  critic,  and  Mark  Antony,  the  rival  of  Caesar. 
ARTEVELD,  Jacques,  the  famous  brewer  of  Flanders  ; 

His  son,  Philippe,  who  continued  his  father's  political  work. 
BENTINCK,  William,  Duke  of  Portland,  Prime  Minister  of  England, 

1783,  1784,  and  1807 — 1810; 
His  son,  Henry,  Governor-General  of  India ;  he  introduced  there 

the  freedom  of  the  press  and  abolished  Suttee ; 
His  grandson,  member  of  Parliament,  eminent  financier,  and  a 

leading  statesman. 
C/ESAR.     He  might  equally  have  been  ranked  among  the  soldiers, 

but  is  placed  here  on  account  of  his  family ; 
His  mother,  Aurelia,  seems  to  have  been  no  ordinary  woman. 
His  daughter,  Julia,  who  married  Pompey  and  died  prematurely, 
was  remarkable  for  her  wit  and  beauty.  Historians  have 
observed  the  transmission  of  certain  hereditary  characters  in 
the  family  of  the  Caesars.  '  There  existed  in  all  the  Caesars,' 
says  J.-J.  Ampere,  'a  morbid  principle.  The  first  was  epileptic; 
his  nephew  (the  Emperor  Augustus)  was  a  life-long  valetudi- 
narian ;  an  acrid  humour  disfigured  the  countenance  of 
Tiberius;  Caligula  was  extraordinarily  pale,  slept  little,  and 
was  constantly  delirious;  Claudius  was  physically  inclined 
to  imbecility ;  Nero  gave  unequivocal  indications  of  insanity  ; 
Tiberius,  adopted  stepson  of  Augustus, '  had  fine  and  noble 


Heredity  of  the  Will.  99 

features,  and  was  remarkably  like  his  mother,  Livia.  His 
thin,  dry  lips  show  his  crafty  and  ruthless  soul.'  The  mother 
of  Mark  Antony  belonged  to  the  Julian  family. 
CHARLES  THE  FIFTH.  There  is  a  curious  similarity  between  this 
sovereign  and  Don  Carlos.  On  comparing  Don  Carlos  with 
his  celebrated  grandfather,  we  discover  such  striking  features 
of  resemblance  between  them,  that  we  cannot  but  see  here  an 
instance  of  reversional  heredity,  or  atavism. 

Don  Carlos  was  the  son  of  Philip  II.  and  Dona  Maria  of 
Portugal.  His  mother,  who  died  four  days  after  giving  him 
birth,  appears  in  history  only  as  an  insignificant  personage. 
As  for  the  father,  he  was  in  nearly  every  respect  the  antithesis 
of  his  sons.1  The  character  of  Don  Carlos,  his  temperament 
and  his  physical  habit,  are  inexplicable  unless  we  go  back  to 
Charles  V. 

Charles  V.  was  slow  in  his  development,  and  grew  old  early. 
He  was  nearly  twenty-one  before  he  could  grow  a  beard. 
He  was  rather  below  the  medium  stature,  his  health  was 
feeble,  and  his  face  long  and  sad  in  expression;  he  spoke 
slowly,  and  stammered.  The  development  of  his  intellect 
was  as  slow  as  that  of  his  body.  He  remained  for  a  long 
time  absolutely  dependent  on  Chievres,  his  tutor.  His 
phlegmatic  temperament  saved  him  from  excesses,  although 
his  gluttony  is  well  known.  *  Before  getting  up,  a  capon  was 
usually  served  to  him,  dressed  with  sugar,  milk,  and  spice.  He 
dined  at  noon,  off  a  large  number  of  dishes.  Soon  after 
vespers  he  took  another  meal,  and  for  supper,  later  in  the 
evening,  he  would  take  anchovies,  or  other  strong,  gross  food. 
Even  at  the  monastery  of  San  Yuste  he  ate  with  avidity, 
before  the  eyes  of  his  physician,  frogs'  legs  and  eel  pies.' J 

Don  Carlos,  according  to  the  account  of  the  Venetian  envoys, 
and  of  the  imperial  ambassador  at  Madrid,3  was  a  prince  of 
very  inferior  stature — his  'features  ugly  and  disagreeable. 
His  temperament  was  melancholy,  nor  had  he  any  taste  either 
for  study  or  for  manly  exercises.  He  spoke  with  difficulty 

1  See  the  contrast  in  Gachard,  Don  Carlos  and  Philippe  //.,  p.  237,  «y. 

•  Prescott,  Reign  of  Philip  II. ,  voL  i.  ch,  9. 

*  Gachard  and  Prescott,  vol.  iv. 


too  Heredity. 

and  slowly,  and  bis  words  were  disconnected.  '  His  voice 
is  thin  and  shrill;  he  is  embarrassed  when  he  begins  to 
speak,  and  the  words  come  with  difficulty.  He  pronounces 
his  r's  and  his  fs  badly.'  At  the  age  of  twenty-one  he  had 
his  tongue-string  cut  He  had  little  desire  for  women,  but 
was  a  glutton,  like  his  grandfather.  In  his  prison,  he  brought 
on  his  own  death  by  his  excess  in  eating.  He  took  to  a 
diet  consisting  of  partridge  pie,  pie-crust,  spiced  meats,  and 
iced  drinks.  And  he  began  these  excesses  very  early  in  the 
day.  '  He  eats  so  much,  and  with  such  ravenousness,'  writes 
the  imperial  ambassador,  'as  to  surpass  belief;  scarcely  has 
he  finished  one  meal  when  he  is  ready  for  another.' 

The  reader  will  observe  that  in  the  foregoing  comparison  we 
have  not  mentioned  Don  Carlos's  violence  of  temper,  which, 
also,  we  incline  to  think  hereditary.  As  an  infant,  he  would 
bite  the  breast  of  his  nurse ;  there  were  three  of  them  bitten 
so  severely  by  him  as  to  have  their  lives  endangered.  His 
short  life  is  full  of  cruel  acts.  He  used  to  beat  his  servants  ; 
he  made  an  unskilful  shoemaker  eat  a  pair  of  boots ;  he 
wanted  to  burn  down  a  house  because  a  drop  of  water  fell 
from  it  on  his  head.  Later,  while  in  prison,  he  would  have 
the  floor  of  his  chamber  flooded  with  water,  and  then  would 
walk  about  barefooted  and  almost  naked  on  the  icy  boards. 
Several  times  during  the  night  he  would  have  a  pan  full  of  ice 
and  snow  brought  to  his  bed,  keeping  it  there  for  hours. 
(Prescott,  vii.  12.) 

These,  and  sundry  other  acts,  show  mental  derangement  If 
now,  the  reader  will  bear  in  mind  that  Charles  V.'s  mother 
was  Juana  the  Mad,1  Queen  of  Castille,  he  will  see  in  Don 

1  According  to  recent  investigations,  the  restraint  of  Juana  was  in  a  great 
measure  due  to  political  reasons  ;  but  even  if  her  insanity  has  been  exaggerated, 
it  must  be  admitted  that  she  had  a  strange  disposition,  and  a  morbid  sensibility. 
She  was  subject  to  '  frightful  hallucinations.'  (See  Hildebrand,  Revue  desDetix 
Mondes,  1 866,  June  I.)  Diseased,  trembling  with  fever,  and  crippled  by  gout, 
he  (Charles  V.)  nevertheless  dragged  his  bones  from  place  to  place,  disquieting 
the  whole  world  by  his  own  unrest,  till  an  evil  trick  of  fortune  drove  so  wise 
a  man  into  the  convent  of  San  Yuste,  and  afflicted  him  with  the  madness  of 
Jane  the  Mad  and  Charles  the  Bold.  Michelet,  Hisioire  de  France,  voL  vii. 


Heredity  of  the   Will.  101 

Carlos's  insane  acts  fresh  proof  of  revarsional  heredity.  This 
same  observation  was  made  at  the  time  by  the  Venetian 
ambassadors.  '  He  has  been  suffering  almost  uninterruptedly 
during  the  past  three  years  from  quartan  fever,  attended  at 
times  by  mental  alienation — a  thing  the  more  worthy  of  note, 
inasmuch  as  he  seems  to  have  inherited  this  disorder  from 
his  grandfather  and  great  grandmother.' 

COND£.     Of  the  family  of  Cond^  we  will  speak  hereafter. 

COLBERT,  Jean-Baptiste.    The  family  of  this  celebrated  minister 

reckoned  several  distinguished  members  ; 
His  brother,  Charles,  statesman  and  diplomatist ; 
His  son,   Jean-Baptiste,   commanded  the    expedition    against 

Genoa,  in  1684; 
Another  son,   Jacques,  archbishop,    member    of  the    French 

Academy ; 
A  nephew,  Charles's  son,  diplomatist 

CORNELIA  (the  Gens  Cornelia).  This  family,  which  we  shall 
meet  again  under  the  head  of  the  Scipios,  reckoned  from 
P.  Cornelius  Scipio,  Magister  Equitum  in  396,  to  Scipio 
Nasica,  who  died  in  56,  without  issue,  nineteen  consuls,  one 
dictator,  two  tribunes  (the  Gracchi),  two  quaestors,  one  sedile, 
one  censor,  two  magistri  equitum.  To  this  family  belongs 
the  famous  Sylla. 

CROMWELL.  His  direct  descendants  are  mediocre ;  but  we  may 
mention  with  him  two  collaterals — the  patriot  Hampden, 
uncle's  son  to  Oliver;  and  Edmond  Waller,  the  poet, 
Hampden's  nephew. 

DISRAELI,   Benjamin,   novelist,   Prime    Minister  of   England  in 

1868; 
His  father,  Isaac,  author  of  Curiosities  of  Literature,  etc. 

FLAVIA  (the  Gens  Flavia)  had  for  its  principal  representatives 
Vespasian,  Titus,  Domitian.  Vespasian's  avarice  was  here- 
ditary. '  The  founder  of  this  family  was  a  Cisalpine,  Petro 
by  name,  a  centurion  under  Pompey,  who  afterwards  called 
himself  Titus  Flavius  Petronius,  and  became  a  banker's  clerk. 
His  son,  Flavius  Sabinus,  a  tax  collector  in  Asia,  afterwards 
followed  the  trade  of  a  usurer  in  Helvetia.  One  of  his  sons 
was  Vespasianus,  Proconsul  of  Africa.  He  bought,  and  sold 


IO2  Heredity. 

and  sold  again  horses  and  mules,  and  hence  his  nickname, 
"  the  Jockey." ' 

Fox,  Charles  James,  Pitt's  rival ; 
His  grandfather,  a  statesman  ; 
His  father,  Lord  Holland,  Secretary  at  War ; 
His  brother,  Stephen,  statesman,  and  leader  of  the  House  cf 

Commons ; 

Several  nephews,  statesmen,  authors,  and  generals. 
GRENVILLE,  George,  Premier  in  1763.     Gallon  reckons  twelve 

notable  members  in  this  family. 
GUISE,  Francois,  Due  de ; 

His  brother,  Charles,  Cardinal  de  Lorraine ; 
His  son,  Henri,  assassinated  at  the  assembly  of  the  States  at 
Blois ; 

His  son,  the  Cardinal,  killed  at  the  same  time ; 

His  grandson,  Charles,  who,  with  his  uncle,  the  Due  de  Mayenne, 

fought  against  Henri  IV. ; 

His  great-grandson  conspired  against  Cardinal  Richelieu. 
LAMOIGNON,  a  celebrated  family  of  magistrates,  'one  of  those 
families  whose  members  seem  born  only  to  practise  justice 
and  charity,  wherein  virtue  is  transmitted  with  the  blood,  is 
upheld  by  good  counsels,  and  is  exalted  by  great  examples.' 
(Flechier.)  Charles  de  Lamoignon,  born  1514,  was  about  to 
succeed  to  the  chancellorship  when  he  died,  in  1572.  He 
had  twenty  children,  among  whom  were  Pierre,  a  wonderful 
child,  who  died  prematurely,  and  Chretien,  who  was  President 
a  mortier.  Chretien  had  a  son,  Guillaume  de  Lamoignon, 
First  President  of  the  Parliament,  and  the  most  celebrated  of 
his  family ;  Fle'chier  preached  his  funeral  sermon.  His  son, 
Chretien-Francois,  President  a  mortier,  was  an  associate  of 
Boileau,  Racine,  etc.  His  brother,  Nicolas,  was  Intendant 
at  Montauban,  Pau,  Poitiers,  and  Montpellier;  he  was 
implicated  in  the  Dragonnades,  but  displayed  great  ability. 
Guillaume,  son  of  Chretien-Francois,  First  President,  exiled 
by  Maupeou.  Chretien-Francois  II.,  great  grandson  of 
Boileau's  friend,  Chancellor  in  1787.  Malesherbes  was  of 
this  family. 
MEDICI.  The  following  is  their  genealogy,  abridged.  The  family 


Heredity  of  f/ie  Will.  103 

was  of  middle-class  origin  ;  in  the  fourteenth  century,  Silvestro 
was  Gonfaloniere,  or  head  of  the  Florentine  Republic. 
Silvestro 

~  "  ^\ 

Co.-mo 

Father  of  his  country  Lorenzo 

Pietro  L 

I 

Lorenzo  theMagnifirpnt 


Pietro  IL  Giovanni  (Leo  X.)  Giovanni  de  Medici 

(II  grande  diavolo) 

Lorenzo  II.  Cosmo  (first  Grand-duke) 

Catherine  de  Medicis  Francis  L 

Marie  de  Medicis 

As  regards  the  relations  of  the  Medicis  to  the  three  kings  of 
France,  Francis  IL,  Charles  IX.,  and  Henry  III.,  see  Michelet, 
Histoire  de  France,  vol.  ix.  He  gives  some  very  ill-digested 
physiological  details. 

MIRABEAU.  In  the  opinion  of  his  father,  the  '  Friend  of  Man  ' 
(ami  des  homines),  possessed  '  all  the  vile  qualities  of  his  mater- 
nal stock.' 

*  The  correspondence  of  the  great  tribune's  father  and  uncle, 
and  the  notice  on  the  life  of  his  grandfather,  give  evidence 
of  a  peculiar  race,  and  exhibit  the  characters  of  a  grand 
and  lofty  originality.  Our  Mirabeau  needed  but  to  descend 
from  such  stock,  in  order  to  spread  himself  abroad,  to  shower 
down  as  he  has  done,  and  to  give  of  himself  to  all,  so  that 
we  might  name  him  the  enfant  perdu,  the  enfant  frodigue  d 
sublime  of  his  race.'  (Ste.-Beuve.) 
PEEL,  Sir  Robert,  thrice  Premier  ; 

His  father,  a  great  manufacturer,  founded  the  family  ; 

Two  brothers  and  three  sons  of  Peel's  have  held  high  judicial 

or  administrative  positions. 

PITT,  William,  Lord  Chatham,  Premier  in  1766,  married  a  Gren- 
ville.  (See  Grenville.) 

His  son,  William,  Premier  at  twenty-five,  the  famous  rival  of  Fox; 


1 04  Heredity. 

His  grand-daughter,  Lady  Hester  Stanhope,  the  'Sibyll  of  the 
Libanus.'    We  shall  meet  with  this  family  again,  when  we 
speak  of  the  law. 
RICHELIEU,  Armand  du  Plessis,  Cardinal,  Due  de; 

His  father,  FranQois,  Grand-PreVot   of  France,  showed  some 
diplomatic  ability ; 

The  grandson  of  his  brother  Henri,  Due  de  Richelieu,  one  of 
the  most  curious  characters  of  the  eighteenth  century,  whose 
son  was  the  famous  Due  de  Frousac,  and  whose  grandson  was 
the  Due  de  Richelieu,  Minister  of  Louis  XVIII. 
SHERIDAN.  '  The  name  of  Sheridan,'  says  Galton,  '  is  peculiarly 
associated  with  a  clearly  marked  order  of  brilliant  and 
engaging,  but  "  ne'er-do-weel,"  qualities.  Brilliant  social  and 
conversational  qualities,  with  a  dash  of  profligacy,  are  found 
among  numerous  members  of  this  family ; 

His  father  wrote  a  dictionary,  and  was  manager  of  Drury  Lane 
Theatre ; 

His  grandfather,  friend  and  correspondent  of  Swift ; 

His  son,  '  a  Sheridan  all  over ; ' 

His  grand-daughter,  Carolin.e,  Mrs.  Norton,  poetess  and  novelist 

TEMPLE,  Henry,  Lord  Palmers  ton.     This   family  has  had  many 

remarkable  members,  among  whom  we  may  name  Palmer- 

ston's  great  grand-uncle,  Sir   William  .Temple,  author  and 

statesman. 

THEODOSIUS,  Roman  Emperor.     In  this  family  talent  and  vigour 
seem  to  have  descended  particularly  to  the  female  members. 
The  Count  Theodosius 

I 

Theodosius 


Arcndius  Honorius  Pulcheria  Placidia 


Pulcheria         Theodosius  II. 

WALPOLE,  Sir  Robert,  Premier,  1721-42  ; 

His  father,  Sir  Edward,  a  distinguished  member  of  Parliament 
in  the  reign  of  Charles  II.  ; 

His  brother,  Horace,  a  diplomatist  of  great  ability j 


Heredity  of  the  Will.  105 

Two  sons,  Edward,  in  government  employ,  and  Horace,  a  man 

of  letters.     Byron  calls  him  '  the  incomparable.' 
WITT.     John  de  Witt  and  his  brother  Cornelius. 

III. — SOLDIERS. 

ALEXANDER  THE  GREAT,  died  at  the  age  of  thirty-two,  had  but  one 

posthumous  son,  who  was  assassinated  at  the  age  of  twelve  ; 
His  mother,  Olympias,  an  ambitious,  intriguing  woman ; 
His  father,  Philip,  King  of  Macedon ; 

His  brother  (half-brother)  Ptolemy,  Philip's  son  by  Arsinoe, 
though  this  filiation  is  very  questionable.  The  family  of  the 
Ptolemies  will  hereafter  be  mentioned. 

His  grand-nephew  (or  great-grand-nephew?)  Pyrrhus,  King  of 
Epirus,  whose  resemblance  to  Alexander  was  long  since 
noticed. 

BERWICK,  Duke  of,  natural  son  of  James  II.  and  Arabella  Church- 
hill  ; 

His  maternal  uncle,  John  Churchill,  Duke  of  Marlborough. 
BONAPARTE,  Napoleon.     The  genealogy  of  this  family  is  so  well 

known,  that  the  mere  mention  is  enough. 
CHARLEMAGNE.     The  direct  succession  is  noteworthy ; 
His  great-grandfather,  Pepin  d'Heristal ; 
His  grandfather,  Charles  Martel ; 
Hisfat/ier,  Pepin  the  Short 
COLIGNY,  Admiral  Gaspard  de,  murdered  in  the  massacre  of  Saint 

Bartholomew ; 
His  father,  Gaspard,  Marshal  of  France,  gained  distinction  during 

the  wars  in  Italy  ; 

His  uncle,  Due  de  Montmorency,  Constable  of  France. 
DORIA,  Andrea,  Genoese  admiral  and  statesman; 

His  nephew,  Filippino,  succeeded  him  as  admiral  and  defeated 

the  French. 
EUGENE,  Prince,  ranked  by  Napoleon  with  Turenne  and  Frederick 

the  Great ; 

His  grand-uncle,  Cardinal  de  Mazarin. 

GUSTAVUS  ADOLPHUS.  Equally  remarkable  as  statesman  and 
general ;  spoke  French,  Italian,  Latin,  and  German ;  restored 
the  University  of  Upsala ; 


io6  Heredity. 

His  daughter,  Christina,  who  induced  Grotius,   Descartes,  and 

Vossius  to  reside  at  Stockholm ; 
His  great-grandfather,  Gustavus  Vasa.     The  latter  had  a  daughter 

Cecilia,  who  was  in  many  respects  very  like  Christina ; 
His  grand-nephew,  the  romantic  Charles  XII. 
HANNIBAL,  the  greatest  of  a  distinguished  family  of  soldiers ; 

His  father,  Hamilcar  Barca ; 
-  His  brothers,  Hasdrubal  and  Mago. 
MAURICE  OF  NASSAU,  one  of  the  greatest  captains  of  his  time,  was 

Governor  of  the  Low  Countries ; 
His  father,  William  of  Orange,  'the  Silent;' 
His grandfatlier,  Maurice,  Elector  of  Saxony; 
His  brother,  Frederick  William,  Statholder ; 
His  great-nephew,  William  III.,  Statholder,  and  King  of  England; 
His  nephew,  Turenne. 
NAPIER,  Sir  Charles,  conqueror  of  Scinde ; 

His   great-grandfather  invented    logarithms,   and    the    family 
reckons  eight  members  distinguished  as  generals  or  statesmen. 
PTOLEMIES,  the  family  of  the  Lagidse ; 

The  founder  of  this  dynasty  was  Ptolemy  Soter,  son  of  Lagos, 
or,  according  to  some,  of  Philip  and  Arsinoe.  There  were  in 
this  family  three  distinguished  men  :  Ptolemy  Soter ;  his  son, 
Ptolemy  Philadelphus,  and  his  grandson,  Ptolemy  Euergetes. 
The  rapid  decline  of  the  Lagidae  seems  to  be  the  result  of 
heredity,  produced  by  intermarriage.  Ptolemy  II.  married 
first  his  niece  and  then  his  sister;  Ptolemy  IV.,  his  sister ; 
Ptolemy  VI.  and  Ptolemy  VII.  brothers,  both  married,  con- 
secutively, the  same  sister;  Ptolemy  VIII.  married  two  of  his 
sisters;  Ptolemy  XII.  and  Ptolemy  XIII.  married  their  sister, 
the  famous  Cleopatra. 
SAXE,  Marshal,  natural  son  of  Augustus  II.,  King  of  Poland;  he 

was  great-grandfather  of  Georges  Sand. 
SCIPIO,  P.  Cornelius  (Africanus  Major)  the  greatest  soldier  of  the 

Gens  Cornelia,  of  which  we  have  already  spoken; 
His  father,  who  was  conquered  by  Hannibal ; 
His  grandfather,  drove  the  Carthaginians  out  of  Corsica  and 

Sardinia ; 

His  daughter,  Cornelia,  mother  of  the  Gracchi; 
His  two  grandsons,  Tiberius  and  Caius  Gracchus. 


Heredity  and  National  Character.          107 

TROMP,  Marten,  and  his  son,  Cornelius  van  Tromp,  famous  Dutch 

admirals. 
TURENNE,   probably  the  greatest  general  produced  by  France, 

prior  to  Napoleon ; 
"Risfaf/ier,  Henri,  Due  de  Bouillon,  pupil  of  the  £colede  Henri 

IV.,  was  leader  of  the  Huguenots ; 

Turenne's  relationship  to  the  house  of  Orange  lias  been  already 
mentioned. 

It  would  be  easy,  by  searching  history,  to  collect  a  far  larger 
number  of  cases  of  heredity.  Those  here  given  are  sufficient  to 
disprove  all  idea  of  accidental  coincidence.  It  is  not  surprising 
that  cases  of  heredity  seem  to  be  rarer  among  great  soldiers  than 
elsewhere.  Many  soldiers  gifted  with  great  natural  abilities  must 
have  died  before  they  could  attain  to  fame  or  found  a  family. 


CHAPTER  VIIL 

HEREDITY  AND   NATIONAL  CHARACTER. 


WE  have  thus  hastily  traversed  the  field  of  history,  noting  a  few 
important  cases  of  mental  heredity  in  families  of  artists,  men  of 
science,  literary  men,  soldiers,  and  statesmen.  Considerations  of 
this  nature  are  so  foreign  to  most  historians  that  their  works  afford 
but  little  aid  in  our  present  study.  They  care  little  for  details, 
which  are  '  beneath  the  dignity  of  history,'  and  disregard  those 
little,  precise,  and  trivial  facts  which  teach  us  more  about  a  char- 
acter than  ten  pages  of  vague  phrases.  From  biographies  and 
memoirs  we  may  learn  more,  though  in  them  little  attention  is 
bestowed  on  physiological  data.  The  day  will,  perhaps,  yet  come 
when  such  history  will  not  be  so  disregarded  and  so  rare,  and  when 
it  will  be  seen  that  the  infinitesimally  small  plays,  in  the  evolution 
of  humanity,  the  same  latent  and  incessant  part  as  in  the  evolution 
of  nature.  Then  history,  without  neglecting  the  study  of  great 
facts  and  their  connection — which  is  its  chief  purpose — will  furnish 
the  psychologist  with  materials  both  numerous  and  precise.  Since, 


1 08  Heredity. 

in  the  absence  of  such  works,  our  researches  would  necessarily  be 
long,  tedious,  and  often  without  result,  all  that  we  have  been  able 
to  do  here  is  to  indicate  roughly  the  part  of  heredity  in  history,  as 
a  physiological  and  psychological  law.  We  have  had  to  content 
ourselves  with  showing  its  existence,  for  we  have  no  means  of 
telling,  save  in  a  vague  way,  in  what  measure  a  given  quality  has 
descended  from  one  generation  to  another,  whether  it  has  varied, 
or  why  it  has  varied. 

We  have  now  to  treat  of  the  influence  of  heredity,  not  on  indi- 
viduals, but  on  masses.  We  shall  see  how  it  transmits  and  fixes 
certain  psychological  characters  in  a  people  as  in  a  family. 

The  habit  of  our  times  is  to  regard  the  State  as  an  organism. 
Herbert  Spencer  has  even  shown  that  this  simile  holds  good  at 
every  point ;  that  there  is  in  nature  a  hierarchical  series  of  organ- 
isms parallel  to  the  hierarchical  series  of  states,  the  one  from  the 
protozoon  to  man,  the  other  from  the  savage  tribes  of  Australia  to 
the  most  highly  civilized  nations  of  Europe;  and  that  in  the 
organism,  as  in  the  State,  progress  consists  in  division  of  labour, 
and  in  the  increasing  complexity  of  functions.  The  organism 
subsists  only  by  a  continual  assimilation  and  disassimilation  of 
molecules :  the  State  by  continual  gain  and  loss  of  individuals. 
But  amid  this  incessant  whirl,  which  constitutes  their  life,  there  is 
ever  something  fixed,  which  is  the  basis  of  their  unity  and  their 
identity.  In  a  people,  that  sum  of  psychical  characteristics  which 
is  found  throughout  its  whole  history,  in  all  its  institutions,  and  at 
every  period,  is  called  the  national  character. 

The  national  character  is  the  ultimate  explanation,  and  the  only 
true  one,  of  the  virtues  and  vices  of  a  people,  of  its  good  or  bad 
fortune.  This  truth,  simple  though  it  is,  is  hardly  yet  recognized. 
The  successes  and  reverses  of  a  people  do  not  depend  on  their  form 
of  government,  but  are  the  effect  of  their  institutions.  Their 
institutions  are  the  effect  of  their  manners  and  their  creeds;  their 
manners  and  creeds  are  the  effect  of  their  character.  If  one 
people  is  industrious,  another  indolent ;  if  the  one  has  an  internal, 
moral  religion,  and  the  other  an  external,  sensuous  religion,  the 
cause  is  to  be  looked  for  in  their  habitual  mode  of  thinking  and 
feeling — that  is  to  say,  in  their  character.  Nor  can  it  be  seriously 
doubted  that  character  itself  is  also  an  effect  It  is  extremely 


Heredity  and  National  Character.          109 

probable  that  every  character,  individual  or  national,  is  the  very 
complex  result  of  physiological  and  psychological  laws.  But 
sociology  is  a  science  so  little  advanced  that  we  dare  not  risk  a 
judgment  on  the  causes  of  the  formation  of  national  characters, 
and  hence  we  must  provisionally  regard  character  as  an  ultimate 
cause.  On  this  basis,  let  us  see  what  part  is  played  by  heredity  in 
the  formation  of  national  character. 

It  is  usual  to  explain  the  history  of  a  people  by  their  institu- 
tions, which,  in  one  sense,  is  true,  though  institutions  themselves 
are  but  an  effect  In  the  social  and  political  order,  effects  and 
causes  are  not  presented  under  the  form  of  a  simple  series,  as  in 
the  physical  order ;  we  rather  find  a  reciprocity  of  action  between 
them.  The  character  produces  the  institutions,  and  they  in  turn 
form  the  character ;  thus,  after  several  generations,  the  two  are  but 
one,  the  institutions  are  but  the  character  rendered  visible  and 
permanent.  Still,  we  must  not  forget  that  the  institutions  are  only 
an  external  cause,  which  is  sustained  by  an  internal  cause — cha- 
racter— and  this  is  transmitted  hereditarily.  Take  a  people  in  its 
earliest  period — the  Romans  under  the  kings,  or  the  Gauls  before 
Caesar's  time — the  grand  outlines  of  its  character  are  already 
traced.  They  are  probably  the  result  of  its  physical  constitution, 
and  of  the  climate.  And  as  a  people  is  perpetuated  by  genera- 
tion ;  as  it  is  a  law  of  nature  that  like  shall  produce  like ;  as  the 
exceptions  to  this  law  tend  to  disappear  when  large  masses  instead 
of  particular  cases  are  examined,  obvious  facts  point  out  how 
national  character  is  preserved  by  heredity. 

This  is,  after  all,  only  to  assert  that  physical  transmission  is  as 
much  the  law  for  obscure  individuals  as  for  famous  men.  In  the 
preceding  chapters  we  have  taken  our  examples  from  history, 
because  such  examples  are  known  to  all.  But  every  one  is  aware 
that  the  various  modes  of  imagination,  intelligence,  and  sensibility 
may  be  preserved  by  heredity  in  ordinary,  obscure  families.  Every 
one  might  readily  find  in  his  own  experience  instances  to  confirm 
this.  The  permanence  of  national  character  is  at  once  the  result 
and  the  experimental  proof  of  psychological  heredity  in  the 
masses. 

If  we  had  any  true  science  of  ethnographical  psychology,  we 
should  more  clearly  perceive  the  part  played  by  heredity  in  the 


no  Heredity. 

formation  of  the  character  of  a  people.  Such  a  science  may  one 
day  exist;  at  present  we  have  but  fragments.  In  France,  M.  Taine 
has  based  on  the  law  of  heredity  his  studies  on  the  literature,  the 
constitution,  and  the  manners  of  England,  considered  as  an 
expression  of  national  character — he  has  shown  how  firmly  the  old 
Germanic  and  Scandinavian  groundwork  was  established,  and  sees 
in  Lord  Byron  a  true  descendant  of  the  Berserkers. 

In  Germany,  Lazarus  and  Steinthal  have  laid  the  foundation  for 
a  psychology  of  nations,  '  of  which  the  object  is  to  determine  the 
nature  of  the  mind  of  a  people,  and  to  discover  the  laws  which 
govern  its  internal,  intellectual,  or  ideal  activity  in  life,  in  art,  and 
in  science.' x  Even  in  the  absence  of  such  scientific  researches, 
based  on  exact  criticism,  historians  have  long  been  accustomed  to 
express  decided  judgments  upon  national  character,  and  the 
impossibility  of  altering  it  Thus,  the  French  of  the  iQth  century 
are,  in  fact,  the  Gauls  described  by  Csesar.  In  the  Commentaries,  in 
Strabo,  and  in  Diodorus  Siculus  we  find  all  the  essential  traits  of 
our  national  character :  love  of  arms,  taste  for  everything  that 
glitters,  extreme  levity  of  mind,  incurable  vanity,  address,  great 
readiness  of  speech,  and  disposition  to  be  carried  away  by 
phrases.  There  are  in  Csesar  some  observations  which  might  have 
been  written  yesterday.  'The  Gauls,'  says  he,  'have  a  love  of 
revolution ;  they  allow  themselves  to  be  led  by  false  reports  into 
acts  they  afterwards  regret,  and  into  decisions  on  the  most  im- 
portant events ;  they  are  depressed  by  reverses ;  they  are  as  ready 
to  go  to  war  without  cause  as  they  are  weak  and  powerless  in 
the  hour  of  defeat.' 3 

But  it  is,  perhaps,  among  that  people  which  has  borne  succes- 
sively the  names  of  Ancient  Greeks,  Byzantines,  and  Modern 
Greeks  that  we  must  look  for  the  most  striking  instance  of  the 
tenacity  of  character.  '  Amid  all  these  vicissitudes,'  says  Ampere, 
'  the  fundamental  character  of  the  Greek  has  not  changed  ;  he  has 
now  the  same  qualities,  the  same  defects,  as  of  old.'  Pougueville 
found  in  the  Morea  Apelles's  and  Phidias's  models ;  and,  what  is 

1  Zeitschrift  fur  Volkerpsychologk  und  Sprachwissenschaft,  band  i. 

1  Caesar,  De  Bella  Gallico,  iv.  5.  See  also  Strabo,  iv.  4.  Diodorus  Siculus, 
v.  ;  Michelet  and  H.  Martin,  tome  L  ;  and  Carlyle,  French  Revoltttiont 
vol  ii.  book  iii.  ch.  2. 


Heredity  and  National  Character.  in 

of  more  interest  to  us,  he  shows  that  the  chief  traits  of  the  national 
character  and  habits  have  been  transmitted ;  thus,  the  Arcadians 
still  lead  a  pastoral  life,  and  the  inhabitants  of  Sparta,  their  neigh- 
bours, have  a  love  for  fighting,  and  an"  excitable,  quarrelsome  tem- 
per. In  the  middle  ages  the  Byzantine  possessed  all  the  essential 
characteristics  of  his  ancestors. 

If  the  reader  will  examine  with  us  the  ponderous,  but  scarce 
known,  volumes  of  the  histories  of  the  Lower  Empire,  he  will  find 
that  this  people  which  called  itself  Roman x  remained  thoroughly 
Greek,  notwithstanding  their  Latin  traditions,  their  imperial 
routine,  their  manners  imported  from  the  East — such  as  eunuchs, 
the  dress  and  worship  of  the  emperor,  etc. — and  their  narrow 
Christianity.  There  is  here  a  curious  study  in  historical  psycho- 
logy which  we  would  one  day  willingly  attempt  From  the  Greek 
the  Byzantine  derived,  besides  language  and  literary  traditions,  a 
subtlety  which,  for  want  of  mental  force  to  strengthen  it,  degener- 
ated into  low  cunning.  The  love  of  the  Greek  for  rhetoric  and 
brilliant  conversation  became  the  braggart  self-assertion  of  the 
Byzantine ;  the  subtle  sophistry  of  the  philosophers  degenerated 
into  the  empty  scholasticism  of  the  theologians ;  and  the  versatility 
of  the  Graculus  into  the  perfidious  diplomacy  of  the  Emperors. 
The  Byzantine  is  the  Greek  of  Pericles'  time,  but  in  a  dry  and 
withered  old  age. 

Similar  observations  might  be  made  on  any  nation  whatsoever, 
but  it  is  enough  to  direct  the  reader's  attention  to  this  subject 
To  sum  up,  every  people  has  its  own  physiognomy,  and  this  results 
(i)  from  certain  primary  characteristics,  considered  here  as  final 
causes  \  (2)  from  external  conditions,  or  the  influences  of  cir- 
cumstances ;  (3)  from  heredity,  which  maintains  the  primitive 
characteristics.  To  this  last  factor,  so  often  overlooked,  we  will 
now  attend. 

II. 

It  may  be  further  observed  that  crossings  and  alliances  take 
place  between  different  nations — to  their  advantage,  say  some, 
to  their  great  disadvantage,  say  others.  This,  at  least,  is  certain, 
that  such  intermingling  of  blood  must,  to  some  extent,  modify 

1  'Ot  Poyuuoi :  so  the  Byzantines  always  designated  themselves. 
6 


H2  Heredity. 

the  national  character,  which  remains  intact  where  there  is  no 
such  intermixture.  But  there  are  very  few  nations  indeed  that 
have  been  able  to  survive  and  gain  civilization  without  fusion  with 
others.  Though  it  has  been  held  that  the  superior  races  are  those 
which  have  ever  been  exclusive — a  proposition  which  we  will 
hereafter  examine  in  detail — still  it  is  difficult  to  see  how,  under 
such  conditions,  a  people  could  acquire  that  variety  and  that 
complexity  of  elements  without  which  civilization  is  impossible. 
A  great,  simple  civilization  is  a  contradiction  in  terms,  so  that 
we  have  but  little  chance  of  reaching  a  conclusion.  One  of  two 
things  must  always  take  place  :  either  a  people  remains  intact, 
and  then  its  development  is  inconsiderable ;  or  it  develops  only 
by  intermingling  with  other  races. 

Yet,  after  having  spoken  of  nations  among  whom  the  primitive 
national  character,  in  its  struggle  with  foreign  elements,  must  have 
been  in  some  degree  modified,  we  turn  to  some  which  have  been 
at  least  relatively  exclusive.  Were  China  better  known,  that 
country  would  probably  offer  a  curious  subject  of  study.  We 
take  for  examples  the  Jews,  the  Gypsies,  and  the  Cagots. 

THE  JEWS. 

The  Jewish  people  is,  perhaps,  the  only  one  that  has  played  a 
part  in  history,  while  jealously  guarding  its  purity  of  race.  It 
is  not,  however,  quite  unmixed.  From  the  psychological  point  of 
view,  it  is  not  easy  to  decide  how  far  its  character  has  been 
modified  by  Persian  doctrines  after  the  Babylonian  captivity,  by 
Greek  and  Egyptian  manners  from  Alexander  to  Philo,  and,  in 
the  middle  ages,  by  the  hard  condition  of  its  very  existence. 
According  to  Munck,  '  the  commercial  spirit  of  the  modern  Jew 
is  not  a  heritage  from  his  ancestors,  but  the  result  of  the 
oppressions  to  which  they  were  subjected,  and  of  their  exclusion 
from  every  other  trade.'  It  will,  however,  be  generally  admitted 
that,  notwithstanding  a  few  physical  and  moral  variations  from 
which  no  living  thing  is  free,  the  Jewish  nation  has  preserved 
better  than  any  other  its  distinctive  character :  in  other  words, 
that  in  them  heredity  is  better  seen  than  elsewhere. 

But  when  we  attempt  to  determine  the  physical  and  moral 
characteristics  of  this  race,  not  in  vague  and  general  phrases,  but 


Heredity  and  National  Character.  113 

in  definite  points,  there  is  considerable  difficulty.     Here,  however, 
are  a  few. 

The  Jews  are  usually  to  be  distinguished  by  their  black  hair  and 
beards,  their  long  eyelashes,  thick,  prominent,  arched  eyebrows, 
their  large,  dark,  bright  eyes,  their  dark  complexion,  their  strongly 
aquiline  noses.  In  the  east  there  are  fair  or  red  Jews :  or,  as  they 
are  called,  German  Jews.  They  seem  to  result  from  a  crossing  of 
German  or  Sclavonic  races  with  the  original  Jews.1  There  are, 
also,  black  Jews  settled  in  India  from  time  immemorial,  who 
possess  very  many  of  the  physical  characters  of  the  Hindus, 
owing  to  the  influence  of  the  climate,  of  circumstances,  and 
perhaps  of  cross-breeding.  Still,  they  have  a  remote  resemblance 
to  the  Jews  of  Europe.  Nott  and  Gliddon,  after  having  studied 
the  question  profoundly,  conclude  that  'all  Jews  possess  some 
identical  features.' 

According  to  the  statistical  tables  of  France,  Algeria,  and 
Prussia,  it  would  appear  that  this  race  is  remarkably  long-lived.2 
In  the  various  countries  of  Europe  they  increase  more  rapidly 
than  the  Christian  populations.  Thus,  in  Germany,  twenty-five 
per  cent  of  Christians  die  before  they  are  six  months  old ;  twenty- 
five  per  cent,  of  Jews  before  they  are  twenty-eight  years  and  three 
months ;  fifty  per  cent  of  the  Christian  population  die  before  they 
are  twenty-eight,  while  fifty  per  cent,  of  the  Jews  exceed  fifty-three 
years. 

As  regards  moral  qualities,  the  Jewish  race  is  presented  in 
history  as  possessed  of  very  definite  characters,  viz. — a  pre- 
dominance of  sentiment  and  imagination ;  and  this  it  is  that  has 
given  that  nature  its  aptitude  for  the  creation  of  religion,  poetry, 
and  music.  We  need  not  dwell  upon  the  religious  importance  of 
a  nation  from  which  have  sprung  Judaism  and  Christianity,  and 
which  alone  among  the  nations  of  antiquity  rose  to  Monotheism. 
Nor  can  their  poetic  eminence  be  called  in  question,  though  this 
race  has  a  poetry  of  its  own — passionate,  convulsive,  abrupt,  and 
full  of  imagery.  Though  among  the  Jews  we  find  very  few  painters 
and  sculptors,  their  aptitude  for  music  is  remarkable  :  no  other 

1  Bulletins  de  la  Societf  (£  Anthropologie,  tome  ii.  p.  389. 
*  Ibid.  vol.  i.  p.  1 80. 


114  Heredity. 

race  has  given  to  the  world  so  high  a  proportion  of  musicians. 
We  need  only  mention  the  names  of  Mendelssohn,  HaleVy,  and 
Meyerbeer. 

On  the  other  hand,  they  are  but  ill-endowed  with  all  that  relates 
to  scientific  culture.  'A  race  incomplete  by  reason  of  its  very 
simplicity,  it  has  neither  plastic  art  nor  rational  science,  nor 
philosophy,  nor  political  life,  nor  military  organization.  The 
Semitic  race  has  never  understood  civilization  in  the  sense  which 
we  attach  to  the  word ;  no  great  organized  empires,  no  public 
spirit  are  found  in  its  womb.  The  questions  of  aristocracy, 
democracy,  and  feudalism,  which  constitute  the  whole  secret  of 
Indo-European  history,  have  no  meaning  for  the  Semitic  race. 
Their  military  inferiority  is  the  result  of  their  utter  incapacity  for 
discipline  and  organization.'  (Renan.) 

To  these  general  considerations  may  be  appended  a  few  more 
precise  facts.  Heredity  seems  to  have  exerted  on  the  Jewish  race 
a  baleful  influence,  by  sowing  the  seed  of  sundry  mental  disorders, 
the  result  of  intermarriage.  The  number  of  Jewish  deaf-mutes  is 
enormous.  Idiocy  and  mental  alienation  are  also  very  frequent 
According  to  the  German  statistics,  there  is  one  idiot 

In  Silesia  to     580  Catholics,  to     408  Protestants,  to     514  Jews. 

In  \Vurtemburgt04, 1 13         „          103,207          „  103,003    „ 

And  one  lunatic 

In  Bavaria          to     908         „          to     967          „  to     514    „ 

In  Hanover        to     528        „          to     641          „          to     337    „ 
In  Silesia  to  1,355         »»          to  1.264          „  to     624    „ 

In  Wurtemburg  to  2,006        ,,          to  2,028          „  to  1,544    ,, 

(Bulletins  de  la  Soci6t6  <T Anthropologie,  tome  iv.) 


The  Gypsies,  called  in  different  countries  by  the  names  of 
Bohemians,  Zingari,  Zigeuner,  and  Gitanos  (Egyptians),  afford 
a  striking  example  of  the  hereditary  conservation  of  certain 
psychological  characteristics. 

According  to  Pasquier,  they  first  appeared  at  Paris  in  1427. 
Accused  of  palmistry  and  sorcery,  they  were  excommunicated, 
expelled  the  country,  threatened  with  death  and  the  galleys.  At 
present  Gypsies  are  to  be  found  in  most  European  countries. 
In  Turkey  and  in  Hungary  they  are  smiths,  tinkers,  musicians 


Heredity  and  National  Character.          115 

In  England  they  are  tinkers  and  horse-dealers.  In  Transylvania, 
Moldavia,  and  Wallachia,  they  have  their  own  chiefs,  and  enjoy 
a  fair  share  of  the  comforts  of  life.  In  Russia  there  are  some 
Gypsies  that  are  rich  and  respected.  But  the  classic  land  of  the 
Gypsies  is  Spain.  Seville,  Cordova,  the  caves  of  Monte  Sagro, 
near  Grenada,  and  the  forests  of  Andalusia,  the  cellars  and  attics 
of  Madrid,  swarm  with  them.  They  live  in  squalid  huts,  surrounded 
by  all  the  paraphernalia  of  sorcery,  and  their  only  business  is 
thieving,  dancing,  and  fortune-telling.  An  English  missionary,  Mr. 
Borrow,  who  succeeded  in  overcoming  their  abhorrence  of  all 
Christians,  who  lived  with  them  and  spoke  their  language,  has 
given  us  valuable  particulars  as  to  their  habits  and  usages.1 

It  is  generally  believed  that  the  Gypsies  are  of  Hindu  origin ; 
that  they  may  have  passed  through  Egypt,  but  do  not  spring  from 
it ;  that  they  were  a  despised  caste,  probably  expelled  from  India, 
unless,  indeed,  they  left  it  after  the  conquest  of  Tamerlane.  Their 
true  and  sacred  name  is  Romi.  '  All  the  world  over,'  says  Borrow, 
'  their  usages  are  the  same,  and  they  employ  the  same  words.' 
When  we  compare  sundry  terms  of  their  idiom  with  the  corre- 
sponding Sanscrit  words  (especially  those  denoting  number),  the 
analogy  is  striking. 

Undoubtedly  the  physical  and  mental  constitution  of  Gypsies 
is  the  same  in  all  countries.  It  is,  no  doubt,  somewhat  difficult  to 
decide  how  much  is  due  to  education,  that  is  to  say,  to  tradition  ; 
and  how  much  to  heredity.  To  the  latter,  however,  these  facts 
seem  due. 

As  regards  physical  constitution,  Borrow  finds  in  all  Gypsies 
hard,  sharp  features,  jet  black  hair,  fine,  white  teeth,  bright  eyes, 
and  the  '  fascinating '  glance. 

As  regards  their  intellect,  they  appear  to  be  as  thoughtless  and 
frivolous  as  children.  'Nothing  makes  a  letting  impression  on 
the  Gypsy's  mind ;  it  is  as  restless  as  running  water,  and  reflects 
all  images  alike.  The  Gypsy  believes  everything  and  nothing, 
or,  rather,  believes  only  in  the  sensation  of  the  moment;  a 
sensation  that  is  past  is  for  him  only  a  fable.  Hence  he  is 
sceptical,  not  only  as  regards  moral  and  social  ideas,  but  even  with 

1  An  Account  of  the  Gypsies  of  Spain.     By  G.  Borrow. 


ii6  Heredity. 

regard  to  his  own  impressions.  He  abandons  himself  to  a 
blind  trust  in  fleeting  emotions,  just  as,  in  the  ordinary  course  of 
life,  he  gives  himself  up  to  all  the  chances  of  vagabondage.  One 
impression  is  driven  out  by  another.  In  him  simple  animalism  is 
supreme.  Emotions — of  whatever  kind,  gross  or  poetical,  grovel- 
ling or  exalted — are  the  rule,  and,  as  it  were,  the  motive  power  of 
his  mifld.'  Their  poetry,  specimens  of  which  Borrow  gives,  is 
prosaic,  rude,  vulgar,  and  childish  rather  than  artless. 

As  their  mind,  so  their  manners  :  with  childish  ideas  they  have 
a  childish  morality.  If  children  had  a  morality  of  their  own,  it 
would  be  a  very  bad  morality.  Hobbes  was  right  when  he  said : 
Homo  malus,  puer  robustus.  What  specially  characterizes  the 
Gypsy  is  his  love,  his  inborn  need,  of  vagabondage,  and  an 
adventurous  life.  He  abhors  civilization  as  slavery,  and  despises 
all  sedentary  and  regular  occupation.  Marriage  is  but  a  temporary 
union,  concluded  in  presence  of  a  few  members  of  the  tribe. 
Gypsies  usually  live  organized  into  corporations  or  tribes,  under 
the  authority  of  an  elective  chief — a  very  primitive  form  of  polity. 
Hating,  as  they  do,  all  civilized  peoples,  they  have  certain  vices  to 
which  they  cling  as  to  an  hereditary  creed,  and  these  they  love  and 
uphold  as  a  religion.  Thus,  their  highest  ambition  is  to  steal  from 
the  Christians ;  and  mothers  teach  their  children  thieving  as  the 
noblest  of  virtues.  They  are,  moreover,  like  children,  less  violent 
than  tricky,  incapable  of  lofty  thoughts,  and  unaffected  in  their 
superstitions.  Borrow  having  translated  into  Romany  the 
Gospel  according  to  St.  Luke,  the  Gypsies  accepted  the  book, 
and,  regarding  it  as  a  talisman,  carried  it  about  their  persons  when 
they  went  to  thieve. 

This  race  offers  a  curious  instance  of  a  native  incapacity,  pre- 
served and  transmitted  by  heredity,  for  adaptation  to  civilized  life. 
The  Gypsies  are  in  our  moral  and  social  world  what  the  dodo  and 
the  ornithorhynchus  are  in  our  physical  world,  the  survivors  of  a 
past  age.  Civilization  is  a  very  complex  condition,  a  moral  atmo- 
sphere to  which  man  has  to  become  acclimatized.  There  must  be 
a  correspondence  between  the  moral  man  and  his  moral  condi- 
tions, as  between  the  physical  man  and  his  physical  conditions. 
Whoever  cannot  adapt  himself  to  new  conditions  of  social  life 
must  die  out — gradually,  perhaps,  yet  surely.  If  he  disappears 


Heredity  and  National  Character.          117 

but  slowly,  he  remains  only  as  a  curious  and  useless  thing, 
picturesque  to  an  artistic  eye  \  but  he  is  ill  adapted  to  his  circum- 
stances, and  certain  sooner  or  later  to  vanish. 

THE  CAGOTS. 

The  various  names  of  Cagots,  Agots,  Capots,  Gahets,  and 
Caqueux,  are  given  to  races  which  subsisted  down  to  the^present 
century  in  Guyenne,  Gascony,  and  Beam,  on  the  northern  side  of 
the  Pyrenees,  in  Navarre  and  Guipuzcoa,  and  even  in  Maine  and 
Brittany.1  They  formed  a  population  apart,  separated  from  the 
other  inhabitants  by  the  aversion  with  which  it  was  regarded. 
Popular  tradition  confounded  these  people  with  lepers.  It  was 
said  that  they  might  be  distinguished  by  their  dull-gray  eyes,  and 
by  the  shortness  of  the  lobe  of  the  ear.  'They  are,'  says  an 
author  of  the  i6th  century,  '  comely  men,  industrious,  skilful 
mechanics ;  but  in  their  countenances  and  in  their  acts  you  always 
detect  something  that  makes  them  worthy  of  all  the  abhorrence 
wherewith  they  are  universally  regarded.  Furthermore,  be  they  as 
comely  as  they  may,  they  have  all,  men  and  women  alike,  a  stink- 
ing breath,  and  when  you  come  near  one  of  them  you  experience 
a  certain  unpleasant  odour  emanating  from  their  flesh,  as  though 
some  curse  descending  from  father  to  son  had  fallen  upon  this 
miserable  race  of  men.' 

Though,  like  the  population  amid  which  they  lived,  they  were 
Catholics,  still  they  were  not  allowed  to  mix  with  their  co- 
religionists. Their  hovels  stood  at  some  little  distance  outside 
the  villages ;  they  could  enter  the  parish  church  only  through  a 
narrow  doonvay  exclusively  reserved  for  thern  ;  they  took  the  holy 
water  from  a  special  stoup,  or  received  it  from  the  point  of  a  stick ; 
and  in  the  church  they  had  a  corner  where  they  were  obliged  to 

1  During  the  Reign  of  Terror  there  were  yet  to  be  found  many  of  the 
Caqueux  in  Finistere.  M.  Francisque  Michel  states  that  in  a  commune  of  the 
canton  of  Accous,  arrondissement  of  Oleron,  a  Cagot  was,  about  the  yeat 
1817,  nominated  for  maire  of  the  commune,  to  the  great  scandal  of  the  people 
of  the  place.  Protests  were  sent  in  from  all  sides  to  the  prefet,  but  be  did  not 
heed  them.  Still  the  complaints  did  not  cease,  they  continued  to  be  made  till 
1830,  when  the  electors  forced  the  maire  to  retire  into  his  former  privacy. 
—Histoirc  da  Races  Maudites,  i.  127. 


1 1 8  Heredity, 

keep  apart  from  the  rest  of  the  faithful.  Down  to  the  end  of  the 
1 7th  century  they  were  required  by  the  legislation  then  in  force 
to  wear  a  distinctive  mark,  called  'the  goose's  foot,'  or  'the 
duck's  foot '  (pied  d'oie,  pied  de  canard)  in  the  decrees  of  the  par- 
liaments of  Navarre  and  of  Bordeaux. 

Of  course  these  outcasts  intermarried,  as  a  general  rule,  and 
marriages  between  Cagot  families  held  to  be  'pure'  were  very 
rare.  Hence  this  race  remained  under  much  the  same  conditions 
as  the  Jews — in  a  state  highly  favourable  to  hereditary  transmis- 
sion. It  is  to  be  observed  that  many  of  those  who  have  spoken  of 
these  Cagots  from  personal  observation,  and  particularly  the 
physicians  of  the  i6th  and  i;th  century,  whose  remarks  are  given 
in  M.  Michel's  work,  noticed  the  fact  of  heredity.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  same  author  tells  us  that  a  modern  writer  says,  'I  dis- 
trust external  signs  as  means  of  distinguishing  Cagots  from  people 
of  other  races.'  Perhaps  these  opinions  might  be  reconciled,  if 
we  observe  that  the  Cagots  do  not  appear  to  have  been  a  race 
strictly  distinct,  like  the  Jews  and  the  Gypsies.  While  the  origin 
of  the  last-named  races  is  known,  that  of  the  Cagots  is  ex- 
tremely obscure.  All  sorts  of  conjectures  have  been  made, 
ranging  from  the  one  which  would  have  them  to  be  the  descend- 
ants of  a  servant  of  the  prophet  Elijah,  down  to  that  which  sees 
in  them  a  remnant  of  the  Goths.1  If,  then,  between  the  Cagots 
and  the  surrounding  population  there  were  no  diversity  of  race,  all 
external  differences  would  gradually  disappear  under  the  influence 
of  identical  conditions. 

Still,  during  their  pariah  period  the  Cagots  would  have  been  a 
curious  object  of  study  from  the  standpoint  of  psychological  and 
moral  heredity.  But  unfortunately  the  data  are  totally  wanting. 
We  only  know  that  in  Guyenne  and  in  Gascony  they  were  all 
coopers  or  carpenters;  and  that  in  Brittany  they  were  all  rope- 
makers  ;  and  were  considered  very  expert  in  their  trade.  But  this 
fact  seems  to  us  to  be  far  less  the  result  of  heredity  than  of  the 
caste-rule  to  which  they  were  subjected.  They  were  accused  of 
being  presumptuous,  arrogant,  braggart — defects  which  may  be 
explained  as  well  by  the  attitude  of  permanent  hostility  in  which 

1  Races  Mauditest  i.  266. 


Morbid  Psychological  Heredity.  119 

they  stood  with  regard  to  all  other  men,  as  by  the  organic  trans- 
mission of  quality.  There  is  one  simple  fact,  insignificant  enough 
in  itself,  respecting  an  hereditary  taste  and  talent  for  music:  'Navar- 
reins  has  seen  the  Campagnets  hand  down  through  three  or  four 
generations  a  highly  prized  violin.  No  holiday  was  happily  spent 
where  the  violin  or  the  flute  of  the  Campagnets  did  not  contribute 
to  the  mirth.' l 


CHAPTER  IX. 

MORBID    PSYCHOLOGICAL   HEREDITY. 


AT  the  commencement  of  this  work,  in  the  introduction 
devoted  to  physiological  heredity,  we  showed  briefly  that  diseases 
are  transmissible,  like  all  the  characteristics  of  the  external  or 
internal  structure,  and  all  the  various  modes  of  the  organization  in 
a  normal  state.  The  same  question  now  arises  in  the  psychologi- 
cal order.  Are  the  modes  of  mental  life  transmissible  under  their 
morbid,  as  they  are  under  their  normal  form  ?  Does  the  study  of 
mental  diseases  contribute  its  quota  of  facts  in  favour  of  heredity? 
The  answer  must  be  in  the  affirmative.  The  transmission  of  all 
kinds  of  psychological  anomalies — whether  of  passions  and  crimes, 
of  which  we  have  already  spoken,  or  of  hallucinations  and  insanity, 
of  which  we  are  next  to  speak — is  so  frequent,  and  evidenced  by 
such  striking  facts,  that  the  most  inattentive  observers  have  been 
struck  by  it,  and  that  morbid  psychological  heredity  is  admitted 
even  by  those  who  have  no  suspicion,  that  this  is  only  one  aspect 
of  a  law  which  is  far  more  general. 

In  considering  hereafter  the  direct  causes  of  mental  heredity, 
we  shall  endeavour  to  establish  this  important  proposition :  that 
in  man,  to  every  psychological  state  whatsoever,  corresponds 
a  determinate  physiological  state,  and  vice  versd.  Here  this 
question  is  presented  incidentally,  for  it  has  been  much  debated 
whether  mental  diseases  have  or  have  not  an  organic  cause. 

>  Ibid.  i.  41. 


1 20  Heredity. 

If  we  restrict  ourselves  to  payable,  visible,  demonstrated,  and 
accepted  facts,  we  meet  with  two  sorts  of  cases  :  those  in  which 
disorders  of  the  intellect  have  corresponding  to  them  evident 
changes  of  the  tissue  of  the  nerve-centres,  and  those  in  which  the 
brain  presents  no  appreciable  degeneration. 

Taking  their  stand  on  facts  of  the  second  of  these  categories, 
some  writers  on  insanity,  of  whom  the  most  celebrated  is  Leuret, 
have  held  that  insanity  may  proceed  from  purely  psychological 
causes.  *  Physiology,'  says  he,  '  pathology,  acquaintance  with  the 
facts  and  the  laws  of  thought  and  of  passion,  clinical  and  micro- 
scopic observations,  therapeutical  experiments — all  concur  to 
negative  the  absolute  proposition  that  insanity  always  and 
necessarily  has  its  rise  in  an  affection  of  the  organs.  While 
everything  contributes  to  bestow  the  character  of  evidence  upon 
the  following  definition  of  insanity  :  '  Insanity  consists  in  the 
aberration  of  the  understanding  .  .  .  and  the  causes  that  produce 
it  mostly  belong  to  an  order  of  phenomena  that  have  nothing  to 
do  with  the  laws  of  matter.'  Notwithstanding  these  categorical 
affirmations,  Leuret's  view  finds  daily  fewer  adherents.  The 
reason  of  this  is,  that  it  really  rests  only  on  our  ignorance  and 
impotence.  It  simply  affirms  that  in  many  cases  there  exists  no 
physical  cause,  since  we  discern  none.  But  beyond  the  limits 
that  cannot  be  passed  by  the  microscope,  there  exist  phenomena 
which,  though  inappreciable  to  our  senses,  are  nevertheless 
material.  Electricity,  magnetism,  and  all  the  various  physical 
and  chemical  agencies,  produce  in  our  inmost  organs  molecular 
changes  which  elude  our  methods  of  investigation,  but  of  which 
the  consequences  may  be  fatal.  Moreover,  the  idea  of  a  mental 
disease  independent  of  all  organic  cause  is  a  theory  so  unintel- 
ligible that  the  Spiritualists  themselves  have  rejected  it,  and  it  is 
now  generally  admitted  that  the  cause  of  madness  is  always  to  be 
found  in  a  diseased  state  of  the  organs  :  insanity,  like  other 
\  maladies,  is  a  disease  physical  in  its  cause,  though  mental  as 
regards  most  of  its  symptoms.1 

1  See  Lemoine,  L' Alien/,  p.  105—137.  The  hypothesis  of  purely  psycho- 
logical causes  of  insanity  led  Heinroth  to  pen  the  following  absurdities  which 
are  worth  quoting : — 

•  Insanity  is  the  loss  of  moral  freedom  ;  it  never  depends  on  a  physical  cause ; 


Morbid  Psychological  Heredity.  121 

Since  the  direct  cause  of  insanity  is  some  morbid  affection  of 
the  nervous  system,  and  as  every  part  of  the  organism  is  trans- 
missible, clearly  the  heredity  of  mental  affections  is  the  rule.  It 
makes  little  difference  whether  we  regard  thought  as  simply  a 
function  of  the  nervous  system,  or  the  nervous  system  as  a  simple 
condition  of  thought  Our  experimental  psychology,  which  deals 
only  with  facts,  remands  to  metaphysics  all  researches  into  first 
causes.  The  metamorphoses  of  heredity  are  still  more  perplex- 
ing. Nervous  disorders  are  often  transformed  in  their  transmission. 
Convulsions  in  the  progenitors  may  change  to  hysteria  or  to 
epilepsy  in  the  descendants.  A  case  is  cited  where  hyperaesthesia 
in  the  father  branched  out  in  the  grandchildren  into  the  various 
forms  of  monomania,  mania,  hypochondria,  hysteria,  epilepsy, 
convulsions,  spasms.  Facts  of  this  kind  are  very  numerous.  To 
confine  ourselves  to  psychological  metamorphoses,  nothing  is  more 
frequent  than  to  see  simple  insanity  become  suicidal  mania,  or 
suicidal  mania  become  simple  insanity,  alcoholism,  or  hypo- 
chondria. '  A  goldsmith,  who  had  been  cured  of  a  first  attack  of 
insanity,  caused  by  the  revolution  of  1789,  took  poison ;  later,  his 
eldest  daughter  was  seized  with  an  attack  of  mania,  passing  into 
dementia.  One  of  her  brothers  stabbed  himself  in  the  stomach 
with  a  knife.  A  second  brother  gave  himself  up  to  drunkenness, 
and  ended  his  career  by  dying  in  the  streets.  A  third,  owing  to 
domestic  annoyances,  refused  all  food,  and  died  of  anaemia. 
Another  daughter,  a  woman  of  most  capricious  temper,  married, 
and  had  a  son  and  daughter:  the  former  died  insane  and  epileptic; 
the  latter  lost  her  mind  during  her  lying  in,  became  hypochondriac, 
and  wished  to  starve  herself  to  death.  Two  children  of  this  same 
woman  died  of  brain  fever,  and  a  third  would  never  take  the 
breast' 1  This  is  one  of  the  most  instructive  cases  we  have. 

it  is  not  a  disease  of  the  body,  but  a  disease  of  the  mind,  a  sin.  It  neither  is, 
nor  can  be  hereditary,  because  the  thinking  ego,  the  soul,  is  not  hereditary. 
What  is  transmissible  by  way  of  generation  is  temperament  and  constitution, 
and  against  these  he  must  react  whose  parents  were  insane,  if  he  would  not 
himself  become  lunatic.  The  man  who,  during  his  whole  life,  has  before  his 
eyes  and  in  his  heart  the  image  of  God,  need  never  fear  that  he  will  lose  his 
wits,'  etc. 

1  Piorry,  De  THiridM  dans  la  Maladies,  p.  169.  See  also  Mauds'.ey, 
Pathology  of  Mind,  244 — 256. 


122  Heredity. 


There  are  others  of  a  more  obscure  nature,  which  give  us  a 
glimpse  of  the  curious  relations  between  talent  and  insanity. 
Long  before  Moreau  of  Tours'  celebrated  thesis  in  regard  to 
genius,  Gintrac  had  noticed  the  following  fact :  a  father  touched 
with  insanity  had  able  sons,  who  filled  public  situations  with  dis- 
tinction. Their  children  appeared  at  first  sensible,  but  at  the  age 
of  twenty  became  insane.  In  twenty-two  cases  of  hereditary  in- 
sanity, Aubanel  and  Thore  have  noticed  two  facts  of  this  kind. 

Deferring,  for  a  while,  the  difficult  question  of  the  metamorphoses 
of  heredity,  we  here  give  only  similar,  and,  consequently,  the  most 
indisputable,  cases,  and  they  also  are  the  most  frequent  There 
are  families  the  members  of  which,  with  few  exceptions,  are  all 
subject  to  the  same  kind  of  insanity.  Three  relations  were  placed 
at  the  same  time  in  a  lunatic  asylum  at  Philadelphia.  In  a  Con- 
necticut asylum  there  was  once  a  lunatic  the  eleventh  in  his 
family.  Lucas  mentions  a  lady  who  was  the  eighth.  More  curious 
still,  this  infirmity  often  appears  at  the  same  period  of  life  in  suc- 
cessive generations.  All  the  scions  of  a  noble  family  at  Hamburg, 
distinguished  through  four  generations  for  great  military  talents, 
went  mad  at  the  age  of  forty  :  there  remained  but  one  member,  a 
soldier  like  his  father,  and  he  was,  by  decree  of  the  senate,  forbidden 
to  marry ;  the  critical  period  came,  and  he  also  went  mad.  (Lucas.) 
A  Swiss  merchant  saw  two  of  his  children  die  insane  both  at  the 
age  of  nineteen.  A  lady  went  mad  at  the  age  of  twenty-five  after 
childbirth;  her  daughter  became  insane  at  the  same  age,  also  after 
childbirth.  In  one  family  the  father,  son,  and  grandson  committed 
suicide  at  about  the  age  of  fifty.  (Esquirol.) 

II. 

We  now  proceed  to  show  from  examples  that  the  chief  varieties 
of  mental  malady  are  transmissible.  In  the  absence  of  any 
universally  accepted  classification,  we  group  our  facts  under  the 
following  heads :  Hallucination,  Monomania,  Suicide,  Mania, 
Dementia,  Idiocy. 

Hallucination  assumes  two  principal  forms.  Sometimes  it  results 
from  the  automatic  action  of  the  nerve-centres,  and  is  compatible 
with  perfect  reason;  hallucination  in  this  case  does  not  imply 
error  of  judgment:  it  is  recognized  as  an  illusion,  nor  is  the  subject 


Morbid  Psychological  Heredity.  123 

of  the  hallucination  at  all  deceived.  In  the  other  case,  the  hallucina- 
tion is  complete,  and  then  the  patient  believes  in  the  objective 
reality  of  his  imaginary  perceptions,  and  acts  accordingly.  Under 
this  form,  hallucination  is  one  of  the  first  symptoms  of  insanity. 
It  is  hereditary  in  both  shapes. 

*  We  cannot  establish  by  statistics,'  says  the  author  of  one  of  the 
best  treatises  on  this  subject,  '  the  power  of  heredity  on  hallucina- 
tions, because  they  almost  always  exist  with  insanity.  In  order  to 
thoroughly  appreciate  this  influence,  it  should  be  studied  in  indi- 
viduals who  have  only  simple  hallucinations,  and  in  those  mono- 
maniacs, subject  to  hallucination,  who  have  a  very  decided  form  of 
insanity.  It  is  undeniable  that  they  often  occur  in  the  sons  of 
those  who  have  presented  this  double  condition. 

'The  father  of  Jerome  Cardan  used  to  see  apparitions  ;  so  also 
did  his  son.  Catherine  de  Medicis  had  an  hallucination,  as  Pierre 
de  1'Estoile  relates ;  and  her  son,  Charles  IX.,  had  one  the  very 
night  of  the  massacre  of  Saint  Bartholomew.'  -1 

Abercrombie  cites  a  case  of  hereditary  hallucination  where  the 
reason  remained  intact  '  I  know  a  man,'  says  he,  '  who  all  his 
life  has  been  subject  to  hallucination.  This  disposition  is  of  such 
a  nature  that  if  he  meets  a  friend  in  the  street,  he  cannot  tell  at 
once  whether  it  is  an  actual  person  or  a  phantasm.  By  dint  of 
attention  he  can  make  out  a  difference  between  the  two.  Usually 
he  connects  the  visual  impressions  by  touch,  or  by  listening  for 
the  footfalls.  This  man  is  in  the  flower  of  his  age,  of  sound  mind, 
in  good  health,  and  engaged  in  business.  Another  member  of 
his  family  has  had  the  same  affection,  though  in  a  less  degree.' 

Here  is  a  case  no  less  curious.  A  young  man  of  eighteen, 
neither  enthusiastic,  nor  superstitious,  nor  fanciful,  lived  at  Rams- 
gate.  Happening  one  evening  to  enter  a  village  church,  he  was 
terror-stricken  at  seeing  the  ghost  of  his  mother,  who  had  died 
some  months  before.  Having  witnessed  this  same  apparition  many 
times,  he  fell  sick,  and  returned  to  Paris,  where  his  father  lived. 
He  did  not  venture  to  speak  to  him  of  this  apparition. 

Being  obliged  to  sleep  in  the  same  room  as  his  father,  he  was 
surprised  on  seeing  that,  contrary  to  his  former  habit,  the  lattet 

1  Brierre  de  Boismont,  Des  Hallucinations,  p.  431. 


1 24  Heredity. 

always  kept  a  light  burning  through  the  night  As  this  trouble- 
some light  prevented  the  son  from  sleeping,  he  put  it  out  one 
night,  but  his  father,  much  agitated,  bade  him  light  it  again. 

At  length  the  young  man  went  to  visit  a  younger  brother,  who 
was  at  school  in  a  small  town  some  fifty  miles  from  Paris.  The 
schoolmaster's  son  said  to  him,  almost  at  once  :  '  Has  your  brother 
ever  given  any  signs  of  insanity  ?  Last  night  he  came  downstairs 
in  his  shirt,  quite  beside  himself,  declaring  that  he  had  seen  his 
mother's  ghost.'1 

This  fact  can  only  be  explained  by  supposing  that  the  sons 
derived  from  their  father  a  tendency  to  hallucination  under  the 
influence  of  their  deep  regret  for  their  loss. 

A  man  in  the  Lyons  hospital  was  subject  simultaneously  to 
hallucinations  of  taste  and  smell ;  tormented  by  disgusting  odours 
and  tastes,  he  spent  whole  hours  in  blowing  his  nose  and  spitting. 
His  father  had  died  in  the  same  hospital  from  the  effects  of  mania 
with  hallucination. 

We  might  also  cite  the  famous  Seeress  of  Prevorst,  Frederika 
Hauffe,  whose  life,  together  with  a  collection  of  her  visions,  was 
edited  by  Kerner.  This  faculty  of '  talking  with  the  spirits '  was 
shared  by  most  of  the  members  of  the  Hauffe  family.  Her 
brother,  in  particular,  possessed  this  gift,  but  in  a  lower  degree,  and 
without  the  complication  of  the  phenomena  of  ecstasy  and  cata- 
lepsy which  characterized  the  seeress.2 

in. 

Among  the  morbid  psychological  affections  to  which  Esquirol 
gave  the  name  of  monomania,  there  is  none  the  heredity  of  which 
is  better  proved  than  that  of  suicide.  Voltaire  was  among  the 
first  to  call  the  attention  of  physicians  to  this  subject. 

'  I  have  with  my  own  eyes,'  he  writes,  '  seen  a  suicide  that  is 
worthy  of  the  attention  of  physicians.  A  thoughtful  professional 
man,  of  mature  age,  of  regular  habits,  having  no  strong  passions, 
and  beyond  the  reach  of  want,  committed  suicide  on  the  iyth  ol 
October,  1769,  leaving  behind  him,  addressed  to  the  council  of  his 

1  Brierre  de  Boismont,  Des  Hallucinations,  p.  57. 
*  Lucas,  ii.  769. 


Morbid  Psychological  Heredity.  125 

native  city,  an  apology  for  his  voluntary  death,  which  it  was  not 
thought  advisable  to  publish,  lest  men  should  be  encouraged  to 
quit  a  life  whereof  so  much  evil  is  spoken.  So  far  there  is  nothing 
extraordinary,  since  instances  of  this  kind  are  everywhere  to  be 
found  ;  but  here  is  the  astonishing  feature  of  the  case  : — 

'  His  father  and  his  brother  had  committed  suicide  at  the  same 
age  as  himself.  What  hidden  disposition  of  mind,  what  sympathy, 
what  concurrence  of  physical  laws,  caused  this  father  and  his  two 
sons  to  perish  by  their  own  hand  and  by  the  same  form  of  death, 
just  when  they  have  attained  the  same  year  of  their  age  ? ' x 

Since  Voltaire's  day,  the  history  of  mental  disease  has  registered 
a  great  number  of  similar  facts.  They  abound  in  Gall,  Esquirol, 
Moreau  of  Tours,  and  in  all  the  writers  on  insanity.  Esquirol 
knew  a  family  in  which  the  grandmother,  mother,  daughter,  and 
grandson  committed  suicide.  'A  father  of  taciturn  disposition,' 
says  Falret,  '  had  five  sons.  The  eldest,  at  the  age  of  forty,  threw 
himself  out  of  a  third  story  window;  the  second  strangled  himself 
at  the  age  of  thirty-five ;  the  third  threw  himself  out  of  a  window  ; 
the  fourth  shot  himself;  a  cousin  of  theirs  drowned  himself  for  a 
trifling  cause.  In  the  Oroten  family,  the  oldest  in  Teneriffe,  two 
sisters  were  affected  with  suicidal  mania,  and  their  brother,  grand- 
father, and  two  uncles  put  an  end  to  their  own  lives.2  One  of  the 
most  singular  combinations  of  related  suicides  on  record  is  this  . 

'  D ,  son  and  nephew  of  suicides,  married  a  woman  who  was 

daughter  and  niece  to  suicides.  He  hanged  himself,  and  his  wife 
married  a  second  husband  who  was  son,  nephew,  and  first-cousin 
of  suicides.' 

The  point  which  excited  Voltaire's  surprise,  viz.  the  heredity  of 

suicide  at  a  definite  age,  has  been  often  noticed.     '  M.  L ,  a 

monomaniac,'  says  Moreau  of  Tours,  '  put  an  end  to  his  life  at  the 
age  of  thirty.  His  son  had  hardly  attained  the  same  age  when  he 
was  attacked  with  the  same  monomania,  and  made  two  attempts 
at  suicide.  Another  man,  in  the  prime  of  life,  fell  into  a  melan- 
choly state  and  drowned  himself;  his  son,  of  good  constitution, 


1  Voltaire,  Dutionnaire  Philosophique,  Art.  'Caton.' 

1  Annales  Medico- Psychologiqws,  1844.     Several  other  facts  will  be  found  in 
Lucas,  ii.  780,  and  in  Moreau,  Psychologie  Morbide,  171 — 174. 


126  Heredity. 

wealthy,  and  father  of  two  gifted  children,  drowned  himself  at  the 
same  age.  A  wine-taster  who  had  made  a  mistake  as  to  the  quality 
of  a  wine,  threw  himself  into  the  water  in  a  fit  of  desperation.  He 
was  rescued,  but  afterwards  accomplished  his  purpose.  The 
physician  who  had  attended  him  ascertained  that  this  man's  father 
and  one  of  his  brothers  had  committed  suicide  at  the  same  age 
and  in  the  same  way.' 

This  identity  of  the  manner  of  suicide  is  another  point  worthy 
of  notice,  as  tending  to  show  the  automatic  character  of  the 
heredity.  We  have  given  several  cases  in  point,  and  the  data  with 
regard  to  this  matter  show  that  the  same  manner  of  death  is  often 
traditional  in  a  family :  some  drown,  others  hang,  or  strangle  them- 
selves, others  throw  themselves  out  of  window. 

With  suicidal  may  be  ranked  homicidal  monomania,  of  which  we 
have  already  spoken  under  the  head  of  passions,  and  which  is  also 
hereditary.  We  need  here  give  only  one  instance  of  this  form  of 
morbid  heredity,  but  it  is  one  that  by  itself  is  more  convincing 
than  a  host  of  others.  We  take  it  from  the  Annales  de  Hencke, 
1821. 

A  woman  named  Olhaven  fell  ill  of  a  serious  disorder,  which 
obliged  her  to  wean  her  daughter,  six  weeks  old.  This  complaint 
of  the  mother  began  by  an  irresistible  desire  to  kill  her  child. 
This  purpose  was  discovered  in  season  to  prevent  it.  She  was 
next  seized  with  a  violent  fever,  which  utterly  blotted  the  fact  from 
her  memory,  and  she  afterwards  proved  a  most  devoted  mother  to 
her  daughter. 

This  daughter,  become  a  mother  in  her  turn,  took  two  children 
to  nurse.  For  some  days  she  had  suffered  from  fatigue  and  from 
'  movements  in  the  stomach,'  when  one  evening  as  she  was  in  her 
room  with  the  infants,  one  of  them  on  her  lap,  she  was  suddenly 
seized  by  a  strong  desire  to  cut  its  throat  Alarmed  by  this 
horrible  temptation,  she  ran  from  the  spot  with  the  knife  in  her 
hand,  and  sought  in  singing,  dancing,  and  sleep,  a  refuge  from  the 
thoughts  that  haunted  her.  Hardly  had  she  fallen  asleep,  when 
she  started  up,  her  mind  filled  with  the  same  idea,  which  now  was 
irresistible.  She  was,  however,  controlled,  and  in  a  measure 
calmed.  The  homicidal  delirium  recurred,  and  finally  gave  way, 
only  after  many  remedies  had  been  employed. 


Morbid  Psychological  Heredity.  127 

A  form  of  monomania  which  has  now  disappeared,  but  which 
was  in  a  highly  flourishing  state  three  hundred  years  ago,  is  the 
monomania  of  possession,  or  dsemonomania.  In  our  day,  the 
narratives  of  demoniacal  possession  read  like  dreams ;  but  in  the 
times  when  they  had  a  place  outside  of  the  world  of  fiction,  when 
they  were  a  cruel  and  absurd  reality,  and  when  possession  was  a 
crime  having  its  tribunals,  its  code  of  procedure,  and  its  punish- 
ments, this  mental  affection,  then  qualified  as  supernatural,  was 
transmitted  by  heredity. 

Writers  on  possession  are  unanimously  of  opinion  that  from 
generation  to  generation  the  members  of  a  family  were  bound 
to  the  devil,  or  were  sorcerers.  Two  high  authorities  on  the 
question — Bodin,  in  his  Dhnonologie,  and  Sprenger,  in  his 
Malleus  Maleficorum — lay  down  this  principle  as  a  rule  that  has 
no  exception.  Bodin  says :  '  When  the  father  or  mother  is  a 
sorcerer,  the  sons  and  daughters  are  sorcerers.'  Sprenger  says 
that  the  accused  must  always  be  carefully  questioned,  '  si  ex  con- 
sanguinitate  sua  aliqui,  propter  maleficta,  fuissent  dudum  incinerati, 
•vel  ^suspecti  habitij  for  witchcraft  commonly  infects  the  whole  race. 
The  accused  were  themselves  the  first  to  admit  this. 

In  our  times,  persons  who  think  themselves  possessed  are 
merely  sent  to  a  lunatic  asylum,  and  sometimes  several  members 
of  one  family  will  be  found  there  affected  with  this  form  of  mono- 
mania. A  mother  and  her  daughter  believed  themselves  to  be 
under  the  special  protection  of  spirits,  which  they  called  Airs.  A 

lady  of  B believed  herself  to  be  a  fantastic  being  whom  she 

called  Solomon,  and  who  was,  for  her,  the  Genius  of  Evil,  and 
the  author  of  all  her  torments.  Her  father  attributed  to  a  sylph 
named  Stratageme  everything  that  happened  to  him.1 

With  daemonomania  may  be  classed  the  epidemic  choreae  of 
the  middle  ages,  which,  according  to  mediaeval  authors,  were 
hereditary  in  some  families.  So,  too,  with  the  convulsionaries  of 
the  seventeenth  century  :  during  the  epidemic  of  ecstasy  mingled 
with  convulsions,  which  broke  out  among  the  Protestants  of  the 
Cevennes,  children  of  four  or  five  years,  and  even  of  eighteen 
months,  were  affected  with  the  prevailing  disorder.  Sympathy 

1  Morcau,  Psychologie  Morbide,  171. 


128  Heredity. 

and  nervous  contagion  certainly  contributed  to  produce  this 
phenomenon,  but  there  is  no  doubt  that  it  is  to  be  in  a  great 
measure  referred  to  heredity. 

Another  mental  affection,  known  as  melancholia  and  lypemania, 
by  some  authors  identified  with  hypochondria,  but  by  others  held 
to  be  a  distinct  complaint,  though  it  much  resembles  it  in  its 
psychological  effects,  while  differing  in  its  organic  causes,  is  also 
hereditary.  'Lypemania,'  says  Esquirol,  'is  most  commonly 
hereditary;  lypemaniacs  are  born  with  a  particular  temperament, 
the  melancholic,  and  this  predisposes  them  to  lypemania.' 

Cases  are  on  record  of  families,  all  of  whose  members  are 
tormented  with  the  fixed  idea  that  people  want  to  murder  them 
or  poison  them.  A  woman  affected  with  lypemania  was  sent,  at 
the  age  of  forty-two,  to  an  asylum,  and  there  died.  It  was  dis- 
covered that  her  grandfather  and  her  mother  had  been  insane; 
and  her  son,  barely  fifteen  years  of  age,  already  gave  signs  of 
lypemania.1  In  482  cases  of  this  disorder,  Esquirol  found  no  to 
be  hereditary. 

With  this  form  of  morbid  heredity  we  may  couple  the  heredity 
of  presentiments.  The  following  curious  case  is  taken  from 
Brierre  de  Boismont.  If  we  accept  the  anecdote  as  true,  we 
must,  says  Dr.  Delasiauve,  recognize  the  principal  cause  of  the 
phenomena  in  the  heredity  of  a  nervous  affection. 

'  Marshal  de  Soubise  related,  in  presence  of  Louis  XIV.,  that  as 
he  was  one  day  conversing  in  his  cabinet  with  an  English  lady,  he 
all  at  once  heard  the  lady  utter  a  shriek,  and  saw  her  rise  to  go 
away  and  fall  unconscious  at  his  feet ;  this  without  any  external 
cause.  Filled  with  surprise  and  concern,  the  Duke  de  Soubise 
rang  the  bell.  The  servants  ran  in  and  attended  on  the  fainting 
lady,  who  soon  came  to  herself.  "  Do  not  detain  me,"  she  said  to 
the  Marshal,  excitedly ;  "  I  shall  scarcely  have  time  to  put  my 
affairs  in  order  before  I  die." 

'  She  then  told  M.  de  Soubise  that  both  sides  of  her  family  had 
the  gift  of  divination :  every  member  of  it  had  been  able  to  name 
the  very  hour  of  their  deaths  a  month  beforehand.  She  added 

1  Gazette  des  HSpitaux,  19  October,  1844.  See  also  Moreau,  192  ; 
Maudsley,  376. 


Morbid  Psychological  Heredity. 


that,  in  the  midst  of  the  conversation  she  had  held  with  M.  de 
Soubise,  her  own  double  had  appeared  to  her  in  the  mirror  before 
her.  She  saw  herself  wrapped  in  a  shroud,  over  which  was  a  black 
cloth  sprinkled  with  white  tears  :  at  her  feet  was  an  open  coffin. 

'  A  month  after  this  occurrence,  M.  de  Soubise  received  a  letter 
informing  him  that  this  mysterious  premonition  had  been  proved 
true  by  the  event' l 

It  is  natural  to  suppose  that  these  sudden  visions  are  due  to  a 
certain  mental  constitution  hereditarily  transmitted :  imagination 
does  the  rest,  and  on  the  appointed  day  brings  about  the  catas- 
trophe, which  is  thus  an  effect,  not  a  cause. 

IV. 

Mania  consists  in  a  total  derangement  of  the  intellectual  and 
affective  faculties.  '  The  maniac,'  says  Esquirol,  '  only  lives  in  a 
chaos.  His  wild  and  menacing  purposes  show  the  disordered 
state  of  his  mind ;  his  actions  are  mischievous ;  he  would  injure 
or  destroy  everything ;  he  is  at  war  with  every  one.  To  this 
pitiable  state,  if  the  patient  does  not  recover,  succeeds  a  calm  that 
is  a  thousand  times  more  painful  to  behold  :  the  maniac  becomes 
demented ;  he  drags  out  stupidly  the  remnant  of  material  life, 
without  thought,  without  desires,  without  regrets,  sinking  gradually 
into  death.'  '  Chronic  mania,'  adds  the  same  author,  'is  a  chronic 
affection  of  the  brain,  ordinarily  unattended  by  fever,  and  charac- 
terized by  perturbation  and  exaltation  of  sensibility,  intellect,  and 
will.  Maniacs  are  noted  for  their  illusions  and  hallucinations,  and 
for  their  faulty  associations  of  ideas,  which  spring  up  with  extreme 
vivacity,  and  without  any  coherence.' 

The  heredity  of  this  mental  affection  is  very  frequent :  according 
to  figures  collated  by  Esquirol,  about  fifty  per  cent  of  the  cases 
are  hereditary.  At  the  Salpetriere,  in  220  cases  he  found  88 
hereditary ;  and  in  his  own  establishment  75  out  of  152  cases 
were  hereditary. 

The  mental  diseases  that  remain  to  be  considered  represent 
the  extreme  forms  of  intellectual  decay,  viz.  dementia,  general 
paralysis,  and  idiocy. 

1  Bricrre  de  Boismont,  Des  Hallucinaticns,  p.  536. 


1 30  Heredity. 

Dementia  and  general  paralysis  are  the  usual,  or,  at  least,  the 
possible  termination  of  all  kinds  of  insanity.  Hence  their 
hereditary  transmission  does  not  properly  constitute  a  particular 
case  to  be  considered  separately.  Sometimes  the  dementia  of 
progenitors  is  reproduced  in  the  same  form  and  at  about  the  same 
age  in  the  descendants.  Esquirol  saw  it  appear  at  the  age  of 
twenty-five  in  a  young  sculptor,  whose  family  was  subject  to  this 
disease.  At  other  times  the  simple  insanity  of  parents  is  meta- 
morphosed, and  becomes  dementia  or  general  paralysis  in  the 
children.  Thus  individuals  have  been  seen,  born  of  parents  affected 
with  mental  diseases,  to  reach  the  age  of  forty  or  fifty  without 
appreciable  signs  of  mental  disease,  and  then  fall  into  dementia 
without  any  apparent  cause,  and  even  contrary  to  all  expectations. 

In  idiots  and  imbeciles  the  mental  activity  has  suffered  such  an 
arrest  of  development  that  some  of  them  adopt  the  habits  of  the 
mere  animal.  This  disease  is  incurable,  since  to  cure  it  we  should 
have  to  create  a  new  brain.  As  Esquirol  ingeniously  remarks,  the 
demented  subject  is  a  rich  man  that  has  become  poor;  the  idiot, 
a  pauper  who  can  never  attain  to  wealth. 

As  the  sexual  appetite  is  mostly  very  keen  in  idiots,  the  conse- 
quence being  an  unhappy  fertility,  it  is  easy  to  show  the  heredity 
of  idiocy.  Cases  of  the  direct  heredity  are  numerous.  Thus, 
Esquirol  saw  at  the  Salpetriere  an  idiot  woman,  the  mother  of  two 
daughters  and  a  son,  all  of  them  idiots.1  But  idiocy  appears  to 
be  transmitted  rather  in  the  collateral  form ;  or  if  in  the  direct 
line,  then  it  disappears  for  a  generation  or  two.  Haller  was  the 
first  to  note  this  in  the  case  of  two  noble  families  in  which  idiocy 
had  appeared  one  hundred  years  before,  and  it  was  found  to 
reappear  in  the  fourth  or  fifth  generation.  In  our  own  time, 
Dr.  Sdguin,  who  is  a  good  authority  on  the  question,  remarks  : 
'  I  have  not,  to  my  knowledge,  ever  had  to  attend  an  idiotic  son 
of  an  idiot,  or  even  the  son  of  a  man  of  weak  intellect ;  but  I  have 
often  found  in  the  family  of  one  of  my  pupils  an  aunt,  an  uncle, 
or  oftener  a  grandfather  afflicted  with  idiocy,  alienation,  or,  at 
least,  imbecility.' 

In  conclusion,  we  could  wish  that  we  could  answer  here  two 

1  Further  facts  in  Lucas,  ii.  787. 


Morbid  Psychological  Heredity.  131 

questions  that  are  unfortunately  very  obscure.  The  first  is  this  : 
What  rank  must  we  assign  to  heredity  among  the  causes  of 
insanity  ?  Good  statistical  documents  alone  can  afford  the  answer ; 
•but  the  various  tables  agree  but  little  with  one  another.  Cases  of 
hereditary  insanity  are,  according  to  Moreau  of  Tours,  nine-tenths 
of  the  whole  number;  according  to  other  writers  they  are  only 
one-tenth.  According  to  Maudsley  they  are  more  than  one-fourth, 
but  less  than  half:  in  50  cases  of  insanity  carefully  examined 
by  him,  16  were  hereditary,  or  one-third.  In  73  cases  given  by 
Trelat  in  his  Folie  Lucide,  43  are  represented  as  due  to  heredity. 
From  a  report  made  to  the  French  Government  in  1861,  it  appears 
that  in  1000  cases  of  persons  of  each  sex  admitted  to  asylums, 
264  males  and  266  females  had  inherited  the  disorder.  Of  the 
264  males,  128  inherited  from  the  father,  no  from  the  mother, 
and  26  from  both.  Of  the  266  females,  100  inherited  from  the 
father,  130  from  the  mother,  and  36  from  both.  Hence  we  should 
hardly  be  in  error  were  we  to  say  that  the  cases  of  hereditary 
insanity  represent  from  one-half  to  one-third  of  the  total  number. 

The  second  question  is  this  :  To  what  form  of  mental  heredity 
must  hereditary  insanity  be  referred?  In  the  first  place,  as 
regards  mere,  simple  hallucination,  it  is  plain  that  it  is  only  a  form 
of  heredity  of  the  sensorial  faculties.  As  for  insanity,  properly 
so  called,  since  it  assumes  every  possible  shape  ;  since  it  presents, 
now  separately,  now  collectively,  perversion  of  the  sentiments  and 
instincts,  loss  of  intellect,  and  weakness  of  will ;  and  since  it  has 
never  been  found  possible  so  far  to  trace  back  all  the  psychological 
phenomena  of  insanity  to  one  cause,  we  may  affirm  that  the  fore- 
going facts  are  a  fresh  demonstration,  in  extenso,  of  psychological 
heredity  under  all  its  forms. 


PART   SECOND. 

THE  LAWS. 

Quel  monstre  est-ce,  que  cette  goutte  de  semence,  de  quoy  nous  sommcs 
produicts,  porte  en  soy  les  impressions,  non  de  la  forme  corporelle  seulement, 
mais  des  pensements  ct  inclinations  de  nos  peres?— Montaigne. 


CHAPTER  I. 

ARE  THERE  LAWS  OF  HEREDITY? 

L 

SCIENCE  begins  only  with  the  investigation  of  laws.  All  that  pre- 
cedes has  one  only  object,  to  prepare  the  way  for  this  investigation. 
Unless  we  hoped  that  out  of  the  mass  of  facts  drawn  from  animal 
and  human  psychology,  from  pathology  and  history,  some  fixed 
and  certain  rule  would  arise,  our  store  of  materials  were  valueless, 
a  mere  collection  of  curious  anecdotes,  which  would  afford  the 
mind  nothing  like  true  science.  We  believe  that  the  facts  we  have 
cited  are  not  to  be  thus  lightly  esteemed.  It  is  the  privilege  of 
the  experimental  method — which  is  so  often  charged  with  creeping 
on  the  ground,  with  being  tied  down  to  facts,  and  restricted  within 
narrow  boundaries  without  a  horizon — to  reveal  to  us  what  is  uni- 
versal, to  exhibit  to  us  laws  in  facts,  and  to  demonstrate  for  us  the 
seeming  paradox,  that  in  the  world  for  the  scientific  mind  there  are 
no  facts,  but  only  laws. 

If  we  take  any  simple  fact  of  the  inorganic  world — a  stone,  a 
liquescent  gas,  a  falling  drop  of  water — and  consider  these  pheno- 
mena, as  do  people  in  general,  with  the  eyes  and  not  with  the  mind, 
they  will  be  a  complete  reality,  and  whatever  is  not  visible  and 
tangible  will  be  but  a  vain  abstraction.  But  science  analyzes  these 
facts  into  laws  of  gravity,  heat,  molecular  attraction,  affinity,  etc., 
secondary  laws  which  may  themselves  be  referred  to  more  general 
laws — and,  perceiving  that  these  laws  are  found  everywhere  in  the 
organic  world,  science  concludes  that  they  it  is  that  are  real. 
Group  these  laws,  and  we  have  facts ;  group  different  kinds  of  laws, 
and  we  have'  different  kinds  of  facts.  It  follows  that  to  know  a 
fact  thoroughly  is  to  know  the  quality  and  the  quantity  of  the  laws 
which  compose  it,  to  know  that  a  given  fact  is  resolvable  into 
given  laws  of  heat,  gravity,  etc.,  and  into  a  given  amounl  of  heat, 
7 


1 36  Heredity. 

gravitation,  etc.  But  in  this  analysis  the  fact  has  crumbled  away, 
vanished,  ceased  to  be,  and  has  left  in  its  stead  nothing  but  a 
group  of  laws. 

If  we  take  a  biological  fact,  a  flowering  plant,  a  respiratory 
animal,  there  again  we  find  only  a  sum  of  laws.  First,  there  are 
the  laws  of  inorganic  mattei ;  and,  indeed,  if  we  reduce  life  to  pure 
mechanism,  there  are  no  others.  But  if,  on  the  contrary,  we  hold 
that  physics  and  chemistry  fail  to  explain  life  in  its  entirety,  we 
bring  in  other  laws,  those  governing  assimilation,  disintegration, 
generation,  and  all  the  vital  processes ;  and  although  we  have  as 
yet  no  precise  knowledge  of  these  laws,  we  do  not  doubt  that 
they  exist 

So,  too,  with  the  moral  world.  A  passion,  a  poem,  a  historical 
event,  a  revolution,  result  from  the  grouping  of  an  almost  infinite 
number  of  laws.  For,  beyond  the  physical  and  biologic  laws 
which  they  presuppose,  they  imply  also  psychological,  economical, 
and  social  laws.  The  simplest  moral  fact  presents  such  a  compli- 
cation, such  a  tangle  of  laws,  themselves  but  ill-understood,  that 
many  men,  unable  to  recognize  them,  have  chosen  rather  to  deny 
them.  But  each  new  advance  of  science  discredits  this  solution ; 
and,  although  it  is  possible  that  beyond  this  general  reference  to 
law  there  may  exist  something  which  is  not  subject  to  it,  still  we 
may  affirm  that  every  fact,  considered  as  such,  is  a  grouping  of 
laws. 

Let  us  suppose  all  the  facts  of  the  physical  and  moral  universe 
reduced  to  a  thousand  secondary  laws,  and  these  to  a  dozen 
primitive  laws,  which  are  the  final  and  irreducible  elements  of  the 
world ;  let  us  represent  each  by  a  thread  of  peculiar  colour,  itself 
formed  of  a  collection  of  finer  threads ;  a  superior  force — God, 
Nature,  Chance,  it  matters  not  what — is  ever  weaving,  knotting  and 
unknotting  these,  and  transforming  them  into  various  patterns.  To 
the  ordinary  mind  there  is  nothing  besides  these  knots  and  these 
patterns ;  for  it  these  are  the  only  reality — beyond  them  it  knows 
nothing,  suspects  nothing.  But  the  man  of  science  sets  to  work : 
h,e  unties  the  knots,  unravels  the  patterns,  and  shows  that  all  the 
reality  is  in  the  threads.  Then  the  antagonism  between  fact  and 
law  disappears  ;  facts  are  but  a  synthesis  of  laws,  laws  an  analysis 
of  facts. 


Are  there  Laws  of  Heredity?  137 

Thus  a  scientific  idea  of  the  world  is  formed.  The  experimental 
method  appeared  to  be  imprisoned  in  the  raw  material  of  the  fact, 
when  all  at  once  its  range  of  vision  is  enlarged,  its  horizon  recedes 
almost  immeasurably,  to  that  mysterious  limit  where  the  world  of 
laws  comes  to  an  end ;  observation  attains  to  the  universal,  and 
experience  gains  the  almost  idealistic  conclusion  that  facts  are  but 
appearances,  laws  the  reality. 

IL 

We  must  now  inquire  whether,  among  the  many  threads  the  inter- 
weaving of  which  constitutes  the  facts  we  have  cited,  any  one  is 
common  to  this  entire  group.  To  speak  more  clearly,  the  ques- 
tion is  whether  heredity  is  a  law  of  the  moral  world,  or  whether 
the  many  instances  already  quoted  are  only  isolated  cases  resulting 
from  the  fortuitous  concurrence  of  other  laws. 

It  may  be  surprising  why,  after  what  has  been  already  said,  the 
question  is  now  raised.  But  the  perfect  indifference  of  most 
psychologists  with  regard  to  heredity  would  seem  to  show  that 
they  do  not  recognize  in  it  a  psychical  law.  The  doctrines  of 
those  physiologists  who  have  bestowed  more  attention  on  the 
subject  are  by  no  means  harmonious  on  th'is  point,  and  many  of 
them  have  roundly  denied  moral  heredity.  It  is,  therefore,  im- 
portant that  the  question  should  be  studied.  To  speak  frankly, 
the  objections  brought  against  psychological  heredity  do  not 
appear  to  be  very  formidable;  they  would,  indeed,  be  often 
inexplicable,  did  we  not  know  the  motive  which  has  inspired 
them.  This  is  the  fear,'  whether  with  or  without  reason,  of  the 
consequences  which  may  result  from  it ;  but  such  a  prejudice  is 
neither  scientific,  since  it  proceeds  arbitrarily,  nor  moral,  because 
it  does  not  prefer  truth  to  all  else. 

Thus  it  is  not  possible  to  accept  the  doctrine  of  which  Lordat 
is  the  most  illustrious  exponent,  and  which,  while  unreservedly 
subjecting  to  the  laws  of  heredity  the  'dynamism'  (or  the  various 
modes  of  psychic  activity)  of  the  animal,  exempts  from  them  the 
'  dynamism '  of  man.  The  author's  intention  is  too  plain.1  He 

1  '  If  the  laws,'  says  he,  'are  identical  in  the  two  orders  (animal  and  human), 
analogy  would  lead  u^  to  suppose  that  the  dynamism  of  brutes  is  like  our  own, 
and  that  man  is  only  a  nobler  and  better-developed  animal,  as  Gall  and  hi» 


1 38  Heredity. 

would  place  between  man  and  animals  a  chasm  which  has  no 
existence.  From  either  the  physical  or  the  mental  point  of  view 
it  is  impossible  to  make  man  a  being,  apart,  to  set  up  a  'human 
kingdom.'  It  is,  no  doubt,  too  daring  to  say,  as  some  have  done 
in  our  own  time,1  that  there  is  nothing  in  man  which  is  not  found 
also  in  the  animal,  whether  it  be  language,  or  the  faculty  of  count- 
ing (the  magpie  counts  up  to  seven),  or  moral  ideas,  or  the 
sentiment  of  veneration  and  awe,  which  is  the  basis  of  the  religious 
sentiment.  But  setting  aside  these  hypothetical  assertions,  and 
these  exaggerations  in  the  opposite  sense,  which  always  cha- 
racterize a  reaction,  it  is  certain  that,  in  the  transition  from  the 
animal  to  the  human,  the  axiom  of  Linnaeus  remains  true,  Natura 
non  facit  saltus.  Heredity  is  a  biological  law,  which  itself  results 
from  another  law — that  of  the  transfer,  by  generation,  of  the 
attributes  of  physical  and  mental  life  :  and  the  laws  of  generation 
govern  everything  that  lives — the  plant  as  well  as  the  animal,  or 
as  well  as  man.  As  we  shall  see  hereafter,  there  is  not  one  part 
of  the  domain  of  life  subject  to  the  laws  of  heredity  and  another 
part  exempt  from  them. 

So  chimerical  is  Lordat's  hypothesis  that,  even  in  a  psychologi- 
cal study  of  heredity,  we  must  not  think  of  separating  the  animal 
from  the  man.  We  must  take  one  after  another  all  the  modes  of 
mental  life,  and  see  how  they  are  influenced  by  heredity,  as  well 
under  the  lower,  or  animal  form,  as  under  the  higher,  or  human 
form.  This  we  have  tried  to  do  here,  but  very  roughly,  since  this 
work  is  but  an  essay ;  yet,  in  the  absence  of  a  comparative 
psychology  which  might  serve  as  a  basis  and  plan  for  our  ex- 
position, we  are  compelled  to  grope  our  way. 

Another  doctrine,  maintained  by  Virey,  holds  that  we  must 
distinguish  'between  the  moral  qualities  which  appertain  to  the 
body,  and  the  moral  qualities  which  belong  to  the  soul : '  the 
former  are  transmissible  by  heredity,  the  latter  are  not  And 
Lordat  defends  a  similar  thesis.  '  In  man,'  he  says,  '  heredity 

followers  have  so  persistently  taught.  But  if  these  two  heredities  present 
different  laws,  we  are  justified  in  questioning  the  identity  of  the  two 
dynamisms.' 

1  See  the  Bulletins  de  la  Soci6t6  if  Anthropolo°ie,  I4re  serie,  vol.  vi.,  et  3^ 
serie,  vol.  i. 


Are  there  Laws  of  Heredity?  139 

controls  everything  relating  to  vital  force,  but  does  not  control  the 
indigenous  or  exotic  qualities  of  the  inner  sense  :  or,  in  plainer 
language,  unconscious  modes  of  vital  activity  are  hereditary ;  not 
so  the  conscious  modes.' 

The  objection  so  formulated  is  vague,  and  has  but  little  force  if 
closely  pressed;  it  rests  on  the  idea  of  an  absolute  distinction 
between  body  and  mind — an  idea  which,  if  it  were  admissible  in 
Descartes'  day,  is  so  no  longer.  But  if  we  look  less  at  the  letter 
than  at  the  spirit  of  the  objection — less  at  what  it  says  than  at 
what  it  means  to  say — we  must  acknowledge  that  it  raises  a  nice 
question,  on  which  now  we  do  but  touch,  but  which  will  hereafter 
be  discussed. 

Among  the  'moral  qualities'  appertaining  to  the  body  are 
reckoned  in  the  first  rank  sensations  and  perceptions. 

The  organism  is  inherited,  and  with  it  the  organs  of  sense  and 
their  functions.  But  the  imagination  depends  in  great  measure  on 
our  faculty  of  sense,  and  sensations  with  sensorial  images  are  the 
raw  material  of  cognition.  It  is  no  longer  maintained  that  they 
are  sufficient  to  constitute  it.  We  know  that  the  mind  adds  some- 
what, and  that  the  phenomena  are  moulded  by  causality,  time,  and 
space.  These  conditions  of  all  thought — the  subjective  forms  of 
the  mind,  according  to  Kant ;  the  preformations  of  the  organism, 
according  to  the  physiologists — are  universal,  common  to  all  men, 
and  consequently,  without  exception,  hereditary. 

If  we  set  aside  for  the  moment  the  question  of  intellectual 
activity,  and  consider  only  the  sentiments,  emotions,  and  passions ; 
we  may  yet  be  justified  in  placing  these  among  those  'moral 
qualities  which  appertain  to  the  body.'  It  will  be  readily  admitted 
that  the  emotions  differ  accordingly  as  the  person  who  experiences 
them  is  of  lymphatic  or  nervous,  of  bilious  or  sanguine  tempera- 
ment :  and  these  original  dispositions  are  the  source  whence 
afterwards  spring  our  most  complex  sentiments. 

Hence,  when  closely  examined,  this  assumed  difference  between 
the  'moral  qualities  which  appertain  to  the  mind,'  and  those  which 
'  appertain  to  the  body,'  entirely  disappears.  We  seek  it,  and  find 
it  not — for  it  is  not.  Heredity  has  been  willingly  admitted  in 
regard  to  certain  inferior  psychical  conditions,  and  it  was  supposed 
that  thus  full  justice  was  rendered  to  this  principle ;  but,  logically 


140  Heredity. 

and  necessarily,  it  has  invaded  the  entire  field  of  psychology. 
This  was  but  the  natural  consequence  of  a  vague,  loose,  incon- 
sistent hypothesis,  totally  at  variance  with  facts.  Yet,  as  we  have 
said,  there  is  perhaps  some  ground  for  this  distinction.  This, 
then,  is  the  important  point,  which  the  objection  has  not 
sufficiently  declared  or  explained. 

Suppose  that  it  has  been  distinctly  proved  that  all  modes  of 
psychical  activity — the  senses,  memory,  imagination,  reasoning, 
sentiments,  instincts,  passions,  normal  or  morbid  dispositions — art 
transmissible :  is  the  aggregate  of  these  modes  the  whole  sentient 
and  conscious  being ;  or  is  there,  besides  these,  a  nescio  quid  called 
the  /,  the  person,  the  genius,  the  character,  that  inner  power 
which  in  its  own  way  elaborates  all  these  materials  of  sentiment 
and  cognition,  and  impresses  on  them  its  own  peculiar  stamp? 
Must  it  be  considered  that  the  various  modes  of  psychical 
activity,  by  varied  inter-relations,  constitute  in  themselves  the 
personality ;  or  is  there  something  else  ?  Is  the  I  a  result  or  a 
cause?  If  we  consider  that  like  impressions  are  felt  and  trans- 
formed in  widely  different  ways  by  different  individuals,  and  that 
between  genius  and  idiocy  are  found  all  possible  shades  of  mental 
activity,  one  may  be  inclined  to  regard  as  reasonable  the 
hypothesis  of  a  principle  of  individuation,  which  explains  these 
differences.  And  then  would  arise  the  question  :  Is  the  I,  the 
personality,  the  constituent  element  of  the  individual,  transmissible 
by  heredity,  as  are  the  various  modes  of  mental  activity  ? 

Such  is,  it  would  seem,  the  only  true  way  in  which  to  put  this 
objection :  and  under  this  form  it  cannot  be  denied  that  it  raises 
a  grave  difficulty.  We  do  not,  however,  now  discuss  it :  a  better 
occasion  for  so  doing  will  hereafter  present  itself. 

The  part  played  by  psychological  heredity  has  been  doubted 
not  only  by  physiologists,  but  also  by  so  great  a  philosophic 
historian  as  Buckle.  It  is  surprising  that  so  clear  a  mind,  which 
brought  to  the  investigation  of  historic  phenomena  a  rare  penetra- 
tion, originality  of  method  and  scientific  exactitude,  should  have 
misconceived  a  fact  of  such  significance. 

We  often  hear  of  hereditary  talents,  hereditary  vices,  and 
hereditary  virtues;  but  whoever  will  critically  examine  the  evi- 
dence will  find  that  we  have  no  proof  of  their  existence.  The 


Are  there  Laws  of  Heredity?  141 

way  in  which  they  are  commonly  proved  is  in  the  highest  degree 
illogical ;  the  usual  course  being  for  writers  to  collect  instances 
of  some  mental  peculiarity  found  in  a  parent  and  in  his  child, 
and  then  to  infer  that  the  peculiarity  was  bequeathed. 

By  this  mode  of  reasoning  we  might  demonstrate  any  pro- 
position ;  since  in  all  large  fields  of  inquiry  there  are  a  sufficient 
number  of  empirical  coincidences  to  make  a  plausible  case  in 
favour  of  whatever  view  a  man  chooses  to  advocate.  But  this  is 
not  the  way  in  which  truth  is  discovered ;  and  we  ought  to  inquire 
not  only  how  many  instances  there  are  of  hereditary  talents,  etc., 
but  how  many  instances  there  are  of  such  qualities  not  being 
hereditary. 

Until  something  of  this  sort  is  attempted,  we  can  know  nothing 
about  the  matter  inductively ;  while  until  physiology  and  chemistry 
are  much  more  advanced,  we  can  know  nothing  about  it 
deductively. 

These  considerations  ought  to  prevent  us  from  receiving  state- 
ments (Taylor's  Medical  Jurisprudence,  pp.  644,  678,  and  many 
other  books)  which  positively  affirm  the  existence  of  hereditary 
madness  and  hereditary  suicide ;  and  the  same  remark  applies  to 
hereditary  disease  (on  which  see  some  admirable  observations  in 
Phillips  on  Scrofula,  pp.  101—120,  London,  1846) ;  and  with  still 
greater  force  does  it  apply  to  hereditary  views  and  hereditary 
virtues ;  inasmuch  as  ethical  phenomena  have  not  been  registered 
as  carefully  as  physiological  ones,  and  therefore  our  conclusions 
respecting  them  are  even  more  precarious. 

In  this  objection,  however  preposterous  it  may  appear,  we  find 
all  the  qualities  of  a  thoroughly  scientific  mind — that  is,  one  which 
receives  evidence  with  caution.  Yet  it  is  difficult  to  see  what 
method  Buckle  would  have  us  adopt  in  researches  of  this  kind. 
Is  it  the  differential  method,  which  consists  in  comparing  the  facts 
of  heredity  with  the  exceptions  to  it,  in  accounting  for  the  latter, 
and  in  showing  why  they  do  not  come  under  the  law?  Possibly 
this  might  be  done.  Or  is  it  the  statistical  method,  which  consists 
in  accepting  the  facts  as  they  present  themselves,  in  grouping,  on 
the  one  hand,  those  which  have  an  hereditary  character,  and  on 
the  other  those  which  have  not,  and  in  estimating  arithmetically 
the  relations  of  the  two  groups?  We  shall  see  hereafter  that  this 
has  been  attempted. 


142  Heredity. 

It  must  be  conceded  to  Buckle  that  the  question  of  psycho- 
logical  heredity  is  by  no  means  one  that  can  be  treated  with  strict 
scientific  rigour;  and  there  are  many  reasons  why  this  is  so. 
Oftentimes  in  the  course  of  this  present  work  we  have  felt  the 
insufficiency  of  the  argument,  'A  distinguished  father,  a  distin- 
guished son — therefore  talent  is  hereditary,'  whereas  we  ought  to 
be  able  to  show  that  to  a  given  mode  of  mental  activity  in  the 
progenitor  corresponds  precisely  the  same  mode  in  the  descendant, 
or,  at  least,  to  say  why  this  is  not  so.  But  this  is  too  much  to 
require  in  the  present  state  of  psychology. 

This  granted,  if  we  revert  to  the  essential  point  of  Buckle's 
objection,  we  find  that  in  his  view  the  cases  of  heredity  are  simply 
fortuitous  successions,  such  as  are  to  be  found  whenever  we  com- 
pare a  great  mass  of  facts.  If  we  take  from  the  registers  of  a 
lottery  the  winning  numbers  through  a  long  series  of  years,  we 
should  probably  find  that  there  were  occasionally  the  same  succes- 
sion of  numbers,  the  result  of  mere  chance.  In  this  way,  or 
nearly  so,  Buckle  explains  cases  of  heredity.  He  reduces  the 
question  to  a  calculation  of  probabilities.  But  this  singular 
hypothesis  had  already  been  answered  by  a  mathematician. 

Maupertuis,  after  citing  a  case  of  sexdigitism  which  persisted 
through  four  generations,  adds  :  '  I  presume  no  one  would  regard 
sexdigitism  as  the  effect  of  mere  chance.  But  suppose  we  so 
regard  it,  let  us  then  see  what  is  the  probability  that  this  accidental 
variation  in  a  parent  will  not  be  repeated  in  the  descendants.  In 
the  course  of  an  inquiry  made  by  me  in  a  city  of  100,000  inhabit- 
ants, I  found  two  persons  marked  by  this  singular  anomaly. 

'  Suppose — a  thing  not  very  easy — that  three  other  cases  escaped 
my  observation,  and  that  we  have  a  man  with  six  fingers  for  each 
20,000  souls  ;  the  probability  that  his  son  or  daughter  will  not  be 
born  with  six  fingers  is  as  20,000  to  i,  and  the  probability  that  his 
grandson  will  not  have  six  fingers  will  be  as  20,000  times  20,000 
(or  4  millions)  to  i.  Finally,  the  probability  that  sexdigitism  will 
not  continue  through  three  successive  generations  will  be  as  8000 
millions  to  i,  figures  so  large  that  the  certainty  of  things  best 
demonstrated  in  physics  does  not  approximate  to  these  proba- 
bilities.' 1 

1  Maupertuis,  (Ettvra,  voL  ii.  letter  17. 


Are  there  Laws  of  Heredity  ?  143 

If  we  apply  Maupertuis'  argument  to  a  few  cases  of  psycho- 
logical heredity,  for  instance  mental  disorder,  or  some  special 
talent  (for  painting,  or  music)  persisting  through  three  or  four 
generations,  it  is  easy  to  see  what  becomes  of  Buckle's  objection. 

in. 

The  greater  part  of  these  objections  would  never  have  been 
raised,  were  it  not  for  the  serious  error  of  reasoning  only  from  the 
exceptions.  To  treat  the  question  fairly,  it  ought  first  of  all  to  have 
been  properly  stated,  that  is  to  say,  the  fact  of  heredity  should 
have  been  considered,  not  partially,  but  in  its  whole  extent  in  the 
entire  domain  of  life,  as  we  here  propose  to  do. 

In  order  to  proceed  logically,  we  should  in  the  first  place  have 
to  determine  what  is  meant  by  species.  We  will  not  enter  into 
this  very  difficult  question.  It  will  be  enough  for  us  to  lay  down 
a  few  very  simple,  unquestionable  and  elementary  facts,  which  will 
be  admitted  by  all. 

When  we  compare  together  two  living  beings — that  is  to  say,  two 
sums  of  attributes — and  find  that  these  two  beings  possess  in  common 
a  very  large  number  of  essential  attributes,  differing  only  in  those 
which  are  secondary,  so  that  the  two  beings  may  be  regarded  as 
very  much  alike,  we  say  that  they  are  of  the  same  species.  The 
many  essential  characteristics  possessed  by  them  in  common  we 
call  specific ;  the  few  accidental  characters  which  differentiate 
them  we  call  individual.  Thus,  for  instance,  two  individuals  of  the 
human  species  possess  in  common  very  many  essential  characters, 
being  organic,  vertebrate  mammals,  with  all  that  is  thereby  implied, 
having  senses,  physiological  or  psychological  functions,  such  as 
sensation,  memory,  imagination,  reason.  But  they  differ  from  one 
another  in  accidental  or  individual  characteristics,  as  that  the 
muscular  system  common  to  both  is  in  the  one  very  well  developed, 
very  slightly  in  the  other ;  that  the  faculty  of  memory  common  to 
both  is  weak  in  the  one,  and  very  strong  in  the  other ;  that  the 
faculty  of  reason  common  to  both  does  not  in  the  one  go  beyond 
the  simplest  acts,  while  in  the  other  it  includes  the  highest 
abstractions. 

Now,  by  the  act  of  generation,  in  which  heredity  has  its  origin, 
every  creature  produces  beings  like  itself.     In  the  lower  forms  of 


<44  Heredity. 

generation,  such  as  gemmation  and  fission,  this  fact  is  evident 
In  the  higher  forms,  where  the  connection  of  the  two  sexes  is 
requisite,  two  contrary  forces  are  brought  together,  and  conse- 
quently are  antagonistic.  The  result  is,  that  the  product  will 
(though  not  without  exceptions)  resemble  one  or  other  of  the 
parents,  or  both  at  once.  This  general  truth,  that  the  organisms 
of  a  given  type  descend  from  organisms  of  the  same  type,  is  so 
well  established  by  countless  instances  that  it  has  the  character  of 
an  axiom.  '  The  tendency  of  a  living  being  to  repeat  itself  in  its 
progeny,'  says  a  certain  naturalist,  'seems  to  be  a  sort  of  necessity. 
It  were  difficult  to  imagine  a  creature  which  should  not  resemble 
its  parents.  In  fact,  so  universal  is  this  tendency  that  it  is  recog- 
nized as  one  of  those  fundamental  facts  which  underlie  all  the 
natural  sciences,  and  which,  with  regard  to  them,  take  the  place 
held  by  axioms  in  the  mathematical  sciences.' 

This  being  understood,  heredity  appears  in  its  true  light,  and 
the  objections  brought  against  it  can  be  appreciated  at  their  value; 
for  the  question  already  stated,  'Are  cases  of  psychical  heredity 
fortuitous,  or  are  they  the  result  of  a  law  ? '  may  plainly  be  resolved 
into  several  parts,  each  of  which  easily  admits  of  answer. 

1.  Are  specific  characteristics,  physical  or  moral,  transmitted  by 
heredity  ? — They  are  always  transmitted,  both  in  the  animal  and 
in  man. 

2.  Are  those  less  general  characteristics,  which  constitute  races 
and  varieties,  hereditary  ? — They  also  are  hereditary ;  a  spaniel 
was  never  produced  by  a  bull-dog,  nor  a  white  man  by  a  negro. 
And  this  holds  good  also  of  psychical  qualities :  a  given  animal 
possesses  not  only  the  general  instincts  of  the  species,  but  also 
the  peculiar  instincts  of  the  race.     The  negro  inherits  not  only 
the  psychological  faculties  which  are  common  to  all  men,  but 
also  a  certain  peculiar  form  of  mental  constitution,  namely,  an 
excess  of  sensibility  and  imagination,  sensual  tendencies,  inca- 
pacity for  abstract  thought,  etc. 

3.  Are  purely  individual  characteristics  hereditary  ? — Facts  have 
demonstrated  that  they  are  often  so,  both  in  physics  and  in  morals. 

In  conclusion,  heredity  always  governs  those  broadly  general 
characteristics  which  determine  the  species,  always  those  less 
general  characteristics  which  constitute  the  variety,  and  often 


The  Laws  of  Heredity.  145 

individual  characteristics.  Hence  the  evident  conclusion  that 
heredity  is  the  law,  non-heredity  the  exception.  Suppose  a  father 
and  mother — both  large,  strong,  healthy,  active  and  intelligent — 
produce  a  son  and  a  daughter  possessing  the  opposite  qualities. 
In  this  instance,  wherein  heredity  seems  completely  set  aside,  it 
still  holds  good  that  the  differences  between  parents  and  children 
are  but  slight,  as  compared  with  the  resemblances. 

Let  it  not  be  said  that  we  have  dwelt  too  long  on  points  that 
are  self-evident  They  are  so  clear  that  we  forget  them,  and  argue 
only  from  isolated  cases,  thus  changing  the  state  of  the  question 
by  the  way  in  which  it  is  stated.  But  when,  on  the  contrary,  we 
consider  the  facts  as  a  whole,  heredity  appears  universal,  and  we 
are  less  surprised  at  rinding  characteristics  that  are  hereditary,  than 
in  finding  those  which  are  not 


CHAPTER  II. 

THE   LAWS   OF  HEREDITY. 

THUS,  then,  heredity  presents  itself  to  us  as  a  biological  law, 
that  is,  inherent  in  every  living  thing,  having  no  other  limits  than 
those  of  life  itself.  Life  under  all  its  forms — vegetal,  animal  and 
human,  normal  and  morbid,  physical  and  mental — is  governed  by 
this  law.  It  is,  in  fact,  concerned  with  the  essential  and  inmost 
nature  of  vital  activity.  Among  the  various  functions  which  in 
their  united  action  constitute  life,  two  are  primary — the  one,  nutri- 
tion, which  preserves  the  individual,  the  other,  generation,  which 
perpetuates  the  species.  Some  physiologists  even  reduce  these  to 
one,  nutrition  being,  in  their  view,  only  a  form  of  generation,  or  in 
the  words  of  Claude  Bernard,  'a  continuous  creation  of  organized 
matter  by  means  of  the  histogenic  processes  appertaining  to  the 
living  creature.'  Ultimately,  therefore,  the  vital  functions  are 
reduced  to  generation ;  and  as  it  is  from  this  that  heredity 
immediately  flows,  we  must  conclude  that  the  law  of  hereditary 
transmission  has  its  rise  in  the  sources  of  life  itself. 

If  we  accept  the  foregoing  views,  the  law  of  heredity  would  seem 
to  be  one  of  absolute  simplicity.  Like  produces  like :  the  progeni- 
tor is  repeated  in  the  descendant.  Thus  the  primitive  types  would 


146  Heredity. 

remain,  being  continually  reproduced,  and  the  world  of  life  would 
present  the  spectacle  of  perfect  regularity  and  supreme  monotony. 
But  this  is  true  only  in  theory.  So  soon  as  we  come  to  the  facts, 
we  find  the  law  is  resolved  into  secondary  laws,  or  it  even  appears 
to  vanish  in  the  exceptions.  Not  to  speak  of  the  external  causes 
(chance,  influence  of  circumstances)  which  interfere  with  the  action 
of  heredity,  there  are  interior  causes,  inherent  in  heredity  itself, 
which  hinder  the  law  from  pursuing  the  simple  course  from  like  to 
like.  A  moment's  reflection  will  make  this  plain. 

In  the  inferior  creatures,  in  which  generation  takes  place  without 
sexual  connection,  hereditary  transmission  from  the  parent  to  the 
progeny  occurs  in  a  perfectly  natural  way.  This  happens  in  cases 
of  fission,  as  in  Trembley's  hydra,  or  in  the  Nais,  which  naturally 
divide  into  two  or  more  individuals  like  themselves ;  and  also  in 
cases  of  gemmation,  where  a  bud  forms  on  an  animal  and  is  soon 
itself  changed  into  a  new  and  complete  animal. 

But  in  the  higher  forms  of  generation  sexual  connection  is 
indispensable ;  as  a  struggle  necessarily  arises  between  the  sexes, 
each  parent  tends  to  produce  its  like.  Here  hereditary  transmis- 
sion can  at  best  produce  only  a  mixed  constitution,  holding  from 
both  parents.  '  Clearly,'  says  De  Quatrefages,  '  the  mathematical 
law  of  heredity  would  be  for  the  parent  creature  to  reproduce  itself 
completely  in  its  progeny.  And  perhaps  this  law,  absolute  though 
it  be,  is  to  be  found  underlying  all  natural  phenomena,  but  in 
every  case  it  is  masked  by  accessory  circumstances,  by  the  condi- 
tions amid  which  heredity  acts.  But  it  does  not  only  rest  on 
theoretical  considerations,  it  rests  also  on  facts.  Although  subject 
to  profound  and  continual  disturbance,  still,  if  we  note  all  the 
phenomena  which  show  in  individuals  a  tendency  to  obey  the 
mathematical  law,  heredity  is  found  to  realize  in  the  aggregate  of 
each  species  the  result  which  it  fails  to  realize  in  isolated  indi- 
viduals. To  use  a  figurative  expression,  the  true  meaning  of 
which  cannot  fail  to  be  apprehended,  while  it  cannot  be  verified 
in  the  whole,  it  may  be  in  detail.' 

The  question  is  still  more  complicated  when  we  descend  to 
individual  facts.  We  meet  with  so  many  oddities  and  exceptions, 
and  so  many  contradictory  opinions  in  explanation  of  them,  that 
it  seems  as  though,  when  we  pass  from  theory  to  practice,  all  law 


The  Laws  of  Heredity. 


had  vanished.  Still  these  facts,  however  numerous  and  varied  they 
may  be,  may  all  be  brought  within  the  compass  of  a  few  formulas, 
which  might  be  called  the  empirical  laws  of  heredity.  These  real 
laws,  which  are  so  many  aspects  or  incomplete  expressions  of  the 
ideal  law,  are  the  following,  so  far  as  observation  reveals  them. 

1.  Direct  heredity,  which  consists  in  the  transmission  of  paternal 
and  maternal  qualities  to  the  children.     This  form  of  heredity 
offers  two  aspects  : 

(i.)  The  child  takes  after  father  and  mother  equally  as  regards 
both  physical  and  moral  characters,  a  case,  strictly  speaking,  of 
very  rare  occurrence,  for  the  very  ideal  of  the  law  would  then  be 
realized. 

Or  (2),  the  child,  while  taking  after  both  parents,  more  specially 
resembles  one  of  them;  and  here  again  we  must  distinguish 
between  two  cases. 

a.  The  first  of  these  is  when  the  heredity  takes  place  in  the  same 
sex  —  from  father  to  son,  from  mother  to  daughter. 

ft.  The  other,  which  occurs  more  frequently,  is  where  heredity 
occurs  between  different  sexes  —  from  father  to  daughter,  from 
mother  to  son. 

2.  Reversional  Heredity,   or  atavism,   consists  in  the  reproduc- 
tion in  the  descendants  of  the  moral  or  physical  qualities  of  their 
ancestors.     It  occurs  frequently  between  grandfather  and  grand- 
son, grandmother  and  granddaughter. 

3.  Collateral,  or  indirect  heredity,  which  is  of  rarer  occurrence 
than  the  foregoing,  subsists,  as  indicated  by  its  name,  between 
individuals   and   their  ancestors   in   the  indirect  line  —  uncle,  or 
grand-uncle  and  nephew,  aunt  and  niece. 

4.  Finally,  to  complete  the  classification,  we  must  mention  the 
heredity  of  influence,  very  rare  from  the  physiological  point  of 
view,  and  of  which  probably  no  single  instance  is  proved  in  the 
moral  order.     It  consists  in  the  reproduction  in  the  children  by  a 
second  marriage  of  some  peculiarity  belonging  to  a  former  spouse. 

Such  are  the  various  formulas  under  which  all  the  facts  of 
heredity  may  be  classed.  We  propose  to  study  them  in  succession. 
When  to  this  we  have  added,  as  the  necessary  complement,  the 
study  of  the  exceptions  to  these  laws,  we  shall  have  passed  in 
review  every  single  case  of  heredity. 


148  Heredity. 


SECTION   I. DIRECT   HEREDITY. 

L 

We  have  first  to  resort  to  physiology  in  order  to  clear  the  field, 
since  the  laws  of  physiological  heredity  have  been  oftener  and  far 
better  studied  than  those  of  moral  heredity ;  yet  so  close  is  the 
connection  between  the  two  orders  of  facts,  that  a  person  can 
hardly  study  the  one  without  the  other. 

In  the  case  of  direct  heredity,  the  concurrence  of  the  two  sexes 
in  the  formation  of  the  product  is  now  admitted  by  all  physiolo- 
gists. We  need,  therefore,  only  refer  to  the  ancient  doctrines  of 
the  spermatisls  and  the  ovists.  The  former  held  that,  notwith- 
standing the  apparent  concurrence  of  both  sexes  in  generation, 
the  germ  is  contained  in  the  male  element  alone.  The  latter,  who 
held  a  doctrine  the  very  reverse  of  this,  but  equally  exclusive, 
maintained  that  the  germ  exists  only  in  the  female  element  The 
first  doctrine,  which  was  adopted  by  Galen,  Hartsoeker,  Boerhaave, 
Leeuwenhoek,  and  the  second,  which  was  held  by  Malpighi, 
Vallisnieri,  Spallanzani,  Bonnet,  Haller,  and  even  De  Blainville, 
are  now  equally  abandoned.  It  is  admitted  that  the  child  is 
sprung  from  both  father  and  mother,  and  embryology  demon- 
strates this.  But  opinions  diverge  in  regard  to  the  part  taken 
by  each  of  the  parents. 

If  we  take  a  purely  theoretic  point  of  view,  it  is  easy  enough  to 
formulate  the  law  of  direct  heredity.  According  to  P.  Lucas,  it 
would  consist  in  the  'absolute  equilibrium  in  the  physical  and 
moral  nature  of  the  infant  of  the  integral  resemblances  of  the 
two  parents.'  The  procreated  individual  would  be,  everywhere  and 
always,  nothing  but  the  exact  mean  of  his  two  parents ;  the  dis- 
tinct characters  of  both  would  be  reproduced  in  their  progeny — 
in  every  portion  of  his  body,  and  in  every  faculty  of  his  mind. 
But  this  is  only  a  logical  hypothesis,  which  very  rarely  becomes  a 
reality  in  the  higher  animals  ;  and  it  is  hardly  rash  to  say  that  the 
law  has  never  been  met  with  in  this  ideal  form. 

And  yet  we  understand  that  this  is  the  law,  that  is  to  say,  the 
only  formula  broad  enough  to  include  all  the  phenomena;  the 
only  rule  which  flows  of  necessity  from  the  nature  of  things,  and 
which  expresses  the  essence  of  heredity. 


77ie  Laws  of  Heredity.  149 

It  is  easy  to  account  for  the  disagreement  between  logic  and 
experience.     No  law  of  nature  is  unconditional.     They  all  require 
certain  determinate  conditions  for  their  realization ;  and  where 
these  fail,  the  action  of  the  law  rests  suspended,  or  without  efficacy. 
But  nowhere  are  the  requisite  conditions  more  numerous  or  more 
difficult  to  fulfil  than  in  the  phenomena  of  generation.     For  in 
order  to  produce  in  the  infant  this  perfect  equilibrium  of  paternal 
and  maternal  qualities,  there  must  evidently  be  perfect  equality  of 
action  on  the  part  of  both  parents ;  for  it  will  be  admitted  that  in 
all  races,  and  in  all  species,  the  general  or  partial  preponderance  in 
the  act  of  reproduction  appertains  to  that  one  of  the  parents  in 
whom  the  general  or  partial  force  of  constitution  is  the  greater. 
A  great  number  of  facts,  collected  by  a  crowd  of  writers,  show 
that  this  rule  applies  both  to  the  vegetal  and  the  animal  world. 
This  preponderance  of  one  of  the  procreative  individuals  is  very 
notable  in  crosses  between  distinct  races  or  species.     It  is  true 
that  in  this  case  there  is  a  struggle  not  only  between  the  sexes, 
but  between  distinct  specific  forces.     These  crosses,  however,  only 
exhibit  to  us,  more  or  less  magnified,  what  takes  place  in  ordinary 
cases.     According  to  Rursh,  marriages  between  Danes  and  East 
Indian  women  produce  children  with  the  physique  and  the  vigour 
of  the  European  type,  while  nothing  of  this  kind  occurs  when 
these  same  women  marry  other  Europeans.     The  intermarriage  of 
Causasians  and   Mongolians   produces,  according   to    Klaproth, 
half-breeds  in  whom  the  Mongolian  type  is  always  predominant, 
whatever  may  be  the  sex  of  the  half-breed.     From  Levaillant's 
observations  (Voyage  en   Cafrerie)  on  the  half-bred  children  of 
Europeans  and   Hottentots,  we  gather  that  in  them  the  moral 
nature  is  always  determined  by  the  race  of  the  father.     'When- 
ever it  happens,  which  is  but  rarely,  that  a  white  woman  has 
intercourse  with  a  Hottentot,  the  child  has  always  the  good-nature, 
and  the  gentle  and  kindly  inclinations,  of  the  father.     But  the 
children  of  white  men  and  Hottentot  women,  on  the  other  hand, 
have  in  themselves  the  germs  of  all  vices  and  unruly  passions.' 
Cross  breeding  in  the  animal  races  exhibits  also  the  unquestionable 
preponderance  of  one  of  the  parents. 

This  being  admitted,  it  may  be  readily  shown  that  among  the 
higher  animals  the  complete  conditions  necessary  for  the  realiza- 
tion of  the  ideal  law  can  nowhere  be  found. 


1 50  Heredity. 

1.  There  must  be  first  of  all  a  perfect  correspondence  between 
the  physical  and  mental  constitution  of  the  parents.     A  moment's 
reflection  will  show  that  each  of  these  two  general  states — the 
physical  and  the  mental  constitution — is  itself  the  result  of  many 
particular  states,  which,  taken  together,  impress  on  every  individual 
that   distinct  and  special   mark  which  is   in  physiology  called 
temperament,  in  psychology,  character. 

2.  But  even  if  these  first  conditions  are  fulfilled,  there  is  some- 
thing more  required.     It  is  not  enough  that  the  physical  and 
mental  constitution  of  both  parents  should  be  equipoised  in  a 
general  sense ;  there  are,  moreover,  particular  conditions  of  age 
and  health,  which  are  indispensable.     Disproportion  in  the  ages  of 
the  two  parents,  where  it  does  not  produce  sterility,  gives  the 
preponderance  to  the  younger.     Experiments  made  by  Girou  de 
Buzareingues  on  various  animals  show  that  the  progeny  of  an  old 
male  and  a  young  female  are  less  like  their  father,  in  proportion  as 
he  is  feeble  and  the  mother  vigorous,  and  that  the  progeny  of  an 
old  female  and  a  young  male  resemble  the  mother  less  in  propor- 
tion as  he  is  vigorous.     Nor  is  the  influence  of  the  actual  state  of 
health,  of  vigour,  or  of  cheerfulness  in  one  of  the  parents  less 
marked  in  the  progeny. 

3.  Finally,  there  are  sundry  other  states  more  accidental  and 
transitory  than  those  named,  which  influence  the  act  of  generation. 
Positive  facts  show  that  these  states,  all  transitory  as  they  are, 
exert  a  very  powerful  influence  on  the  progeny,  and  ensure  the 
preponderance  of  one  or  the  other  sex.     We  need  only  recall  the 
fact  that  nothing  is  more  common  than  the  intellectual  feebleness 
of  children  begotten  in  a  state  of  intoxication ;   that  a  popular 
tradition,  adopted  by  several  authors,  and  to  some  extent  supported 
by  history,  represents  illegitimate  children  as  cleverer,  more  hand- 
some, and    more   healthy   than  others,   because  they  are  '  love- 
children.'    On  the  other  hand,  'when  parents,'  says  Burdach,  '  have 
a  dislike  to  one  another,  they  beget  ugly  forms,  and  their  children 
are  less  lively  and  vigorous.' 

It  is  easy  to  see  that  there  are  many  circumstances  of  this  kind 
which  must  influence  the  act  of  generation.  When  we  consider 
how  impossible  it  is  to  have  these  general,  particular  and  for- 
tuitous conditions  in  perfect  equilibrium  in  the  two  parents,  we 


The  Laws  of  Heredity.  151 

find  it  natural  that  the  law  already  stated  should  remain  in  the 
purely  theoretic  state. 

Hence  we  have  to  seek  in  the  facts  themselves  for  some  empiric 
formula,  which  may  be  deduced  from  them.  Here  arise  many 
opinions,  of  which  the  following  are  the  chief. 

The  simplest  is  that  which  holds  that  there  is  an  invariable 
connection  between  the  heredity  of  physical  resemblance  and  the 
heredity  of  moral  resemblance.  That  parent  who  transmits  the 
former,  or  who  influences  it  most,  transmits  also  the  latter,  by 
reason  of  the  strict  correlation  existing  between  the  two.  This 
doctrine,  which  has  been  maintained  by  Burdach,  rests,  in  principle, 
on  the  general  relations  between  the  physical  and  moral  natures ; 
and,  in  fact,  on  numerous  cases  furnished  by  experience.  The  case 
of  twins  is  particularly  cited,  as  commonly  presenting  an  extra- 
ordinary conformity,  not  only  in  the  external  form  and  in  the 
features  of  the  face,  but  also  in  tastes,  in  faculties,  and  even  in 
fortune. 

Da  Gama  Machado,  author  of  a  Theory  of  Resemblances, 
which  contains  a  large  number  of  curious  facts  for  the  study  of 
physical  heredity,  holds  that  the  parent  who  transmits  his  colour 
transmits  likewise  his  character.  '  In  the  colonies,'  says  he,  '  the 
half-breed,  called  griffon  or  fusco  (dark),  resulting  from  the  union 
of  a  mulatto  and  a  negress,  is  much  darker  than  the  mulatto. 
But  this  difference  of  colour  is  accompanied  by  a  difference  in 
character:  the  issue  of  a  mulatto  and  a  negress  are  far  more 
docile  than  the  issue  of  a  negress  and  a  white  man.  If  a  wild 
duck  couple  with  a  domestic  duck,  the  duckling  resulting  from  this 
union,  having  its  father's  colour,  leaves  the  barn-yard  and  returns 
to  the  wild  life.  If  the  linnet  be  crossed  with  the  canary  or  the 
goldfinch,  the  transmission  of  instincts  will,  according  to  this 
author,  follow  the  transmission  of  colour,  and  if  there  is  a  mixture 
of  colours,  there  will  be  also  a  mixture  of  instincts. 

Girou  de  Buzareingues,  whose  experiments  on  generation  are 
well  known,  distinguishes  two  lives  in  every  individual,  whatever 
the  sex :  The  external  life,  on  which  depend  the  nervous  system 
of  the  animal  life  and  the  muscular  system,  of  which  motor  activity, 
will,  and  intelligence  are  the  attributes ;  and  the  internal  life, 
which  comprises  the  cellular  tissue,  the  digestive  system,  the  great 


152  Heredity. 

sympathetic,  and  the  whole  nerve-system  of  the  organic  life  :  on 
this  depend  internal  sensibility  and  the  sentiments. 

Each  of  these  two  lives  would  have  the  faculty  of  reproduction ; 
consequently  the  transmission  of  the  external  life  would  imply  the 
transmission  of  the  intelligence,  while  the  transmission  of  the 
internal  life  would  imply  that  of  the  sentiments.1 

Gall  and  his  disciple  Spurzheim,  rejecting  these  doctrines,  main- 
tained an  opinion  which  results  logically  from  their  system — that 
the  analogy  in  the  conformation  of  the  various  regions  of  the 
cranial  arch  implies  analogous  psychological  constitution.  *  It  has 
been  always  observed,'  says  Gall,  '  that  when  brothers  and  sisters 
resemble  one  another,  or  their  father  and  mother,  in  the  shape  of 
the  head,  they  also  resemble  each  other  in  psychical  and  mental 
qualities.' 

We  may  fairly  consider  that,  since  every  one  of  these  doctrines 
is  supported  by  a  large  number  of  facts,  they  all  may  be  esteemed 
partial  generalizations;  but  since  they  are  all  open  to  many 
exceptions,  none  can  be  accepted  as  a  total  generalization.  Thus 
is  theory  confirmed  by  experience  :  reasoning  deductively,  we 
arrived  at  the  conclusion  that  the  perfect  law  of  heredity  would 
never  be  realized ;  and  now  the  examination  of  the  facts  shows 
that  no  empiric  formula  attains  the  breadth  of  a  general  law. 

The  only  thing  that  results  clearly  from  this  conflict  of  doctrines 
is,  that  in  point  of  fact  there  is  always  a  preponderance  of  one  of 
the  parents. 

In  the  case  of  direct  heredity,  the  child  is  always  more  specially 
like  either  the  father  or  the  mother. 

This  preponderance,  moreover,  is  never  exclusive,  as  will  appear 
hereafter,  from  some  curious  facts.  In  spite  of  appearances,  the 
heredity  of  parents  to  children  is  never  unilateral,  but  always 
bilateral.  The  phenomena  of  reversionary  heredity  prove  that, 
although  the  influence  of  one  of  the  parents  on  the  child  may 
seem  abolished,  it  never  is  annihilated,  and  thus  the  law  of  equality 
of  action  is  as  far  as  possible  realized. 

The  phenomena  of  cross-breeding  confirm  what  has  been  said. 
Anthropologists  have  drawn  up  tables  wherein  the  influence  of  the 

1  De  la  Gdndration,  pp.  130,  131. 


The  Laws  of  Heredity. 


153 


father  and  that  of  the  mother,  each  represented  by  a  fraction,  are 
supposed  to  be  equal  in  the  production  of  the  half-breed.  But 
this  hypothesis,  as  expressed  in  the  following  table,  is  altogether 
theoretic, 

WHITE  AND  BLACK. 


Generations. 

Parents. 

Offspring. 

Blood. 
White.     Black. 

1st 

White  +  Negro 

Mulatto 

i          i 

2nd 

< 
Mulatto  + 

1 

1 

(  White 

Negro 

i  ' 

Tierceroon 
Griffo 

*          \ 

\         \ 

3rd 

Tierceroon  + 

White 
Negro 

Quadroon 
Ditto 

i          i 

i          * 

4th 

(  White 
Quadroon  +    < 
/  Negro 

Quinteroon 
Ditto 

fS-         TV 

TV                tt 

Eut,  in  fact,  cross-breeding  does  not  by  any  means  proceed  with 
such  mathematical  regularity.  Not  to  speak  of  the  numerous 
cases  in  which  the  union  of  white  and  black  results  in  a  child 
entirely  black,  or  entirely  white,  in  half-breeds  there  is  always  a 
preponderance  of  one  or  other  of  the  parents.  Burmeister,  one  of 
the  closest  observers  of  the  mulattoes  of  South  America  and  of 
the  West  Indian  Islands,  denies  that  the  mulatto  is  exactly  the 
mean  between  his  two  parents.  In  the  immense  majority  of  cases, 
his  characters  are  borrowed  from  both  races,  but  one  of  them  is 
always  predominant,  and  that  usually  the  negro  race.  Primer 
Bey,  who  has  carefully  studied  the  mulattoes  in  Egypt  and  Arabia, 
passes  the  same  judgment  He  observes  the  marked  predomi- 
nance of  the  negro  type.  It  is  manifest  in  the  curly,  woolly  hair ;  in 
the  general  form  and  dimensions  of  the  skull ;  in  the  forehead, 
usually  low  and  slightly  receding ;  in  the  conformation  of  the  feet, 
and  in  a  prognathism  which  scarcely  ever  disappears  in  the  first 
generation. 


Pier  edit  y. 


The  foregoing  observations  may  be  thus  summarized  :  In  the 
case  of  direct  heredity  the  child  derives  its  qualities  from  father 
and  mother. 

There  is  always  a  preponderance  of  one  of  these. 

It  will,  perhaps,  be  asked  whether,  after  having  treated  the 
question  mainly  from  the  physiological  point  of  view,  we  ought 
not  now  to  take  it  up  again  from  the  psychological  point  of  view, 
and  search  history  for  facts  in  support  of  this  first  form  of  direct 
heredity  —  that  is,  for  cases  of  persons  who  derived  their  qualities 
from  both  father  and  mother.  Such  cases  might  be  found.  It 
might  be  said  that  Alexander  resembled  Philip  in  some  respects, 
Olympias  in  others.  Nero  was  the  worthy  son  of  Agrippina  ;  but 
it  is  not  to  be  forgotten  that  his  father,  Domitius  Ahenobarbus,  was 
noted  for  his  cruelty  :  he  had  one  of  his  freedmen  put  to  death  for 
refusing  to  drink  to  excess  ;  he  purposely  crushed  to  death  a  child 
on  the  Appian  Way  ;  and  he  was  wont  to  say  :  '  Of  me  and 
Agrippina  nothing  can  be  born  that  is  not  accursed.'  Michelet 
declares  that  Queen  Elizabeth  resembled  both  Henry  VIII.  and 
Ann  Boleyn.  According  to  the  same  historian,  the  Duke  de 
Vendome  was  most  like  his  mother,  Gabrielle  d'Estrees  ;  but  in 
his  '  waggish  look  comes  out  his  Gascon  ancestry  and  the  great 
Bearnais  jester.'  (Henri  IV.)  Schopenhauer,  who  explains  the 
question  of  heredity  according  to  his  metaphysical  system,  holds 
that  whatever  is  primary  and  fundamental  in  the  individual  — 
character,  passions,  tendencies  —  is  inherited  from  the  father  :  the 
intelligence,  a  secondary  and  derivative  faculty,  directly  from  the 
mother.  He  was  pleased  to  imagine  that  he  found  in  his  own 
person  the  irrefutable  evidence  of  this  doctrine.  Intellectual  and 
subtle  like  his  mother,  who  had  literary  tastes  and  lived  in 
Goethe's  circle  at  Weimar,  he  was,  like  his  father,  shy,  obstinate, 
intractable  :  he  was  a  man  of  '  scowling  mien,  and  of  fantastic 
judgments.'  l 

It  would  not  be  difficult  to  multiply  instances,  but  the  labour 
would  be  wholly  useless  ;  for  the  question  before  us  now  is,  not 
whether  the  child  derives  its  qualities  from  both  father  and  mother 


1  Schopenhauer,  Die  Wdt  als  Wtile  und  Vorstchung,  voL  L  §  23 ;    vol.  ii. 
book  iv.  ch.  43. 


The  Laws  of  Heredity.  155 

(about  which  there  can  be  no  doubt),  but  whether  there  are  cases 
where  it  derives  them  in  equal  degree  from  both.  If  such  a  case 
were  to  occur,  we  could  not  show  that  it  did,  especially  as  regards 
moral  resemblances.  To  that  end  we  must  needs  have  exact  pro- 
cesses of  measurement,  which  do  not  exist;  we  should  have  to 
estimate  quantities  and  not  qualities.  The  foregoing  examples, 
and  all  the  others  we  might  accumulate,  could  prove  only  this  one 
thing,  that  there  is  always  a  more  or  less  marked  preponderance 
of  one  of  the  two  parents.  Cases  occur  where  the  preponderant 
action  of  the  father  or  of  the  mother  is  manifested  in  a  singular 
way,  each  parent  seeming  to  have,  as  it  were,  chosen  some  par- 
ticular organ.  Thus  the  father  may  transmit  to  the  child  the  brain, 
and  the  mother  the  stomach ;  one  the  heart,  the  other  the  liver ; 
one  the  great  intestine,  the  other  the  pancreas ;  one  the  kidneys, 
the  other  the  bladder.  These  facts  have  been  established  by 
animal  and  human  anatomy.  They  give  the  organic  reason  for  the 
intercrossing  of  instincts,  which  is  often  so  curious,  and  of  the 
morbid  and  passionate  predispositions  of  both  parents  in  the 
child. 

Sometimes,  too,  one  of  the  parents  transmits  the  entire  physical, 
the  other  the  entire  moral  nature.  The  most  curious  and  incon- 
testable instance  of  this  is  the  case  of  Lislet-Geoffroy,  engineer 
in  Mauritius.  He  was  the  son  of  a  white  man  and  of  a  very 
stupid  negress.  In  physical  constitution  he  was  as  much  a  negro 
as  his  mother;  he  had  the  features,  the  complexion,  the  woolly 
hair,  and  the  peculiar  odour  of  his  race.  In  moral  constitution  he 
was  so  thoroughly  a  white  as  regards  intellectual  development,  that 
he  succeeded  in  vanquishing  the  prejudices  of  blood,  so  strong 
in  the  colonies,  and  in  being  admitted  into  the  most  aristocratic 
houses.  At  the  time  of  his  death  he  was  Corresponding  Member 
of  the  Academy  of  Sciences. 

Thus  we  are  brought  to  the  examination  of  cases  of  unilateral 
heredity — the  word  unilateral  being  here  taken,  as  has  been  ex- 
plained, in  a  restricted  sense. 


156  Heredity. 


ii. 

Whenever,  then,  the  strict  conditions  of  intermixture  are  wanting, 
the  rule  is  that  one  of  the  parents  is  preponderant  When  we 
study  empirically  the  laws  of  heredity,  we  find  that  this  case  is  of 
by  far  the  most  frequent  occurrence.  Common  language  translates 
this  everyday  experience  into  such  phrases  as  these:  this  child 
reminds  one  of  his  father ;  or,  that  child  is  the  image  of  its  mother. 
But  experience  also  teaches  us  that  this  preponderance  takes  place 
in  two  ways,  being  sometimes  direct,  sometimes  diagonal. 

Sometimes  the  preponderance  is  manifested  in  an  individual 
of  the  one  sex  on  the  child  of  the  same  sex  ;  in  that  case  the  son 
resembles  the  father ;  the  daughter  the  mother. 

Again,  this  preponderance  is  manifested  in  the  opposite  sex; 
then  the  daughter  resembles  the  father,  and  the  son  the  mother. 

We  will  consider  the  latter  case  first 

When  we  study  heredity  empirically,  when,  that  is,  we  observe 
facts  and  the  generalizations  which  immediately  result  from  it,  the 
formula  which  includes  the  largest  number  of  facts  and  admits  of 
the  fewest  exceptions  is  the  following :  Heredity  passes  from  one 
sex  to  the  opposite.  This  assertion  may  at  first  appear  strange, 
and  even'  entirely  at  variance  with  what  has  already  been  said, 
that  like  produces  like.  This  will  hereafter  be  explained ;  but 
perhaps  it  will  appear  less  difficult  of  comprehension  if  we  follow 
heredity  through  several  generations.  It  will  then  be  seen  to  pass 
from  the  grandfather  to  the  mother,  and  then  from  the  mother  to 
the  son;  or  from  the  grandmother  to  the  father,  and  from  the 
father  to  the  daughter.  Thus  it  returns  to  its  starting-point 

But  not  to  dwell  on  this  question  here,  we  would  remark  that 
the  thesis  of  cross  heredity  is  admitted  by  several  great  physio- 
logists, such  as  Haller,  Burdach,  Girou  de  Buzareingues,  and 
Richerand.  '  This  explains,'  says  the  latter,  '  why  so  many  great 
men  have  mediocre  sons.'  Michelet  thinks  that  history  justifies 
him  in  broadly  affirming  the  existence  of  cross  heredity.  '  No 
other  king,'  says  he,  speaking  of  Louis  XVL,  'exemplifies  better 
a  law  of  which  history  has  but  few  exceptions.  The  king  was  a 
foreigner.  Every  son  takes  after  his  mother.  The  king  was  the 

son  of  a  foreign  woman,  and  had  her  blood.     Succession  in  such 

ft 


T/ie  Laws  of  Heredity.  157 

cases  has  nearly  always  the  effect  of  an  invasion.  The  evidences 
of  this  are  numberless.  Catherine  and  Marie  de  Medicis  gave 
us  pure  Italians ;  in  the  same  way  La  Farnese  may  be  traced  in 
Carlos  II.  of  Spain  ;  Louis  XVI.  was  a  real  Saxon  king,  and  more 
German  than  the  Germans  themselves.' 1 

Dr.  P.  Lucas,  though  he  does  not  explicitly  accept  this  law,  still 
does  not  reject  it 

Let  us,  therefore,  look  at  the  facts  which  support  it  These  we  take 
at  three  sources :  intermixture  of  races,  mental  diseases,  and  history. 

i.  From  the  physiological  point  of  view  cases  of  cross  heredity 
are  very  numerous  under  normal  conditions,  that  is,  when  the 
parents  are  healthy  and  of  good  constitutions.  When  one  of 
them  presents  any  anomaly  or  deformity,  we  find  that  cross- 
heredity  is  still  more  common  :  thus,  a  curved  spine,  lameness, 
rickets,  sexdigitism,  deaf-muteness,  mycrophthalmy — in  short,  all 
organic  imperfections — pass  from  the  father  to  the  daughters,  and 
from  the  mother  to  the  sons.2 

From  the  psychological  point  of  view,  Gall  cites  the  curious 
case  of  twins  of  opposite  sexes,  where  the  boy  was  like  the 
mother,  a  very  stupid  woman,  and  the  girl  like  the  father,  who  was 
a  man  of  considerable  talent 

In  cross  breeding,  this  appears  very  plainly.  When  a  dog  is 
crossed  with  a  wolf-bitch,  the  males  usually  inherit  the  character  of 
the  wolf,  the  females  that  of  the  dog.  It  even  appears  that  this 
transfer  of  qualities  to  the  opposite  sex  takes  place  more  regularly 
with  regard  to  moral  than  to  physical  characters.  As  will  be  seen, 
Buffon,  after  in  vain  trying  to  bring  about  a  crossing  of  a  dog  and 
a  she-wolf,  abandoned  the  attempt  But  chance  brought  about 
that  which  art  could  not  do.  The  wolf  dropped  two  cubs;  the 
one  a  male  which  physically  resembled  the  dog,  but  in  character 
was  wild  and  savage ;  the  other,  a  female,  physically  resembled  the 
wolf,  but  in  disposition  was  gentle,  familiar,  and  even  trouble- 
somely  affectionate.  From  the  crossing  of  a  he-goat  and  a  bitch 
hound  sprang  young  ones,  some  of  which  were  like  the  goat, 
others  like  the  bitch :  the  latter  had  all  the  habits  of  their  sire. 

1  Histoire  cU  France,  vol.  xvii. 

a  Girou  has  a  great  number  of  observations  on  this  point. — D;  la  G 
276 — 284. 


158  Heredity. 

'  A  wild  torn  cat,'  says  Girou,  'and  a  domestic  cat  produced  two 
torn  cats  which  were  like  their  mother,  and  were  gentle  and 
familiar  like  her,  and  one  she-cat,  which  resembled  the  father,  and 
was  wild  like  him,  and  far  more  shy  than  the  other  two  kittens.' 

The  same  author  states  that  hunters  have  a  proverb  which  says, 
Dog  from  bitch  and  bitch  from  dog  ('  Chien  de  chienne  et  chientie 
de  chien),  meaning  that  the  mother's  qualities  are  found  in  the  son, 
and  the  father's  in  the  daughter. 

The  Arabs,  who  think  so  much  of  the  genealogy  of  their  horses, 
show  a  marked  preference  for  blood  on  the  female  side  over  the 
male  side. 

We  may  also  cite  decisive  facts  drawn  from  the  human  race. 

'  P was  in  the  habit,'  says  Girou,  '  of  going  to  sleep  with  the 

right  leg  crossed  upon  the  left.  One  of  his  daughters  came  into 
the  world  with  the  same  habit ;  she  constantly  assumed  that  pos- 
ture in  the  cradle,  in  spite  of  the  resistance  offered  by  the  napkin. 

*  I  know  several  girls  who  resemble  their  fathers,  and  who  from 
them  have  inherited  peculiar  and  extraordinary  habits,  not  to  be 
attributed  either  to  imitation  or  to  education ;  as  also  of  boys  who 
from  birth  have  borne  a  very  striking  resemblance,  whether  physi- 
cally or  morally,  to  their  mothers ;  but  propriety  forbids  all  detail 
on  this  subject 

*  Here  I  would  observe  that  the  external  and  the  moral  resem- 
blance of  the  son  to  the  mother    is  far  less  frequent  and  less 
perfect  than  that  of  the  daughter  to  the  father.' 

2.  Mental   disorders  furnish   a   considerable  number  of  cases 
in  support  of  cross  heredity.      These  are  to  be  found  scattered 
through  the  works  of  writers  on  insanity.    Baillarger,  in  his  Recher- 
ches  sur  F  Anatomic,  la  Physiologic,  et  la  Pathologic  du  Systeme 
Nerveux,  has  endeavoured  to  go  over  the  whole  ground.     In  571 
cases  observed,  he  found  246  of  cross  heredity  and  325  of  direct 
The   result,  as   we  see,  is    not  favourable   to  the  thesis   which 
regards  cross  heredity  as  of  the  more  frequent  occurrence.      The 
author  has  not  failed   to   draw  this   conclusion,  which  will   be 
hereafter  examined. 

3.  We  need  now  to  collect  some  facts  from  history,  restricting 
ourselves  to  well-known  personages,  and  eliminating  carefully  all 
cases  in  which  hereditary  transmission  appears  questionable. 


The  Laws  of  Heredity. 


'59 


HEREDITY  FROM  MOTHER  TO  SON. 


MOTHER. 

Olympias  •        •        . 

Cornelia       .... 

Livia 

Agrippina    .... 
Faustina  . 

Soemias        .... 
Mammxa        .         .         .         . 
Marozia       .... 
Blanche  of  Castille . 
Berengaria  .... 
Charlotte  of  Savoy  .        .        . 
Louise  of  Savoy  .         .        . 
Mary  Stuart     . 
Catherine  de  Medicis   .         . 
Jeanne  d'Albret 
Marie  de  Medicis         .        . 
Anne-Christine  Marlin 
Mdlle.  de  Tencin 
Genevieve  de  Vassau 

Santi  Lomaka  (Greek) .         . 
Mrs.  Byron  (Catherine  Gordon) 


SON. 

Alexander  the  Gieat 
The  Gracchi 
Tiberius 
Nero 

Commodus 
Heliogabalus 
Alexander  Severus 
Pope  John  XL 
Louis  IX. 
St  Ferdinand 
Charles  VIIL 
Francis  I. 
James  I.  (?) 
Her  sons 
Henri  IV. 
Louis  XIIL 
Buffon 
D'Alembert 
Mirabeau 
Andre"    ) 
M-J.      / 
Goethe 
Byron 


Chdnier 


Remarks. — Alfonso  XL,  King  of  Castille,  famed  for  his  re- 
ligious zeal  and  his  love  of  warfare  against  the  Moors,  was  the 
father  of  Berengaria,  Blanche,  and  Uraca.  The  first  of  these 
became  the  mother  of  St  Ferdinand.  The  second  had  four  sons, 
among  them  St  Louis  and  Charles  of  Anjou,  both  ascetics,  who 
mortified  their  flesh  with  iron  girdles,  scourgings,  extreme  fastings, 
etc.  The  third  made  her  son  Sancho  take  the  monastic  habit, 
though  called  to  the  throne  of  Portugal. 

Buffon,  who  held  the  doctrine  of  cross  heredity,  used  to  say 
that  he  himself  took  after  his  mother.  '  He  held  it  for  a  principle, 
says  Herault  de  Sechelles,  '  that  childen  usually  inherit  intellectual 
8 


1  60  Heredity. 

and  moral  qualities  from  their  mother.  And  this  he  applied  to  his 
own  case,  speaking  in  the  highest  terms  of  praise  of  his  mother, 
who  in  point  of  fact  was  a  woman  of  much  ability,  extensive 
knowledge,  and  of  a  superior  mind. 

Mirabeau  (Friend  of  Humanity)  was  wont  to  say  of  his  son  : 
'  He  possesses  all  the  low  qualities  of  the  maternal  stock.' 

Goethe  resembled  his  father  physically,  but  psychologically  he 
resembled  his  mother  by  his  strong  instinct  of  self-preservation, 
his  dislike  of  all  strong  emotions,  and  his  caustic  and  biting 
speech.  (For  well-known  anecdotes  on  this  point,  see  his  Life  by 
Henri  Blaze,  and  Life  by  Lewes.) 

By  his  servant  maid,  whom  he  married,  a  woman  of  inferior 
intellect,  he  had  several  children,  one  only  of  them  a  boy  ;  they  all 
died  young.  This  son  resembled  Goethe  in  bodily  vigour,  but  he 
was  of  narrow  mind  like  his  mother,  and  Wieland  used  to  call 
him  the  son  of  the  handmaiden  (der  Sohn  der  Magd). 

HEREDITY  FROM  FATHER  TO  DAUGHTER. 

FATHER.  DAUGHTER. 

Aristippus,  the  Cyrenaic  philo- 

sopher         ....  Areta 

Theon,  the  geometrician       .  Hypatia 

Scipio      .....  Cornelia 

Caesar          ....  Julia  (Pompey's  wife) 

Cicero     .....  Tullia 

Caligula       .        .         .        .  Julia  Drusilla 

Charlemagne   ....  His  daughters  (?) 

Alexander  VI.      ...  Lucretia  Borgia 

Louis  XI  .....  Anne  de  Beaujeu 

Louis  XII  .....  Claude  de  France 

Henrv  VIII  (  Elizabeth 

Henry  vill.    .  .  -j 


Henri  II  .....  Marguerite  de  Valois 

Henri  IV  .....  Henrietta  of  England 

Cromwell     ....  His  daughters 

Gustavus  Adolphus  .        .  Christina 

The  Regent         .        .        .  His  daughters 

Necker    ...  .  Madame  de  Stae'l 


The  Laws  of  Heredity.  161 

Remarks. — Complaint  having  been  made  to  Caligula  that  his 
daughter,  two  years  old,  scratched  the  little  children  who  were  her 
playfellows  and  even  tried  to  tear  out  their  eyes,  he  replied  with 
a  laugh,  '  I  see ;  she  is  my  daughter.' 

'The  Regent,'  says  Michelet,  'took  after  his  mother,  a  robust, 
masculine  Bavarian  woman.  She  was  of  an  inquiring,  active 
mind,  who  roamed  in  all  fields  of  science,  and  had  a  liking  for 
general  culture,  which  was  in  those  times  rare  in  France." 
(Histoire  de  France,  tome  xiv.)  Her  son,  the  Regent,  was  a 
fool :  her  daughters  were  extremely  strange.  The  eldest,  the 
Duchesse  de  Berry,  a  charming  woman  of  unbridled  passions,  was 
certainly  mad.  The  second,  who  possessed  her  father's  versatility, 
was  an  encyclopaedic  whirlwind.  The  third  and  fourth  were  all 
caprice  and  folly.  They  astonished  Italy  and  Spain  with  such 
daring  scandals  that  it  is  impossible  not  to  see  madness  in  all  they 
did. 

Lucas,  following  Carlyle,  thus  sums  up  the  genealogy  of  the 
Cromwells.  Robert  Cromwell,  grandson  of  the  terrible  and 
frenzied  instrument  of  Henry  VIII.  in  his  contest  with  Rome, 
married  Catharine  Stuart,  a  second  cousin  of  Charles  I.  To 
Oliver,  the  only  male  among  the  seven  children  which  were  the 
fruit  of  this  strange  marriage,  passed  the  enthusiastic  and  powerful 
genius  of  the  Cromwells,  and  it  raised  him  to  the  highest  station. 
Oliver  took  to  wife  Eliza  Bouchier,  a  woman  of  gentle  disposition. 
His  male  issue  were  'Arcadian  Shepherds,'  his  daughters  more 
fanatical  than  himself. 

in. 

We  next  consider  the  third  form  of  direct  heredity,  the  pre- 
ponderance of  one  parent  in  the  children  of  the  same  sex. 

This,  like  the  preceding  form,  is  based  upon  a  large  number  of 
facts  derived  from  physiology,  psychology,  and  history. 

Possibly  these  are  not  so  numerous  as  the  facts  of  cross 
heredity.  This,  however,  is  no  more  than  a  vague  and  general 
impression,  in  short,  a  mere  hypothesis.  Against  the  questionable 
arguments  derived  from  the  number  of  facts,  the  upholders  of  the 
contrary  opinion  might  not  only  cite  facts,  but  might  also  allege  a 
theoretical  consideration  in  favour  of  their  view,  which  is  not 


1 62  Heredity. 

without  value ;  they  might  say  that  their  thesis  is  only  a  special 
application  of  a  maxim  generally  admitted  with  regard  to  gener- 
ation, viz.  that  like  produces  like.  When  we  treat  of  reversional 
heredity,  we  shall  endeavour  to  show  that  the  conflict  between 
these  two  opinions  is  only  apparent,  and  also  how  they  may  be 
harmonized. 

Among  the  physiological  facts  which  exhibit  heredity  trans- 
mitted in  the  same  sex,  we  may  cite  the  family  of  Edward 
Lambert,  the  human  porcupine,  in  which  a  peculiar  affection  was 
transmitted  only  to  the  males.  Daltonism,  or  colour-blindness, 
manifests  itself  more  frequently,  as  we  have  seen,  in  men  than  in 
women ;  yet  it  has  been  transmitted  through  five  generations  to 
twelve  persons,  all  females.  Constitution,  temperament,  fecundity, 
longevity,  idiosyncrasies,  or  anomalies  of  every  kind,  pass  as  often 
from  father  to  son  as  from  mother  to  daughter. 

From  the  psychological  point  of  view,  as  we  have  said,  Bail- 
larger,  resting  on  the  statistical  data  of  mental  disease,  inclines  to 
the  belief  that  heredity  usually  occurs  between  individuals  of  the 
same  sex.  His  671  cases  were  distributed  as  follows : — 

CASES  OF  MENTAL  DISEASE. 

Total 

In  the  father        225         In  the  mother      346         571 
„        sons  128  „      daughters  197         325 

„        daughters    97  „       sons  149         246 

We  now  turn  to  the  statistical  reports  made  to  the  French 
Government  in  1860,  of  which  we  have  already  spoken. 

MEN  WOMEN 

In  1,000  cases.  In  1,000  cases. 

128  inherited  from  the  father  130  inherited  from  the  mother 

no          „        „     the  mother  TOO        „          „     the  father 

26          „        „     both.  26        „          „     both. 

It  is  plain  that  these  two  tables  lead  to  the  same  conclusions. 

We  hold  that  the  study  of  mental  disease  is  of  great  importance 
for  experimental  psychology,  and  well  adapted  for  resolving  many 
problems ;  yet  we  would  not  place  over-much  confidence  in  it  in 
the  present  case. 


The  Laws  of  Heredity.  163 

In  the  first  place,  if  the  author,  basing  his  judgment  entirely  on 
the  fact  of  mental  alienation,  proposes  thence  to  draw  a  conclusion 
covering  the  whole  question  of  heredity,  physical  as  well  as  moral, 
he  makes  so  great  a  mistake  in  logic  that  the  mere  statement  is  a 
sufficient  condemnation.  It  would  be  too  arbitrary  to  rely  on  a 
single  characteristic,  for  the  heredity  of  insanity  does  not  include 
that  of  the  muscular  system,  of  the  features,  of  the  complexion,  or 
the  apparatus  of  organic  life. 

But  if,  as  is  probable,  he  means  to  speak  only  of  mental  here- 
dity, the  fault  of  his  reasoning,  though  less  grave,  is  still  very  serious. 
The  heredity  of  mental  affections  is  only  one  of  the  forms  of 
psychological  heredity,  and  it  is  not  legitimate  to  argue  from  one 
to  all  To  derive  from  parents  a  morbid  predisposition  which  will 
hereafter  lead  to  mania,  monomania,  hallucination,  or  dementia, 
by  no  means  necessitates  the  inheritance  of  their  entire  psycho- 
logical constitution,  their  character,  their  genius,  their  scientific 
and  artistic  aptitudes,  their  memory,  passions,  or  sentiments  ;  facts 
prove  the  contrary.  In  very  many  cases  the  cause  of  mental 
disease  is  altogether  physical — a  lesion  of  the  brain  or  of  some 
other  organ  ;  and  nothing  justifies  the  assertion,  that  as  these 
lesions  are  inherited,  therefore  the  whole  mental  dynamism  is  also 
inherited. 

Thus  the  arguments  drawn  from  mental  pathology  have  not  so 
wide  a  range  as  Baillarger  assigns  to  them.  But  if  they  are 
insufficient  to  prove  that  heredity  in  the  same  sex  is  more  frequent 
than  cross  heredity,  they  do,  however,  prove  that  it  is  of  frequent 
occurrence. 

We  now  cite  from  history  some  well-established  instances  of  thii 
form  of  heredity. 

HEREDITY  FROM  FATHER  TO  SON. 

FATHER.  SON. 

Nicomachos     ,  .         .      Aristotle 
Scipio  (Publius  Cornelius)       Scipio  (Africanus  major) 

Vespasian         .  .        .      Titus 
Verus  (^Elius)       .         .          Verus  (Lucianus) 

Pepin  d'Heristal  .        .      Charles  Martel 
Charles  Martel      .        .         Pepin  the  Short 


164 


Heredity. 


HEREDITY  FROM  FATHER  TO  SON  (continued). 


FATHER. 

Pepin  the  Short   .        . 
Hamilcar          •        •        • 

Seneca  (Marcus)  .        . 

Artevelt  (Jaques  van)        . 
Guise  (Francois)  .        . 

Nassau  (William  of) . 
Scaliger  (Julius  Csesar)          . 
Casaubon  (Isaac)      .        . 
Tasso  (Bernardo)          .        . 
Sanzio  (Giovanni)     ,    ,     . 
Bellini  (Jacopo)    .         .        . 
Teniers  (David)         .        . 

Mie'ris  (F.)  . 

Van  der  Velde  (William)  . 

Racine  (Jean) 

Mozart  (Johann  George)  . 

Beethoven  (Johann) 

Niebuhr  .... 

Buckland  (W.)     .     ., ,.'. 

Herschell  (W.) 

Ampere  (Andre')  . 

Geoffroy  St.-Hilaire  (Etienne) 

De  Candolle  (A.  Pyrame) 

Arago  (Francois) 

Pitt  (Lord  Chatham)     . 

D'Israeli  (Isaac) 

Mill  (James) 

Schopenhauer  .        .        . 


SON. 

Charlemagne 
f  Hannibal 
<  Hasdrubal 
'  Mago 

Seneca 

Gallic 

Artevelt  (Philip  van) 

Guise  (Henri) 

Nassau  (Maurice  of) 

Scaliger  (Joseph) 

Casaubon  (Meric) 

Tasso  (Torquato) 

Rafaelle  (Sanzio) 

Bellini  (Giovanni) 

Teniers  (David) 

Guillaume-Mie'ris 

Jean 

Van  der  Velde  (William) 

Racine  (Louis) 

Mozart  (Johann) 

Beethoven  (Ludwig) 

Niebuhr  (Carsten) 

Buckland  (F.) 

Herschell  (J.) 

Ampere  (J.-J.) 

Geoffroy  St.-Hilaire  (Isidore) 

De  Candolle  (Alphonse) 

Arago  (Emmanuel) 

Pitt  (W.) 

D'Israeli  (Benjamin) 

Mill  (J.  Stuart) 

Schopenhauer  (Arthur) 


Remarks. — In  many  families  the  transmission  from  father  to  son 
has  continued  for  several  generations,  as  has  been  already  noticed 


The  Laws  of  Heredity.  165 

in  the  family  of  Charlemagne ;  among  artists  it  is  frequent  (Beet- 
hoven, Mozart,  Van  der  Velde,  etc.). 

L.  Verus,  colleague  of  Marcus  Aurelius,  is  commonly  known, 
but  not  so  his  father,  ./Elius  Verus.  Yet  a  knowledge  of  his  cha- 
racter would  serve  to  explain  that  of  his  son.  In  Spartianus 
(Historia  Augusta)  are  some  curious  details  as  to  his  beds  of 
roses  carefully  picked  and  prepared,  etc.,  showing  his  extreme 
effeminacy. 

HEREDITY  FROM  MOTHER  TO  DAUGHTER. 

It  is  not  surprising  that  there  are  not  many  instances  under  this 
head.  Probably  any  one  who  will  tax  his  memory  a  little  will 
recollect  instances  of  this  kind  occurring  in  ordinary  families.  In 
history,  science,  literature,  this  is  more  difficult  Women  have 
there  acted  but  an  inconsiderable  part,  and  it  is  therefore  natural 
that  cases  of  heredity  between  famous  mothers  and  famous 
daughters  should  be  rare.  Still  here  are  a  few. 

The  Emperor  Augustus,  who  was  several  times  married,  had  by 
his  wife  Scribonia  his  celebrated  daughter  Julia.  She  became  the 
wife  of  Agrippa  and  had  a  daughter,  another  Julia.  Both  of  them 
caused  much  grief  to  Augustus  by  their  infamous  conduct,  'Julias, 
filiam  et  neptem,'  says  Suetonius  (c.  65),  omnibus  probris  contam- 
inatus  relegavit.' 

We  may  remark  in  passing  that  according  to  the  same  historian 
Csesar  had  by  Cleopatra  a  son,  '  similem  Caesaris  forma  et  incessu.' 
He  was  called  Caesarion,  and  died  very  young. 

Agrippina,  the  wife  of  Germanicus,  '  Mother  of  the  camps,'  was 
a  strong-willed,  heroic  woman,  'pervicax  irae,'  says  Tacitus. 
Being  Agrippa's  daughter,  she  had  in  her  character  some  of  her 
father's  sternness.  '  My  daughter,'  said  Tiberius  to  her,  '  you  are 
always  complaining  because  you  do  not  reign.'  She  was  the 
mother  of  the  famous  Agrippina,  who  made  Claudius  her  slave, 
and  raised  Nero  to  the  imperial  throne. 

We  have  already  mentioned  Marozia,  mother  of  Pope  John  XI. 
This  woman,  who  was  famous  in  the  tenth  century  for  her  wealth, 
her  influence,  and  her  misconduct,  had  her  vices  from  her  mother, 
Theodora,  and  transmitted  them  to  her  son. 

Michelet  points  out  the  resemblance  between  Marie  Leczinska 


1 66  Heredity. 

and  her  daughter  Adelaide.  'The  queen,  before  her  marriage,  had  a 
tendency  to  epileptic  fits.  Even  after  her  marriage,  being  agitated 
with  causeless  fears,  she  would  rise  from  her  bed  at  night  and  walk 
about  Madame  Adelaide  appears  to  have  inherited  much  of  this 
excitability.  She  was  brave,  with  the  courage  of  her  race,  with 
some  childish  fears,  as  for  instance  of  thunder.  ....  The  queen 
loved  her  father  (Stanislas),  and  was  very  much  beloved  by  him, 
which  aroused  her  mother's  jealousy.  This,  too,  Adelaide  in- 
herited from  her  mother,  and  she  loved  her  father  beyond  all 
bounds  of  reason.'  (Histoire  de  France,  tome  xvi.) 

To  sum  up  all  that  we  have  said  about  direct  heredity :  it  is 
certain  that  the  child  inherits  from  both  parents.  It  never  happens 
that  either  parent  exercises  an  exclusive  influence.  The  action  of 
one  is  always  preponderant,  this  preponderance  takes  place  in  two 
ways,  either  within  the  same  sex  or  from  one  sex  to  the  other.  As 
we  have  seen,  both  of  these  are  of  very  frequent  occurrence. 

The  only  question  is,  which  is  the  more  frequent  ? 

An  answer  is  impossible,  and  even  if  it  were  possible,  it  would 
be  to  no  purpose.  To  make  it  perfectly  exact  we  should  have  to 
bring  together  all  the  cases  of  direct  heredity  and  range  them  in 
two  groups :  on  the  one  hand,  cross  heredity,  and  on  the  other 
heredity  in  the  same  sex,  and  then  compare  the  totals.  Yet  all 
this  labour,  even  if  possible,  would  lead  to  nothing.  Between 
these  totals  there  would  probably  be  so  small  a  difference  that  no 
one  could  say  which  expressed  the  law  and  which  the  exceptions. 
Whenever  a  case  of  this  kind  arises,  we  may  say  that  both  sides 
are  right  and  both  wrong ;  that  each  possesses  only  a  fragment  of 
the  law,  thinking  he  possesses  the  whole,  and  that  there  is  some 
higher  point  of  view  which  will  reconcile  the  two.  With  regard 
to  heredity,  we  seek  that  law  of  which  fragments  only  have  so  far 
been  given  to  us  by  our  empiric  generalizations.  But  we  must 
first  study  the  phenomena  of  atavism. 

SECTION   IL — ATAVISM. 

Whenever  a  child,  instead  of  resembling  his  immediate  parents, 
resembles  one  of  his  grandparents,  or  some  still  remoter  ancestor, 
or  even  some  distant  member  of  a  collateral  branch  of  the  family — 
a  circumstance  which  must  be  attributed  to  the  descent  of  all  its 


The  Laws  of  Heredity.  167 

members  from  a  common  ancestor — this  is  called  a  case  of  atavism. 
This  is  called  reversional  heredity  (Lucas) ;  reversion,  or  in  the 
more  expressive  German  term,  JRuckschlag  and  Ruckschritt. 

The  fact  was  known  to  the  ancients;  Aristotle,  Galen,  and 
Pliny  speak  of  it  Plutarch  mentions  a  Greek  woman  who  gave 
birth  to  a  negro  child,  and  was  brought  to  trial  for  adultery,  but  it 
transpired  that  she  was  descended  in  the  fourth  degree  from  an 
Ethiopian.  Montaigne  expresses  his  astonishment  at  this,  '  Is  it 
not  marvellous,'  says  he,  '  that  this  drop  of  seed  from  which  we 
are  produced  should  bear  the  impression,  not  only  of  the  bodily 
form,  but  even  of  the  thoughts  and  the  inclinations  of  our  fathers  ? 
Where  does  this  drop  of  water  keep  this  infinite  number  of  forms  ? 
and  how  does  it  bear  these  likenesses  through  a  progress  so  hap- 
hazard and  so  irregular  that  the  great-grandson  shall  resemble  the 
great-grandfather,  the  nephew  the  uncle  ? ' 

In  the  first  part  of  this  work  are  recounted  a  large  number  of 
cases  of  atavism ;  here  it  will  suffice  to  call  attention  to  some 
curious  facts  which  will  serve  to  show  the  tendency  of  heredity. 

The  phenomenon  of  reversion  is  of  very  frequent  occurrence  in 
vegetal  and  animal  races.  Dr.  Broca  gives  a  curious  example,  the 
result  of  an  experiment  he  made  with  a  view  to  study  the  formation 
of  races  by  methodical  selection.  He  took  the  seeds  of  corn- 
flower which  he  gathered  promiscuously  in  the  fields,  and  sowed 
them.  This  produced  blue  and  red  cornflowers.  He  then  sowed 
the  seed  of  the  red  cornflowers  only,  and  obtained  about  a  hundred 
flowers,  two  thirds  of  which  were  blue,  the  remainder  varying  from 
violet  to  rose  colour.  If  again  the  seed  of  the  rose  cornflower  be 
sown,  the  result  will  be  a  few  blue  flowers,  many  red,  rose,  and 
even  white.  It  would  thus  be  possible  to  create  a  white  species, 
but  only  by  a  constant  struggle  against  the  phenomena  of  reversion 
which  persistently  reproduce  the  primitive  type.1 

Girou  de  Buzareingues  gives  at  length  the  history  of  a  strain  of 
dogs,  a  cross  between  the  pointer  and  the  spaniel,  which  is  briefly 
as  follows.  In  the  first  generation  the  product  is  a  spaniel ;  this, 
being  crossed  with  a  pure  pointer,  the  result  is  a  mongrel  male  with 
all  the  external  characters  of  the  pointer.  By  coupling  this  mongrel 

1  Bulletins  de  la  Soctfl'e  <f  Anthropologie,  2*  serie,  tome  iv.  See  Darwin,  Vari- 
ation, etc.,  ch.  xiii.,  for  several  instances  of  reversion  in  plants  and  animals. 


1 68  Heredity. 

with  a  pure  pointer  bitch,  pointers  were  produced,  outwardly  re- 
sembling the  pure  pointer.  Here,  then,  we  have  the  phenomena 
of  heredity,  alternating  with  atavism,  revealing  themselves  from  one 
generation  to  another  in  the  mixed  nature  of  the  mongrel. 

Facts  of  the  same  kind  occur  in  many  other  domesticated  races. 
P.  Lucas  tells  of  a  half-bred  Arab  mare  which  gave  no  sign  of  her 
noble  origin :  covered  by  a  stallion  of  inferior  breed,  she  pro- 
duced a  colt  possessing  a  strong  likeness  to  its  maternal  ancestors. 
The  contrary  often  takes  place,  and  breeders  often  find  instances 
of  the  inferior  type  reappear  after  a  long  time  in  stock  that  has 
been  improved  by  crossing.  Atavism  presents  itself  in  the  silk- 
worm, after  more  than  a  hundred  generations. 

In  man  it  is  a  common  fact  that  certain  affections,  such  as 
rheumatism,  and  especially  gout,  pass  from  grandfather  to  grand- 
son. In  the  portrait  galleries  of  old  families,  and  in  the  monu- 
mental bronzes  of  the  neighbouring  churches,  types  of  feature 
are  often  seen  which  still  are  repeated  from  time  to  time  in  the 
members  of  those  families.1 

It  is  common  to  find  children  with  their  father's  or  mother's 
nose  or  mouth.  The  nose  is,  perhaps,  of  all  the  features  of  the 
face,  the  one  which  is  best  preserved  by  heredity.  The  Bourbon 
nose  is  well  known.  P.  Lucas  tells  us  that  in  the  beginning  of 
this  century  Dr.  Gregory,  while  visiting  at  a  country  house  in 
England,  the  residence  of  a  lady  of  high  family,  was  struck  with 
the  resemblance  between  the  nose  of  his  hostess  and  that  of  the 
Chancellor  of  Scotland  in  the  reign  of  Charles  I.  He  was,  there- 
fore, not  surprised  to  learn  that  the  lady  was  the  great-grand- 
daughter of  that  personage,  who  died  two  centuries  before ;  nor 
is  this  all.  As  Dr.  Gregory  walked  in  the  neighbourhood  he 
noticed  the  same  form  of  nose  in  several  labourers,  and  he 
learned  from  the  steward  that  these  were  also  descended  from 
the  Chancellor,  but  in  illegitimate  line.  Moreover,  the  re-appear- 
ance of  features  is  so  frequent  an  occurrence  that  it  has  become 
a  popular  belief.  Marryat  has  turned  it  to  account  in  his  novel, 
Japhd  in  Search  of  a  Father.  'From  Dr.  Parsons,'  says 
Quatrefages,2  '  I  borrow  a  case  which  is  doubly  interesting,  as  it 

1  Herbert  Spencer,  Principles  of  Biology,  §  83. 
*  Uniti  de  TEsplce  Humaine, 


The  Laws  of  Heredity.  169 

is  officially  vouched  for,  and  as  it  shows,  in  the  case  of  a  pair  of 
negroes,  a  very  singular  hereditary  disposition. 

'Two  negro  slaves,  living  on  the  same  Virginian  plantation, 
were  married.  The  wife  gave  birth  to  a  daughter  who  was 
perfectly  white.  On  seeing  the  colour  of  the  child  she  was  seized 
with  alarm,  and  while  protesting  that  she  never  had  intercourse  with 
a  white  man,  she  tried  to  hide  the  infant,  and  put  out  the  light, 
lest  the  father  should  see  it  He  soon  came  in,  complained  of 
the  unusual  darkness  of  the  room,  and  asked  to  see  the  babe ; 
the  mother's  fears  were  increased  when  she  saw  the  father  ap- 
proach with  a  light,  but  when  he  saw  the  child  he  appeared 
pleased.  A  few  days  afterwards  he  said  to  his  wife  :  "  You  were 
afraid  of  me  because  my  child  was  white,  but  I  love  her  all  the 
more  on  that  account.  My  own  father  was  white,  although  my 
grandfather  and  grandmother  were  as  black  as  you  and  L  Al- 
though we  are  come  from  a  country  where  white  men  were  never 
seen,  still  there  has  always  been  one  white  child  in  families  related 
to  ours."  This  girl  was  sold  to  Admiral  Ward  when  she  was 
fifteen  years  old,  was  brought  by  him  to  London,  and  exhibited 
before  the  Royal  Society.  .  ' 

'It  appears  that  phenomena  of  this  nature  have  occurred  even 
in  Africa,  and  Admiral  Fleuriot  Delangle  lately  told  me  of  an 
analogous  case.' 

Reversional  heredity  in  insanity  is  well  established,  as  we  have 
seen.  It  is  not  unusual  to  find  persons  descended  from  insane 
ancestors  living  to  the  age  of  thirty  or  forty  with  every  sign  of 
judgment  and  reason,  who  then  became  insane  without  any 
assignable  cause.  Gintrac  records  that  a  man  who  had  become 
insane  had  sons,  men  of  ability,  filling  public  offices  with  distinc- 
tion. Their  children  were  at  first  sane,  but  at  the  age  of  twenty 
gave  signs  of  insanity.  Facts  like  these  are  recounted  by  all 
writers  on  insanity. 

As  regards  the  reversional  heredity  of  talents,  character,  aptitudes, 
and  passions,  it  is  of  as  frequent  occurrence  as  purely  organic 
heredity.  In  the  following  table  we  give  some  instances  of  this, 
which  have  been  already  treated  of  in  detail  in  the  First  Part. 


;o 


Heredity. 


REVERSIONAL  HEREDITY. 


1st  Generation. 

2nd  Generation. 

3rd  Generation. 

4th  Generation. 

Theodosius 

Arcadius 

Pulcheria 

... 

Scipio 

Cornelia 

The  Gracchi 

••• 

Charles  Martel 

Pepin  the  Short 

Charlemagne 

••• 

Henry    I.     of 

Henry   IL    of 

... 

England 

Matilda 

England 

... 

Philippe  le  Bel 

Isabelle 

Edward  III. 

•  •  . 

Charles  VI.  of 

Henry  VI.   of 

... 

France 

Catherine 

England 

... 

Charles    d'Or- 

Marguerite  de 

leans 

... 

Valois 

•  •• 

Joanna 

Charles  V. 

... 

Don  Carlos 

Gustavus  Vasa 

... 

... 

Gustavus 

Adolphus 

Van  der  Velde 

Van  der  Velde 

Van  der  Velde 

Mendelssohn, 

Mendelssohn, 

(philosopher) 

... 

(musician) 

... 

Mozart,  J. 

Mozart,  J. 

Mozart 

... 

Beethoven,  J. 

Beethoven,  J. 

Beethoven,  L. 

... 

Lord  Chatham 

... 

Lady  Hester 

Stanhope 

... 

Darwin,    Eras- 

Darwin, 

mus 

... 

Charles 

... 

Remarks. — All  the  names  in  the  second  column  held  in  a  latent 
condition  the  characteristics  of  the  first  generation,  and  trans- 
mitted them  to  the  third. 

The  case  of  Charles  VI.  of  France  is  peculiarly  remarkable. 
This  mad  king  gave  his  daughter  Catherine  in  marriage  to  his 
conqueror,  Henry  V.  of  England.  The  fruit  of  that  union  was 
the  weak  and  unfortunate  Henry  VI.,  the  sad  victim  of  the  wars 
of  the  Roses. 

SECTION   III. — INDIRECT   HEREDITY. 

Indirect  heredity  is  'the  representation  of  collaterals  in  the 
physical  and  moral  character  of  the  progeny.'  We  often  observe 


The  Laws  of  Heredity.  171 


between  distant  relatives  out  of  the  direct  line  of  descent — 
between  uncle  and  nephew,  aunt  and  niece ;  granduncle  and 
grandnephew,  and  cousins,  even  in  the  remoter  degrees — striking 
resemblances  of  conformation,  face,  inclinations,  passions,  cha- 
racter, deformity,  and  disease. 

But  while  the  two  forms  of  heredity,  hitherto  considered  direct 
heredity  and  atavism,  are  generally  admitted,  that  now  to  be 
discussed  has  been  received  with  considerable  distrust  and  doubt. 
In  the  last  century,  Wollaston,1  in  The  Religion  of  Nature  Deli- 
neated, after  having  shown  that  a  child  often  more  closely  re- 
sembles an  uncle,  an  aunt,  or  a  cousin,  than  it  does  either  of  its 
parents,  adds :  '  Neither  uncle,  nor  aunt,  nor  cousin  have  anything 
to  do  with  generation  in  this  instance ;  therefore  the  resemblance 
does  not  proceed  from  the  act  of  generation.'  In  this  century 
indirect  heredity  has  been  often  denied,  or  doubted.  Piorry,  in 
his  Traite  sur  FHeredite  des  Maladies  (1840),  views  it  with  sus- 
picion. Baillarger,  in  the  work  already  quoted,  brings  together  one 
hundred  and  forty-seven  cases  of  mental  disease  traceable  to 
collateral  heredity;  but  he  judged  it  best  to  omit  them  from  his 
calculations,  for  the  reason  that  '  heredity,  under  this  indirect 
form,  although  in  most  cases  quite  probable,  still  does  not  appear 
to  be  unquestionable.' 

To  explain  these  facts,  which  are  so  well  established  that  it  is 
impossible  to  deny  them,  these  authors  have  recourse  to  various 
hypotheses.  Some  speak  of  the  force  of  circumstances ;  others 
of  accident ;  others  see  in  them  nothing  more  than  coincidence. 
They  all  agree  in  finding  here,  in  the  last  analysis,  only  the  result 
of  chance. 

We  have  already  seen,  while  considering  Buckle's  objection, 
what  is  the  value  of  such  an  explanation  as  this,  how  improbable 
and  inaccurate  it  really  is.  But  the  doctrine  which  insists  on 
collateral  heredity  has  something  better  to  offer  than  these  negative 
reasons.  To  show  that  it  is  correct,  we  need  only  remark  that 
indirect  heredity  is  only  a  form  of  atavism — a  form  which  is  rarer 
and  less  easy  of  apprehension  than  direct  atavism,  but  differing 
from  it  only  in  appearance.  The  nephew  resembles  the  uncle,  the 

1  Quoted  by  Lucas. 


172  Heredity. 

cousin  resembles  the  cousin,  because  each  of  them  hold  some 
characteristic  from  a  common  ancestor,  who  transmitted  it  to  the 
intermediate  generations,  in  whom  it  has  been  latent  The 
researches  made  into  the  subject  of  generation  during  the  past 
fifty  years,  and  the  discovery  of  alternate  generations,  have  greatly 
enlarged  our  view  of  heredity,  and  this  transmission  in  collateral 
line  has  in  it  nothing  wonderful  Hence  this  form  of  heredity, 
which  was  admitted  by  Burdach  and  proved  by  Lucas,  no  longer 
meets  with  opposition.  We  now  regard  it  as  nothing  more  or  less 
than  a  somewhat  complicated  case  of  atavism.  We  treat  it  here 
under  a  special  heading,  merely  for  the  sake  of  making  the  whole 
subject  plain :  in  fact,  we  are  but  continuing  our  study  of  rever- 
sional  heredity.  However,  a  few  facts  will  show  the  identity  of 
direct  atavism  with  collateral  heredity. 

'  I  am  acquainted,'  says  Quatrefages,  '  with  a  family  into  which 
married  a  grand-niece  of  the  illustrious  Bailli  de  Suffren  Saint- 
Tropez,  the  last  French  commander  in  the  great  Indian  wars 
against  the  English,  with  Hyder  Ali  for  his  ally.  This  lady  had 
two  sons,  the  younger  of  whom,  judging  from  a  very  fine  portrait, 
bore  a  very  striking  resemblance  to  his  great-great-uncle,  but  was 
not  at  all  like  his  father  or  mother.  The  celebrated  sailor,  there- 
fore, and  his  great-great-nephew  reproduced,  with  an  interval  of 
four  generations  between  them,  the  features  of  a  common  ancestor. 
Plainly,  atavism  acted  here  in  both  branches,  for  in  this  case  there 
is  no  direct  heredity.' 

A  well-formed  man  had  two  relatives  affected  with  hare-lip ; 
by  his  first  wife  he  had  eleven  children,  two  of  them  hare-lipped, 
and  by  his  second  wife,  two  who  possessed  the  same  deformity. 
— A  woman  in  whose  family  were  several  members  hard  of 
hearing  gave  birth  to  two  deaf  and  dumb  boys. — A  man  whose 
brother  and  whose  aunt  were  deaf-mutes  had  five  children,  one 
of  them  deaf  and  dumb.  There  are  many  similar  cases  of  deaf- 
muteness  on  record.  A  still  more  singular  case  is  that  of  a 
woman  come  of  a  family  in  which  there  had  been  several  cases  of 
hypospadia,  and  who  gave  birth  to  two  boys  affected  with  that 
anomaly.1 

1  Lucas,  ii.  p.  36. 


Tke  Laws  of  Heredity. 


173 


COLLATERAL  HEREDITY. 


Ancestors. 

Descendants. 

Degree  of  Kinship. 

Caesar 

Octavius 

Grandnephew 

(His  mother  was 

Caesar's  niece) 

Seneca 

Lucan 

Nephew 

Pliny  the  Elder 

Pliny  the  Younger 

Nephew  (sister's 

son) 

Alexander  the  Great 

Pyrrhus 

Grandnephew 

Doria  (Andrea) 

Doria  (Felipo) 

Nephew  (brother's 

son) 

Montmorency 

Coligni 

Nephew 

Nassau  (Maurice  of) 

Turenne 

Nephew 

Mazarin 

Prince  Eugene 

Grandnephew 

Gustavus  Adolphus 

Charles  XII. 

Grandnephew 

Marlborough 

Berwick 

Grandnephew 

Corneille 

Fontenelle 

Nephew  (sister's 

son) 

f  Juan 

Murillo  )  Agustin 

Murillo,  Esteban 

Nephew  and  cousin 

(  Antonio 

on  mother's  side 

Caracci,  Agostino 

Caracci,  Annibale 

Caracci,  Luigi 

First  cousins 

Bernouilli,  Jacques 

Several  nephews  and 

grand  nephews, 

named  already  in 

the  genealogy  of 

this  family 

Jussieu,  Bernard 

Jussieu,  Laurent 

Nephew  (see 

genealogy) 

Bentham,  Jeremy 

Bentham,  George 

Nephew,  celebrated 

botanist 

Some  authors  reckon  among  cases  of  collateral  heredity  those 
where  two  or  more  illustrious  brothers  are  found  in  the  same 


1 74  Heredity. 

family,  e.g.  ^Lschylus  and  Cynegirus,  the  two  Boileaus,  the  two 
Corneilles,  the  two  Van  Eycks,  the  two  Van  Ostades,  the  Schlegels, 
the  two  Cuviers,  the  two  Humboldts,  Charles  Lamb  and  his  sister, 
Napoleon  and  his  brothers,  etc.  We  do  not  regard  as  strictly 
collateral  heredity  anything  save  that  heredity  which  passes  from 
an  ancestor  to  a  descendant  In  all  the  cases  just  cited,  and  in 
others  like  them,  it  seems  to  us  very  probable  that  this  talent 
common  to  several  brothers  springs  from  one  common  source — 
from  some  kinsman  whose  merits  lie  unnoticed,  for  merit  does  not 
belong  exclusively  to  history  :  or  else  it  is  the  result  of  some  quiet 
work  of  nature,  for  who  can  tell  how  and  through  what  metamor- 
phoses, she  produces  talent?  We  know  not,  and  doubtless  we 
should  be  profoundly  surprised  if  we  could  understand  it  But 
as  we  wished  in  the  foregoing  table  to  state  only  incontestable 
facts,  we  have  carefully  narrowed  our  ground. 

SECTION   IV. — THE   HEREDITY  OF   INFLUENCE. 

We  admit  that,  from  the  psychological  point  of  view,  we  are 
sceptical  in  regard  to  this  form  of  heredity,  especially  as  regards 
man.  It  consists  in  the  influence  of  a  former  alliance  on  the 
children  born  of  a  subsequent  marriage. 

The  fact  seems  to  be  perfectly  out  of  the  order  of  things. 
Atavism,  though  it  may  appear  strange  at  first  view,  is  explained 
by  the  community  of  blood  and  of  origin ;  if  the  father  and 
mother  seem  to  bear  absolutely  no  resemblance  to  their  child ;  if 
they  are  merely  the  channels  of  some  quality  or  some  feature 
of  the  ancestors,  at  least  there  exists  between  these  and  the 
descendants  a  continuous  chain  which  accounts  for  the  trans- 
mission. Here  is  nothing  of  the  kind  :  a  child  resembles  a 
person  who  has  nothing  in  common  with  him,  save  that  the  person 
was  once  its  mother's  husband. 

Still,  among  the  lower  and  even  the  higher  animals  there  are  facts 
to  show  that  heredity  of  influence  frequently  occurs. 

We  would  mention  in  the  first  place  Bonnet's  well  known 
experiments  on  the  aphis.  He  took  a  young  aphis  just  after  it 
was  hatched,  isolated  it  completely,  and  saw  it,  in  that  state  of 
undoubted  virginity,  produce,  after  twenty-one  days,  ninety-five 


The  Laws  of  Heredity.  175 

young  ones.  The  aphides  thus  produced  were  able  themselves  to 
produce  others.  Bonnet  placed  one  apart,  and  obtained  from  it 
five  successive  generations  without  the  aid  of  a  male.  An  aphis 
of  the  fifth  generation  produced  young  under  the  same  conditions, 
and  Bonnet  saw  this  fecundity  prolonged  through  over  ten  genera- 
tions. This  viviparous  condition  ceased  in  the  autumn,  when  the 
males  begin  to  appear ;  then  the  aphis  becomes  oviparous. 

This  is  a  curious  example  of  the  influence  of  the  male  on  a 
whole  series  of  generations,  fecundated  as  it  appears  by  one  single 
act.  Facts  of  a  like  nature  occur  in  certain  caterpillars,  and  in 
some  species  of  molluscae. 

Among  the  higher  animals  it  is  still  more  easy  to  study  the 
heredity  of  influence.  Burdach 1  gives  the  following  examples. 

When  a  mare  is  crossed  by  an  ass  and  produces  a  mule,  if  she 
be  afterwards  put  to  a  stallion,  the  colt  she  then  drops  will  have 
some  points  of  resemblance  to  the  ass. 

An  English  mare  which  in  1815  was  once  covered  by  a  quagga 
gave  birth  to  a  mule  marked  with  spots  ;  she  never  saw  the  quagga 
again.  In  1817,  1818,  and  1823,  she  was  covered  successively  by 
three  Arab  stallions,  and  produced  three  brown  colts  with  bands 
like  those  of  the  quagga. 

A  sow  which  had  had  by  a  wild  boar  a  litter  in  which  the  brown 
colour  of  the  sire  was  predominant,  was  put,  long  after  his  death, 
to  boars  of  domestic  breeds ;  among  the  pigs  of  the  second  and 
third  litters  were  several  having  patches  of  the  colour  of  the  wild 
boar. 

If  a  bitch  be  once  put  to  a  dog  of  another  race,  every  litter 
of  puppies  afterwards  will  include  one  belonging  to  that  other 
breed,  except  the  first  time  she  be  put  only  to  dogs  of  her  own 
breed. 

'  It  is  the  same  with  the  human  species/  says  this  physiologist. 
'  We  sometimes  find  the  children  of  a  second  marriage  resembling 
the  former  husband,  who  may  be  long  since  dead,  and  showing  a 
closer  relation  to  him,  even  from  the  moral  point  of  view,  than  to 
their  true  father.' 

Burdach  is  content  with  affirming  this  without  citing  any  instance. 

1  Traiti  de  Pkysiohgie,  ii.  243. 


1 76     •  Heredity. 

Lucas  does  the  same.  He  prudently  confines  himself  to  observing 
that  the  fact  that  children  begotten  in  adultery  resemble  their 
putative  father  does  not  prove  the  case,  as  the  putative  father  may 
also  be  the  real  father;  and  that  only  in  case  of  the  husband's 
death  or  prolonged  absence  could  the  fact  be  absolutely  con- 
clusive. I  find  in  Michelet,  and  repeat  with  all  reserve,  an 
assertion  which,  if  admitted,  would  be  a  true  case  of  the  heredity 
of  influence,  from  the  psychological  point  of  view,  but  it  is  the 
only  case  I  know.  'Madame  de  Montespau,'  says  Michelet, 
'had  already  had  a  son  by  M.  de  Montespau.  The  first  child 
she  had  by  the  king — the  Due  de  Maine — resembled  only  her 
husband  :  he  had  his  Gascon  disposition,  his  buffoonery.  He 
might  have  passed  for  the  grandson  of  Zamet,  the  buffoon.'  * 

When  this  question  of  the  heredity  of  influence  was  discussed 
before  the  French  Anthropological  Society,  most  of  the  members 
took  the  negative  side.  While  admitting  that  cases  of  it  are  fre- 
quent among  animals,  they  doubted  whether  a  widow  could  have 
children  resembling  her  first  husband.2 

We  can  only  repeat  what  we  have  already  said,  and  while  we  do 
not  deny  a  fact  which  is  not  at  all  impossible,  and  which  could 
perhaps  be  explained,  we  may  consider  it  so  rare,  so  difficult  to 
establish  psychologically,  that  it  is  useless  to  insist  on  it  in  a  study 
of  mental  heredity. 

We  will  now  endeavour  to  get  a  general  view  of  what  has  been 
said  on  heredity,  and  to  appreciate  the  results. 

We  first  reduced  the  facts  to  a  few  empiric  formulas,  which 
include  them  all,  viz.  direct  cross  heredity,  direct  heredity  in  one 
sex,  reversional  heredity  and  collateral  heredity.  These  we  hold 
to  be  so  many  fragments,  as  it  were,  of  a  single  law,  of  which  we 
are  sensible,  though  we  do  not  understand  it  We  now  have  to 
find  this  law.  We  do  not  speak  here  of  the  theoretical  and  ideal 
law  of  heredity,  which  we  have  already  given,  but  only  of  an 
empirical  law,  a  more  general  formula,  which  includes  and  explains 
all  the  others.  If  we  succeed  in  finding  all  the  ties  which  bind 
these  various  formulas  together,  this  simplification  of  the  work 
will  render  it  easier  to  understand  the  nature  of  heredity. 

1  Histoire  de  Fratue,  tome  xiiL 

•  Bulletins  de  la  Soctiti  d1  Anlhropologic,  tome  L  p.  291. 


The  Laws  of  Heredity.  177 

We  remark,  in  the  first  place,  that  the  empiric  formulas  given 
above  are  capable  of  being  simplified  and  reduced  under  two  chief 
heads  :  immediate  and  mediate  heredity.  When  we  find  a  child 
resembling  its  father  or  mother,  the  fact  appears  perfectly  simple, 
either  because  it  is  so  common,  or  because  we  judge  it  to  be  quite 
natural  that  like  should  produce  like.  But  when  we  see  the  great- 
grandchild resembling  the  great-grandfather,  or  the  great  nephew 
resembling  the  great  uncle,  and  this  without  any  intermediate 
stage  to  explain  the  resemblance,  this  case  of  heredity  appears 
to  us  so  strange  that  many  have  rejected  it.  It  would  then  be  a 
great  point  if  we  could  show  that  this  mediate  heredity  resolves 
itself  into  the  other  form.  To  do  this  we  must  make  a  brief 
digression. 

All  naturalists  are  agreed  that  no  studies  are  of  more  advantage 
for  them  than  those  of  comparative  anatomy  and  comparative 
physiology  ;  that  the  knowledge  of  rudimentary  organisms  has 
given  them  a  better  understanding  of  organs  and  functions,  and 
that  these  results  have  been  specially  remarkable  as  regards 
generation.  The  study  of  the  lower  forms  of  this  function  has 
greatly  enlarged  their  views,  and  even  .entirely  modified  the  ideas 
of  scientific  men  on  that  subject  Among  these  discoveries,  that 
of  alternate  generations  appears  to  us,  of  all  others,  the  best  fitted 
to  throw  light  on  the  subject  which  now  engages  our  attention. 

In  1818  Chamisso's  studies  on  certain  molluscs  called  biphorae, 
or  salpae,  led  him  to  the  discovery  that  these  animals  are  alter- 
nately free  and  aggregated.  In  the  first  generation  strings  of 
biphorae  are  found,  the  product  of  gemmation  ;  in  the  second, 
solitary  biphorae  produced  from  spores ;  in  the  third,  the  strings 
reappear:  so  that  the  young  never  resemble  the  parent,  but  always 
the  grand-parent 

ist  generation         Aggregated  salpae      Grandfather 
2nd          „  Free  „          Father 

3rd          „  Aggregated     „          Son 

The  researches  of  Saars,  Steenstrup,  Owen,  and  Van  Beneden, 
show  that  in  some  animals  the  cycle  is  not  limited  to  three  genera- 
tions, but  that  often  it  is  more  extended,  and  that  the  resemblance, 
instead  of  passing  from  the  grandfather  to  the  grandson,  passes 
from  the  great-grandfather  to  the  great-grandson.  In  those  species 


1 78  Heredity. 

which  propagate  by  alternate  generation,  the  process  is  this :  an 
ovum  produces  a  simple  organism,  and  this  propagates  by  gem- 
ination ;  the  creatures  thus  produced  resemble  neither  the  parent 
nor  the  original  organism  ;  next  the  primitive  type  reappears,  and 
with  it  the  attributes  of  the  two  sexes,  and  propagation  by  ova. 
Thus,  in  the  medusa,  between  two  perfect  types  we  find  three,  as 
follows  : — 

ist  generation          Medusa  Great-grandfather 

2nd        „  Ciliated  larva  Grandfather 

3rd         „  Polyp  Father 

4th         „  Strobila  Son 

5th         „  Medusa  Great-grandson 

It  is  not  here,  as  in  cases  of  metamorphoses,  the  same  in- 
dividual which  passes  from  the  larval  to  the  nymph  state,  and  then 
becomes  a  perfect  adult :  here  we  have  several  individuals  totally 
different  from  one  another. 

The  conclusion  to  be  drawn  from  these  facts  is,  that  we 
ordinarily  understand  heredity  in  too  narrow  a  sense,  looking 
at  it  only  under  its  immediate  form — from  one  generation  to  the 
next  But,  as  we  see,  it  may  embrace  a  much  larger  cycle.  It  is 
true  that  these  phenomena  are  met  with  only  in  the  lower  species, 
and  there  are  no  instances  of  alternate  generation  among  verte- 
brates :  but  still  they  show  how  strong,  tenacious,  and,  so  to  speak, 
unlimited  is  heredity.  At  the  same  time  it  gives  us  a  better  under- 
standing of  atavism.  The  two  facts,  indeed,  are  not  identical,  and 
we  do  not  at  all  mean  to  say  that  atavism  is  a  form  of  alternate 
generation,  yet  the  mind  readily  perceives  an  analogy  between 
them.  Reversional  heredity  in  man  seems  less  singular  to  us 
when  we  compare  it  with  these  orderly  cycles  ;  and  on  witnessing 
these  indisputable  facts  we  can  better  understand  how  great  is  the 
force  of  heredity. 

At  a  time  when  alternate  generation  was  yet  unknown,  Burdach 
and  Girou  de  Buzareingues  were  led  by  their  researches  to  admit 
that  there  are  stronger  resemblances  between  grandfather  and  grand- 
son, grandmother  and  granddaughter,  than  between  father  and  son, 
mother  and  daughter.  This  is  expressed  in  the  following  table 
(Burdach,  Physiologic,  ii  269) : — 


The  Laws  of  Heredity.  1 79 


Paternal  Line 
First  Generation        Grandfather    Grandmother 

Maternal  Line 
Grandfather    Grandmother 

Second  Generation 

fatl 

ler 

mo 

her 

Third  Generation              son 

daughter 

son 

daughter 

If  we  compare  this  table  with  that  given  above  for  the  salpae,  it 
is  impossible  not  to  be  struck  with  the  resemblance. 

But  a  difficulty  still  remains.  In  cases  of  reversional  heredity 
where  the  grandson  resembles  the  grandfather,  the  grandnephew 
the  granduncle — the  intermediate  stages  being  totally  unlike  either 
— how  is  this  resemblance  to  be  explained  ?  Above  all,  how  can 
it  be  said,  as  we  have  done,  that  these  cases  are  to  be  referred  to 
immediate  heredity  ?  The  reply  to  this  question  is  to  be  found  in 
one  of  two  hypotheses ;  either  these  resemblances  are  fortuitous. 
or  else  they  have  been  preserved  in  the  latent  state  by  the  inter- 
mediate generations,  and  thus  what  appears  to  be  mediate  heredity 
is  really  immediate.  The  first  hypothesis  cannot  be  accepted, 
therefore  we  must  hold  the  second.  And  this  leads  us  to  ask 
what  is  meant  by  '  latent  characters.' 

One  of  the  best  examples  of  these,  says  Darwin,  is  afforded 
by  secondary  sexual  characters.  In  every  female  all  the  secondary 
male  characters,  and  in  every  male  all  the  secondary  female  cha- 
racters exist  in  a  latent  state,  ready  to  be  evolved  under  certain 
conditions.  It  is  well-known  that  a  large  number  of  female  birds 
when  old  or  diseased,  or  when  operated  on,  partly  assume  the 
secondary  male  characters  of  their  species.  Waterton  gives  a 
curious  case  of  a  hen  which  had  ceased  laying,  and  had  assumed 
the  plumage,  voice,  spurs,  and  warlike  disposition  of  the  cock; 
when  opposed  to  an  enemy  she  would  erect  her  huckles  and  show 
fight  Thus  every  character,  even  to  the  instinct  and  manner  of 
fighting,  must  have  lain  dormant  in  this  hen  as  long  as  her  ovaria 
continued  to  act  We  see  something  of  an  analogous  nature  in 
the  human  species. 

On  the  other  hand,  with  male  animals,  it  is  notorious  that  the 
secondary  sexual  characters  are  more  or  less  lost  when  they  are 
subjected  to  castration,  as  in  the  case  of  capons. 

Thus  the  secondary  characters  of  each  sex  lie  dormant  in  the 


i  So  Heredity. 

opposite  sex,  ready  to  be  evolved  under  peculiar  circumstances. 
'  We  can  thus  understand  how,  for  instance,  it  is  possible  for  a  good 
milking  cow  to  transmit  her  good  qualities  through  her  male  off- 
spring to  future  generations,  for  we  may  confidently  believe  that 
these  qualities  are  present,  though  latent,  in  the  males  of  each 
generation.  So  it  is  with  the  game-cock,  who  can  transmit  his 
superiority  in  courage  and  vigour  through  his  female  to  his  male 
offspring.'1 

As  Darwin  remarks,  these  facts  oblige  us  to  admit  that  certain 
characters,  aptitudes,  and  instincts  may  remain  in  the  latent  state 
in  an  individual,  and  even  in  a  series  of  individuals,  while  yet  we 
are  unable  to  find  any  trace  of  their  presence ;  and  on  this  hypo- 
thesis the  transmission  of  a  characteristic  from  grandfather  to  grand- 
child, with  the  apparent  omission  in  the  intermediate  parent  of  the 
opposite  sex,  becomes  very  plain. 

What  has  now  been  said  respecting  latent  characteristics  applies 
to  a  form  of  heredity  of  which  we  have  not  yet  treated  specifically, 
heredity  occurring  at  corresponding  periods.  This,  it  appears  to 
us,  may  be  explained  on  the  hypothesis  of  latent  characteristics 
contained  in  the  individual  in  the  germ  state,  and  which  come  to 
light  only  under  definite  conditions,  and  at  some  particular  point 
of  his  development,  and  this  particular  moment  corresponding 
with  a  similar  moment  in  the  progenitors.  Hereditary  diseases 
are  a  good  instance  of  heredity  at  corresponding  periods.  Thus, 
chorea,  which  usually  makes  its  appearance  in  childhood,  con- 
sumption in  middle  age,  gout  in  old  age,  are  naturally  hereditary 
in  the  same  periods. 

Blindness  furnishes  still  more  striking  instances.  In  one  family 
it  was  hereditary  for  three  generations,  and  thirty-seven  children 
and  grandchildren  became  blind  between  their  seventeenth  and 
eighteenth  year.  In  another  instance,  a  father  and  his  four 
children  were  all  attacked  with  blindness  at  the  age  of  twenty-one. 
It  is  the  same  with  deafness.  Two  brothers,  their  father,  their 
paternal  grandfather,  all  became  deaf  at  the  age  of  forty.2  Esquirol 

1  Variation,  etc.,  ii. 

1  Dr.  Sedgwick,  British  and  Foreign  Medical  and  Chirurgical  Review,  iS6l, 
p.  485.  See  also  Lucas  ii.  739,  and  Darwin  Variation,  etc.,  ii.  80 


The  Laws  of  Heredity.  181 

cites  some  instances  of  insanity  which  made  its  appearance  at  the 
same  age  in  several  generations.  One  of  these  cases  is  that  of  a 
grandfather,  father,  and  son,  who  all  committed  suicide  at  about 
the  age  of  fifty  ;  another  is  that  of  a  family  all  of  whose  members 
became  insane  at  the  age  of  forty. 

Such  facts  as  these — and  they  are  numerous— are  a  strong  argu- 
ment in  favour  of  the  hypothesis  of  latent  characteristics,  and  this 
in  turn  does  much  to  throw  light  upon  many  singular  features  of 
heredity,  as  we  can  show  by  passing  in  review  all  the  cases  we  have 
cited. 

When  the  child  takes  equally  after  father  and  mother,  the  case 
needs  no  explanation,  it  being  the  realization  of  the  ideal  law,  as 
far  as  that  is  possible. 

When  the  child  resembles  one  of  its  parents  to  the  exclusion  of 
the  other,  this  exclusion  does  not  really  take  place.  That  parent 
whose  influence  appears  destroyed  may  reappear  in  the  next 
generation,  or  later. 

It  will  be  observed  that  the  question  already  debated,  '  whether 
heredity  is  more  frequent  in  one  sex  or  between  the  two  sexes,' 
loses  much  of  its  importance  when  we  regard  heredity  as  a  cycle. 
When  we  see  the  father  reappear  in  the  daughter,  and  finally  in 
the  grandson,  the  mother  in  the  son,  and  finally  in  the  grand- 
daughter, we  have  no  difficulty  in  believing  that  each  sex  reasserts 
its  rights,  though  it  does  not  receive  them  at  first. 

Finally,  the  hypothesis  of  latent  characteristics  gives  a  plausible 
and  simple  explanation  of  all  the  phenomena  of  reversion,  whether 
in  direct  or  collateral  line. 

Still  it  is  evident  that  these  formulas  cannot  pretend  to  give  a 
complete  explanation  of  a  fact  so  abstruse  and  so  complex  as 
hereditary  transmission.  Our  only  purpose  is  to  show  that  the 
term  is  taken  in  too  narrow  a  sense  when  it  is  restricted  to  two 
generations,  and  that  the  facts  seem  less  strange  so  soon  as  we 
grasp  them  as  a  whole.  We  desired  also  to  exhibit  the  wonderful 
tenacity  of  heredity.  Its  law  is  absolute  transmission;  and,  in  spite 
of  all  the  obstacles  which  tend  to  weaken  or  destroy  it,  it  struggles 
on  without  truce  or  pause,  losing  much  of  its  strength  as  it  advances, 
dissipating  itself,  so  to  speak,  so  as  to  appear  no  longer  to  exist. 
And  yet,  when  we  see  the  same  characters  reappear,  sometimes 


1 82  Heredity. 

after  a  hundred  generations,  here  is  indeed  matter  for  reflection. 
It  may  be  said  that  heredity  verifies  in  its  own  way  the  axiom, 
Nothing  is  lost  With  its  character  of  unconquerable  firmness,  of 
obstinate  persistency,  it  appears  to  us  as  one  of  those  many  inflex- 
ible bonds  by  which  omnipotent  nature  imprisons  us  in  necessity. 
We  have  now  to  see  what  attempt  has  been  made  to  subject 
the  facts  of  heredity  to  the  control  of  numbers. 


CHAPTER    IIL 

ESSAYS   IN   STATISTICS. 
I. 

IT  is  rightly  said  that  there  is  no  perfect  ideal  science  except 
that  which  is  exact,  that  is  to  say,  submitted  to  the  control  of 
number,  weight,  and  measure;  but  it  is  not  correct  to  say  that 
there  is  no  science  save  that  which  is  exact  Yet  distinguished 
and  even  eminent  thinkers  have  maintained  this  paradox.  If  we 
are  to  believe  Herschel,  '  no  branch  of  human  knowledge  can  be 
considered  as  having  left  the  state  of  infancy,  if  it  does  not  base 
its  theories  and  correct  them  practically  by  means  of  numbers.' 
If  this  be  true,  the  domain  of  science  at  the  present  day  would  be 
somewhat  narrow.  We  should  have  to  exclude  from  it  a  large 
number  of  studies  which  rightly  count  as  scientific,  and  even  to 
despair  of  ever  bringing  them  under  the  conditions  of  science. 
Admitting,  what  is  probable,  that  certain  branches  of  physics  and 
chemistry,  at  present  refractory,  may  be  subjected  to  all  the  strict- 
ness of  mathematical  formulas,  it  is  very  doubtful  whether  the 
facts  of  biology,  and  still  more  those  of  psychology  and  sociology, 
can  ever  be  so  subjected.  But  it  is  not  therefore  necessary  to 
exclude  them  permanently  from  the  domain  of  science. 

When  we  compare  scientific  knowledge  with  ordinary  knowledge, 
such  as  serves  the  ordinary  needs  of  life,  and  when  we  consider  the 
nature  of  both,  we  find  that  they  differ  only  in  degree,  that  science 
is  not  a  mode  of  knowledge  apart  and  sui  generis,  employing 
processes  exclusively  its  own,  but  that  it  springs  from  ordinary 
knowledge  by  a  natural  evolution,  tending  always  towards  more 
and  more  complex  and  more  and  more  exact  previsions,  until 


Essays  in  Statistics.  183 

finally  they  attain  to  a  close  relation  or  identity,  the  most  perfect 
end  which  they  can  reach.  In  this  process  of  evolution  there  are, 
as  it  seems  to  us,  two  principal  stages :  the  first  of  these,  which 
constitutes  science  properly  so  called,  consists  in  the  employment 
of  verification;  the  second  constitutes  exact  and  ideal  science, 
and  it  consists  in  quantification,  or,  to  avoid  neologism,  quantita- 
tive determination. 

This  we  will  try  to  show. 

When  we  are  aware  of  a  large  number  of  phenomena  which  are 
analogous,  that  is,  at  once  like  and  unlike,  we  endeavour  to  seize 
the  fixed  basis  in  the  production  of  these  phenomena — their  law. 
But  whether  this  law  result  from  an  intuition  of  genius,  or  from  a 
slow  and  minute  comparison  of  facts,  followed  by  induction,  must 
be  submitted  to  the  process  of  verification,  for  it  has  to  explain  all 
the  facts,  or  at  least  most  of  them ;  and  it  alone  must  explain  them, 
otherwise  it  remains  an  hypothesis. 

Thus  every  science,  in  order  to  become  science,  passes  through 
three  stages,  the  facts,  the  law,  and  the  verification.  First,  the 
phenomena  are  collected  and  observed,  scrutinized,  turned  over  and 
over,  placed  on  the  rack  of  experiment,  then  from  them  is  drawn 
their  generic  constant  element ;  finally,  the  law  thus  discovered  is 
anew  tested  by  application  to  facts,  just  as  a  seal  is  verified  when 
applied  to  its  impression.  This  last  process — verification — is 
essential. 

Without  verification  there  is  no  science,  because  this  process 
alone  can  give  to  our  theories  an  objective  value.  It  is  a 
complete  mistake  to  suppose  that  what  is  not  true  can  be 
scientifically  established.  There  are  a  hundred  ways  of  looking 
at  facts,  of  interpreting,  and  of  generalizing  them.  Of  course,  these 
are  not  all  correct,  but  who  is  to  decide  between  them  ?  In  such 
case  science  gets  only  the  individual,  personal  opinion  of  one  man, 
his  special  mode  of  understanding  and  accounting  for  the  facts. 
But  this  is  an  entirely  subjective  doctrine,  which  may  indeed  be 
science,  but  if  so  is  science  only  by  accident,  nor  have  we  any 
means  of  knowing  that  it  is  science,  or  any  grounds  for  affirming 
that  it  is. 

It  may  be  said,  parenthetically,  that  this  is  what  distinguishes 
metaphysics  from  science. 
9 


184  Heredity. 

When  in  the  works  of  one  of  the  great  philosophers,  Aristotle, 
Leibnitz,  or  Hegel,  we  read  the  scheme  of  some  grand  doctrine, 
the  argument,  especially  to  a  novice  in  such  studies,  is  attractive 
and  convincing.  The  grandeur  of  the  views,  the  breadth  of  the 
method,  the  fruitfulness  in  results,  are  all  alike  charming.  On 
reflection  some  difficulties  present  themselves  :  these  are  the  usual 
processes  of  science,  the  inductions  are  legitimate,  the  deductions 
exact,  and  yet  we  are  dissatisfied — some  infirmity  of  mind  hinders 
an  entire  assent.  The  mind  is  undecided,  hesitates  between  two 
opinions.  Yet,  for  the  most  part,  no  cause  can  be  assigned  for 
this  indecision,  although  the  true  reason  is  that  to  these  doctrines 
verification  is  wanting,  which  alone  gives  perfection  to  science  and 
produces  an  absolute  conviction.  When  Aristotle  reduces  every- 
thing in  nature  to  the  opposition  between  the  possible  and  the 
actual ;  when  Leibnitz  reduces  all  to  forces,  and  Hegel  to  the 
evolution  of  ideas,  their  doctrine  is  irreproachable  for  logical 
strength  and  precision.  Yet  we  dare  not  assert  that  these  doc- 
trines are  true,  since  verification  is  impossible.  When,  in  the  last 
century,  the  doctrine  of  the  pre-existence  of  germs  in  embryogeny 
was  taught,  it  was  acceptable,  was  logically  deduced,  perhaps  true. 
Experiment  alone  could  decide :  and  experiment  showed  it  to  be 
false  by  proving  epigenesis  to  be  true;  and  this  last  theory  has 
been  therefore  adopted  by  science. 

Thus,  of  the  three  stages  to  be  travelled,  metaphysics  traverse 
the  first  two,  the  facts  and  the  laws,  but  never  reach  the  third, 
strict  verification  by  the  differential  method,  and  not  that  arbitrary 
and  hasty  verification  which  explains  some  facts  without  concern 
for  those  which  it  overlooks.  Thus  metaphysics  remain  beyond 
and  above  verification,  beyond  and  above  science,  confined  for  ever 
to  what  is  subjective. 

But,  as  has  been  already  said,  verification  is  but  the  first  degree 
in  science.  The  second  degree,  that  which  completes  the  work,  is 
quantitative  determination.  That  is  the  ideal  to  which  all  sciences 
aspire,  but  to  which  but  few  attain. 

It  is  clear  that,  as  the  domain  of  quantity  is  that  of  number, 
weight,  and  measure,  every  process  from  the  qualitative  to  the 
quantitative  conducts  us  to  more  and  more  precise  determinations. 
But  how  does  this  transformation  of  quality  into  quantity  take  place, 
and  under  what  conditions  ? 


Essays  in  Statistics.  185 

Hegel  somewhere  says  :  *  Quantity  is  quality  suppressed ' — a 
somewhat  obscure  way  of  saying  that  quantity  is  the  canvas  on 
which  quality  is  embroidered.  To  understand  this,  let  us  observe, 
in  the  first  place,  that  what  we  call  quality  comes  to  us  originally 
by  sensation  and  feeling,  that  is  to  say,  under  an  agreeable  or 
disagreeable  form,  which  is  consequently  subjective.  If  I  feel  any 
sensation — that,  for  instance,  of  heat — it  has  the  property  of  affect- 
ing me  in  a  certain  way ;  but,  further,  I  notice  that  it  may  increase, 
or  diminish,  or  vary  indefinitely.  There  is,  then,  in  it  a  greater 
and  a  less,  a  something  measurable,  or  quantity.  It  is  the  same 
with  all  sensations.  If,  then,  in  any  quality  I  suppress,  by  the 
power  of  thought,  all  that  is  agreeable  or  disagreeable — all  that 
is  simply  affective,  all  that  depends  on  the  constitution  of  our 
organs — there  remains  a  possibility  of  indefinite  variation  to  greater 
or  less ;  in  other  words,  what  belongs  specially  to  quality  having 
been  suppressed,  there  remains  what  belongs  to  quantity. 

Thus  under  all  quality  lies  quantity.  The  category  of  quantity 
is  the  more  general,  consequently  the  more  simple,  and  so  the 
more  measurable.  If,  then,  we  can  transform  quality  into  quantity, 
we  make  quality  measurable ;  and  this  transformation  is  sometimes 
possible.  If  it  be  found  that  some  variations  of  quality  in  a  class 
of  phenomena  correspond  regularly  to  variations  of  quantity,  then 
every  mathematical  formula  that  is  applicable  to  the  variable 
quantities  may  be  applied  to  the  corresponding  qualities.  Thus  it 
has  been  proved  by  experiment  that  every  variety  of  sound  corre- 
sponds to  a  distinct  and  determinable  variety  of  motion.  Thus 
the  physicist,  in  regard  to  light  and  heat,  can  eliminate  all  that  is 
purely  qualitative,  and  see  only  a  movement  of  vibration  subject 
to  mechanical  laws.  Thus,  too,  mechanics,  hydrostatics,  optics, 
acoustics,  and  thermology,  have  gradually  become  mathematical. 
But  this  transformation  grows,  as  is  natural,  more  and  more 
difficult  in  proportion  as  we  ascend  from  simple  qualities  to  com- 
plex existences.  In  the  world  of  life  and  thought  number  is  as 
yet  powerless,  and  there  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  it  can  hold 
dominion  there  for  some  time  to  come. 

We  now  apply  what  has  been  said  to  the  special  question  of 
heredity. 

We  began  by  collecting  a  large  number  of  facts  belonging  to  the 


1 86  Heredity. 

domain  of  physiology,  to  mental  maladies,  to  animal  and  human 
psychology  and  history — facts  of  various  kinds,  and  adapted  for 
showing  all  the  varieties  of  hereditary  transmission.  We  next 
endeavoured  to  disengage  what  is  constant  in  the  production  of 
these  phenomena,  and  proposed  heredity  as  a  biological  law,  the 
exceptions  being,  as  we  shall  see,  only  the  results  of  disturbing 
causes;  and  we  examined  the  various  forms  of  this  law.  We 
believe  that  this  theory  may  be  verified,  that  it  has  a  scientific 
value. 

The  facts  which  have  served  to  establish  the  law  will  serve  also 
to  verify  it,  for  it  is  nothing  more  than  a  simple  generalization. 
Of  course  it  were  puerile  to  suppose  that,  in  the  present  state  of 
physiology,  and  yet  more  of  psychology,  any  theory  of  heredity 
could  be  final  Nevertheless,  we  persist  in  the  conviction  that  the 
laws  already  recited,  being  only  the  expression  of  facts,  are  no 
merely  subjective  view :  and  this  is  the  important  point 

But  it  may  be  possible  to  go  -even  beyond  this,  and  to  submit 
the  laws  of  heredity  to  a  quantitative  test.  In  a  recent  work, 
entitled  Hereditary  Genius,  the  statistical  method  has  been  applied 
to  this  subject  Before  giving  our  opinion  on  the  question,  we 
will  briefly  state  the  results  obtained  by  this  author. 

II. 

Mr.  Gallon's  book  possesses  merits  and  defects  somewhat  common 
in  English  works :  many  figures,  a  sufficiency  of  facts,  very  little 
generalization.  His  method  is  purely  statistical.  His  investigations 
have  for  their  object  not  heredity  in  general,  nor  even  psychological 
heredity,  but  simply  this  question :  Is  genius  hereditary,  and  to  what 
extent  ?  Given  an  illustrious  or  eminent  man,1  what  are  the  chances 
of  his  having  had  an  illustrious  or  eminent  father,  grandfather,  son, 
grandson,  brother,  etc.  ?  To  answer  this  question,  the  author  has 

1  'There  are,' says  he,  'in  the  British  Isles,  two  millions  of  male  persons 
above  the  age  of  fifty.  Among  these  I  find  850  that  are  illustrious,  and  500 
eminent  In  one  million  men,  therefore,  there  will  be  425  illustrious  and  250 
eminent.'  The  author  declares  that  he  has  got  these  same  figures  by  various 
methods,  viz.  by  consulting  the  Dictionary  of  Contemporaries,  the  necrological 
notices  in  the  Times,  etc.  This  will  give  an  idea  of  Mr.  Gallon's  method,  aud 
of  his  taste  for  exact  research. 


Essays  in  Statistics.  187 

searched  the  biographies  of  great  men,  drawn  out  their  genealogies, 
traced  their  relationships,  compared  the  results,  struck  averages, 
and  the  following  are  his  conclusions. 

He  first  entered  this  field  with  a  work  on  English  Judges  from 
1660  to  1865.  These  judges,  always  eight  in  number,  constitute 
the  highest  magistracy  in  England,  and  are,  as  he  assures  us, 
universally  admitted  to  be  exceptional  men.  Their  biography  is 
known,  as  are  also  their  family  connections.  Here,  then,  is  a  fair 
number  of  facts,  which  may  be  grouped  together  in  order  to 
examine  the  results. 

In  the  course  of  205  years  there  were  286  judges,  and  among 
these  the  author  has  found  112  who  had  one  or  more  illustrious 
kinsmen.  Hence,  the  probability  that  a  judge  has  in  his  family 
one  or  more  illustrious  members  exceeds  the  ratio  of  1:3 — in  itself 
a  striking  result 

Passing  now  from  these  general  results  to  details,  it  may  be 
shown  how  this  probability  diminishes  as  we  pass  from  relations  of 
the  first  degree  (father,  son,  brother),  to  relations  of  the  second 
degree  (grandfather,  uncle,  nephew,  grandson),  and  those  of  the 
third  degree  (great-grandfather,  granduncle,  cousin,  grandnephew). 

Suppose  100  families  of  judges,  and  let  N  stand  for  the  most 
eminent  man  in  each  of  them,  the  number  of  their  illustrious 
kinsmen  will  on  the  average  be  distributed  as  follows: — Father,  26; 
brother,  35  ;  son,  36  ;  grandfather,  15  ;  uncle,  18 ;  nephew,  19; 
grandson,  1 9  ;  great-grandfather,  2 ;  granduncle,  4 ;  first-cousin, 
ii  ;  grandnephew,  17.  This  statement  will  be  more  readily 
understood  from  the  following  table : — 

TABLE  I. 

2  great-grandfathers 

15  grandfathers  4  granduncles 

26  fathers  18  uncles 

100  ^V  35  brothers  11  cousins-german 

36  sons  19  nephews 

19  grandsons  17  grandnephews 

6  great-grandsons 

If  now  we  pass  from  thif  paitial  work  on  the  judges  to  broader 
researches,  we  meet  with  results  of  very  much  the  same  kind 


i88 


Heredity. 


Mr.  Galton  distributes  into  seven  groups  the  remarkable  men  who 
have  been  the  objects  of  his  investigations — statesmen,  generals, 
men  of  letters,  men  of  science,  artists,  poets,  and  divines.  He 
pursues  the  method  already  indicated.  He  sets  out  from  the 
hypothesis  of  100  families  studied,  modifying  his  results  according 
to  circumstances ;  for  example,  when  his  researches  have  extended 
to  only  twenty,  twenty-five,  or  fifty  families,  he  multiplies  his 
results  by  five,  four,  or  two.  Thus  he  is  enabled  to  institute  a 
direct  comparison  between  the  various  groups.  These  results  are 
given  in  the  following  table,  with  the  addition  of  the  group  already 
considered,  that  of  the  judges  : — 

TABLE    II. 


• 

id 

d 

V 

g 

tn 

•S 

g 
u 

i 

in 

7 

13 

IM 

o 

V3 

rf 

g 

hn 

4) 

O 

8 

(/) 

^jj 

1 

2 

•73 

"3 

g 

g 

.3i 

1 

's 

'? 

o 

3 

w 

O 

S 

en 

^ 

p 

*j 

Father    

26 

33 

47 

48 

26 

20 

32 

28 

31 

Brother       ...» 

35 

39 

50 

42 

47 

40 

5° 

36 

41 

70 

40 

t^J 

60 

A  f 

89 

48 

Grandfather        .         .         . 

15 

"X 

28 

16 

24 

14 

5 

*^7 

7 

20 

*T^ 

17 

Uncle      

18 

18 

8 

24 

16 

5 

14 

40 

18 

Nephew     ...» 

19 

18 

35 

24 

23 

5° 

iS 

4 

22 

Grandson         ...» 

19 

IO 

12 

9 

9 

5 

18 

IO 

H 

Great-grandfather       .        . 

2 

8 

8 

3 

o 

0 

o 

4 

3 

Granduncle     .                   .         . 
First-cousin         .         .         . 

4 
II 

5 

21 

8 

20 

6 

18 

,5 

5 
o 

7 
i 

4 
8 

5 
13 

Grandnephew           .         .         . 

17 

5 

8 

6 

16 

IO 

o 

o 

IO 

Great-grandson  . 

6 

o 

o 

3 

7 

0 

0 

o 

3 

We  will  not  follow  our  author  through  the  extended  observations 
he  makes  on  each  column  and  on  each  of  its  figures,  nor  through 
the  remarks,  often  ingenious,  often  very  problematical,  which  he 
makes  with  a  view  to  explain  whatever  differs  overmuch  from  the 
average.  There  is  no  question  but  that,  if  we  omit  columns  six 
and  seven  (poets  and  artists),  which  present  some  singular  devia- 
tions, we  cannot  fail  to  be  struck  with  the  resemblance  between 
the  figures  here  compared.  The  impression  made  by  the  table 
will  be  still  more  striking  if  we  compare  the  first  column,  that  of 


Essays  in  Statistics. 


189 


the  judges — of  the  men  whose  kinships  the  author  has  studied 
most  closely — with  the  last  column,  that  which  gives  the  averages, 
that  is,  with  the  column  which  purports  to  express  the  law  in 
numerical  terms. 

The  number  of  families  that  has  served  as  the  basis  of  the  work 
is  about  300,  and  includes  nearly  1000  men  of  note,  of  whom 
415  are  illustrious.  The  author  thinks  that,  if  there  is  a  law,  so 
great  a  mass  of  facts  ought  to  bring  it  to  light  This  law  is  given 
in  the  last  column  of  Table  II.  The  probability  that  a  man  of 
mark  would  have  remarkable  kinsmen  is,  for  his  father,  thirty-one 
per  cent. ;  brothers,  forty-one  per  cent ;  sons,  forty-eight  per  cent, 
etc.  (See  Table  II.,  column  9.) 

If  we  estimate  the  probability  of  the  kinsmen  of  illustrious  men 
rising  to  be  eminent — and  the  author  shows  that  eminent  men  are  in 
general  less  numerous  by  one  half  than  illustrious  men — it  will  be 
found  to  be  as  follows : — 

In  the  first  degree,  for  the  father  as  one  to  six ;  for  each  brother 
as  one  to  seven ;  for  each  son  as  one  to  four.  In  the  second 
degree,  for  each  of  the  grandfathers,  as  one  to  twenty-five ;  uncle, 
one  to  forty ;  nephew,  one  to  forty  ;  grandson,  one  to  twenty-nine ; 
In  the  third  degree,  for  each  cousin-german,  one  to  one  hundred ; 
each  of  the  other  relatives  one  to  two  hundred. 

Before  we  dismiss  statistics  we  must  clear  up  one  point  In 
Table  II.  the  word  'father'  stands  for  'mother,'  as  well,  and 
'brother'  includes  ' sister 'j  in  a  word,  the  male  and  female  rela- 
tives are  indicated  by  one  term.  We  have  now  to  determine  the 
respective  positions  of  the  males  and  females  in  the  eight  groups 
of  one  hundred  families  each. 

TABLE   IIL 


| 

V 

e 
I 

bo 

1 

B 

V 

s 

B 

S 

»5 

» 

In 

i 

1 

i 

i 

6 

vt 

O 

•g 

> 

i—  > 

CO 

O 

3 

w 

PH 

•< 

Q 

-*5 

Male  Line        .        . 
Female  Line 

2 

64 

68 
32 

74 
26 

7i 
29 

94 
6 

85 

»5 

27 
73 

70 
3° 

Total 

100 

100 

100 

100 

100 

100 

100 

100 

100 

1 90  Heredity. 

On  comparing  the  two  averages,  seventy  for  males,  thirty  for 
females,  we  cannot  fail  to  be  struck  by  the  great  difference  between 
the  two,  and  the  marked  preponderance  of  the  male  line.  The 
author  has  inquired  into  the  cause  of  this,  but  without  arriving,  as 
he  himself  admits,  at  any  very  satisfactory  conclusion.  He  allows 
but  little  weight  to  the  hypothesis  that  in  the  biographies  of  great 
men,  if  their  mothers  are  mentioned,  but  little  is  said  with  regard 
to  their  other  female  relations ;  for  in  the  case  of  statesmen  and 
great  commanders,  whose  genealogy  is  well  known,  the  female  line 
is  likewise  very  much  inferior  to  the  male,  as  is  shown  in  columns 
two  and  three  of  Table  III.  The  author  thinks  that  a  more 
satisfactory  solution  would  be  to  admit  that  the  aunts,  sisters,  and 
daughters  of  illustrious  men,  being  accustomed  at  home  to  an 
intellectual  and  moral  atmosphere  above  the  common,  do  not,  on 
an  average,  marry  as  much  as  other  women  ;  and  he  is  of  opinion 
that  his  hypothesis  would  bear  the  test  of  facts,  though  he  confesses 
that  it  is  impossible  to  apply  the  test 

in. 

We  have  now  given  in  a  few  pages  the  results  of  a  thick  volume 
filled  with  facts  and  figures.  While  regretting  again  the  absence 
of  larger  views,  we  must  bestow  high  praise  on  this  taste  for  exact 
research,  this  constant  aiming  at  precision,  this  fear  of  elevating  to 
the  rank  of  objective  truths  merely  subjective  impressions.  But 
the  work  does  not  give  what  it  promises  to  give. 

It  will  be  noticed  in  the  first  place  that  Mr.  Gallon's  method, 
being  chiefly  quantitative,  differs  totally  from  our  own,  which  is 
chiefly  qualitative.  In  the  foregoing  chapters  we  have  striven  to 
show  that  by  comparison  of  facts  we  arrive  at  a  great  biological, 
universal  law — heredity ;  a  law  that  is  necessary,  invariable,  and 
without  exception,  provided  secondary  causes  do  not  intervene. 
In  the  next  place,  descending  from  the  more  to  the  less  general, 
we  have  examined  the  various  aspects  of  this  law,  and  have  shown 
how  the  facts  of  heredity  fall  under  three  formulas,  or  four  at  the 
most  The  laws  have  been  in  our  view  only  the  simple  general- 
ization of  facts. 

Mr.  Galton  proceeds  differently ;  facts  are  for  him  only  a  matter 
of  calculation,  he  groups  them  with  a  view  of  arriving  not  at  laws 


Essays  in  Statistics.  191 

but  only  at  averages.  We  do  not  find  in  his  book  anything  like  an 
analytical  research  into  the  general  formulas  of  heredity.  His 
method  is  statistical.  And  here  the  question  arises,  What  is  the 
value  of  this  method,  applied  to  moral  facts  ? 

Statistics,  according  to  the  definition  of  its  professors,  is  '  the 
science  of  social  facts  expressed  in  numerical  terms.'  Its  object 
is  to  collect  and  group  methodically  all  moral  or  social  phenomena 
which  are  susceptible  of  numerical  valuation.  Its  method  consists 
in  exposition  and  induction.  The  method  of  exposition,  which  is 
the  simple  and  the  more  certain,  consists  in  the  calculation  of 
averages,  and  is  based  on  this  undoubted  truth,  that  '  in  an  inde- 
finitely protracted  series  of  events,  the  action  of  regular  and  con- 
stant causes  must  in  the  long  run  outweigh  that  of  irregular  causes.' 
(Laplace).  The  inductive  method,  which  is  less  certain,  consists 
in  obtaining  numerical  expressions  for  social  facts,  by  means  of 
arithmetical  or  algebraic  processes  applied  to  a  small  number  of 
observations,  and  in  admitting,  on  the  ground  of  analogy  or  prob- 
ability, results  not  directly  established.  Mr.  Gallon  employs  both 
methods,  but  chiefly  the  second.  He  feels,  therefore,  confident  in 
regard  to  his  method. 

In  spite  of  all  the  attacks  and  jokes  levelled  against  it,  I  hold 
that  statistics  is  a  genuine  science,  and  that  it  is  of  high  importance. 
But  its  mistake,  in  my  opinion,  is  to  suppose  that  it  furnishes  a 
quantitative  determination.  As  we  have  seen,  science  has  two 
chief  phases :  the  one  where  it  takes  its  rise  in  becoming  objec- 
tive; the  other  where  it  attains  its  perfect  form  in  becoming 
quantitative.  Statistics  halts  at  the  first,  while  thinking  to  reach 
the  second. 

To  see  that  this  is  so,  in  spite  of  appearances,  in  spite  of  columns 
of  figures  and  the  imposing  array  of  calculations,  we  will  take  a 
moral  and  social  fact  of  high  importance — human  liberty.  An 
attempt  has  been  made  to  study  it  by  means  of  statistical  data. 
Quelelet  in  his  Physique  Sociale,  and  after  him  Buckle  in  his  His- 
tory of  Civilization,  have  used  these  with  great  ability.  They  have 
shown  that  the  amount  of  crime  in  general,  and  of  each  species  of 
crime  in  particular,  varies  much  less  than  is  supposed ;  that  in  the 
beginning  of  each  year,  supposing  the  circumstances  to  remain  the 
same,  we  might  almost  predict  with  certainty  the  numb3r  of  crimes 


192  Heredity. 

that  will  be  committed  in  each  country  during  the  year.  If  we 
look  into  the  French  criminal  reports  and  compare  several  years, 
we  shall  be  surprised  to  find  that  various  crimes  and  offences, 
classed  under  a  score  of  heads,  oscillate  within  very  restricted 
limits.  The  number  of  suicides,  too,  is  much  the  same  for  each 
year ;  in  five  years  it  varied  in  London  between  two  hundred  and 
thirteen  and  two  hundred  and  sixty-six.  Nay,  even  occurrences 
which  might  appear  to  be  governed  entirely  by  chance,  and  to 
result  from  pure  stupidity,  are  not  without  regularity.  It  has  been 
shown  that  in  London  and  in  Paris  about  the  same  number  of 
letters  without  an  address  are  posted  every  year. 

I  have  no  wish  to  discuss  here  whether  or  no  we  are  free  agents, 
nor  whether  that  problem  can  be  resolved  by  the  present  method. 
My  object  is  only  to  inquire  whether  it  can  lead  to  quantitative 
determination — that  is,  to  absolute  certitude.  It  is  plain  that  it 
cannot  do  so.  When  we  are  told  that  the  statistical  method 
enables  us  to  predict  the  number  of  murders,  larcenies,  suicides, 
marriages,  etc.,  the  meaning  is  that  they  are  foreseen  in  the  gross 
and  approximatively ;  but  in  true  quantitative  knowledge  nothing 
is  determined  in  the  gross  or  approximatively.  Given  a  great  man 
in  a  family,  does  any  one  imagine  that  by  means  of  Gallon's 
averages  we  can  determine  how  many  illustrious  brothers,  sons,  or 
nephews  he  will  have,  with  as  much  certainty  as  we  can  calculate 
the  day  and  the  hour  of  an  eclipse  ? 

It  is,  therefore,  a  mistake  to  fancy  that  because  mathematical 
processes  are  employed  we  can  arrive  at  mathematical  certainty. 
The  real  service  rendered  by  figures  is  this  :  there  is  a  multitude 
of  scattered  facts,  which  have  no  visible  connection,  and  appear 
to  be  perfectly  fortuitous.  The  statistician  compares  these  to- 
gether, and  discovers  in  them  uniformities,  or,  in  other  words, 
laws.  And  as  from  uniformity  of  effects  we  may  infer  uniformity 
of  causes ;  as  from  moral  and  social  facts  we  can  ascend  to  the 
psychological  states  from  which  they  result,  the  consequence  is 
that  statistics  can  be  of  service  in  the  study  of  morals  and  even  of 
psychology.  By  grouping  together  certain  phenomena  of  social 
life  it  gives  us  a  means  by  which  we  can  verify  and  check  our 
conclusions ;  it  gives  to  the  purely  subjective  views  of  the  mind 
the  means  of  acquiring  an  objective  value,  and  so  of  passing  from 


Essays  in  Statistics.  193 

the  conjectural  to  the  scientific  state.  It  supplies  the  psychologist 
and  the  moralist  with  materials — with  observations  and  experi- 
ments. But  this  is  only  the  beginning  of  science,  not  its  perfection. 

And,  indeed,  how  could  it  be  expected,  in  the  present  state  of 
the  moral  sciences,  that  figures  could  solve  every  problem  ?  The 
philosophers  of  the  present  century  have  shown  (and  the  positivist 
school  have  performed  a  fair  proportion  of  the  work)  that  the 
sciences  are  not  isolated  systems  of  doctrine,  each  detached  from 
each,  but  that  there  exists  among  them  an  hierarchical  subordina- 
tion, so  that  the  more  complex  rest  on  the  more  simple,  and  pre- 
suppose them.  The  mathematical,  physical,  biological,  moral,  and 
social  sciences  represent  so  many  phases  of  a  continuous  process, 
which  advances  from  the  simple  to  the  complex.  Social  pheno- 
mena presuppose  thought  and  sensation ;  these  presuppose  life ;  life 
presupposes  physical  and  chemical  conditions ;  physical  and  chem- 
ical facts  presuppose  mathematical  conditions,  time,  space,  and 
quantity,  which  are  simply  the  most  vague  and  general  conditions 
of  existence.  In  this  series  of  an  increasing  complexity,  and  of  a 
decreasing  comprehensiveness,  it  would  be  folly  to  imagine  that 
the  superior  science  could  exist  before  the  inferior  science  were 
constituted.  But  quantitative  determination  exists  only  in  mathe- 
matics, and  to  some  extent  in  physics  ;  it  has  not  yet  penetrated 
into  biology ;  how,  then,  could  it  have  attained  to  the  moral  and 
social  sciences?  It  is,  perhaps,  doubtful  if  it  will  ever  reach  them. 
Number  is  an  instrument  at  once  too  coarse  to  unravel  the  delicate 
texture  of  these  phenomena,  and  too  fragile  to  penetrate  deeply 
into  their  complicated  and  multiple  nature.  With  all  its  apparent 
precision  it  stops  at  the  surface  of  things,  for  it  can  give  us  only 
quantity,  which  is  a  very  unimportant  thing  as  compared  with 
quality. 

In  short,  this  statistical  research  into  heredity  fails  to  do  what 
it  promised.  Yet,  by  comparing  facts  and  grouping  figures,  it 
arrives  at  the  same  result  as  ourselves,  but  by  another  route :  it 
establishes  psychological  heredity,  and  the  objective  reality  of 
its  laws. 


i 94  Heredity. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

EXCEPTIONS   TO   THE    LAW    OF    HEREDITY. 


THE  study  of  the  laws  of  heredity  would  not  be  complete  with- 
out an  examination  of  the  exceptions.  Nothing  gives  a  clearer 
notion  of  the  nature  of  a  law,  than  a  knowledge  of  its  anomalies. 

Here,  especially,  this  is  indispensable,  for  the  infractions  of 
hereditary  transmission  are  so  numerous  and  so  striking,  that  from 
time  to  time  we  ask  with  hesitation  if  the  law  exists  at  all  beneath 
the  phenomena  which  conceal  it  On  considering  these  difficulties, 
we  shall  understand  why  the  author  of  the  most  famous  work 
upon  this  subject  should  have  set  up  over  against  heredity  an 
equal  and  contrary  law,  that  of  innateness,  which  as  he  considers 
explains  all  the  exceptions. 

Before  discussing  this  hypothesis,  and  showing  how  heredity 
may  explain  the  exceptions  no  less  than  the  regular  cases,  we  will, 
as  usual,  begin  by  a  statement  of  facts. 

In  the  physiological  world,  these  exceptions  are  readily  shown 
in  the  internal  or  external  structure,  the  physiognomy,  the  stature, 
constitution  or  temperament. 

Though,  generally,  brothers  and  sisters  have  a  family  likeness,  it 
is  not  rare  that  there  is  between  them  such  a  diversity  of  feature 
and  countenance  that  no  external  sign  would  indicate  their  com- 
mon blood.  This  difference  is  sometimes  seen  even  in  twins. 
Sinibaldi  asks  '  how  it  comes  that  at  Rome  ugly  boors  and  women 
from  the  dregs  of  the  people,  with  hideous  features,  produce  sons 
and  daughters  of  surprising  beauty,  and  of  such  perfect  form  that 
their  equals  are  not  to  be  found  in  the  palaces  of  nobles,  or  in  the 
courts  of  princes.' l 

Fathers  and  mothers  of  erect  form,  none  of  whose  families  have 
ever  been  misshapen,  produce  children  hunchbacked  and  de- 
formed. Deformed  parents  have  had  perfectly  straight  children. 
Parents  of  middle  height  sometimes  beget  tall  children,  while  other 

1  Might  not  this  be  a  fact  of  atavism  ? 


Exceptions  to  the  Law  of  Heredity.         195 

parents,  of  good  station,  in  good  health,  and  belonging  to  families 
of  good  constitution,  beget  children  of  very  low  stature.  A  man 
had  by  his  wife  eight  children,  of  whom  four  were  dwarfs.  Bebe, 
the  famous  dwarf  of  King  Stanislas,  and  whose  height  was  thirty- 
three  inches,  was  born  in  the  Vosges  of  well-formed,  vigorous, 
healthy  parents.  The  celebrated  Polish  gentleman,  Borwslaski, 
whose  height  was  twenty-eight  inches,  had  a  brother  and  sister, 
dwarfs  like  himself,  and  three  other  brothers,  each  five  feet  six 
inches  in  stature.1 

Such  idiosyncrasies  as  the  predominance  of  some  one  organ, 
one  of  a  viscus,  or  even  of  an  entire  system  of  organs,  likewise 
present  curious  instances  of  spontaneity.  Family  constitutions,  as 
P.  Lucas  remarks,  very  often  begin  with  individuals,  and  the  most 
rooted  constitutions,  those  that  are  most  general  in  families,  are 
yet  not  those  of  all  the  members. 

We  may  quote  especially,  as  remarkable  facts  of  spontaneity, 
those  called  by  Zimmermann  exceptions  in  temperament  He 
has  gathered  several  examples ;  as,  for  instance,  of  a  man  who 
suffered  extreme  agonies  when  his  nails  were  clipped  ;  another 
when  his  face  was  washed  with  a  sponge.  For  some  persons  coffee 
is  an  emetic,  jalap  a  constipant  Hachn  could  not  eat  more  than 
seven  or  eight  strawberries  without  falling  into  convulsions,  and 
Tissot  could  not  swallow  sugar  without  vomiting. 

But  there  is  no  need  to  cite  a  large  number  of  such  facts,  if  the 
reader  will  bear  in  mind  that  peculiarities  of  organization — con- 
genital or  natural  varieties — are  necessarily  exceptions  to  the  law 
of  heredity.  Thus  polydactylism,  ectrodactylism,  harelip,  and  all 
deformities  of  a  similar  nature,  begin  by  a  deviation  from  the 
specific  type.  The  celebrated  case  of  Edward  Lambert,  '  the  man- 
porcupine,'  may  be  remembered,  whose  parents  were  healthy  and 
well  formed,  but  he  transmitted  his  singular  carapace  to  his  chil- 
dren. Thus  we  see  from  facts  that  heredity  imposes  its  law  even 
on  its  own  exceptions. 

Among  animals  all  races  which  are  not  due  to  intercrossing,  but 
which  spring  from  spontaneous  variation,  are  at  once  the  result  of 
innateness  and  heredity  :  of  the  former  for  their  origin,  of  the  latter 

1  Lucas,  i.  ioJT;   Burdach,  ii.  427. 


196  Heredity. 

for  their  continuance.    Thus  it  is  with  the  hornless  bulls,  or 
of  the  Argentine  Republic,  with  rumpless  fowls,  bantams,  etc. 

If  we  pass  from  the  physiological  to  the  psychological  order  we 
shall  find  no  less  striking  instances  of  spontaneity. 

Phrenologists  have  accumulated  facts  to  show  that  among 
animals,  where  we  see  only  uniformity  of  habits,  characters,  and 
physical  aptitudes,  there  exist  between  members  of  the  same 
family  individual  differences,  which,  as  they  do  not  result  from 
education,  are  due  to  spontaneity.  In  a  litter  of  wolf  cubs  taken 
from  their  dam,  says  Gall,  and  which  were  all  brought  up  in  the 
same  way,  one  became  tame  and  gentle  like  a  dog,  while  the  others 
preserved  their  natural  savagery. 

In  twins  there  sometimes  occur  extrejne  contrasts  of  tastes, 
propensities,  and  ideas.  This  was  observed  by  the  ancients  : 

Castor  gaudet  equis,  ovo  prognatus  eodem 
Pugnis. 

What  is  still  more  curious  is,  that  double  monsters,  when  they 
survive,  may  possess  different  psychical  constitutions.  Serres  ob- 
served this  in  the  case  of  Ritta  and  Christina,  the  female  twins  of 
Presburg,  who  were  united  by  the  inferior  lumbar  vertebrae.  They 
differed  completely  in  character.  One  was  handsome,  gentle, 
sedate,  with  sensuous  character  little  marked ;  the  other  ugly,  ill- 
conditioned,  quarrelsome,  and  of  strong  passions.  Her  outbursts 
of  rage  against  her  sister,  and  their  disputes  became  so  frequent, 
that  in  the  convent  where  Cardinal  von  Saxe-Zeits  had  placed  them, 
the  inmates  were  compelled  to  give  them  in  charge  of  a  watcher, 
who  never  left  them  alone.  Notwithstanding  these  quarrels,  they 
lived  to  the  age  of  twenty-two. 

It  has  been  said  that  the  law  of  spontaneity  cannot  be  disputed, 
since  we  see  the  sons  of  great  men  unworthy  of  them.  By  what 
singular  freak  of  nature  did  two  fools  like  Paxalos  and  Xantippos, 
and  a  maniac  like  Clinias,  spring  from  Pericles  ?  or  from  the 
upright  Aristippos,  the  infamous  Lysimachos?  from  the  grave 
Thucydides,  a  silly  Milesias  or  a  stupid  Stephanos?  from  the 
temperate  Phocion,  the  dissolute  Phocus?  from  Sophocles,  Aris- 
tarchos,  Socrates,  and  Themistocles  unworthy  sons?  And  the 
like  differences  are  to  be  found  in  Roman  history :  Cicero  and  his 
son,  Germanicus  and  Caligula,  Vespasian  and  Domitian,  Marcus 


Exceptions  to  the  Law  of  Heredity.         197 


Aurelius  and  Corumodus.  In  modern  history,  'it  is  enough  to 
mention  the  sons  of  Henri  IV.,'  says  Lucas,  '  of  Louis  XIV.,  of 
Cromwell,  of  Peter  the  Great;  as  also  those  of  La  Fontaine, 
Crebillon,  Goethe,  and  Napoleon.' l 

We  do  not,  however,  accept  these  cases  as  facts  conclusive  of 
spontaneity.  The  greater  part  of  them  are  doubtful,  and  many  of 
them  are  false.  It  is  not  enough  to  say,  Such  an  illustrious  man 
has  mediocre  sons,  in  order  to  conclude  that  therefore  heredity  is 
at  fault  A  son  who  does  not  inherit  from  his  father,  may  perfectly 
do  so  from  his  mother.  As  we  have  already  seen,  this  case  is  so 
frequent  that  some  authors  have  regarded  it  as  a  rule. 

Among  the  examples  cited  by  Lucas,  there  are  some  in  which 
the  maternal  heredity  is  clear,  as  Commodus,  Louis  XIII., 
Goethe,  Napoleon.  And  it  is  probable  in  the  case  of  others  in 
the  list,  especially  those  taken  from  Greek  history,  that  if  we  had 
precise  data  regarding  the  wives  of  those  great  men,  or  their 
immediate  ancestors,  it  would  be  easy  to  show  that  these  obscure 
or  dissolute  personages  have  inherited  from  their  mothers,  or  of 
their  grand-parents.  Thus  heredity  would  recover  a  large  number 
of  facts  which  have  been  wrongfully  removed  from  its  domain. 

However,  we  would  not  deny  that  there  are  exceptions,  and 
very  important  exceptions.  But  the  conclusive  way  to  establish 
them  is,  not  to  show  that  a  great  man  has  mediocre  children, 
which  proves  nothing,  but  that  a  great  man  has  sprung  suddenly 
from  an  obscure  family.  Nor  is  this  case  rare.  '  Often,'  says 
Burdach,  '  the  parents  possess  very  limited  intellectual  faculties, 
while  all  their  children  display  abilities  of  the  first  order.  From 
simple  parents  often  spring  those  superior  men,  those  minds  whose 
influence  is  felt  for  thousands  of  years,  and  whose  presence  was  a 
need  for  humanity  at  the  moment  when  they  entered  life.  The 
greatest  men  have  belonged  to  lowly,  poor,  or  obscure  families,' 

In  the  negro  race,  whose  lack  of  capacity  is  recognized,  anthro- 
pologists have  noted  individuals  possessed  of  remarkable  faculties. 
Toussaint  L'Ouverture  was  certainly  no  ordinary  politician.  Ac- 
cording to  Pritchard,  even  the  stupid  Esquimaux  and  Greenlanders 
can  produce  men  of  intelligence. 


198  Heredity. 

A  peculiar  conformation  of  certain  organs  of  sense,  or  a  total 
lack  of  them,  are  facts  at  once  both  of  physiological  and  psych- 
ological spontaneity.  There  are  some  persons  whose  eyes  are  unable 
to  discern  some  given  colour — blue,  red,  yellow,  etc.  Others  are 
born  blind  of  parents  possessed  of  perfect  vision.  Deaf-muteness 
in  many  cases  cannot  be  explained  by  anything  in  the  parents. 
Physicians  cite  many  examples  of  families  where  the  parents  both 
hear  and  speak  very  well,  while  their  children  are  all  born  deaf 
and  dumb.  Finally,  the  taste  and  the  smell  are  sometimes  struck 
with  anaesthesia,  or  complete  insensibility,  which  cannot  be  ex- 
plained by  hereditary  transmission. 

We  will,  in  conclusion,  glance  at  psychological  idiosyncrasies, 
and  exceptional  mental  facts.  Psychology,  even  as  physiology, 
has  its  rare  cases,  but  unfortunately  not  so  much  pains  have  been 
taken  to  note  and  describe  them.  Not  to  speak  of  insanity, 
idiocy,  or  hallucination,  which  may  occur,  apparently  at  least, 
without  visible  antecedent  in  the  progenitors,  there  are  some 
purely  moral  states  which  are  met  with  in  a  certain  class  of 
criminals — murderers,  robbers,  and  incendiaries — which,  if  we 
renounce  all  prejudices  and  preconceived  opinions,  can  only  be 
regarded  as  psychological  accidents,  more  painful  and  not  less  in- 
curable than  those  of  deaf-muteness  and  blindness.  We  have  given 
sundry  instances  of  these  anomalies,  and  of  their  heredity ;  but 
they  also  frequently  occur  in  the  shape  of  isolated  and  nontrans- 
mitted  cases  of  moral  monstrosity.  These  creatures,  as  Dr.  Lucas 
says,  partake  only  of  the  form  of  man;  there  is  in  their  blood 
somewhat  of  the  tiger  and  of  the  brute :  they  are  innocently  criminal, 
and  sometimes  are  capable  of  every  crime. l 

IL 

Having  shown  by  facts  of  every  kind  that  there  exist  grave 
exceptions  to  the  law  of  heredity,  we  have  now  to  explain  them. 
As  we  have  seen,  it  is  perfectly  clear  and  unquestionable  that 
heredity  is  the  law  ;  that  this  cannot  be  doubted ;  and  that  even 
in  those  cases  which  we  qualify  as  exceptions,  the  exception  is 


1  See  several  instances  of  moral  monstrosity  in  the  work  of  Dr.  Despine 
already  quoted,  vols.  ii.  and  iii. 


Exceptions  to  the  Law  of  Heredity.         199 

never  more  than  partial :  for  even  where  heredity  does  not  transmit 
the  individual  characters,  it  at  least  transmits  the  specific  characters. 
The  question,  therefore,  is  not  to  ascertain  whether  heredity  is  a 
biological  law,  but  whether  that  law  is  absolute.  As  the  excep- 
tions are  no  less  unquestionable  than  the  law,  and  as  they  must 
necessarily  have  a  cause,  there  can  be  but  two  hypotheses. 

a.  We  may  hold  that  there  is  in  nature  an  essential,  permanent 
cause,  of  which  the  phenomena  of  spontaneity  are  the  effects — in 
other  words,  that  the  biologic  fact  of  generation  is  governed  by 
two  laws,  one  of  spontaneity,  the  other  of  heredity,  the  law  being 
only  the  expression  of  what  is  constant  in  the  production  of 
phenomena — the  invariable  relation  between  cause  and  effect. 
This  is  the  thesis  maintained  by  Dr.  Lucas. 

/3.  Or  we  may  say  that  the  causes  of  spontaneity  are  only  acci- 
der'.al;  that  it  is  never  more  than  a  chance,  the  result  of  the 
fortuitous  play  and  concurrence  of  natural  laws  ;  but  that  it  is  not 
the  effect  of  any  distinct  and  special  law.  On  this  theory  there 
would  be  one  law  of  heredity  with  its  exceptions,  not  two  laws,  the 
one  of  heredity,  the  other  of  spontaneity.  This  second  thesis  is 
our  own.  But  before  demonstrating  it  we  must  consider  the  oppo- 
site opinion. 

Of  this  Dr.  Lucas  has  given  a  full  exposition,  applying  to  it 
philosophic  principles.  He  holds  that  every  living  being,  con- 
sidered in  its  origin — that  is,  in  its  generation — is  the  product  of 
two  laws,  which  he  places  both  on  one  plane  and  on  the  same 
level.  One  is  the  law  of  spontaneity,  by  which  nature  ever 
creates  and  invents.  The  other  is  the  law  of  heredity,  by  which 
nature  ever  imitates  and  repeats  herself.  The  former  is  the 
principle  of  diversity,  the  latter  of  resemblance.  If  the  former 
stood  alone,  there  would  be  in  the  world  of  life  nothing  but 
differences  infinite  in  number;  if  the  latter  stood  alone,  we 
should  have  nothing  but  absolute  resemblances.  But  taken 
together,  these  two  principles  explain  how  all  living  things  of  the 
same  species  may  at  the  same  time  resemble  one  another  in  their 
specific  characteristics,  and  differ  in  their  individual  characteristics. 

If  we  regard  the  question  here  proposed  from  a  metaphysical 
point  of  view,  it  cannot  be  denied  that  a  difficult,  and  probably  an 
insoluble,  problem  arises.  In  the  middle  ages,  it  was  hotly 


2oo  Heredity, 

debated  under  the  singular  titles  of  '  the  problem  of  individua- 
tion,'  of  '  hoccity,'  and  of  'haeccity.'  This  barbarous  jargon  has 
been  ridiculed,  but  yet,  if  we  turn  from  words  to  things,  we  can- 
not deny  that  this  problem  pressed  upon  the  schoolmen,  and 
was  of  paramount  importance.  Modern  philosophy,  as  it  seems 
to  us,  has  been  far  more  concerned  with  what  is  general — laws, 
genera,  species — than  with  what  is  individual.  Now,  if  we  are 
hence  led  to  consider  what  is  general  as  the  true  reality,  the 
logical  conclusion  is  that  the  individual  is  only  a  momentary 
phenomenon,  of  no  importance,  the  ephemeral  result  of  laws 
which  intersect  and  combine  in  a  thousand  ways  during  the  end- 
less evolution  of  the  universe.  To  use  the  words  of  Dr.  Lucas,  we 
should  have  to  affirm  resemblance  by  rejecting  diversity :  heredity 
would  be  the  law,  spontaneity  the  exception.  If,  on  the  other 
hand,  we  regard  the  individual  as  a  reality,  as  a  sort  of  nomad, 
governed  and  hemmed  in  on  all  sides  by  the  laws  of  nature, 
but  whose  essential,  impenetrable  being  is  never  modified,  then 
we  set  diversity  above  resemblance,  and  sacrifice  heredity  to 
spontaneity. 

We  have  here  undertaken  only  a  study  of  experimental  psych- 
ology, and  hence  we  need  not  discuss  this  difficult  metaphysical 
problem.  We  may  note,  in  passing,  that  if  we  descend  to  the 
ground  of  experience,  it  is  impossible  to  deny  absolutely  the  exist- 
ence of  diversity,  for  it  is  demonstrated  by  facts.  There  are  in 
nature  no  two  beings  alike.  When  we  see  a  large  flock  of  sheep 
we  may  regard  most  of  them  as  copies  of  one  another,  but  the 
practised  eye  of  the  shepherd  can  distinguish  each  one.  The 
courtiers  of  Alfonso  X.  sought  in  vain  for  two  leaves  like  each 
other.  But  though  diversity  exists,  we  do  not  believe  that  it  is 
only  explicable  by  a  special  law. 

If  we  consider  the  act  of  generation  under  the  simplest  possible 
conditions,  as  a  single  being  engendering  another,  without  the 
intervention  of  any  disturbing  cause,  it  is  absolutely  impossible  to 
conceive  how  the  product  could  differ  from  the  producer  ;  for 
there  is  no  reason  for  admitting  one  deviation  rather  than  another, 
such  deviation  would  be  an  effect  without  a  cause.  Linnaeus' 
aphorism,  like  produces  like,  strikes  us  therefore  with  all  the 
evidence  of  an  axiom.  But  in  reality  the  process  docs  not  take 


Exceptions  to  the  Law  of  Heredity.        201 

place  with  such  ideal  simplicity.  In  the  first  place,  there  are 
ordinarily  in  the  act  of  generation  two  sexes,  and  consequently 
two  antagonistic  heredities ;  this  is  the  first  cause  of  diversity. 
There  are,  furthermore,  accidental  causes  which  are  in  action  at  the 
very  moment  of  generation  ;  and  this  is  another  cause  of  diversity. 
Finally,  there  are  external  and  internal  influences  subsequent  to 
conception. 

It  is  clear,  says  M.  Quatrefages,  that  in  every  procreation  the 
parents  import  influences  which  may  be  ranged  in  the  following 
three  orders  of  facts :  their  characters  may  be  similar,  or  opposite, 
or  different  In  the  first  case  there  will  be  a  persistence  or  an 
augmentation  of  the  characters  transmitted ;  in  the  second  a 
diminution  of  them,  or  a  reciprocal  neutralization.  Suppose  two 
parents,  one  of  them  presbyopic  and  the  other  myopic ;  the  child 
will  have  the  chance  of  good  sight,  in  consequence  of  the  conflict 
of  opposite  influences.  In  the  third  case,  if  the  characters  are 
simply  different,  the  product  is  the  resultant  of  the  father  and 
mother ;  that  is  to  say,  a  new  character  appears,  differing  from  the 
other  two,  though  due  to  heredity.  Thus,  among  animals,  when 
the  parents  are  of  uniform  different  colours,  the  progeny  very  often 
have  the  skin  mottled,  parti-coloured,  or  striped,  and  consequently 
very  different  from  that  of  the  father  and  mother. 

Thus  heredity,  in  virtue  of  its  fundamental  law,  may  play  the 
part  of  this  force  of  spontaneity  devised  by  Lucas.  We  hold  that 
there  are  cases  of  spontaneity  which  result  from  natural  causes ; 
we  do  not  admit  a  law  of  spontaneity.  Indeed  Lucas's  hypothesis 
is  contradictory.  To  understand  how  little  spontaneity  possesses 
the  character  of  a  law,  we  need  but  observe  that  a  law  is  identical 
with  the  phenomena  it  governs,  since  it  is  only  the  expression  of 
what  in  them  is  permanent  and  essential,  so  that  it  enables  us  to  fore- 
tell them.  If  the  law  of  heredity  may  be  supposed  to  be  alone  in 
operation,  without  disturbing  influences,  it  may  be  predicted  that 
the  product  will  resemble  one  of  the  parents,  or  both.  But  sup- 
pose a  law  of  spontaneity,  no  prediction  or  provision  is  any  longer 
possible,  since  anything  whatever  may  occur  where  diversity  is  the 
rule.  This  is  permanent  disorder.  But  it  is  impossible  from  this 
to  deduce  a  law.  A  law  is  declared  by  a  process  of  abstraction 
and  generalization,  which  cannot  be  applied  to  cases  which  are 


2O2  Heredity. 

totally  diverse,  since  the  very  object  is  to  find  resemblances  and 
to  eliminate  differences.  All  scattered  facts,  all  diversities  which 
cannot  be  grouped  together,  are  called  anomalies,  or  facts  without 
laws.  We  may,  therefore,  speak  of  facts  of  spontaneity  ;  but  a  law 
of  spontaneity  is  a  contradiction  in  terms.  Where,  ex  hypothesi, 
there  are  no  two  facts  which  resemble  each  other,  we  may  in 
strictness  admit  the  arbitrary  intervention  of  a  creative  power, 
but  in  no  degree  the  regular  and  constant  action  of  a  law. 

It  is  therefore  impossible  to  recognize  two  antagonistic  laws,  the 
one  heredity,  the  other  spontaneity.  And  we  may  add  that 
theories  of  our  own  day  concerning  the  origin  of  species  and  their 
evolution,  do  not  admit  of  anything  like  a  law  of  spontaneity. 
Besides  selection  and  heredity,  which  are  the  chief  factors  in  this 
transformation,  they  do,  indeed,  presuppose  what  Wallace  calls  '  the 
tendency  of  varieties  to  depart  indefinitely  from  the  original  type;' 
but  this  tendency,  which  is  the  prime  source  of  all  variation,  is 
owing  to  the  action  of  surrounding  conditions — that  is  to  say,  of 
accidental  and  fortuitous  causes — but  by  no  means  to  an  unintelli- 
gible entity  such  as  the  hypothetical  law  of  P.  Lucas. 

III. 

If,  then,  there  is  no  law  of  spontaneity,  we  have  only  to  recognize 
in  the  foregoing  facts  exceptions  to  the  law  of  heredity.  We  can 
only  explain  these  by  attributing  them,  not  to  a  single  cause,  but  to 
causes.  No  doubt  it  is  far  simpler  to  say,  whenever  heredity  is  at 
fault,  This  is  the  result  of  spontaneity;  spontaneity  causes  the 
sudden  appearance  of  such  a  great  man — of  such  a  great  criminal 
— in  a  given  family;  but  the  simplicity  of  the  explanation  is  of  little 
account,  if  it  is  imaginary.  In  truth,  there  is  no  problem  more 
difficult  and  more  complex  than  that  of  accounting  for  these 
exceptions,  and  of  pointing  out  how  heredity  may  be  so  trans- 
formed as  to  become  unrecognizable.  In  the  present  state  of 
physiology  and  psychology  it  is  impossible  to  explain  these  excep- 
tional cases  in  a  complete  and  satisfactory  manner.  We  get  but 
an  indistinct  view  of  the  explanation. 

The  doctrine  which  regards  heredity  as  the  absolute  rule,  beyond 
which  are  only  anomalies,  is  very  ancient  Aristotle  taught  it  in 
its  strictest  form.  '  He  who  does  not  resemble  his  parents,'  says 


Exceptions  to  the  Law  of  Heredity.         203 

he,  'is  a  sort  of  monster,  for  in  him  nature  departs  from  her 
specific  form  ;  this  is  the  first  step  in  degeneration.'  The  authors 
who  in  modern  times  have  adopted  this  opinion,  attribute  these 
exceptions  to  various  causes,  which  may  be  ranged  under  three 
heads,  according  as  they  act  after  birth,  before  birth,  or  at  the 
moment  of  conception. 

1.  We  are  inclined  to  assign  but  little  importance  to  causes 
acting  after  birth,  such  as  diet,  climate,  circumstances,  education, 
physical  and  moral  influences.    They  often  produce  serious  effects, 
but  it  is  not  possible  for  them  to  produce  the  radical  transforma- 
tions   we   are   now  considering.     This    proposition,  upheld    by 
Bossuet,  Helvetius,  and  by  the  writers  of  the  eighteenth  century, 
resulted  from  the  philosophy  of  that  period.     But  there  is  now  no 
need  to  prove  that  spontaneity  is  not  to  be  explained  by  external 
and  late-acting  causes,  and  we  no  longer  believe  with  Helvetius 
that  we  can  manufacture  great  men  by  means  of  education. 

2.  The  causes  anterior  to  birth,  but  subsequent  to  conception, 
are  all  the  physical  and  moral  disturbances  of  uterine  existence — 
all  those  influences  which  can  act  through  the  mother  upon  the 
foetus   during   the   period   of  gestation ;   impressions,   emotions, 
defective  nutrition,  effects  of  imagination.     These  causes  are  very 
real,  despite  the  objections  of  Lucas,  who  attacks  them  in  order  to 
establish  his  law  of  spontaneity.    We  shall  see  from  examples  that 
between  inconsiderable  causes  and  their  effects  there  exists  an 
amazing  disproportion. 

3.  Finally,  there  are  causes  anterior  to  intra  and  extra-uterine 
life,  which  act  at  the  instant  of  conception.     These  depend  less 
upon  the  physical  and  moral  natures  of  the  parents  than  on  the 
particular  state  in  which  they  are  at  the  moment  of  procreation. 
'  One  fact  which  fully  proves  the  universality  of  the  law  of  heredity,' 
says  M.  de  Quatrefages,  '  is  the  frequent  transmission  from  parent 
to  child  of  the  actual  and  momentary  state  of  the  former  at  the 
instant  of  conception.     This  fact  had  attracted  the  attention  of 
physicians  and  philosophers,  but  it  had  been  exaggerated.     They 
went  so  far  as  to  assert  that  the  past  history  of  the  parents  was  as 
nothing  in  the  constitution  of  the  child,  who,  according  to  them, 
depends  altogether  on  the  state  of  the  parents  at  the  moment  of 
procreation.     On  the  other  hand,  modern  writers  had  lost  sight  of 


2O4  Heredity. 

this  class  of  phenomena,  and  P.  Lucas  did  well  in  calling  fresh 
attention  to  the  matter,  and  citing  facts  in  its  favour. 

'It  has  been  long  remarked  that  children  begotten  in  a  fit  of 
intoxication  often  present  for  ever  after  the  characteristic  signs  of 
that  state  :  obtuse  senses,  and  the  almost  total  absence  of  the 
intellectual  faculties.  I  had  occasion  at  Toulouse,  during  my  brief 
medical  career,  to  observe  a  fact  of  this  kind.  A  couple  of 
artisans,  man  and  wife,  belonging  to  families  all  of  whose  members 
were  of  sound  mind  and  body,  had  four  children.  The  first  two  of 
these  were  quiet  and  intelligent,  the  third  was  half-idiotic  and 
nearly  deaf,  and  the  fourth  was  like  the  elder  two.  From  details 
communicated  to  me  by  the  mother,  who  was  much  afflicted  by  the 
mental  state  of  her  child,  I  learned  that  it  had  been  conceived 
when  the  father  was  brutalized  by  drink.  By  itself,  this  fact  would 
have  little  or  no  significance,  but  when  added  to  those  collected 
by  Lucas,  Morel,  and  others,  it  is  of  very  great  importance.' *  In 
fact,  it  enables  us  to  understand  that  those  transitory  states  which 
exist  at  the  moment  of  conception  may  exert  a  decisive  influence 
on  the  nature  of  the  being  procreated,  so  that  often,  where  now 
we  see  only  spontaneity,  a  more  perfect  knowledge  of  the  causes 
at  work  would  show  us  heredity. 

But  it  may  be  said  that  the  causes  classed  under  the  foregoing 
heads  explain  the  exceptions  very  insufficiently.  It  may  be  said  : 
We  have  no  hesitation  in  admitting  that  heredity,  like  every  other 
law,  is  subject  to  conditions;  that  since  these  conditions  are 
numerous  and  delicate  it  is  impossible  to  realize  them  perfectly, 
and  that  consequently  hereditary  transmission  always  falls  far 
beneath  its  ideal.  But  is  it  not  going  too  far  to  pretend,  as  you 
do,  that  transitory,  accidental  causes  can  produce  in  the  beings 
that  are  procreated-radical  metamorphoses  ?  We  can  understand 
how  from  parents  of  but  mediocre  intellect  should  spring  a  child 
more  intelligent  than  they ;  but  could  a  man  of  genius  ?  How 
could  a  consummate  scoundrel  descend  from  honourable  and 
honest  parents  ?  And  there  is  a  multitude  of  such  cases. 

Without  pretending  to  give  a  conclusive  answer,  we  propose  to 
set  before  the  reader  a  certain  number  of  facts  and  reflections 

1  Qualrefa^es,  Unitf  de  F&splce  Humaine. 


Exceptions  to  the  Law  of  Heredity.         205 

which  appear  to  bring  under  the  law  of  heredity  the  most  refrac- 
tory cases,  the  most  formidable  exceptions.  By  penetrating  farther 
into  the  vital  and  mental  dynamism  of  man,  we  shall  probably 
have  a  glimpse  of  that  mysterious  elaboration  whereby  unity 
produces  diversity,  and  causes  give  rise  to  effects  very  dissimilar 
to  themselves.  We  shall  then  see  how  heredity  seems  to  disap- 
pear, when  it  cannot  be  grasped. 

These  obscure  causes  of  deviations  from  heredity  may  be 
reduced  under  two  heads : — 

1.  Disproportion  of  effects  to  causes. 

2.  Transformations  of  heredity. 

IV. 

If  we  take  up  any  engine  of  simple  structure,  such  as  a  win- 
nowing machine,  a  plough,  or  a  scarifier,  and  some  slight  injury 
befalls  it,  it  is  probable  that  it  will  not  be  less  serviceable  :  a 
trifling  cause  produces  only  trifling  effects;  effect  and  cause  are 
mutually  equivalent,  and  there  is  in  their  relation  nothing  sur- 
prising. But  if  the  one  in  question  is  a  complicated  engine,  such 
as  a  locomotive,  or  a  factory  engine,  the  case  is  very  different ; 
here  an  insignificant  cause  may  produce  terrible  effects  :  the  engine 
may  run  off  the  rails,  an  explosion  or  a  fire  may  take  place. 
Between  causes  and  effects  there  is  a  disproportion  which  experi- 
ence alone  reveals.  If  now  we  consider,  instead  of  a  mechanism 
constructed  by  the  hand  of  man,  those  natural  mechanisms  called 
organisms,  where  wheelwork  and  arrangement  extend  to  even  the 
minutest  details,  then  the  disproportion  between  effects  and  causes 
will  become  enormous;  a  drop  of  prussic  acid  or  the  puncture 
of  a  carbuncle  will  throw  the  machine  out  of  order  in  a  few 
hours.  Finally,  in  that  mental  mechanism — which  is  still  more 
complicated,  and  where  the  impulses,  tendencies,  forces,  conscious 
and  unconscious  processes,  do  but  attain  that  momentary  equili- 
brium which  we  call  the  actual  state  of  consciousness — the  dispro- 
portion between  causes  and  effects  transcends  all  assignable  limits. 
A  rush  of  a  little  alcoholized  blood  to  the  brain,  the  fumes  of 
opium  or  hasheesh  may  produce  the  most  surprising  results  in  the 
mental  machine.  A  few  drops  of  belladonna  or  of  henbane  give 
rise  to  fearful  visions.  A  little  pus  accumulated  in  the  brain,  a 


206  Heredity. 

lesion  so  slight  that  the  microscope  can  scarce  detect  it,  gives  rise 
to  mental  disorganizations  called  delirium,  insanity,  monomania. 
In  short,  we  may  lay  it  down  as  a  general  truth,  solidly  based  on 
experience,  that  the  more  complicated  the  mechanism,  the  greater 
the  disproportion  between  accidental  causes  and  their  effects. 

The  study  of  anomalies,  and  the  artificial  production  of  mon- 
strosities, afford  us  convincing  proofs  of  this  truth.  The  researches 
of  Geoffroy  Saint-Hilaire  and  of  Dareste  have  shown  that  it  is 
possible  to  produce  monsters  at  will,  and  that  these  deviations 
from  the  type  are  brought  about  by  trifling  causes.  Hens'  eggs 
when  set  on  end,  or  in  any  way  disarranged,  produce  monstrous 
chickens.  And  the  same  thing  occurs  if  the  eggs  be  shaken,  or 
perforated,  or  partially  coated  with  varnish.  Isidore  Geoffroy 
Saint-Hilaire  shows  that  women  of  the  poorer  class  who  are 
obliged  to  work  hard  during  pregnancy,  as  also  unmarried  women 
who  are  forced  to  conceal  their  pregnancy,  far  more  frequently 
than  other  women  give  birth  to  monsters.  '  Certain  monstrosities,' 
he  writes,  'are  often  caused  by  lesions  which  happen  to  the 
embryo  in  the  uterus  or  in  the  ovum.  Yet  it  would  seem  that 
complex  monstrosities  are  more  often  determined  at  a  later  period 
than  at  the  beginning  of  embryonic  life.  This  may  in  part  result 
from  the  fact  that  a  point  which  suffered  injury  in  the  origin  of  the 
phenomenon,  afterwards  by  its  anomalous  growth,  affects  the  other 
points  of  the  organism  which  have  afterwards  to  be  developed.' 
His  Hisloire  des  Anomalies,  to  which  we  would  refer  the 
reader,  is  full  of  curious  facts,  well  fitted  to  stimulate  thought 
It  will  be  seen  that  insignificant  causes  are  sufficient  to  effect 
either  a  fusion  of  homologous  parts,  or  inequalities  of  develop- 
ment— checks  to  growth  '  which  make  anomalous  beings,  in  some 
respects,  permanent  embryos,  in  which  nature  has  halted  half-way.' 

In  presence  of  such  facts,  it  is  not  possible  to  accept  futile 
explanations  which  have  only  an  appearance  of  simplicity  :  for 
instance,  '  As  is  the  effect,  so  is  the  cause ;  there  must  exist  in  the 
cause  at  least  as  much  as  in  the  effect'  Such  explanations  are 
available  only  in  very  simple  cases,  or  at  best  in  complicated  cases 
of  a  purely  mechanical  kind.  According  to  a  profound  remark  of 
John  Stuart  Mill,  whenever  an  effect  is  the  result  of  sundry  causes 
(and  nothing  is  more  frequent  in  nature),  we  can  have  two  cases  : 


Exceptions  to  the  Law  of  Heredity.         207 

either  the  effect  is  produced  by  mechanical  laws  or  by  chemical 
laws.  In  the  case  of  mechanical  laws  each  cause  is  found  in  the 
complex  effect,  precisely  in  the  same  way  as  though  it  alone  had 
acted :  the  effect  of  concurrent  causes  is  exactly  the  sum  of  the 
separate  effects  of  eac"h.  On  the  other  hand,  the  chemical  com- 
bination of  two  substances  produces  a  third,  the  properties  of  which 
are  entirely  different  from  each  of  the  other  two,  whether  taken 
separately  or  together  :  thus,  a  knowledge  of  the  properties  of 
sulphur  and  oxygen  does  not  imply  a  knowledge  of  the  proper- 
ties of  sulphuric  acid.1  But  psychological  laws  are  analogous, 
now  to  mechanical,  now  to  chemical  laws.  It  is  even  prob- 
able that  the  greater  number  of  them  are  chemical.  Hence 
it  is  impossible  to  proceed  by  deduction  from  causes  to  effects. 
Here  experience  alone  can  guide  us.  It  is  curious  to  notice  that 
prior  to  the  discoveries  of  modern  chemistry  the  idea  of  a  total 
dissimilarity  between  causes  and  effects,  and,  what  is  still  more 
striking,  between  the  composite  and  its  component  parts,  seems  to 
have  been  unknown  to  science,  except  perhaps  the  dreams  of 
alchemists  about  the  transmutation  of  metals.  It  would  surely 
have  been  a  surprise  for  the  scientific  men  of  that  epoch  had  they 
been  told,  Here  is  oxygen,  a  gas  without  colour  or  odour,  com- 
bustible, and  the  active  agent  of  all  combustion ;  and  here  is 
hydrogen,  another  and  a  very  different  gas.  Combine  the  two  in 
definite  proportions,  and  you  will  get  a  liquid  which  may  be  either 
the  water  you  drink,  or  the  mist  on  which  is  painted  the  rainbow. 
The  chemistry  of  life,  by  showing  us  how  inorganic  matter  is  trans- 
formed into  the  plant,  the  plant  into  the  animal  ;  how  in  the 
animal  the  organic  matter  returns  by  death  to  the  inorganic  world 
to  recommence  its  course,  has  revealed  to  us  metamorphoses  far 
more  astounding  than  those  whose  explication  we  seek. 

We  may,  then,  regard  it  as  certain  that  in  the  domain  of  life 
(including  thought)  a  disproportion  often  exists  between  cause 
and  effect  which  cannot  be  foreseen  by  reasoning,  which  is  given 
us  only  by  experience,  and  that  it  is  a  wholly  gratuitous  assertion 
to  say,  There  is  too  much  difference  between  such  a  fact  and 
such  another — between  the  simplicity  of  the  one  and  the  com- 

1  Mill's  Logic,  book  vi.,  iv.,  and  book  iii.,  vi 
10 


2o8  Heredity. 

plexity  of  the  other — to  allow  of  the  one  being  the  cause  and  the 
other  the  effect. 

This  would  be  the  place  to  consider  the  famous  theory  of  the 
relations  between  genius  and  idiocy  and  insanity  (Moreau  of 
Tours,  Lelut).  In  it  we  should  find  many  arguments  for  our  thesis 
on  the  disproportion  between  effects  and  causes  in  the  physical 
world.  But  not  to  dwell  on  this  point,  we  confess  that  most  of  the 
criticisms  which  have  been  made  on  this  doctrine  do  not  appear 
very  conclusive.  If  the  authors  had  maintained  the  identity  of 
insanity  and  genius,  as  regards  the  facts  which  manifest  them — as, 
for  example,  that  the  lucubrations  of  a  madman  are  of  equal  value 
with  the  works  of  Newton,  or  of  Goethe — the  assertion  would  be 
so  monstrous  that  we  could  only  regard  it  as  a  joke.  But  what 
have  they  maintained?  That  the  secondary  causes,  the  organic 
conditions  of  genius  and  insanity,  seem  to  be  almost  identical ;  so 
that  it  is  only  by  reason  of  accessory  circumstances  that  a  certain 
nervous  organization  produces  grand,  artistic,  or  scientific  creations 
instead  of  expending  itself  on  the  dreams  of  a  madman. 

Plainly,  in  order  to  reach  a  conclusion  on  this  point  we  need  a 
large  number  of  well-attested,  well-interpreted,  and  well-verified 
facts.  But  the  only  arguments  that  have  been  brought  against  this 
thesis  are  sentimental  ones,  which  possibly  are  only  prejudices ; 
and  it  is  probable  that  if  we  knew  clearly  and  scientifically  the 
conditions  on  which  genius  is  produced,  we  should  find  much 
to  surprise  us. 

In  our  opinion,  what  has  excited  most  hostility  against  this 
doctrine  is  that  unconscious  materialism  which  leads  us  to  attach 
so  much  importance  to  the  organic  conditions  of  phenomena. 
But,  even  though  from  the  point  of  view  of  physiological  experi- 
ence there  existed  between  the  causes  of  insanity  and  those  of 
genius  only  insignificant  differences,  would  there  be  any  less 
difference  between  the  two  from  the  standpoint  of  psychological 
and  social  experience  ?  The  analogy  between  the  causes  would  in 
no  degree  change  the  enormous  difference  between  the  effects. 
Even  were  genius  the  result  of  a  certain  state  of  the  cerebral  mass, 
it  would,  nevertheless,  still  be  the  most  exalted  thing  in  the  world. 
The  diamond  has  not  lost  its  value  since  it  has  been  discovered 
that  it  is  carbon.  As  John  Stuart  Mill  well  says,  '  It  is  only  for 


Exceptions  to  the  Law  of  Heredity.         209 

low  minds  that  a  great  and  beautiful  object  loses  its  charm  by 
losing  somewhat  of  its  mystery,  and  discovering  a  part  of  the 
secret  process  whereby  nature  has  given  it  birth.' 

If  we  reflect  on  the  preceding  facts,  we  shall,  I  think,  agree  that 
the  exceptions  to  heredity,  great  as  they  may  be,  are  less  embarrass- 
ing than  at  first  they  seemed.  Suppose  two  children  as  different  as 
possible  in  psychical  constitution :  it  is  probable  that  if  we  could 
ascend  to  the  causes  of  these  differences,  we  should  find  them  very 
simple.  But  unfortunately  there  is  no  mental  chemistry  by  which 
we  can  transform  these  probabilities  into  certainty. 

v. 

We  will  now  examine  another  cause  of  deviation  from  hereditary 
type,  another  source  of  diversity  in  the  act  of  generation — the 
metamorphoses  or  transformations  of  heredity.  This  case  is  more 
simple  than  the  preceding,  to  which,  indeed,  it  may  be  referred  as 
a  species  to  its  genus.  Here  we  can  trace  the  course  of  heredity, 
because  the  transition  is  not  now  from  contrary  to  contrary,  but 
from  like  to  like ;  no  longer  from  genius  to  idiocy,  from  virtuous 
father  to  debauched  son ;  but  from  epilepsy  to  paralysis,  from 
eccentricity  to  insanity.  We  might  say  that  in  the  present  case 
there  are  partial  exceptions,  and  in  the  preceding  case  total  excep- 
tions, were  it  not  that  we  are  anxious  always  to  keep  in  view  the 
important  truth  that  there  is  never  a  total  exception  to  heredity,  the 
exceptions  to  it  never  going  beyond  the  individual  characteristics. 

The  study  of  the  transformations  of  heredity  has  been  made  in 
detail  by  Dr.  Moreau,  of  Tours,  in  his  Psychologic  Morbide.  To 
that  work  we  refer  the  reader  for  particulars,  and  here  extract  from 
it  only  the  facts  of  most  interest  for  psychology.1 

'  It  shows  an  incorrect  conception  of  the  law  of  heredity,'  says 
he,  'to  look  for  a  return  of  identical  phenomena  in  each  new 
generation.  There  are  some  who  have  refused  to  subject  mental 
faculties  to  heredity,  because  they  would  have  the  character  and 
intelligence  of  the  descendants  exactly  the  same  as  those  of  the 
progenitors ;  they  would  have  one  generation  the  copy  of  the 
other  that  went  before  it,  the  father  and  son  presenting  the  spec- 

1  Physiolo^ie  Morbide,  pp.  108 — 193. 


aio  Heredity. 

tacle  of  one  being — having  two  births,  and  each  time  leading  the 
same  life,  under  the  same  conditions.  But  it  is  not  in  the  identity 
of  functions,  or  of  organic  or  intellectual  facts  that  we  must  seek 
the  application  of  the  law  of  heredity,  but  at  the  very  fountain- 
head  of  the  organism,  in  its  inmost  constitution.  A  family  whose 
head  has  died  insane  or  epileptic,  does  not  of  necessity  consist  of 
lunatics  and  epileptics  ;  but  the  children  may  be  idiots,  paralytics, 
or  scrofulous.  What  the  father  transmits  to  the  children  is  not 
insanity,  but  a  vicious  constitution  which  will  manifest  itself  under 
various  forms,  in  epilepsy,  hysteria,  scrofula,  rickets.  Thus  it  is 
that  we  are  to  understand  hereditary  transmission.' 

Dr.  Morel,  in  his  Traite  des  Degenerescences,  published  at  about 
the  same  time,  says  in  much  the  same  terms  : — 

We  do  not  mean  exclusively  by  heredity  the  very  complaint  of  the 
parents  transmitted  to  the  children,  with  the  identical  symptoms, 
both  physical  and  moral,  observed  in  the  progenitors.  By  the 
term  heredity  we  understand  the  transmission  of  organic  dis- 
positions from  parents  to  children.  Mad  doctors  have,  perhaps, 
more  frequent  occasion  than  others  for  observing  this  hereditary 
transmission,  as  also  the  various  transformations  which  are  ex 
hibited  in  the  descendants.  They  are  aware  that  a  simple  neuro- 
pathic state  of  the  parents  may  produce  in  the  children  an  organic 
disposition  which  will  result  in  mania  or  melancholy — nervous 
affections  which  in  turn  may  give  rise  to  more  serious  degeneracy, 
and  terminate  in  the  idiocy  or  imbecility  of  those  who  form  the 
last  links  in  the  chain  of  hereditary  transmission.' 

Speaking  of  the  young  inmates  of  houses  of  correction,  Dr. 
Legrand  du  Saulle  calls  attention  to  an  entire  category  among 
them  of  '  creatures  who  are  whimsical,  irritable,  violent,  with  little 
intelligence,  refractory,  ungovernable  and  incorrigible.'  These  are 
the  children  '  sometimes  of  old  men,  blood  relations,  drunkards, 
epileptics,  or  lunatics.  Sometimes,  and  this  is  the  more  frequent 
case,  their  father  is  unknown,  and  their  mother  is  scrofulous, 
rickety,  hysterical,  a  prostitute,  or  a  lunatic.' l 

In  the  Psychologic  Morbide  will  be  found  several  cases  of  the 
transformation  of  heredity,  taken  from  pathology  and  from  history. 

1  Gazette  da  HSpitaux,  6  Oct.  1867. 


Exceptions  to  the  Law  of  Heredity.         211 

Many  of  the  biographical  facts  there  given  are  not  beyond  criti- 
cism, but  the  following  are  a  few  of  the  most  conclusive  : — 

Frederick  William  of  Prussia  was  the  victim  of  a  sort  of  insanity. 
He  was  an  excessive  drunkard,  eccentric,  brutal ;  he  several  times 
attempted  to  strangle  himself,  and  at  last  fell  into  a  profound 
hypochondria.  He  was  the  father  of  Frederick  the  Great. 

'  We  should  seek  in  vain,'  says  Dr.  Moreau,  '  for  a  more  striking 
proof  of  the  relations  subsisting  between  the  neuropathic  state 
and  certain  intellectual  and  affectional  states,  than  in  the  family  of 
Peter  the  Great.  Genius  of  the  highest  order,  imbecility,  virtues 
and  vices  carried  to  extremes ;  excessive  ferocity,  ungovernable 
maniacal  outbursts,  followed  by  remorse ;  habits  of  debauch,  pre- 
mature deaths,  epileptic  attacks — all  these  are  found  united  in  the 
Czar  Peter,  or  in  his  family.' 

The  Condes  offer  an  analogous  example.  Talent,  eccentricity, 
originality  of  character,  moral  perversity,  rickets,  and  insanity, 
stand  side  by  side,  or  succeed  one  another  in  the  most  unexpected 
way. 

We  may  recall  what  has  been  already  said  of  the  Pitt  family. 
Lady  Hester  Stanhope,  the  Sibyl  of  the  Lebanon,  her  father  Lord 
Stanhope,  her  grandfather  Lord  Chatham,  her  cousin  Lord  Camel- 
ford,  and  Pitt  her  uncle,  were  all  remarkable  for  their  genius,  their 
eccentricities,  or  their  extravagances. 

Tacitus  had  an  idiot  son.  The  gloomy  Louis  XI.  was  grandson 
of  Charles  VI.,  a  lunatic.  Hoffmann,  author  of  fantastic  stories, 
had  lunatics  in  his  family,  and  was  himself  subject  to  hallucinations. 

If  now  we  quit  the  ranks  of  illustrious  men,1  and  consider  those 
of  common  stamp,  we  shall  find  in  writers  on  insanity  a  great 
many  cases  of  transformations  of  heredity,  in  all  that  concerns  the 
psychical  faculties.  The  lypemania  of  parents  is  seen  to  become 
a  tendency  to  suicide  in  the  children ;  insanity  becomes  convul- 
sions or  epilepsy,  scrofula  is  replaced  by  rickets,  and  vice  versd. 

Fixed  ideas  in  the  progenitors  may  become  in  the  descendants 
melancholy,  taste  for  meditation,  aptitude  for  the  exact  sciences, 
energy  of  will,  etc.  The  mania  of  progenitors  may  be  changed  in 
the  descendants  into  aptitude  for  the  arts,  liveliness  of  imagination, 

1  For  further  details  see  Psychologie  Morbide,  3*  partie. 


212  Heredity. 

quickness  of  mind,  inconstancy  in  desires,  sudden  and  variable  will. 
Just  as  real  insanity,  says  Moreau  of  Tours,  may  be  hereditarily 
reproduced  only  under  the  form  of  eccentricity,  may  be  transmitted 
from  progenitors  to  descendants  only  in  modified  form,  and  in 
more  or  less  mitigated  character,  so  a  state  of  simple  eccentricity 
in  the  parents — a  state  which  is  no  more  than  a  peculiarity  or  a 
strangeness  of  character — may  in  the  children  be  the  origin  of 
true  insanity.  Thus,  in  these  transformations  of  heredity  we  some- 
times have  the  germ  attaining  its  maximum  intensity ;  and,  again, 
a  maximum  of  activity  may  revert  to  the  minimum. 

We  cannot  say  what  are  the  causes  of  these  metamorphoses, 
by  what  mysterious  transmutation  nature  thus  extracts  better  from 
worse  and  worse  from  better ;  for  the  question  is  beyond  the 
present  range  of  science.  We  cannot  tell  why  a  given  mode  of 
psychic  activity  is  transformed  in  process  of  transmission,  nor  why 
it  assumes  one  form  rather  than  another.  Were  the  solution  of 
the  problem  attainable,  it  would  doubtless  reveal  some  singular 
mysteries.  Thus  many  physiologists  have  thought  that  when  both 
parents  present  the  same  characteristics,  heredity  may  acquire  such 
power  as  to  destroy  itself.  Sedgwick  thinks  that  in  this  way  the 
fact  may  be  explained  that  two  deaf-mute  parents  oftentimes  give 
birth  to  children  that  can  hear.  In  truth,  we  can  only  ascer- 
tain the  facts :  but  this  is  quite  enough,  since  the  facts  show  by 
what  concurrence  of  fortuitous  circumstances  and  accidental  causes 
nature  produces  diversity. 

But  these  metamorphoses,  occurring  between  generation  and 
generation,  will  cause  us  less  surprise  if  we  bear  in  mind  that  they 
are  also  frequent  in  the  same  individual.  There  is  no  doubt  as 
to  this  point ;  pathology  supplies  countless  instances  of  it  To 
restrict  ourselves  to  mental  diseases  :  '  Madness,'  says  Esquirol, 
'  may  affect  all  forms,  either  successively  or  alternatively.  Mono- 
mania, mania,  and  dementia,  alternately  replace  one  another  in 
the  same  individual.'  Thus  a  lunatic  will  pass  three  months  in 
lypemania,  the  following  three  months  in  mania,  four  months  in 
dementia,  and  so  on  in  succession,  now  in  regular  order,  anon 
with  great  variations.  A  lady,  fifty-four  years  old,  is  one  year  lype- 
maniac,  and  the  next  year  maniacal  and  hysterical.  Often,  in  the 
same  subject  convulsions  are  seen  to  pass  into  epilepsy,  epilepsy 


Exceptions  to  the  Law  of  Heredity,         213 

into  hysteria,  and  vice  vcrsb;  or  lypemania  will  take  the  place  of 
pulmonary  consumption,  hysteria,  hypochondria,  epilepsy. 

To  sum  up  briefly  what  has  been  said  :  M.  Lemoine,  in  his 
study  on  Morbid  Psychology,  has  made  a  very  just  criticism  on 
this  resort  to  two  laws,  the  one  of  spontaneity  and  the  other  of 
heredity,  both  reciprocally  supplying  each  other's  defects.  '  When 
the  one  is  at  fault,'  says  he,  '  and  puts  the  system  in  danger  of 
failure,  the  other  is  hastily  adduced,  and  everything  is  set  right 
with  a  word.  A  madman's  son  is  a  madman :  the  law  of  heredity 
is  invoked  to  explain  his  insanity.  An  idiot  is  born  of  parents 
and  descends  from  ancestors  who  are  all  of  sound  body  and  mind : 
spontaneity  is  invoked  to  account  for  the  fact'  We  hold,  with 
Lemoine,  that  spontaneity  thus  understood  is  an  occult  quality,  an 
explanation  that  explains  nothing,  like  the  Quia  est  in  eo  virtus 
dormitiva. 

But  M.  Lemoine,  speaking  of  the  reduction  of  spontaneity  to 
heredity,  adds  :  '  The  reduction  of  these  two  laws  to  one  is  rather 
ingenious  than  legitimate,  for  it  appears  to  me  that  the  law  of 
spontaneity  should  rather  absorb  the  law  of  heredity.  If  we 
ascend  from  generation  to  generation,  we  certainly  do  not  always 
find  lunatics  the  children  of  lunatics,  or  idiots  the  children  of 
epileptics.  But  at  length  we  shall  be  more  fortunate;  probably 
in  the  distant  past,  not  so  far  back  as  the  deluge,  we  shall  find  a 
lunatic,  or  epileptic,  or  idiot,  who  is  the  child  of  parents  and 
ancestors,  sound  of  mind  and  body — in  short,  an  idiosyncrasy. 
This  idiosyncrasy,  whatever  it  may  be,  is  the  starting-point,  is  the 
pattern  after  which  nature  has  fashioned  all  the  descending  gen- 
erations. In  creating  this  first  case  of  disease,  whensoever  it 
appeared,  nature  acted  freely.  On  the  contrary,  when  she  trans- 
mits disease  as  a  heritage  from  fathers  to  children,  she  does  but 
imitate  herself,  and  copy  her  own  model.  The  law  of  spontaneity 
explains  the  law  of  heredity,  instead  of  being  explained  by  it,  if, 
indeed,  it  explains  anything.' 

To  our  mind  there  is  here  a  confusion  of  two  questions,  which 
it  is  important  for  us  to  notice  :  a  metaphysical  question  regarding 
the  first  cause,  and  a  scientific  question  concerning  secondary 
causes. 

If  we  take  metaphysical  and  transcendental  ground — which  we 


214  -Heredity. 

do  not  here  propose  to  do — spontaneity  undoubtedly  takes  prece- 
dence of  heredity,  since  it  is  clear  that  the  derivative  presupposes 
the  primitive,  and  the  imitation  presupposes  the  model. 

But  if,  as  now,  we  take  our  stand  on  the  ground  of  science  and 
experiment,  heredity  becomes  the  only  law ;  for  it  alone  has  a 
character  of  constancy,  fixedness ;  and  because  it  alone  is  reducible 
to  formulas.  Whether  we  admit  with  Lamarck  the  spontaneity  of 
a  single  type,  or  with  Darwin  of  three  or  four  types,  or  of  a  very 
great  number  with  Cuvier,  so  soon  as  we  quit  that  region  of  origins 
and  enter  the  domain  of  experience  we  see  that  nothing  subsists 
except  by  heredity. 

We  have,  therefore,  to  return  to  our  starting-point  Heredity  is 
the  law.  It  is  no  d  priori  conception,  any  more  than  the  axiom, 
like  produces  like.  It  is  the  accumulated  and  generalized  result 
of  an  innumerable  mass  of  experiences.  Facts  prove  that  between 
the  partus  and  the  parens  there  is  never  anything  more  than 
individual  differences,  and  that  the  immense  majority  of  character- 
istics is  always  inherited.  Thus,  according  to  the  standpoint  which 
we  take,  it  is  equally  true  to  say  that  the  law  of  heredity  is  always 
realized,  and  that  it  is  never  realized.  The  heredity  of  the  greater 
share  of  the  characteristics  is  a  thing  of  universal  occurrence ;  but 
the  heredity  of  the  sum  of  all  the  characteristics  is  never  found. 
So  that  heredity,  while  it  is  the  law,  is  always  the  exception.  But 
no  argument  can  be  drawn  from  this;  for  it  is  a  logical  necessity 
that  where  the  conditions  of  a  law  are  not  completely  realized  the 
law  cannot  attain  its  ideal. 


PART    THIRD. 
THE   CAUSES. 

Die  Materialisten  benuihen  sich  zu  zeigen  dass  alle  Phcenomene,  auch  die 
geistigen,  physisch  sind :  mit  Recht ;  nur  sehen  sie  nicht  ein,  dass  alles  Physiche 
andererseits  zugleich  ein  Metaphysisches  1st — Schofcnhtmer. 


CHAPTER  L 

GENERAL   RELATIONS    BETWEEN  THE   PHYSICAL   AND   THE   MORAL. 

L 

To  inquire  into  causes  we  must  hazard  hypotheses.  This  cannot 
be  avoided;  for  though  science  begins  with  the  investigation  of 
laws,  it  is  perfected  only  in  the  determination  of  causes.  Here, 
too,  as  in  every  experimental  study,  we  have  only  to  deal  with 
secondary  and  immediate  causes,  or,  in  plainer  terms,  with  in- 
variable antecedents.  As  far  as  our  purpose  is  concerned,  to 
explain  physiological  heredity  means  to  define  an  aggregate  of 
conditions,  of  such  a  nature  that  if  these  conditions  are  present 
heredity  necessarily  follows,  and  when  they  are  wanting  heredity 
is  invariably  wanting.  In  what  follows,  therefore,  there  is  no 
question  of  ultimate  causes ;  and,  without  inquiring  here  whether 
they  are  accessible  or  inaccessible  to  the  human  mind,  we  shall 
never  speak  of  them  except  with  the  admission  that  we  are 
entering  on  hypotheses. 

Heredity  is  only  a  special  case  of  the  great  problem  of  the 
relations  between  physics  and  morals,  as  will  more  clearly  appear 
in  the  course  of  this  work.  We  can,  however,  note  in  advance, 
in  a  more  precise  way,  the  position  of  our  question,  by  observing 
that  every  inquiry  into  the  relations  between  physics  and  morals 
necessarily  comprises  two  parts,  the  influence  of  the  moral  on  the 
physical,  and  the  influence  of  the  physical  on  the  moral.  The  pro- 
blem of  heredity  is  concerned  only  with  the  latter.  The  influence 
of  physics  on  morals  manifests  itself  in  many  ways,  of  which  we 
here  consider  one  only,  heredity.  With  this  explanation  we  can  now 
indicate  the  line  of  inquiry  we  shall  follow  in  our  study  of  causes. 

We  shall,  in  the  first  place,  examine  in  a  very  general  way  the 
relations  between  the  physical  and  the  moral,  as  the  problem  in 
its  most  general  form  necessarily  governs  all  the  particular  cases. 


2 1 8  Heredity. 

Then,  passing  from  the  abstract  to  the  concrete,  from  theory  to 
experience,  we  shall  strive  to  show  that  every  mental  state  implies 
a  corresponding  physical  state. 

Thence  we  shall  draw  the  conclusion  that  an  habitual  mental 
state,  such  as  psychological  heredity,  must  have  as  its  condition 
an  habitual  physical  state,  such  as  physiological  heredity. 

In  the  seventeenth  century,  the  question  of  the  '  union  of  soul 
and  body '  was  put  in  a  form  which  rendered  it  insoluble.  It  was 
a  problem  of  metaphysics.  There  were  held  to  be  two  substances, 
body  and  mind ;  between  the  two  an  abyss.  All  their  character- 
istics were  opposed ;  then,  as  was  to  have  been  expected,  it  was 
found  impossible  to  join  together  again  what  had  been  so 
thoroughly  sundered. 

Since  the  time  when  the  progress  of  physiology  showed  that  the 
nervous  system  is  the  physical  condition  of  moral  phenomena,  and 
that  every  variation  in  the  one  is  coupled  with  a  variation  in  the 
other,  researches  into  the  correlation  of  the  physical  and  the 
moral  have  had  a  firm  basis,  for  the  reason  that  it  has  been 
possible  to  rest  them  on  a  something  which  is  the  body,  even 
while  it  is  the  instrument  of  the  soul.  Thus  is  explained  the 
invasion,  ever  widening  since  the  seventeenth  century,  of  neurology 
into  psychology. 

Nor  is  this  all.  A  further  step  in  progress,  which  now  appears 
to  have  been  made  by  all  partisans  of  experimental  inquiry, 
consists  in  substituting  for  the  metaphysical  the  experimental 
point  of  view,  and  for  the  antithesis  of  two  substances  the  anti- 
thesis of  two  groups  of  phenomena.  Hence  the  problem  is  no 
longer  the  relations  between  body  and  soul,  but  the  relations 
between  a  group  of  phenomena  pertaining  to  the  unit  which  we 
call  life,  and  the  group  pertaining  to  the  unit  called  the  ego.  It  is 
true  that  this  way  of  putting  the  question  simplifies  it  only  by 
making  it  insoluble ;  for  when  we  restrict  ourselves  to  experience, 
we  renounce  in  advance  all  ultimate  and  absolute  reason.  But  as 
the  experimental  sciences  are  strictly  speaking  made  up  of  two 
things — facts  and  hypotheses — and  as  the  human  mind  has  an  in- 
vincible tendency  always  to  sacrifice  the  facts  to  the  hypotheses, 
we,  if  we  resist  this  tendency,  run  the  risk  of  throwing  away 
the  booty  for  its  shadow. 


Relations  bet-ivccn  the  Physical  and  the  Moral.    219 

For  us,  who  desire  as  far  as  possible  to  adhere  to  facts,  it  is  clear 
that  we  can  examine  the  general  relations  of  the  physical  and 
moral  only  under  the  experimental  form.  But  when  we  try  to 
state  the  question  without  any  of  the  prejudices  of  the  average 
mind,  which  render  it  equivocal,  or  of  metaphysics,  which  render 
it  insoluble,  the  only  tolerably  precise  formula  we  get  is  this  :  We 
distinguish  in  ourselves  two  groups  of  phenomena  or  operations ; 
those  in  one  group  are  conceived  as  external,  unconscious,  subject 
to  the  twofold  condition  of  space  and  time ;  those  in  the  other  as 
conscious,  internal,  and  successive.  The  correlation  which  we 
discern  between  the  two  groups  consists  in  this,  that  certain  modes 
of  existence  in  one  group  are  the  habitual  antecedents  of  certain 
modes  of  existence  in  the  other ;  for  example,  that  sum  of  states 
of  consciousness  which  we  call  a  pain  is  accompanied  by  certain 
states  of  the  organism,  motion,  play  of  the  physiognomy,  states  of 
the  viscera,  and  vice  versA.  A  little  belladonna,  opium,  or  even 
alcohol,  introduced  into  the  circulation,  produces  certain  deter- 
minate states  of  consciousness ;  in  a  word,  we  observe  between 
the  two  groups  of  phenomena  relations,  whether  of  invariable  co- 
existence or  of  invariable  succession.  It  appears  to  us  that  this 
is  the  only  clear  and  unambiguous  way  of  putting  the  question  with 
which  we  are  now  occupied.  Finally,  when  we  strive  to  get  a  nearer 
view  of  the  opposition  between  the  two  groups,  we  find  that  the 
higher  or  psychological  group  has  for  its  fundamental  character  con- 
sciousness ;  and  thus  the  antithesis  of  physical  and  moral  may 
without  too  great  inaccuracy  be  regarded  as  the  antithesis  of  the 
conscious  and  the  unconscious.  If,  therefore,  we  should  succeed 
in  showing  that  this  attribute  of  consciousness  which  characterizes 
one  of  the  groups,  and  which  consequently  differentiates  the  two 
groups,  does  not  belong  to  the  higher  group  so  essentially  or  so 
exclusively  as  it  seems ;  if  we  succeed  in  showing  that  operations 
which  are  considered  specially  psychological,  such  as  feeling,  enjoy- 
ing, suffering,  loving,  judging,  reasoning,  willing  can  in  some  cases 
be  either  absolutely  or  relatively  unconscious,  then  the  antithesis 
of  physical  and  moral  instead  of  being  absolute  would  become 
relative,  and  the  problem  would  present  itself  under  a  new  aspect 
With  a  view  to  resolve  it,  we  will  endeavour  to  penetrate  into  the 
mysterious  region  of  the  unconscious. 


220  Heredity. 


IL 

The  psychological  study  of  unconscious  phenomena  dates  from 
scarcely  half  a  century  back,  and  is  yet  in  its  first  stages.  The 
school  of  Descartes  and  that  of  Locke — that  is  to  say,  the  whole 
seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries — expressly  held  that  psych- 
ology has  the  same  limits  as  consciousness,  and  ends  with  it  What 
lies  without  consciousness  is  remanded  to  physiology,  and  between 
the  two  sciences  the  line  of  demarcation  is  absolute.  Consequently, 
all  those  penumbral  phenomena  which  form  the  transition  from 
clear  consciousness  to  perfect  unconsciousness  were  forgotten,  and 
not  without  injurious  consequences,  for  hence  came  superficial 
explanations,  and  insufficient  and  incomplete  views.  The  nature 
of  things  cannot  be  violated  with  impunity ;  and  as  everything  in 
nature  forms  series,  continuity,  insensible  transitions,  our  sharp 
divisions  are  always  false.  If  we  did  not  lose  sight  of  the  fact  that 
our  subdivisions  of  universal  science  into  particular  sciences,  how- 
ever useful  and  even  indispensable,  are  always  artificial  and  arbU 
trary  on  one  side  or  another,  we  should  be  saved  much  idle  dis- 
cussion. Thus,  as  regards  the  unconscious  phenomena  which 
pertain  at  once  to  physiology  and  psychology,  it  makes  very  little 
difference  which  of  these  two  sciences  is  occupied  with  them, 
provided  only  that  they  be  studied,  and  studied  well. 

Leibnitz  alone  in  the  seventeenth  century  saw  the  importance  of 
this.  Less  was  not  to  be  expected  of  the  inventor  of  the  infini- 
tesimal calculus,  the  apologist  of  the  Lex  continui  in  naiura,  the 
man  who  in  the  highest  degree  possessed  the  faculty  of  insight 
By  his  distinction  between  perception  (conscious)  and  apperception 
(unconscious),  he  opened  up  a  road  on  which  in  our  times  most 
physiologists  and  psychologists  have  somewhat  tardily  entered. 
There  is,  however,  as  yet  no  comprehensive  work  on  this  question,1 
and  the  undertaking  would  be  no  light  one ;  for  a  psychology  of 


1  The  completes!  and  most  recent  work  on  this  subject  is  Hartmann's 
Philosophy  of  the  Unconscious  {Philosophic  des  Unbcwussten,  Versuch  einer  Welt- 
ansckauung,  Berlin,  1869).  The  author  takes  a  metaphysical  point  of  view 
close  to  that  of  Schelling  and  Schopenhauer  ;  but  he  gives  a  good  number  of 
facts,  some  of  which  will  be  hereafter  quoted. 


Relations  between  the  Physical  and  the  Moral.    221 

the  unconscious  would  have  the  same  limits,  and  the  same  extent 
as  ordinary  psychology.  It  would  be  necessary  to  show — at  least, 
as  we  view  the  matter — that  most,  if  not  all,  of  the  operations 
of  the  soul  may  be  produced  under  a  twofold  form  ;  that  there  are 
in  us  two  parallel  modes  of  activity,  the  one  conscious,  and  the 
other  unconscious.  This  study  would  require  a  volume.  For  our 
purpose  it  will  suffice  here  to  show  by  some  positive  facts  what 
this  unconscious  activity  is,  and  in  what  degree  it  can  explain  the 
correlation  of  the  physical  and  the  moral. 

Passing  from  the  simple  to  the  composite,  from  reflex  action  to 
unconscious  cerebration,  we  will  address  our  study  of  the  uncon- 
scious to  the  nerve-centres  in  the  following  order,  viz.  spinal  cord, 
rachidian  bulb,  annular  protuberance,  cerebellum,  cerebral  hemi- 
spheres. 

i.  The  spinal  cord  is  regarded  by  physiologists  under  a  two- 
fold aspect :  as  a  conducting  cord  it  transmits  sensations  to  the 
brain,  and  brings  back  thence  motor  excitations ;  as  nerve-centre 
it  is  the  seat  of  reflex  action.  Simple  reflex  action,  which  we  may 
define  to  be  a  simple  excitation  followed  by  a  simple  contraction, 
is  the  first  act  of  automatism,  or  of  unconsciousness,  that  presents 
itself  to  us.  Reflex  action  consists  essentially  in  movement  in 
a  part  of  the  body,  called  forth  by  an  excitation  coming  from  that 
part,  and  acting  through  the  intermediary  of  some  nerve-centre 
other  than  the  brain.  Proschaska,  who  was  the  first  to  study  these 
movements,  called  them  *  phenomena  of  reflection  of  sensitive  im- 
pressions in  motor  impressions.' 

If  we  examine  here,  from  our  own  point  of  view,  the  reflex  actions 
whereof  the  spinal  cord  is  the  centre,  we  shall  find  that  their 
distinctive  character  is  that  they  are  automatic,  unconscious,  and, 
what  concerns  us  far  more  closely,  co-ordinated.  *  In  those  purely 
reflex  reactions,'  says  Luys,  'which,  owing  to  their  automatism, 
possess  that  determined  and  necessary  character  which  is  peculiar  to 
the  mechanical  contrivances  of  human  industry,  everything  betrays 
a  sort  of  predestined  consensus  between  the  centripetal  impression 
and  the  centrifugal  action  which  it  calls  forth,  so  essential  to  them 
is  it  to  be  regular  and  co-ordinate.' l  A  few  facts  will  place  this  in 

1  Rxherchcs  sur  It  System:  Ncrveux,  p.  280. 


222  Heredity. 

clearer  light  If,  after  having  cut  off  the  head  of  a  frog,  we  pinch 
any  part  of  its  skin,  the  animal  at  once  begins  to  move  away,  with 
the  same  regularity  as  though  the  brain  had  not  been  removed. 
Flourens  took  guinea-pigs,  deprived  them  of  the  cerebral  lobes, 
and  then  irritated  their  skin :  the  animals  immediately  walked, 
leaped,  and  trotted  about,  but  when  the  irritation  was  discontinued 
they  ceased  to  move.  Headless  birds,  under  excitation,  can  still 
perform  with  their  wings  the  rhythmic  movements  of  flying.  But 
here  are  some  facts  more  curious  still,  and  more  difficult  of  explan- 
ation. If  we  take  a  frog,  or  a  strong  and  healthy  triton,  and  sub- 
ject it  to  various  experiments;  if  we  touch,  pinch,  or  burn  it  with 
acetic  acid  ;  and  if  then,  after  decapitating  the  animal,  we  subject 
it  again  to  the  same  experiments,  it  will  be  seen  that  the  reactions 
are  exactly  the  same ;  it  will  strive  to  be  free  of  the  pain,  to  shake 
off  the  acetic  acid  that  is  burning  it ;  it  will  bring  its  foot  up  to  the 
part  of  its  body  that  is  irritated,  and  this  movement  of  the  member 
will  follow  the  irritation  wherever  it  may  be  produced.1  We  can 
hardly  say  that  here  the  movements  are  co-ordinated  like  those  of 
a  machine ;  the  acts  of  the  animal  are  adapted  to  a  special  end ; 
we  find  in  them  the  characters  of  intelligence  and  will,  a  know- 
ledge and  choice  of  means,  since  they  are  as  variable  as  the  cause 
which  provokes  them. 

If,  then,  these  and  similar  acts  were  such  that  both  the  impres- 
sions which  produce  them  and  the  acts  themselves  were  perceived 
by  the  animal,  would  they  not  be  called  psychological  ?  Is  there 
not  in  them  all  that  constitutes  an  intelligent  act,  adaptation  of 
means  to  ends,  not  a  general  and  vague  adaptation,  but  a  deter- 
minate adaptation  to  a  determinate  end  ?  In  the  reflex  action  we 
find  all  that  constitutes,  in  some  sort,  the  very  groundwork  of  an 
intelligent  act — that  is  to  say,  the  same  series  of  stages,  in  the  same 
order,  with  the  same  relations  between  them.  We  have  thus  in 
the  reflex  action  all  that  constitutes  the  psychologic  act  except 
consciousness.  The  reflex  act,  which  is  physiological,  differs  in 
nothing  from  the  psychological  act,  save  only  in  this,  that  it  is  with- 
out consciousness. 

1  For  further  details  see  Vulpian,  Pkysiologie  du  Systtme  Nerveux,  pp. 
417 — 428  ;  it  will  there  be  seen  that  headless  animals  act  precisely  as  though 
they  had  heads.  See  also  Despine,  Psychologie  Naturdle,  tome  i.  ch.  vii. 


Relations  between  the  Physical  and  the  Moral.    223 

On  this  obscure  problem  some  say  that  'where  there  can  be  no 
consciousness,  because  the  brain  is  wanting,  there  is,  in  spite  of 
appearances,  only  mechanism.'  Others  say  that  '  where  there  is 
clearly  selection,  reflection,  psychical  action,  there  must  also  be 
consciousness,  in  spite  of  appearances.'  For  the  present,  we  will 
not  join  in  this  discussion.  A  German  physiologist,  however, 
quoted  by  Wundt,  holds  that  he  has  by  the  following  experiment 
proved  the  absence  of  all  consciousness  in  the  spinal  cord.  He 
takes  two  frogs,  the  one  blinded,  in  order  to  diminish  the  number 
of  impressions  from  without,  and  the  other  without  its  head.  He 
places  them  in  a  vessel  containing  water  at  20°  Cent  of  tem- 
perature ;  the  two  frogs  remain  perfectly  quiet  in  their  warm  bath, 
But  he  gradually  heats  the  water  in  the  vessel,  and  then  the  scene 
changes.  The  non-decapitated  frog  appears  to  be  ill  at  ease, 
changes  its  place,  breathes  with  difficulty,  and  its  sufferings  become 
greater  as  the  temperature  rises.  At  30°  it  makes  all  possible 
efforts  to  escape ;  finally,  at  33°  it  dies  of  tetanic  convulsions.  In 
the  mean  time,  the  headless  frog  remains  quietly  in  its  place ;  '  the 
spinal  cord  slumbers,  it  does  not  perceive  the  danger.'  The  tem- 
perature goes  on  rising,  the  other  frog  is  now  dead,  and  still  the 
headless  one  continues  motionless.  Finally  at  45°  its  carcase  rises 
to  the  surface,  '  it  is  as  stiff  as  a  board.' 

Yet,  perhaps,  as  Wundt  observes,  this  experiment  is  not  de- 
cisive ;  first,  because  other  experiments  have  given  the  opposite 
results.  Moreover,  the  development  of  consciousness  must  neces- 
sarily depend  on  the  entire  organization,  and  it  is  quite  possible 
that  if  a  headless  animal  could  live  a  sufficient  length  of  time 
there  would  be  formed  in  it  a  consciousness  like  that  of  the  lower 
species,  which  would  consist  merely  of  the  faculty  of  appre- 
hending the  external  world.  It  would  not  be  correct  to  say  that 
the  amphioxus,  the  only  one  among  fishes  and  vertebrata  which 
has  a  spinal  cord  without  a  brain,  has  no  consciousness  because 
it  has  no  brain ;  and  if  it  be  admitted  that  the  little  ganglia  of  the 
invertebrata  can  form  a  consciousness,  the  same  may  hold  good 
for  the  spinal  cord. 

But  not  to  insist  on  a  point  which  cannot  here  be  profitably 
discussed,  we  go  on  with  our  study  of  the  phenomena  of  uncon- 
sciousness. 


224  Heredity. 

a.  The  grey  substance  of  the  medulla  oblongata  has  higher  and 
more  intelligent  functions  than  those  of  the  spinal  cord.  It 
governs  certain  muscular  co-ordinated  contractions  which  do  not 
depend  on  the  will,  and  which  are  often  unconscious ;  these  acts 
are  respiration,  deglutition,  simple  exclamation,  sneezing,  coughing, 
yawning,  and  those  muscular  contractions  which  constitute  the 
play  of  the  physiognomy. 

If  to  the  spinal  cord  and  the  medulla  oblongata  we  add  the 
annular  protuberance,  removing  all  the  rest  of  the  encephalon, 
the  automatic  acts  produced  are  still  more  remarkable.  Animals 
thus  treated  utter,  when  pinched,  plaintive  cries,  having  the  true 
expression  of  pain.  A  rat  with  the  cerebral  hemispheres  removed 
makes  a  sudden  jump  when  one  comes  near  him,  and  imitates  the 
'  spitting '  of  an  angry  cat  Dogs  and  cats  with  the  cerebral 
lobes  removed  will,  if  a  decoction  of  colocynth  be  poured  down 
their  throats,  make  grimaces  with  their  lips  as  though  they  would 
free  themselves  from  a  disagreeable  sensation.  Thus,  then,  the 
nerve-centres  we  have  enumerated  produce,  in  the  absence  of  the 
brain,  unconscious  sensations  of  pleasure  and  of  pain,  of  hearing 
and  of  taste. 

If  to  these  we  add  the  tubercula  quadrigemina  we  shall  have 
unconscious  visual  sensations.  A  pigeon  with  the  cerebral  hemi- 
spheres removed  makes  a  movement  of  the  head  as  though  to 
avoid  a  danger  that  threatens,  when  the  fist  is  suddenly  brought 
close  to  it  An  experiment  first  made  by  Longet  shows  that  the 
pigeon  follows  with  its  head  the  motions  given  to  a  lighted 
candle. 

All  these  phenomena  are  of  the  same  nature  as  those  which 
depend  on  the  spinal  cord,  and  suggest  the  same  reflections. 
They  are  intelligent — that  is  to  say,  adapted  to  an  end.  At  bottom 
they  are  identical  with  physiological  acts,  and  differ  from  them 
only  by  this  one  character,  that  they  are  unconscious,  or  reputed 
as  such. 

3.  The  same  remark  also  applies  to  the  automatic  phenomena 
dependent  on  the  cerebellum.  The  function  of  that  organ  seems 
to  consist  in  co-ordinating  the  muscular  contractions  which  produce 
the  various  movements — 'a  co-ordination  which  requires  infinite 
science,  that  is  utterly  ignored  by  the  mind.'  'I  have  often,' 


Relations  between  the  Physical  and  the  Moral.    225 

says  Despine,1  'admired  this  automatic  science,  when  seeing  a 
dog  follow  his  master's  carriage,  leaping  in  front  of  the  horse, 
passing  between  the  wheels,  while  they  are  revolving  at  every  rate 
of  speed ;  and  all  this  without  ever  being  touched  either  by  the 
wheels  or  by  the  horse's  feet  What  mathematical  precision 
there  must  be  in  the  action  of  the  numerous  muscles  which 
concur  to  execute  all  these  movements  !  It  all  occurs  without 
the  volition  of  the  animal,  nor  does  he  know  how  he  performs  it 
In  man  this  automatic  science  strikes  us  as  more  wonderful  still. 
Instrumentalists  whose  cerebellum  is  imperfect  never  can  per- 
form a  piece  of  music  as  they  think  it  ought  to  be  performed. 
Some  highly  intelligent  men  are  very  awkward,  while  other  men 
of  very  moderate  intelligence  are  possessed  of  very  remarkable 
dexterity ;  in  point  of  address  some  inferior  races  may  equal 
superior  ones.  To  be  a  good  horseman,  a  good  juggler,  a  good 
rope-dancer,  a  good  shot,  the  commonest  grade  of  intelligence 
suffices;  but  there  is  need  of  very  perfect  automatic  organs.  It 
is  not  the  shape  of  the  hand  that  gives  dexterity ;  some  hands 
that  are  very  well  formed  are  yet  very  unskilful,  while  some  ill- 
shaped  hands  perform  prodigies  of  dexterity.  The  hand  and  the 
fingers  are  only  the  instrument  that  operates.' 

To  all  these  facts,  which  appear  to  denote  an  unconscious 
intelligence  seated  in  the  organism,  and  which  we  have  referred 
to  distinct  nerve-centres,  we  might  add  others  no  less  curious; 
such  as  the  tendency  by  which  the  living  thing  attains  its  typical 
form,  or,  in  case  of  lesions,  restores  and  completes  it.  Some 
physiologists,  Burdach  for  instance,  see  in  this  an  unconscious 
instinct  of  individual  conservation  ;  but  most  authors  simply  state 
these  facts  without  explanation.  We  will  not  insist  upon  them, 
so  that  we  may  the  sooner  arrive  at  the  unconscious  operations 
of  the  brain. 

4.  Automatism  was  long  considered  as  appertaining  exclusively 
to  the  spinal  cord  and  to  the  secondary  nerve-centres.  In 
England,  it  has  been  chiefly  the  researches  of  Carpenter  and  Lay- 
cock  which  have  proved  that  the  brain  also  possesses  an  auto- 
matic activity  of  its  own,  which  they  have  called  'unconscious 

1  Psychologie  Naturell?,  voL  L  p.  485. 


226  Heredity. 

cerebration,'  or,  '  the  soul's  preconscious  activity.'  Here  we  touch 
the  quick  of  our  subject,  since  the  brain,  or  at  least  the  ganglionic 
matter  spread  over  the  surface  of  the  hemispheres,  is  the  seat  of 
the  highest  and  most  complex  psychological  operations.  But,  as 
we  have  already  remarked,  there  is  no  mode  of  mental  activity 
which  may  not  be  produced  under  its  unconscious  form.  Facts 
will  prove  this. 

But  how  are  we  to  study  these  phenomena  if  they  are  with- 
drawn from  our  direct  observation  ?  if,  on  the  one  hand,  they  are 
cognizable  only  by  the  consciousness,  and  if,  on  the  other,  they 
lie  outside  of  consciousness  ?  We  do  not  profess  here  to  sketch  a 
method  whose  processes  vary,  of  necessity,  according  to  the  cases. 
Most  commonly  we  reach  them  by  induction,  advancing  from  the 
known  to  the  unknown.  We  arrive  at  the  unconscious  by  ascer- 
taining the  influence  it  may  have  on  conscious  life,  just  as  we 
discover  an  invisible  planet  by  the  perturbations  it  produces.  We 
infer  the  unconscious  from  its  well-ascertained  conscious  results. 
If  I  am  a  somnambulist,  and  rise  from  my  bed  at  night,  dress 
myself,  and  sit  me  down  at  a  table  to  write  verses,  I  must,  when 
I  wake  next  day,  admit  that  I  am  the  author,  because  I  see  them 
in  my  own  handwriting,  though  I  may  have  no  recollection  of 
what  has  occurred;  in  other  words,  I  infer,  from  the  material 
result  before  my  eyes,  that  my  mind  must  have  performed,  in  a 
certain  interval  of  time,  a  certain  number  of  very  complicated 
operations  which  differ  from  ordinary  psychological  work  in  only 
one  point,  viz.  that  they  are  effected  without  consciousness. 

On  entering  upon  the  study  of  the  facts,  we  meet  with  a  group 
of  morbid  states,  comprising  natural  and  artificial  somnambulism, 
ecstasy,  catalepsy — all  facts  so  common  that  there  is  no  need  to 
describe  them.  '  There  are  well-authenticated  cases  in  which  auto- 
matic action  of  this  kind  has  not  only  produced  results  perfect  of 
themselves,  but  has  produced  them  by  a  shorter  and  more  direct 
process  than  would  have  been  thought  possible  in  the  waking  state. 
The  absence  of  every  distracting  influence  seems  to  favour  the 
uninterrupted  action  of  the  mental  mechanism,  if  the  phrase  is 
permissible.'  (Carpenter.)  A  thing  not  so  well  known  is,  that  in 
a  certain  form  of  epilepsy  the  patient  often  goes  on  doing  auto- 
matically, though  consciousness  is  abolished,  what  he  was  doing  at 


Relations  between  the  Physical  and  the  Moral.    227 

the  instant  of  the  attack.  Schrceder  van  der  Kolk  knew  a  woman 
who  went  on  eating,  drinking,  or  working,  and  who,  on  coming  to 
her  senses,  had  no  recollection  of  what  she  had  done.  Trous- 
seau1 speaks  of  a  young  musician  subject  to  epileptic  vertigo, 
attacks  of  which  lasted  from  ten  to  fifteen  minutes,  and  who, 
during  that  interval,  would  continue  playing  the  violin  uncon- 
sciously. An  architect  who  had  long  been  subject  to  epilepsy  was 
not  afraid  to  mount  the  highest  scaffoldings,  though  he  had  often 
had  attacks  when  walking  on  narrow  planks  at  great  heights. 
No  accident  ever  befell  him  ;  when  the  attack  came  on  he  ran 
swiftly  along  the  scaffolds,  shouting  his  own  name  at  the  top  of 
his  voice.  A  few  seconds  later  he  would  come  to  himself,  and 
would  then  give  his  orders  to  the  workmen.  He  would  have 
had  no  idea  of  the  strange  way  in  which  he  had  acted,  had  he 
not  been  told  of  it. 

If  now  we  pass  from  the  morbid  to  the  normal  state,  and  review 
all  the  forms  of  mental  activity,  distinguishing  each  after  the  man- 
ner of  analytical  psychology,  we  shall  see  that  for  every  conscious 
form  there  is  a  corresponding  unconscious  one. 

The  first  forms  of  unconscious  life  must  be  sought  for  in  the 
foetal  life — a  subject  full  of  obscurity,  and  very  little  studied  from 
the  psychological  point  of  view.  We  may  hold,  with  Bichat  and 
Cabanis,  that  though  the  external  senses  are  in  the  foetus  in  a  state 
of  torpor,  and  though  in  the  constant  temperature  of  the  amniotic 
fluid  the  general  sensibility  of  the  foetus  is  almost  null,  still  its 
brain  has  already  exercised  perception  and  will,  as  seems  to  be 
evidenced  by  the  movements  of  the  foetus  during  the  last  months 
of  pregnancy. 

But  to  take  simply  the  adult  man  or  animal.  We  shall  first  find, 
at  the  common  frontiers  of  physiology  and  psychology,  a  notable 
group,  that  of  the  instincts,  which  of  themselves  alone  constitute 
the  psychological  life  of  a  great  number  of  animals.  If  we  con- 
sider these  as  composite  reflex  actions,  the  instincts  form,  as  we 
have  seen,  the  transition  from  simple  reflex  action  to  memory. 

With  instinct  we  may  couple  habit,  which  resembles  it  in  many 
respects,  and  is  no  less  wonderful.  Habit  constitutes  a  true  return 

1  Trousseau,  Lemons  Cliniqua,  i.  59, — in  vol.  ii.  are  cases  no  less  curious. 


228  Heredity. 

to  automatism,  and  it  is  never  perfect  unless  when  it  is  entirely 
unconscious. 

These  facts  have  long  been  recognized  ;  but  here  are  some  that 
have  received  less  attention.  In  the  group  of  the  phenomena  of 
sensibility  we  discern,  both  from  their  effects  and  directly,  the 
existence  of  unconscious  pleasure  and  pain,  whence  come  our 
causeless  joy  and  sadness.  The  instincts  peculiar  to  man,  such  as 
modesty  and  shame,  maternal  love,  presentiments,  secret  sym- 
pathies and  antipathies,  only  become  conscious  exceptionally  and 
incidentally ;  yet  we  feel  that  all  these  instincts  spring  from  the 
depths  of  our  being,  from  the  dim  region  of  the  unconscious. 
Nowhere  is  this  fact  more  striking  than  in  the  sexual  instinct,  which, 
both  in  man  and  in  animals,  takes  its  rise  prior  to  all  experience. 
This  instinct,  which  perhaps  even  determines  individual  selection, 
where  it  takes  place,  caused  Schopenhauer  to  maintain  ingeniously 
that  love  is  the  tendency  of  specific  conservation,  and  that  we  must 
recognize  '  in  this  daemon  a  certain  unconscious  idea  of  species.' 
In  a  word,  are  not  the  intellectual  sentiments  (those  of  the  true 
and  the  false)  an  unconscious,  half-perceived  cognition?  Every 
cognition  is  in  its  origin  instinctive.  The  experimental  method  was 
instinctively  anticipated  by  the  alchemists  before  it  was  clearly  per- 
ceived by  Galileo  and  Bacon.  What  in  medicine  and  the  sciences 
is  denominated  diagnosis  is  an  unconscious  cognition. 

If  we  pass  from  phenomena  of  sensibility  to  intellectual  oper- 
ations, we  shall  see  that  every  mode  of  intelligence  has  its 
unconscious  form.  In  the  first  place,  the  difference  between  con- 
scious perception  and  unconscious  (or  rather  semi-conscious) 
impression  is  well  known  ;  the  sensorial  nerve-centres  can  receive 
and  preserve  impressions  which  either  never  attain  the  state  of 
consciousness  or  do  so  only  after  a  time.  Perception  can  exist 
only  by  the  aid  of  two  principal  forms,  space  and  time,  and  by 
certain  processes  which  ultimately  determine  the  position  of  the 
object  in  a  certain  point  in  space;  and  thus  the  unconscious  serves 
as  support  and  condition  for  conscious  perception.  We  need  say 
nothing  of  memory,  which  is  altogether  a  form  of  unconsciousness, 
recollection  being  nothing  but  the  transition  from  unconsciousness 
to  consciousness.  The  latent  association  of  ideas  is  a  pheno- 
menon of  the  same  k'.nd.  The  mind  goes  through  a  series  of 


Relations  between  the  Physical  and  the  Moral.    229 

operations  of  which  consciousness  holds  only  the  two  extremities. 
Finally,  the  highest  creations  of  the  imagination  spring  from  the 
unconscious.  Every  great  inventor,  artist,  man  of  science,  artificer, 
feels  within  him  an  inspiration,  an  involuntary  invasion,  as  it  were, 
coming  out  of  the  depths  of  his  being,  but  which  is,  as  has  been 
said,  impersonal.  All  that  comes  under  consciousness  is  results 
and  not  processes.  The  difference  between  talent  and  genius  is  the 
difference  between  the  conscious  and  the  unconscious.  Artists, 
prophets,  martyrs,  mystics,  all  those  who  in  any  degree  have  felt 
the  furor  poeticus,  have  ever  acknowledged  their  subjection  to  a 
higher  power  than  their  own  ego,  and  this  power  is  the  unconscious 
overlapping  the  submerged  consciousness. 

The  mystics  of  every  country  and  of  every  age  put  faith  only 
in  their  unconscious  knowledge,  and  it  is  not  to  be  denied  that 
they  have  brought  back  from  the  world  of  unconsciousness  high 
and  entrancing  visions. 

The  logical  operations  of  the  intellect,  namely,  judgment  and 
ratiocination,  may  also  be  performed  without  consciousness.  It  is 
a  known  fact  that  after  a  night's  rest  the  mind  finds  the  materials 
of  its  work  classed  with  an  order  that  we  should  never  have  been 
able  to  give  them,  with  all  our  industry  and  all  our  dexterity.  Men 
of  science  of  the  first  rank  commonly  foresee  results  by  quick 
intuition — a  thing  which  can  only  come  from  unconscious  ratio- 
cination. 'The  art  of  divining,  without  which  it  is  almost  impossible 
to  advance '  (Leibnitz),  is  nothing  but  this.  Every  man,  however 
mediocre  the  quality  of  his  mind,  is  unconsciously  guided  by  a 
hidden  logic.  A  proper  study  of  the  unconscious  would  throw 
some  light  on  the  question  of  '  innate '  ideas,  and  on  those  fun- 
damental truths  which  we  do  not  hesitate  to  admit  under  the 
unconscious  form ;  and  would,  in  particular,  explain  the  induction 
which  presupposes  a  belief  more  or  less  vague  in  the  uniformity  of 
the  laws  of  nature.  Probably  the  difference  between  deduction 
and  induction  is  only  the  difference  between  the  conscious  and  the 
unconscious,  so  that,  outside  consciousness,  the  two  processes 
would  constitute  only  one,  and  that  one  would  be  deductive. 

As  for  the  will,  it  derives  ultimately  from  character,  and  the  root 
of  character  is  in  the  unconscious.  And,  to  our  mind,  it  is 
this  that  makes  the  question  of  the  freedom  ot  the  will  insoluble, 


230  Heredity. 

consciousness  being  incapable  of  giving  us  all  the  elements  of  the 
problem.  We  know  motives  and  acts  ;  but  that  which  causes  the 
possible  to  become  the  actual  is  unconscious. 

*  Languages,'  says  Turgot,  '  are  not  the  work  of  self-conscious 
reason.'  If  his  age  had  understood  this  as  he  did,  it  would  have 
discussed  the  origin  of  language  less;  above  all,  it  would  not  have 
seen  in  it  a  conscious  creation.  The  source  of  language  is  in  the 
unconscious.  '  Without  language  it  is  impossible  to  conceive  the 
philosophic  consciousness,  or  even  human  consciousness,  and 
hence  it  is  that  it  has  never  been  possible  that  the  foundations  of 
language  should  be  laid  in  a  conscious  manner.  Still,  the  more 
we  analyze  language,  the  more  clearly  we  perceive  that  it  exceeds 
in  depth  the  most  conscious  productions  of  the  mind.  It  is  with 
language  as  with  all  organic  beings.  We  fancy  that  these  beings 
come  into  existence,  being  produced  by  a  blind  force,  and  yet  we 
cannot  deny  the  intentional  wisdom  that  presides  over  the  forma- 
tion of  each  one  of  them.' l  Many  philosophers  of  our  day  have 
in  other  terms  pronounced  the  same  opinion  as  to  the  unconscious 
origin  of  language. 

In  fact,  we  meet  with  a  final  manifestation  of  the  unconscious  in 
sociological  phenomena,  in  history.  A  people  arrives  at  conscious- 
ness only  as  it  becomes  civilized ;  perhaps  it  was  only  in  the  last 
century  that  that  ideal  state  was  reached  wherein  the  human  race 
has  clear  consciousness  of  itself  and  of  its  history.  Among  primi- 
tive peoples,  however,  societies  are  formed,  and  a  certain  division 
of  political  powers  and  of  vocations  is  made,  though  without  any 
definite  consciousness  of  the  end  or  of  the  means.  From  this  the 
consciousness  of  the  species  afterwards  springs  by  degrees.  The 
process  of  development  is  the  same  in  the  species  as  in  the  indi- 
vidual ;  compare  Homer  with  Aristotle ;  Gregory  of  Tours  with 
Montesquieu.  Here,  as  everywhere,  consciousness  springs  from  the 
unconscious  and  presupposes  it 

We  have  now,  in  the  compass  of  a  few  pages,  given  a  sketch  of 
a  question  which  would  require  a  volume ;  but,  brief  as  it  is,  it  is 
enough  for  our  purpose.  To  sum  up,  we  have  seen  that  there  is 
no  psychological  phenomenon,  simple  or  complex,  high  or  low, 

1  Schelling,  Einltitun%  in  die  Philcsohhie  der  Mythologie. 


Relations  between  the  Physical  and  the  Moral.    231 

normal  or  morbid,  which  may  not  occur  under  an  unconscious 
form.  In  a  word,  we  find  in  ourselves  or  in  others,  and  we  con- 
clude that  there  exists  in  animals,  a  great  number  of  acts,  often 
complex,  which,  as  a  rule,  are  willed,  deliberated  upon,  conceived, 
felt — in  short,  accompanied  by  consciousness ;  that  is,  by  a  more  or 
less  clear  knowledge  (i)  of  the  means,  and  (2)  of  the  end.  In 
some  cases  the  consciousness  of  the  end  to  be  attained,  and  of  the 
means  to  be  employed  disappears  :  yet  we  know  that  the  end  has 
been  attained,  though  we  know  it  only  through  the  effect  produced. 
Such  acts  are  unconscious. 

Two  hypotheses  only  are  possible  to  interpret  these  facts. 

1.  It  may  be  said  that  consciousness  is  the  habitual,  though  not 
indispensable,  accompaniment  of  mental  life ;  that  the  intellect 
is  by  nature  unconscious :  that  its  essence  consists  in  the  co-ordina- 
tion of  means,  and  its  progress  in  a  more  and  more  complex,  a 
more  and  more  perfect,  co-ordination ;  but  that  consciousness  is 
only  a  secondary  phenomenon,  though  of  the  highest  importance  ; 
somewhat  as  the  brain,  which  is  the  noblest  of  all  the  organs,  is 
nevertheless  only  a  complementary  organ,  superadded  to  the  rest, 
though  it  is  the  noblest  of  all.     This  thesis  has  even  been  applied 
to  physiology,  when  it  has  been  said  that  the  unconscious  pheno- 
mena presuppose  only  nerve-currents  terminating  in  the  secondary 
centres  (rachidian  bulb,  annular  protuberance,  tubercula  quadri- 
gemina,  etc.),  while  the  conscious  phenomena  presuppose  a  second 
series  of  currents  terminating  in  the  ganglionic  substance  of  the 
brain.     In  this  way  consciousness  would  be  a  fact  of  a  higher 
order,  but  not  indispensable  to  psychological  life,  which  could 
subsist  without  it  under  all  its  forms.     Consciousness  would  be 
like  the  intermittent  flashes  from  the  furnace  of  an  engine,  which 
allow  us  to  see  glimpses  of  a  marvellous  mechanism,  but  which  do 
not  constitute  the  mechanism. 

2.  On  the  other  hand,  consciousness  may  be  regarded  as  being 
pre-eminently  the  psychological  fact     The  operation  which  con- 
stitutes consciousness  (Bewusstwerdeii),  never  being  identical  with 
itself  through  two  consecutive  moments,  possesses  every  possible 
degree  of  clearness  and  of  intensity ;  consciousness  increases  and 
diminishes,  but  in  its  progressive  decrease  it  never  reaches  zero  : 
what  we  call  the  unconscious  is  only  a  minimum  of  consciousness 

11 


232  Heredity. 

The  brain  is  the  seat  and  the  condition  of  clear  consciousness,  bat 
every  secondary  nerve-centre  and  every  ganglion  is  conscious  after 
its  own  fashion.  This  view,  which  is  also  based  on  physiology, 
holds  that,  inasmuch  as  sensibility  is  a  histological,  not  a  morpho- 
logical property,  wherever  there  is  a  nerve-substance  there  must 
also  be  a  more  or  less  vague  consciousness,  and  that  the  general 
consciousness  of  the  creature  is  composed  of  these  infinitesimal 
quantities,  which  are  lost  in  it  even  while  they  constitute  it 

We  need  not  decide  between  these  two  hypotheses,  nor  are  we 
competent  to  do  so.  We  would  merely  show  that,  as  far  as  tlif.y 
touch  upon  our  subject,  they  both  lead  to  the  same  conclusion. 

We  have  already  said  that  the  antithesis  of  the  physical  and  the 
moral,  considered  in  the  phenomenal  order,  resolves  itself  into  the 
contrast  of  the  conscious  with  the  unconscious,  and  we  now  see 
that,  as  we  bring  both  groups  together,  the  one  encroaches  on  the 
other,  so  that  it  is  impossible  to  say  where  the  conscious  ends  and 
where  the  unconscious  begins.  For  the  present,  we  only  observe 
that  it  would  be  premature  to  draw  a  conclusion  before  we  have 
studied  the  purely  psychological — that  is,  the  conscious — pheno- 
menon. This  we  now  proceed  to  do. 

in. 

We  therefore  now  pass  from  phenomena  of  a  mixed  nature — half- 
physiological  and  half-psychological  —  to  those  which  properly 
constitute  intellectual  life.  But  we  must  not  forget  that  here  we 
are  concerned  only  with  phenomena ;  we  know  not  what  the  mind 
is  in  itself,  nor  need  we  discuss  that  question  here.  We  have 
merely  to  inquire  whether  psychological  life  may  not  in  the  last 
analysis  be  brought  down  to  a  few  irreducible  elements,  given,  or 
at  least  suggested,  by  experience,  and  whether  there  is  any  relation 
between  the  primordial  facts  of  mental  life  and  the  primordial 
facts  of  physical  life.  Leaving,  therefore,  all  questions  as  to  the 
substance  of  the  mind,  which  concern  metaphysics,  and  all  details 
as  to  its  faculties  and  phenomena,  which  concern  descriptive 
psychology,  let  us  see  to  what  ultimate  form  we  may  reduce  the 
fact  of  conscience,  or  thought,  considered  as  a  phenomenon. 

It  may  be  said  generally,  that  to  think  is  to  unify  and  to 
diversify;  to  reduce  phenomenal  plurality  to  the  unity  of  the 


Relations  between  the  Physical  and  the  Moral.    233 

subject,  and  to  realize  the  unity  of  the  subject  in  a  phenomenal 
plurality.  Every  act  of  thinking  is  definitely  reducible  to  a  per- 
ception of  either  differences  or  resemblances,  that  is  to  say,  it 
resolves  one  into  many,  or  reduces  many  into  one.  This  double 
process  of  analysis  and  synthesis  can  be  infinitely  repeated  and 
complicated,  but  it  underlies  all  our  intellectual  operations,  what- 
ever they  may  be.  Contemporary  psychologists  have  well  shown 
that  on  comparing  the  phenomena  of  intelligence  we  find  a  true 
unity  of  composition,  and  that  this  essential  unity  of  all  intel- 
lectual phenomena  consists  in  this,  that  always  and  everywhere  we 
are  integrating  or  disintegrating  something.  Their  studies,  which 
we  need  not  detail  here,  enable  us  to  pass  from  these  rather  vague 
considerations  to  a  more  precise  knowledge  of  the  fact  of  con- 
sciousness in  its  ultimate  form. 

Since  in  every  act  of  thinking  there  are  necessarily  two  ele- 
ments, plurality  and  unity,  we  will  examine  these  in  order  that 
we  may  see  to  what  they  are  ultimately  reducible. 

i.  We  will  begin  with  the  dividing  element  of  thought  Every 
one  will  readily  admit  that  if  we  start  from  some  very  composite 
mental  state — for  instance,  from  the  idea  of  a  certain  social 
system,  or  of  a  certain  form  of  government — and  then  proceed 
by  continuous  analysis,  constantly  passing  from  the  more  to  the 
less  complex,  from  the  less  complex  to  the  simple,  from  the 
simple  to  the  most  simple,  we  must,  in  traversing  this  descending 
series,  finally  arrive  at  primitive  elements.  Thus  we  are  able  to 
resolve  our  system  into  a  sum  of  ratiocinations  and  relations,  each 
ratiocination  into  a  sum  of  judgments  and  relations,  each  judg- 
ment into  a  sum  of  ideas  and  relations,  each  idea  into  a  number 
of  images  or  of  concrete  forms  from  which  it  is  drawn,  and  each 
image  and  concrete  form  into  internal  or  external,  subjective  or 
objective,  sensations.  Sensation,  therefore,  would  appear  to  be  the 
primitive  element  upon  which  all  rests,  the  molecule  to  which  this 
complicated  diversity  may  be  reduced. 

The  researches  of  physicists  and  of  physiologists,  however,  have 
led  some  psychologists  to  ask  whether  sensation  is  indeed,  as  it 
appears  to  be,  an  irreducible  phenomenon,  and  the  reply  has  been 
in  the  negative.  When  treating  of  the  so-called  simple  sensations 
of  sound,  colour,  taste,  smell,  they  found  themselves  in  the  same 


234  Heredity. 

condition  as  chemistry  once  was  when  dealing  with  bodies  sup- 
posed to  be  simple.  Analysis  has  shown  that  the  so-called  primi- 
tive sensations  are  themselves  composite.  For  the  analysis  of  these 
sensations  we  refer  the  reader  to  recent  treatises  on  psychology, 
giving  here  only  a  single  example. 

We  take  some  sensation  usually  esteemed  irreducible;  for  in- 
stance, that  of  a  musical  note.  It  is  known  that  if  we  cause  a 
body  to  vibrate,  and  that  the  vibrations  do  not  exceed  sixteen  in 
the  second,  we  perceive  a  regular  succession  of  identical  sensations, 
of  which  each  is  a  separate  and  distinct  sound.  But  if  the  vibra- 
tions grow  more  rapid,  these  sounds,  instead  of  being  each 
apprehended  as  a  separate  state  of  consciousness,  blend  into  one 
continuous  consciousness,  and  that  is  the  musical  note.  If  the 
rapidity  of  the  vibrations  be  increased,  the  quality  of  the  sound 
varies,  becoming  sharper;  and  if  the  rapidity  goes  on  steadily 
increasing,  it  becomes  at  length  so  sharp  that  soon  it  becomes 
inappreciable  as  sound.  Nor  is  this  all ;  the  researches  of  Helm- 
holtz  have  shown  that  the  differences  of  tone  between  instruments 
(as  the  violin,  the  horn,  and  the  flute)  are  owing  to  the  fact  that 
different  harmonies  are  added  to  the  fundamental  note.  These 
differences  of  sensations,  known  as  differences  of  tone,  are  there- 
fore due  to  the  simultaneous  integration  of  other  series,  having 
other  degrees  of  integration,  with  the  original  series.  In  plainer 
terms,  the  fusion  of  these  primary  noises  in  a  single  state  of 
consciousness  produces  the  sensation  of  a  musical  note  ;  and  this 
fusion,  combined  with  the  principal  note  of  other  less  intense 
vibrations,  produces  differences  of  tone. 

This  analysis,  summary  and  insufficient  as  it  is,  will  enable  us 
to  understand  how  illusory  is  the  apparent  simplicity  of  the  phe- 
nomenon we  call  sensation.  The  same  is  to  be  said  of  colours, 
tastes,  odours,  and  in  general  of  all  sensations,  though  with  some 
of  them  the  analysis  could  not  be  carried  so  far.1  If,  then, 
sensation  is  a  composite  phenomenon,  it  may,  perhaps,  be  pos- 
sible to  discover  its  primary  element 

The  most    recent  work   written   on   this   subject  is   Herbert 


'  *  For  details,  see  Helmholtz'  Physiological  Optics  (Lehre  von  da-  Tcncui^  fiit* 
dung)  ;  Herbert  Spencer,  Principles  of  Psychology,  §  60. 


Relations  between  the  Physical  and  the  Moral.    235 

Spencer's  Psychology.  Pushing  his  analysis  beyond  the  very  limits 
of  consciousness  to  a  final  element,  which  is  rather  felt  than  seen, 
he  finds  '  the  unit  of  consciousness '  in  what  he  terms  a  '  nervous 
shock.'  If  we  examine  our  various  sensations,  we  shall  see  that 
in  spite  of  their  specific  differences  they  possess  one  thing  in 
common — the  nervous  shock  which  constitutes  the  basis  of  them 
all,  and  to  which  they  all  appear  to  be  reducible.  It  is  not  possible  to 
say  precisely  wherein  consists  this  ultimate  element,  though  a  few 
examples  may  help  us  to  form  an  approximate  idea  of  it  Thus, 
the  effect  produced  in  us  by  a  crash  which  has  no  appreciable 
duration  is  a  nervous  shock.  An  electrical  discharge  traversing 
the  body,  and  a  flash  of  lightning  striking  the  eye,  resemble 
a  nervous  shock.  The  state  of  consciousness  thus  produced  is  in 
quality  like  that  produced  by  a  blow  (leaving  out  of  consideration 
the  consequent  pain),  so  that  this  may  be  taken  for  the  primitive 
and  typical  form  of  a  nervous  shock.  '  It  is  possible — may  we 
not  even  say  probable- — '  writes  Herbert  Spencer,  'that  some- 
thing of  the  same  order  as  that  which  we  call  nervous  shock  is 
the  ultimate  unit  of  consciousness ;  and  that  all  the  unlikelinesses 
among  our  feelings  result  from  unlike  modes  of  integration  of 
the  ultimate  unit'  l 

We  would  observe,  with  the  same  author,  that  there  is  a  perfect 
agreement  between  this  view  and  the  well-known  character  of 
nervous  action.  Experience  shows  that  the  nerve-current  is  inter- 
mittent, that  it  consists  of  undulations.  The  external  stimulus 
does  not  act  continuously  on  the  sensitive  centre,  but  sends  up  to 
it,  as  it  were,  a  series  of  pulsations,  so  that,  objectively,  this  phe- 
nomenon may  be  said  to  resemble  what  is  subjectively  called  a 
nervous  shock. 

It  does  not  seem  possible,  in  the  analysis  of  consciousness,  to 
push  any  farther  the  reduction  of  what  we  have  called  diversity, 
for  the  nervous  shock  is  hardly  a  state  of  consciousness.  From 
the  synthesis  of  these  shocks  would  come  states  of  consciousness 
properly  so-called — that  is  to -say,  sensations  and  sentiments;  and 
then  by  syntheses  of  sensations  and  sentiments,  and  by  associations 
of  iuiages,  ideas,  and  relations,  is  built  the  whole  edifice  of  our 
cognitions. 

1  Herbert  Spencer,  Psychology,  ib. 


236  Heredity. 

2.  In  the  whole  of  the  foregoing  we  have  constantly  spoken  of 
synthesis,  integration,  fusion,  association.  How  is  this  operation 
performed  which  reduces  diversity  to  unity  ?  Does  it  result  from 
the  elements  themselves?  Are  these  syntheses  formed  after  the 
manner  of  chemical  combinations,  and  according  to  laws  depen- 
dent on  the  quantity  and  the  quality  of  the  combined  elements? 
Must  we  deduce  the  unity  of  the  facts  of  consciousness  from  the 
unity  of  the  vital  phenomena,  and  look  for  the  cause  of  mental 
synthesis  in  organic  synthesis  ?  This  would  scarcely  help  us,  for 
we  know  how  difficult  it  is  to  explain  physiological  unity  in  the 
living  being. 

The  unity  of  the  fact  of  consciousness  is  indisputable,  and,  to 
our  mind,  inexplicable,  so  long  as  we  do  not  go  beyond  pheno- 
mena— that  is  to  say,  beyond  the  sphere  of  science.  But,  though  we 
here  treat  of  the  composition  of  the  mind,  we  desire  in  no  respect 
to  go  beyond  the  phenomenology  of  the  mind.  We  will,  then, 
examine  the  different  aspects  of  the  question  from  the  point  of 
view  of  experience. 

The  question  which  arises  with  regard  to  the  unity  of  life  arises 
again  with  regard  to  the  unity  of  consciousness  :  whether  it  be  an 
effect  or  a  cause.  We  have  seen  that  some  physiologists,  instead 
of  regarding  life  as  a  cause  on  which  the  functions  depend,  place, 
on  the  contrary,  all  the  reality  in  the  functions  of  which  vital  unity 
is  only  a  resultant  or  composite  effect  The  same  hypothesis  has 
been  introduced  into  psychology,  and  it  is  upheld  by  the  following 
arguments. 

In  psychology  the  idea  of  personality  is  fundamental,  as  in 
biology  is  the  idea  of  individuality.  But  the  person,  the  ego,  the 
thinking  subject,  assumed  as  a  perfect  unity,  is  but  a  theoretic 
conception.  It  is  an  ideal  which  the  individual  approaches  as  he 
rises  in  the  scale  of  being,  but  to  which  he  never  attains.  Our 
personality  breaks  up  into  an  infinity  of  sensations,  sentiments, 
images  and  ideas,  past  or  future ;  it  is  only  a  synthesis,  an  aggre- 
gate, a  sum  that  is  ever  undergoing  addition  and  subtraction,  but 
of  which  the  whole  reality  is  in  the  concrete  events  which  com- 
pose it 

If  we  scan  the  whole  biologic  scale,  we  shall  see  that  at  the 
lowest  grade,  where  there  is  simply  life,  the  phenomena  and  the 


Relations  between  the  Physical  and  tlie  Moral.    237 

functions  have  for  their  characteristic  the  fact  that  they  are  simul- 
taneous :  digestion,  circulation,  respiration,  the  secretions,  etc, 
with  all  their  subdivisions,  take  place  at  the  same  time,  and  depend 
on  one  another.  But  if  we  pass  from  plants  to  the  lower  animals, 
and  from  them  to  the  higher,  we  find  added  to  the  vital  actions 
other  actions  which  have  a  tendency  to  range  themselves  in  simple 
succession,  to  be  produced  under  the  form  of  a  series.  These 
actions  we  call  psychical.  In  the  radiata,  the  mollusca,  and  the 
articulata,  the  psychical  life  has  for  its  centres  ganglia  dispersed 
through  the  animal;  the  actions  of  these  are  very  imperfectly 
co-ordinated,  so  that  there  is  rather  simultaneousness  than  succes- 
sion :  hence  their  mental  inferiority.  This  dispersion  of  psychical 
life  explains  the  fact  that  if  we  cut  in  two  or  more  pieces  an  earth- 
worm, a  centipede,  or  a  praying  mantis,  each  piece  of  the  insect 
moves  and  acts  on  its  own  account  But  in  proportion  as  we 
ascend  in  the  animal  series,  the  nervous  system  grows  more  and 
more  perfect,  and  the  centres  are  co-ordinated  with  a  view  to  a 
higher  unity ;  simultaneous  action  gives  place  to  a  more  and  more 
perfect  succession,  without  however  attaining  it  This  fusion  of 
simultaneousness  with  succession  can  never  be  complete ;  and  thus 
the  tendency  of  psychical  actions  to  take  the  form  of  a  simple 
series  is  ever  approaching  this  ideal,  but  never  absolutely  attains  it 

We  can  also  attack  this  problem  of  the  unity  of  consciousness  in 
another  way.  We  have  just  seen  that  it  necessarily  occurs  under 
the  form  of  a  series,  a  succession — that  is  to  say,  under  condition 
of  time.  But  time  is  measurable;  and  since  to  study  is  to  measure, 
and  as  accurate  science  consists  of  measurement,  it  follows  that 
consciousness  in  some  degree  comes  under  the  cognizance  of 
exact  science. 

The  experiments  made  on  this  subject  are  of  recent  date. 
Towards  the  close  of  the  last  century  the  Greenwich  astronomers 
remarked  that  the  various  observers  did  not  observe  in  the  same 
way  the  coming  of  a  star  to  the  meridian.  The  variations  some- 
times amounted  to  half  a  second.  Bessel,  of  Konigsberg,  was  the 
first  to  suppose  that  this  difference  was  owing  to  psychological 
causes,  and  he  set  himself  to  determine  this  error,  or  personal  equa- 
tion. From  observations  made  by  astronomers,  it  resulted  that 
some  time  elapses  between  the  instant  when  an  act  '"s>  performed 


238  Heredity. 

and  the  instant  when  an  attentive  observer  signals  his  perception 
of  it  Though  the  velocity  of  thought  seemed  to  defy  all  measure- 
ment, still  it  has  been  determined  by  Helmholtz,  Bonders,  Hirsch, 
and  Marey,  by  means  of  ingenious  experiments. 

From  these  experiments  it  results  that  the  velocity  of  impres- 
sions varies  according  to  the  individuals,  and  even  for  the  same 
individual  according  to  the  temperature  :  at  a  low  temperature  the 
velocity  of  the  nervous  agent  is  less.  Impressions  travel  from  the 
periphery  to  the  nerve-centres,  and  volitions  from  the  nerve-centres 
to  the  periphery,  with  an  average  velocity  of  thirty  metres  per 
second.  Between  visual,  auditory,  and  tactile  impressions  and  the 
reaction  of  the  hand  showing  that  the  perception  has  been  per- 
ceived, there  elapses  one-fifth  of  a  second  in  the  case  of  visual 
impressions  ;  one-sixth  in  case  of  auditory  impressions  ;  and  one- 
seventh  in  case  of  tactile  impressions.  But,  as  Bonders  remarked, 
this  case  is  itself  complex,  and  is  resolvable  into  two  psychical 
stages:  (i)  impression  travelling  from  periphery  to  centre;  (2) 
volition  travelling  from  the  centre  to  the  hand.  By  some  curious 
experiments  he  thinks  he  can  prove  that  the  simplest  act  of 
thought,  the  solution  of  a  very  easy  dilemma,  requires  one-fifteenth 
of  a  second.  Wundt,  from  experiments  of  his  own,  finds  that  the 
most  rapid  act  of  thought  requires  one-tenth  of  a  second.1 

The  velocity  of  thought,  and  consequently  the  number  of  states 
of  consciousness,  vary  considerably.  In  some  dreams,  and  in  the 
mental  state  produced  by  opium  and  hasheesh,  this  velocity  is  such 
that  phenomena  of  consciousness  which  can  have  lasted  only  a 
few  seconds  appear,  by  an  illusion  that  is  easily  explained,  to 
have  lasted  several  minutes  or  several  hours.  The  well-known 
opium  eater,  De  Quincey,  had  dreams  which  appeared  to  '  last 
ten,  twenty,  fifty,  or  seventy  years,  or  even  transcended  the  limits 
of  all  possible  experience.'  The  reason  of  this  is,  that  we  measure 
the  length  of  time  by  the  number  of  our  states  of  consciousness. 
Retrospectively,  a  space  of  time  during  which  we  have  been  active 
seems  much  longer  than  one  in  which  we  have  been  idle.  A  week 
spent  in  travel  seems  longer  than  one  spent  in  the  habitual  mono- 

1  For  a  study  of  this  subject  in  its  psychological  relations,  see  Wundt. 
Menschen  und  Thierseelet  Lectures  4  and  23. 


Relations  betiveen  the  Physical  and  the  Moral.   239 

tony  and  routine  of  life.  Under  the  enormous  and  sudden  afflux  of 
sensations  and  ideas,  space,  like  time,  expands  beyond  all  measure 
in  the  consciousness.  '  The  buildings,  the  mountains,'  says  De 
Quincey,  '  loomed  up  in  proportions  too  grand  to  be  taken  in  by 
the  eye.  The  plain  stretched  out,  and  was  lost  in  immensity.' 

Thus  these  facts,  chosen  from  among  many  others,  show  that 
the  succession  which  constitutes  consciousness  is  ever  varying  in 
velocity  and  complexity,  and  consequently  we  appear  to  be  far 
enough  removed  from  that  ego — that  simple,  invariable,  unchange- 
able unit — which  some  have  imagined. 

These  researches  into  the  measurement  of  the  phenomena  of 
consciousness  as  to  their  duration  will  doubtless  sooner  or  later  lead 
to  important  conclusions;  for  the  present  we  think  we  may  draw  a 
few  of  these  provisionally. 

1.  The  inner  sense,  like  all  the  other  senses,  has  its  limits, 
beyond  which  it  perceives  nothing.     There  is  a  psychical  minimum, 
just  as  there  is  a  visual,  or  an  auditory  minimum.     Suppose  one- 
eighth  of  a  second  to  be  the  briefest  state  of  consciousness,  then  a 
cerebral  phenomenon  lasting  one-fifteenth  or  one-twentieth  of  a 
second  will  lie  outside  of  consciousness. 

2.  In   consciousness,  simultaneousness   is   only  apparent      If 
certain   states  of  consciousness   seem  to   be   simultaneous  (and 
Hamilton  supposed  that  we  could  entertain  seven  ideas  at  once) 
it  is  simply  because  their  succession  is  so  rapid  that  we  cannot  note 
their  want  of  continuity.     If  consciousness  could  have  its  micro- 
scope, as  the  eye  has,  we  should  see  succession  where  now  we  see 
simultaneousness ;  for  instance,  in  the  perception  of  a  complex 
object,  as  a  house. 

3.  The  greater  part  of  our  internal  states  can  never  enter  the 
consciousness.     Our  total  life  is  made  up  of  sundry  particular 
lives,  and  the  life  of  each  organ  has  its  echo  in  the  various  ganglia 
and  nerve-centres  scattered  throughout  the  body.     But  as  all  these 
internal  states  are  simultaneous,  while  consciousness  is  a  succes- 
sion, the  result  is  that  the  majority  of  them  remain  in  the  uncon- 
scious state.     There  exists  between  them  a  real  '  struggle  for  life,' 
a  strife  to  attain  consciousness — a  strife  which  has  place,  now 
between  phenomena  of  the  same  class,  as  between  sensation  and 
sensation,  image  and  image,  idea  and  idea ;  again,  between  phe- 


240  Heredity. 

nomena  of  different  classes — a  sensation  and  an  image,  a  sentiment 
and  an  idea. 

Every  analysis,  therefore,  of  whatever  kind,  issues  in  this  :  that 
consciousness  conveys  to  me  only  a  small  part  of  what  passes 
within  me.  My  personality  is  complex ;  my  unity  is  that  of  a 
regiment,  rather  than  that  of  a  mathematical  point  For,  without 
attempting  the  long  and  delicate  task  of  analysing  our  personality, 
we  may  say  that  it  comprises  at  least  four  essential  elements  :  (i) 
We  have  as  a  basis  for  all  the  others,  the  general  sense  of  the 
existence  of  our  body,  of  the  play  of  its  functions,  of  its  normal  or 
morbid  state.  (2)  The  knowledge  of  our  perceptions  or  actual 
ideas.  (3)  The  knowledge  of  our  previous  states.  (4)  The  sense 
of  our  activity — that  is  to  say,  the  faculty  of  knowing  how  we  act 
upon  the  outer  world,  and  how  we  are  acted  on  by  it. 

But  the  same  question  constantly  presents  itself.  How  does  all 
this  attain  unity  ?  We  are  brought  back  again  to  this  unavoidable 
difficulty.  Is  the  unity,  without  which  there  is  no  consciousness, 
a  reality  or  an  abstraction  ?  There  is  here,  we  take  it,  an  insoluble 
antinomy. 

On  the  one  hand,  if  we  suppose  the  unit,  the  ego,  the  person, 
to  have  any  reality  beyond  the  phenomena,  we  attribute  real 
existence  to  an  abstraction.  For  if,  ex  hypothesi,  I  abstract  from 
my  ego  all  the  phenomenal  plurality  which  manifests  it — my  sensa- 
tions, sentiments,  ideas,  resolutions,  etc. — the  subject  so  denuded 
is  a  mere  possibility ;  that  is  to  say,  the  poorest,  emptiest,  hollowest 
of  abstractions. 

On  the  other  hand,  if  we  suppose  that  the  phenomena  alone  are 
real,  and  that  the  unit,  the  ego,  the  person,  is  but  a  sum,  a  result- 
ant— that  is  to  say,  an  abstraction — we  enunciate  an  unintelligible 
proposition  ;  for  these  phenomena  which  constitute  me  possess  the 
twofold  character  of  being  given  to  me  as  phenomena,  and  of 
being  given  to  me  as  mine.  My  sensations,  sentiments,  ideas — in 
short,  all  my  states  of  consciousness — imply  a  synthetic  judgment, 
in  virtue  of  which  they  are  referred  to  my  personality  and  inte-. 
grated  therewith.  Without  this  synthetic  judgment,  all  those 
phenomena  which  are  most  intimate  to  me  would  be  as  foreign  to 
me  as  those  which  take  place  beyond  Herschel's  nebulae.  Scat- 
tered pearls  do  not  make  a  necklace,  there  is  need  of  a  string  to 


Relations  between  the  Physical  and  the  Moral.     241 

connect  them ;  if  we  cut  an  apple  into  twenty  pieces,  and  scatter 
them  to  the  winds  from  the  summit  of  a  tower,  these  scattered 
fragments  no  longer  make  up  an  apple.  The  same  would  be  the 
case  with  that  phenomenal,  disintegrated,  and  unconnected  plurality, 
which  nothing  can  reduce  to  unity.  But,  like  the  ego  and  the  non- 
ego,  the  internal  and  the  external  are  correlative  terms,  and  the 
one  cannot  be  assumed  without  the  other ;  if  I  cannot  know  my- 
self, I  cannot  know  anything ;  and  thus,  if  there  is  no  unity  of 
consciousness  there  is  no  cognition,  whether  internal  or  external, 
nor  is  there  in  the  universe  any  such  thing  as  thought  To 
suppose,  as  some  appear  to  have  done,  that  the  unity  of  the  ego 
is  nothing  but  the  continuity  of  the  consciousness,  is  an  illusion, 
for  consciousness  being,  as  we  have  seen,  discontinuous,  could 
produce  only  an  intermittent  unity. 

Thus,  then,  we  find  it  impossible  to  reach  a  conclusion,  or 
rather,  we  find  ourselves  forced  to  conclude  that  here  science  ends 
and  metaphysics  begins.  We  are  face  to  face  with  the  unknow- 
able ;  it  is  within  us,  in  the  profoundest  depths  of  our  being.  We 
are  equally  unable  to  suppress  the  two  terms  of  our  antinomy  and 
to  reconcile  them ;  equally  unable  to  say  whether  our  unity  is  real 
or  only  apparent  The  fact  is,  that  the  study  of  the  ultimate  con- 
ditions of  consciousness  withstands  analysis.  The  analytical 
method  is  the  only  one  possible,  and  here  the  analytical  method  is 
illusory.  We  think  we  have  explained  a  complex  fact,  when,  by 
successive  simplifications,  we  have  reduced  it  to  its  constituent 
elements.  And  this  is  generally  true ;  but  in  the  biological  and 
psychological  order,  the  synthesis  made  after  analysis  is  not  iden- 
tical with  the  synthesis  that  existed  prior  to  analysis.  Here  the 
whole  is  not  equal  to  the  sum  of  the  parts.  Chemistry,  by  its  syn- 
thesis and  analysis,  enables  us  to  understand  this  apparent  paradox. 
It  shows  that  if  two  or  more  simple  bodies,  each  having  special 
properties,  combine,  the  resulting  whole  usually  possesses  physi- 
cal, chemical,  and  physiological  characteristics  altogether  different 
from  those  of  its  constituent  parts ;  thus,  sulphuric  acid  resem- 
bles neither  sulphur  nor  oxygen.  In  the  mental  order  there  are 
analogous  combinations,  and  possibly  our  ego  is  one  which  is 
made  and  unmade  every  moment  But  we  cannot  know  this. 

We  must  then,  be  on  our  guard  against  supposing  that  we  have 


242  Heredity. 

explained  all  when  we  have  analysed  all.  In  pyschology,  analysis 
is  of  service  in  making  us  acquainted  with  the  emphatic  conditions 
of  phenomena,  which  is  nearly  the  whole  extent  of  our  science ; 
but  our  science  is  not  everything. 

IV. 

We  can  now  arrive  at  a  summary  view  of  the  general  relations 
of  the  physical  and  the  moral.  In  the  first  place,  all  the  foregoing 
discussions  and  expositions  are  reducible  to  two  essential  pro- 
positions : — 

1.  The  phenomena  which  constitute  physical  and  mental  life, 
taken  in  their  totality,  seem  to  form  a  continuous  series  of  such  a 
nature  that  at  the  one  extremity  of  the  series  all  is  unconscious 
and  purely  physiological,  and  at  the  other  end  all  is  conscious  and 
purely  psychological;  and  that  the  transition  from  the  one  extreme 
to  the  other  is  performed  by  insensible  gradations,  whether  it  be 
that  the  unconscious  rises  to  the  conscious,  or  that  the  conscious 
returns  to  unconsciousness. 

2.  The  purely  physiological  phenomena  appear  to  be  reduced 
in  the  last  analysis  to  motion,  and  purely  psychological  phenomena 
to  sensation ;  and  thus  we  have  the  problem  of  the  relations  be- 
tween the  physical  and  the  moral  brought  down  to  this  question : 
What  is  the  relation  between  a  nerve-vibration  and  a  sensation  ? 

Some,  taking  their  stand  in  metaphysics,  think  the  problem  to 
be  resolvable;  others,  holding  to  experience,  regard  it  as  un- 
solvable. 

If  we  examine  the  tendencies  of  contemporary  metaphysics  on 
this  point,  we  shall  find  two  currents  of  doctrine  quite  distinct, 
and  both  equally  logical.  Either  we  may  regard  motion  as  the 
only  reality,  all  else  being  but  a  modification  of  it,  thought  being 
the  maximum  of  motion ;  or  we  may  regard  thought  as  the  only 
reality,  of  which  all  the  rest  is  only  a  modification,  motion  being 
the  minimum  of  thought  The  former  hypothesis  might  be  called 
mechanism,  or,  by  a  somewhat  antiquated  term,  materialism.  The 
second  hypothesis  is  idealism.  It  is  enough  for  our  purpose  to 
show  briefly  that  neither  of  these  hypotheses  can  be  scientifically 
established. 

i.  The  mechanical  theory  is  very  simple — it  starts  from  motion, 


Relations  between  the  Physical  and  the  Moral.     243 

to  which  it  affirms  that  everything  can  be  reduced.  So  long  as  it 
holds  to  the  inorganic  world  it  is  not  easily  assailable ;  to  motion, 
in  fact,  the  properties  of  brute  matter  may  be  reduced — heat, 
light,  cohesion,  sound,  and,  probably,  also  the  phenomena  of 
electro-magnetism.  It  is  even  known  with  exactitude  what  nu- 
merical ratio  subsists  between  a  given  quantity  of  motion  and  a 
given  quantity  of  heat  As  regards  chemical  action,  its  reduction 
to  motion  is  less  clear ;  but  suppose  that  all  this  should  one  day  be 
explained,  the  inorganic  would  be  reduced  to  simple  bodies  and 
motion.  According  to  the  mechanical  hypothesis,  the  world  of 
life  is  reducible  to  the  same  terms.  In  the  first  place,  since  the 
researches  of  Wohler,  chemical  synthesis  has  effaced  every  line 
of  demarcation  between  organic  and  inorganic  chemistry.  The 
ternary  and  quarternary  compounds  which  constitute  organic 
matter  are  chiefly  confined  to  oxygen,  hydrogen,  carbon  and 
nitrogen.  Their  elements,  therefore,  are  not  bodies  of  a  peculiar 
kind.  Living  substance  possesses  no  properties  due  to  any  imagi- 
nary 'vital  principle.'  Life,  together  with  the  play  of  the 
functions  which  compose  it,  is  but  a  very  complicated  chemistry 
and  mechanism.  But  if  we  were  to  admit  that  this  mechanical 
conception  of  life  is  confirmed  in  all  its  details  (which  is  not  the 
case),  it  would  still  have  to  explain  what  is  most  essential  in  living 
beings,  their  unity.  To  say,  as  has  been  said,  that  living  matter 
is  endowed  with  the  peculiar  property  of  'adapting  itself  to  ends,' 
explains  nothing.  We  thus  attribute  to  it  an  unconscious  intelli- 
gence, but  in  so  doing  we  go  beyond  the  bounds  of  mechanism. 
This  unity,  this  consensus,  is  so  important  in  the  living  creature  that 
Auguste  Comte  himself  admits  that  here  'we  must  substitute 
for  analytic  study  synthetic  considerations' — that  is  to  say,  instead 
of  passing  from  the  lower  to  the  higher,  from  the  components  to 
the  resultant,  we  must  descend  from  the  higher  to  the  lower,  from 
the  end  to  the  subordinated  means.1  But  if  we  suppose  that 
mechanism  explains  life,  and  endeavour,  with  its  assistance,  to 

1  In  his  Rapport  sur  la  Physiologie  Gfatrate,  Claude  Bernard  thinks  that  we 
are  justified  in  reducing  life  to  the  laws  of  inorganic  nature,  but  that  we  have 
no  right  to  say  that  the  processes  are  identical.  Life  has  processes  of  its  own 
See  also  some  excellent  observations  in  Renouvier,  Critique  Gintrale,  tome  iii. 
p.  90,  et  seq. 


244  Heredity. 

arrive  at  an  understanding  of  thought,  we  have  first  to  explain 
how  the  nervous  system  is  constituted,  which  is  the  indispensable 
condition  of  all  thought  As  we  are  aware,  it  is  only  a  comple- 
mentary apparatus  :  certain  infusoria,  whose  bodies  are  only  an 
amorphous  mass,  entirely  void  of  muscles  and  nerves,  have  yet 
a  relative  life.  Relying  on  the  law  of  evolution,  on  the  passage 
from  the  simple  to  the  complex,  and  on  the  physiological  division 
of  labour,  some  have  endeavoured  to  explain  the  genesis  of  the 
nervous  system.  The  most  curious  essays  in  this  direction  have 
been  made  by  one  who  in  other  respects  rejects  the  mechanical 
hypothesis.  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer,  in  his  Biology  (§  302),  and  more 
particularly  in  his  PsycJwlogy  (Part  5),  strives  to  show  how  a  nerve 
might  be  produced  in  an  extremely  simple  primitive  organism 
by  the  laws  of  motion ;  and  how,  from  this  beginning,  more  and 
more  complicated  nervous  systems  might  be  developed.  If  this 
bold  genesis  were  beyond  question,  it  would  be  a  great  victory  for 
the  mechanical  theory,  but  still  the  necessity  would  remain  of  ex- 
plaining how  nerve-vibration  becomes  a  fact  of  consciousness. 
We  are  utterly  incapable  of  understanding  how  motion  becomes 
thought  The  hypothesis  is  indemonstrable  in  theory,  and  incon- 
ceivable in  fact  If  it  be  said  that,  subjectively,  heat  and  light  are 
as  different  from  motion  as  the  fact  of  consciousness  is  different 
from  nerve-vibration,  we  must  observe  that  the  comparison  is  not 
exact  For  a  motion  to  become  light  there  is  need  of  an  optical 
apparatus  and  consciousness ;  for  a  motion  to  become  sound  there 
is  need  of  an  acoustic  apparatus  and  consciousness.  But  for  a 
nerve-vibration  to  become  consciousness — which  as  yet  has  no 
existence — what  is  needed  ?  How  shall  we  explain  this  metamor- 
phosis ? 

Such,  briefly,  is  the  mechanical  hypothesis,  which  it  would 
require  a  volume  to  set  forth  in  its  details.  According  to  it, 
phenomena  differ  in  nothing  from  one  another  save  in  this,  that 
the  higher  are  produced  by  a  concentration,  and  the  lower  by  a 
dispersion  of  force.  A  unit  of  thought  would  be  equivalent  to 
several  units  of  life,  and  a  unit  of  life  to  several  units  of  purely 
mechanical  force.  At  least,  such  would  seem  to  be  the  tenour  of 
the  observations  made  by  one  of  its  most  recent  exponents,  Dr. 
Maudsley,  in  his  Physiology  of  Mind.  '  All  ascending  transform- 


Relations  between  tlte  Physical  and  the  Moral.      246 

ations  of  matter  and  force  are,  so  to  speak,  concentrations  of  the 
same  within  a  less  space.  One  equivalent  of  chemical  force  cor- 
responds to  several  equivalents  of  a  lower  force,  and  one  equivalent 
of  vital  force  to  several  equivalents  of  chemical.  The  same  holds 
good  for  the  various  tissues.  .  .  If  we  suppose  a  higher  tissue  to 
undergo  a  decomposition,  or  a  retrograde  metamorphosis,  which 
shall  necessarily  coincide  with  the  resolution  of  its  energies  into 
lower  modes,  we  may  say  that  a  simple  monad  of  the  higher  tissue, 
or  one  equivalent  of  its  force,  is  equal  to  several  monads  of  the 
lower  kind  of  tissue,  or  to  several  equivalents  of  its  force.  The 
characteristic  of  living  matter  is  that  it  is  a  complexity  of  combina- 
tions, and  a  variety  of  elements  so  brought  together  in  a  small 
space  that  we  cannot  trace  them;  and  in  nervous  structure  this 
concentration  and  this  complication  are  carried  to  the  utmost 
degree.  .  .  The  highest  energy  of  nature  is,  in  fact,  the  most 
dependent.  The  reason  of  the  powerful  influence  it  is  capable  of 
exerting  on  the  lower  forces  which  serve  in  its  evolution  is,  that  it 
implicitly  contains  the  essence  of  all  lower  kinds  of  energy.  As 
the  man  of  genius  implicitly  comprises  humanity,  so  the  nervous 
element  implicitly  comprises  nature.'  In  another  place,  the  author 
adds  the  following  remark,  which  can  hardly  be  reconciled  with 
mechanism  :  '  What  is  this  progress,  this  nisus,  which  is  so  evident 
when  we  take  all  nature  into  account?  Is  it  not  a  striving  of 
nature  to  attain  consciousness,  to  attain  the  possession  of  itself? 
In  the  series  of  manifold  productions,  man,  says  Goethe,  was  the 
first  wherein  nature  "held  converse  with  God.' 

We  shall  not  attempt,  in  this  place,  the  discussion  of  the  mechan- 
ical theory.  We  shall  hereafter  submit  both  it  and  its  opposite, 
idealism,  to  criticism.  We  would  only  remark  for  the  present 
that,  from  the  standpoint  of  experience,  we  may  object  to  it  that  it 
is  an  excessive  abuse  of  hypothesis,  which  it  exalts  to  reality.1  While 

1  Those  who  occupy  the  metaphysical  point  of  view  refute  mechanism  by 
saying  that  from  the  less  it  deduces  the  greater. 

Taken  by  itself,  this  axiom  is  incontestable,  for  it  is  only  another  form  of  the 
plain  truth  that  the  whole  is  greater  than  a  part,  but  we  must  here  be  careful. 
The  terms  greater  and  less  are  quantitative  expressions,  and  hence  they  have  no 
value  except  in  the  domain  of  the  measurable,  the  homogeneous,  the  mathe- 
matical. To  employ  them  aright,  the  two  terms  must  be  comparable  and 


246  Heredity. 

among  these  hypotheses  there  are  some  which  share  in  the  present 
imperfection  of  the  sciences,  but  which  may  be  accepted  in  advance, 
there  are  others  which  so  far  transcend  all  possible  experience 
that  there  is  no  rashness  in  rejecting  them. 

2.  Idealism  is  not  so  easily  set  forth  as  the  opposite  theory  : 
not  that  it  is  less  simple,  or  that  it  does  not  hang  so  well  together, 
but  because  it  conversely  follows  the  scientific  order,  proceeding 
always  from  the  end  to  the  subordinated  means,  descending  step 
by  step  the  series  which  mechanism  ascends  step  by  step.  The 
starting-point  of  mechanism  is  very  definite,  if  it  is  not  very  certain ; 
idealism  at  the  outset  takes  up  its  position  in  the  absolute,  which 
is  the  only  point  of  view  from  which  the  universe  can  be  surveyed, 
'  For  God  serves  to  explain  the  soul,  and  the  soul  to  explain  nature.' 
We  are  here  beyond  the  reach  of  experience,  and  consequently 
of  science.  Yet  we  must  attain  to  science,  must  pass  from  the 
absolute  to  the  relative,  from  ourselves  to  phenomena.  But  how, 
by  what  mysterious  operation  is  this  done  ?  Idealism  answers  only 
in  metaphors — which  is  inevitable,  since  the  finite  and  the  infinite 
are  incommensurable,  and,  ex  hypothesi,  there  is  no  possible  ratio 
between  the  first  and  the  second  term.  If  we  suppose  this  first 
difficulty  solved,  we  are  then  on  the  ground  of  experience,  in 
possession  of  a  reality  derived  from  the  absolute,  which  will  serve 
ultimately  to  measure  and  explain  everything.  This  reality  is 
thought 

According  to  Schopenhauer  and  his  school,  thought  would 
occupy  only  the  second  place,  intelligence  would  be  only  '  the 
physics  of  the  mind '  imprisoned  in  the  subjective  forms  of  time, 

consequently  of  the  same  nature.  To  say  that  mind  is  the  greater  and  matter 
the  less,  is  to  be  the  dupe  of  words  ;  it  is  to  apply  to  quality  what  is  true  only  of 
quantity.  The  relation  of  mind  to  matter  is  not  a  relation  of  greater  and  less, 
but  of  object  to  object 

It  is  also  said  that  the  mechanical  theory  subordinates  the  higher  to  the 
lower.  This  refutation,  for  which  we  are  indebted  to  A.  Comte,  is  more  exact, 
because  it  substitutes  the  qualitative  point  of  view  for  the  quantitative.  For  my 
own  part,  I  certainly  consider  the  psychological  order  superior  to  the  vital 
order,  and  the  latter  to  the  inorganic  world.  But  these  ideas  of  higher  and 
lower  may  well  possess  only  a  subjective  value,  and  be  only  a  mere  human  way 
of  considering  things,  so  that  this  refutation,  however  true  in  fact,  has  no  logical 
cogency  or  true  scientific  value. 


Relations  between  the  Physical  and  the  Moral.     247 

space,  and  causality.  The  supreme  reality  would  be  will,  which 
alone  springs  not  from  intellectual  experience,  and  which  alone  is 
directly  conceived.  Yet  will  thus  posed,  without  and  above  all 
consciousness,  all  idea,  is  only  in  name  like  that  will  of  which  we 
have  consciousness,  or  of  that  which  enters  into  the  texture  of  the 
effects  and  causes  which  constitute  experience.  We  cannot  define 
this  absolute  will  because,  ex  hypothesi,  it  is  not  knowable, 
and  because  nothing  exists  for  us,  except  so  far  as  we  know  it. 
But  not  to  dwell  on  these  inner  discordances  of  idealism,  let  us 
admit  that  thought,  in  its  broad  sense,  is  the  principle  of  all  things. 
Astonishing  and  paradoxical  as  this  thesis  might  at  first  appear 
to  the  average  mind,  it  is  in  many  respects  true,  incontestable, 
even  in  the  eyes  of  the  partisan  of  pure  experience.  By  an  un- 
scientific illusion,  we  imagine  that  were  man  and,  in  general,  every 
thinking  and  sensing  brain  to  disappear,  the  universe  would  still  sub- 
sist with  its  light,  its  colours,  its  forms,  its  harmonies,  its  aesthetics. 
But  this  is  not  so,  since  the  universe,  at  least  for  us,  is  only  a  sum 
of  states  of  consciousness.  Resistance,  form,  colour — in  short,  all 
the  attributes  of  matter — exists  for  us  only  on  this  condition.  The 
order  of  these  phenomena,  their  existences,  or  their  uniform  suc- 
cessions— that  is  to  say,  their  laws — exist  for  us  only  on  this  condi- 
tion. 'And  this  world,'  says  Schopenhauer,  'would  no  longer 
exist  if  human  brains  were  not  unceasingly  multiplied,  springing  up 
like  mushrooms,  to  take  in  the  universe,  which  is  ready  to  founder 
in  nothingness,  and  to  toss  between  them  like  a  ball  this  great 
image  identical  in  all,  of  which  they  express  the  identity  by  the 
word  object* 

Without  accepting  this  absolute  idealism,  which  is  hypothetical, 
experience  alone  compels  us  to  admit  that  for  us  all  real  or 
possible  existence  is  bounded  by  the  limits  of  our  real  or  pos- 
sible thought  If,  then,  we  place  thought  at  the  summit  of  all 
things — as  well  in  the  absolute  as  in  the  experience,  since  it  is 
thought  which,  in  revealing  itself,  reveals  all  things — it  follows  that, 
for  idealism,  in  proportion  as  we  descend  from  pure  thought  to 
sensation,  from  sensation  to  the  vital  phenomena,  and  from  the 
vital  phenomena  to  chemical  and  mechanical  action,  the  universe 
grows  obscure  and  mean ;  there  is  constant  diminution  of  reality, 
of  being.  Sensation  and  sense-impressions  are  intelligible,  but  life 


248  Heredity. 

is  an  unconscious  thought  enclosed  in  matter;  'the  body  is  a 
mind  of  a  moment's  duration.'  In  the  inorganic  world,  at  the 
lowest  grade  of  the  scale,  the  phenomena  of  shock  or  of  the  com- 
munication of  motion,  the  clearest  of  all  for  mechanism,  is  in 
fact  the  most  obscure,  because  there  the  effort,  the  will,  which 
constitutes  all  thought,  is  more  widely  separated  than  elsewhere 
from  its  effect :  there  thought  is  aliena  a  se.  Further,  the  pheno- 
menon of  shock  includes  that  which  some  would  have  it  replace, 
viz.  spontaneity.  '  Inertia,  with  the  elasticity  which  results  from 
it,  is  to  the  body  what  is  to  the  soul  the  innate  tendency  to 
preserve  the  action  that  constitutes  its  essence,  and  to  restore  it 
when  it  is  deranged.'  Inertia  is  analogous  to  and  derived  from 
will,  and  all  motion  is  in  its  essence  an  aiming  at  something.  Thus 
everything  is  explained  by  thought,  all  that  is  intelligible ;  and,  as 
Berkeley  says, '  In  all  that  exists  is  life,  in  all  that  lives  is  sensation, 
and  in  all  that  has  sensation  is  thought.' 

Such  is  the  idealistic  system — a  system  that  hangs  well  together, 
even  if  it  be  not  conclusive.  We  do  not  accuse  it  of  depending 
on  an  hypothesis,  such  as  :  '  Thought  is  the  only  reality,'  for  this 
it  shares  in  common  with  metaphysics,  and,  indeed,  with  all  human 
science.  All  our  scientific  knowledge,  however  coherent,  how- 
ever solid  and  fruitful  in  results,  is  like  a  gold  chain,  of  which 
we  do  not  see  the  first  link.  As  we  are  alike  incapable  of  tran- 
scending experience  and  of  being  content  with  experience,  and  as 
science  has  the  same  limits  as  experience,  the  only  way  of  tran- 
scending these  limits  is  hypothesis.  Every  system  of  thought 
employs  hypothesis  more  or  less ;  idealism  more  frankly  than 
any  other  system.  A  graver  defect,  as  we  view  it,  is,  that  even 
though  the  hypothesis  be  admitted,  the  system  nevertheless  still 
contains  an  insuperable  difficulty.  How  does  thought,  which  is 
the  only  reality,  become  something  else  for  itself,  something  so 
different  that  it  no  longer  recognizes  itself?  What  is  the  cause 
of  this  continuous  and  ever-increasing  lapse  of  thought?  It 
evidently  cannot  be  any  external  cause,  for  by  the  hypothesis 
there  is  nothing  beyond  thought  What,  then,  is  the  internal 
cause  ?  Nature,  it  will  be  said,  is  '  an  exterioration  of  the  mind ' 
— a  proposition  that  relatively  is  incontestable,  but  absolutely 
doubtful,  for  experience  shows  that  we  are  as  incapable  of  sup 


Relations  between  the  Physical  and  the  Moral.     249 

posing  matter  without  mind  as  mind  without  matter ;  subject  and 
object,  external  and  internal,  are  correlative  terms.  If  the  object 
is  in  the  last  analysis  reduced  to  states  of  consciousness  which 
come  from  within,  states  of  consciousness  are  reduced  in  the  last 
analysis  to  sensations  which  come  from  without.  The  object  is 
constituted  by  the  aid  of  elements  derived  from  the  subject,  and 
the  subject  is  constituted  by  the  aid  of  elements  derived  from  the 
object.  From  this  alternative  there  is  no  escape. 

Moreover,  the  radical  weakness  of  these  two  rival  doctrines, 
mechanism  and  idealism,  has  been  so  well  demonstrated  in  a 
recent  work  by  Herbert  Spencer,  that  we  cannot  do  better  than 
to  give  that  author'e  remarks  in  his  own  words. 

'  Here,  indeed,  we  arrive  at  the  barrier  which  needs  to  be  per- 
petually pointed  out,  alike  to  those  who  seek  materialistic  expla- 
nations of  mental  phenomena,  and  to  those  who  are  alarmed  lest 
such  explanations  may  be  found.  The  last  class  prove  by  their 
fear  almost  as  much  as  the  first  prove  by  their  hope,  that  they 
believe  that  mind  may  possibly  be  interpreted  in  terms  of  matter ; 
whereas  many  whom  they  vituperate  as  materialists  are  profoundly 
convinced  that  there  is  not  the  remotest  possibility  of  so  inter- 
preting them.  For  those  who,  not  deterred  by  foregone  conclu- 
sions, have  pushed  their  analysis  to  the  uttermost,  see  very  clearly 
that  the  concept  we  form  to  ourselves  as  matter,  is  but  the  symbol 
of  some  form  of  power  absolutely  and  for  ever  unknown  to  us ; 
and  a  symbol  which  we  cannot  suppose  to  be  like  the  reality 
without  involving  ourselves  in  contradictions.  They  also  see 
that  the  representation  of  all  objective  activities  in  the  terms  of 
motion  is  but  a  representation  of  them,  and  not  a  knowledge  of 
them ;  and  that  we  are  immediately  brought  to  alternative  absur- 
dities if  we  assume  the  power  manifested  to  us  as  motion  to  be 
in  itself  that  which  we  conceive  as  motion.  When,  with  these 
conclusions  that  matter  and  motion,  as  we  think  them,  are  but 
symbolic  of  unknowable  forms  of  existence,  we  join  the  con- 
clusion, lately  reached,  that  mind  also  is  unknowable,  and  that 
the  simplest  form  under  which  we  can  think  of  its  substance  is 
but  a  symbol  of  something  that  can  never  be  rendered  into 
thought ;  we  see  that  the  whole  question  is  -at  last  nothing  more 
than  the  question  whether  these  symbols  should  be  expressed  in 


250  Heredity. 

terms  of  those,  or  those  in  terms  of  these — a  question  scarcely 
worth  deciding,  since  either  answer  leaves  us  as  completely  out- 
side of  the  reality  as  we  were  at  first. 

'  Nevertheless,  it   may  be  as  well  to  say  here,  once   for  all, 
that  were  we   compelled   to  choose  between  the  alternative  of 
translating  mental   phenomena  into  physical  phenomena,  or  of 
translating  physical  phenomena  into  mental  phenomena,  the  latter 
alternative  would  seem  the  more  acceptable  of  the  two.     Mind, 
as  known  to  the  possessor  of  it,  is  a  circumscribed  aggregate  of 
activities ;  and  the  cohesion  of  these  activities  one  with  another, 
throughout  the  aggregate,  compels  the  postulation  of  a  something 
of  which  they  are  the  activities.     But  the  same  experiences  which 
make  him  aware  of  this  coherent  aggregate  of  mental  faculties, 
simultaneously  make  him  aware  of  activities  that  are  not  included 
in  it — outlying  activities  which  become  known  by  their  effects  on 
this  aggregate,  but  which  are  experimentally  proved  to  be  not 
coherent  with  it,  and  to  be  coherent  with  one  another.     As,  by 
the  definition  of  them,  these  external  activities  cannot  be  brought 
within  the  aggregate  01  activities  distinguished  as  those  of  mind, 
they  must  for  ever  remain  to  him  nothing  more  than  the  unknown 
correlatives  of  their  effects  on  this  aggregate,  and  can  be  thought 
of  only  in  terms  furnished  by  this  aggregate.     Hence,  if  he  re- 
gards his  conceptions  of  these  activities  lying  beyond  mind,  as 
constituting  knowledge  of  them,  he  is  deluding  himself;  he  is  but 
representing  these  activities  in  terms  of  mind,  and  can  never  do 
otherwise.     Eventually,  he  is  obliged  to  admit  that  his  ideas  of 
matter  and  motion,  merely  symbolic  of  unknowable  realities,  are 
complex  states  of  consciousness  built  out  of  units  of   feeling. 
But  if,  after  admitting  this,  he  persists  in  asking  whether  units  of 
feeling  are  of  the  same  nature  as  the  units  of  force  distinguished 
as  external,  or  whether  the  units  of  force  distinguished  as  external 
are   of  the   same   nature  as  units   of  feeling ;  then  the  reply, 
still  substantially  the  same,  is,  that  we  may  go  further  towards 
conceiving  units  of  external  force  to  be  identical  with   units  of 
feeling,  than  we  can  towards  conceiving  units  of  feeling  to  be 
identical  with  units  of  external  force.     Clearly,  if  units  of  external 
force  are  regarded  as  absolutely  unknown  and  unknowable,  then 
to  translate  units  of  force  into  them  is  to  translate  the  known 


Relations  between  the  Physical  and  the  Moral.     251 

into  the  unknown,  which  is  absurd.  And  if  they  are  what  they 
are  supposed  to  be  by  those  who  identify  them  with  their  symbols, 
then  the  difficulty  of  translating  units  of  feeling  into  them  is  insur- 
mountable ;  if  force,  as  it  objectively  exists,  is  absolutely  alien  in 
nature  from  that  which  exists  subjectively  as  feeling,  then  the 
transformation  of  force  into  feeling  is  unthinkable.  Either  way, 
therefore,  it  is  impossible  to  interpret  inner  existence  in  terms  of 
outer  existence.  But  if,  on  the  other  hand,  units  of  force,  as 
they  exist  objectively,  are  essentially  the  same  in  nature  with 
those  manifested  subjectively  as  units  of  feeling,  then  a  con- 
ceivable hypothesis  remains  open.  Every  element  of  that  aggre- 
gate of  activities  constituting  a  consciousness,  is  known  as  be- 
longing to  consciousness  only  by  its  cohesion  with  the  rest 
Beyond  the  limits  of  this  coherent  aggregate  of  activities  exist 
activities  quite  independent  of  it,  and  which  cannot  be  brought 
into  it  We  may  imagine,  then,  that  by  their  exclusion  from  the 
circumscribed  activities  constituting  consciousness,  these  outer 
activities,  though  of  the  same  intrinsic  nature,  become  antithe- 
tically opposed  in  aspect  Being  disconnected  from  consciousness, 
or  cut  off  by  its  limits,  they  are  thereby  rendered  foreign  to  it 
Not  being  incorporated  with  its  activities,  or  linked  with  these  as 
they  are  with  one  another,  consciousness  cannot,  as  it  were,  run 
through  them  ;  and  so  they  come  to  be  figured  as  unconscious — 
are  symbolized  as  having  the  nature  called  material,  as  opposed  to 
that  called  spiritual.  While,  however,  it  thus  seems  an  imaginable 
possibility  that  units  of  external  force  may  be  identical  in  nature 
with  units  of  the  force  known  as  feeling,  yet  we  cannot,  by  so 
representing  them,  get  any  nearer  to  a  comprehension  of  external 
force.  For,  as  already  shown,  supposing  all  forms  of  mind  to  be 
composed  of  homogenous  units  of  feeling  variously  aggregated, 
the  resolution  of  them  into  such  units  leaves  us  as  unable  as 
before  to  think  of  the  substance  of  mind  as  it  exists  in  such  units; 
and  thus,  even  could  we  really  figure  to  ourselves  all  units  of  ex- 
ternal force  as  being  essentially  like  units  of  the  force  known  as 
feeling,  and  as  so  constituting  a  universal  sentiency,  we  should 
be  as  far  as  ever  from  forming  a  conception  of  that  which  is 
universally  sentient 

*  Hence,  though  of  the  two  it  seems  easier  to  translate  so-called 


252  Heredity- 

matter  into  so-called  spirit,  than  to  translate  so-called  spirit  into 
so-called  matter  (which  latter  is,  indeed,  wholly  impossible),  yet 
no  translation  can  carry  us  beyond  our  symbols.  Such  vague  con- 
ceptions as  loom  before  us  are  illusions  conjured  up  by  the  wrong 
connotations  of  our  words.  The  expression  '  substance  of  mind,' 
if  we  use  it  in  any  other  way  than  as  the  x  of  our  equation,  in- 
evitably betrays  us  into  errors ;  for  we  cannot  think  of  substance 
save  in  terms  that  imply  material  properties.  Our  only  course  is 
constantly  to  recognize  our  symbols  as  symbols  only,  and  to  rest 
content  with  that  duality  of  them  which  our  constitution  necessi- 
tates. The  unknowable,  as  manifested  to  us  within  the  limits  of 
consciousness  in  the  shape  of  feeling,  being  no  less  inscrutable 
than  the  unknowable  as  manifested  beyond  the  limits  of  conscious- 
ness in  other  shapes,  we  approach  no  nearer  to  understanding  the 
last  by  rendering  it  into  the  first.  The  conditioned  form  under 
which  being  is  presented  in  the  subject  cannot,  any  more  than  the 
conditioned  form  under  which  being  is  presented  in  the  object,  be 
the  unconditioned  being  common  to  the  two.' x 

v. 

In  the  preceding  paragraph  we  said  that  on  the  question  of  the 
relations  between  the  physical  and  the  moral  some  authors,  taking 
the  metaphysical  point  of  view,  think  that  the  problem  can  be 
resolved,  while  others,  basing  themselves  on  experience,  hold  it  to 
be  insoluble.  Further,  we  have  seen  that  metaphysics  fails  to 
solve  it :  mechanism  fails,  because  it  reduces  all  to  motion,  which 
ultimately  is  not  cognized,  save  on  the  condition  of  thought ;  and 
idealism  fails,  because  it  reduces  all  to  thought,  which  does  not 
exist  without  an  object ;  so  that  neither  of  these  two  antithetic 
terms  can  absorb  the  other.  The  conclusion,  therefore,  must  be 
that  the  problem  is  by  its  very  nature  insoluble.  This,  however, 
is  not  a  return  to  a  proposition  long  accepted,  and  in  a  manner 
classical.  We  will  explain  why  it  is  not 

The  commonly  accepted  dualism  takes  the  metaphysical  point  of 
view;  it  opposes  a  substance  which  it  does  not  know — mind — 


1  Principles  of  Psychology,  2nd  Edition,  §  63. 


Relations  between  the  Physical  and  the  Moral.      253 

to  another  substance  it  does  not  know — matter — without  being  able 
to  reconcile  them,  as  is  natural,  for  how  can  light  be  produced  out 
of  the  clash  of  two  ignorances?  On  the  contrary,  the  partisan 
of  experience  pronounces  the  question  unsolvable,  precisely  because 
it  transcends  experience,  that  is  to  say,  demonstrated  or  verifiable 
science.  The  one  is  pent  within  the  impotency  of  his  metaphysics ; 
the  other  within  the  limits  of  his  method.  The  ignorance  of  the 
former  is  owing  to  the  gaps  in  his  philosophy ;  that  of  the  latter, 
to  his  voluntary  abstention  from  all  transcendental  research. 

In  our  times,  the  fine  generalization  known  as  the  law  of  equiva- 
lence, or  of  the  correlation  of  forces,  has  led  some  bold  thinkers  to 
state  in  another  form  the  problem  of  the  relations  between  the 
physical  and  the  moral.  Modern  physics  considers  all  the  forces 
of  nature — heat,  light,  electricity,  magnetism,  cohesion,  chemical 
affinity,  gravity — as  capable  of  being  reduced  all  to  one  principle, 
and  of  being  transformed  into  one  another  in  accordance  with 
fixed  rules,  which  are  nothing  else  but  me  laws  of  mechanics.  It 
is  also  generally  admitted  that  the  law  of  equivalence  governs 
vital  phenomena,  and  muscular  contraction  and  innervation  in  par- 
ticular. But  is  it  also  applicable  to  mental  phenomena  ?  Is  it 
possible  for  it  to  pass  from  nerve  facts  to  states  of  consciousness  ? 
Do  mental  forces  enter  the  category  of  the  other  forces,  and  are 
they  in  like  manner  convertible  ? 

Some  authors  in  our  day  answer  affirmatively.  Bain  has  accu- 
mulated and  cited  some  facts  from  which  he  infers,  (i)  the  equiva- 
valence  or  transmutability  of  nervous  and  mental  forces,  and  (2) 
the  equivalence  or  transformation  of  the  mental  forces  into  one 
another.  Thus,  according  to  him,  it  would  be  possible  to  establish 
an  equivalence  on  the  one  hand  between  a  certain  nervous  state 
and  a  certain  mental  state,  and  on  the  other  hand  between  the 
three  principal  forms  of  mental  life — sensibility,  will  and  intelli- 
gence ;  so  that  a  state  of  consciousness  would  imply  the  trans- 
formation and  expenditure  of  a  certain  amount  of  nerve-force; 
and  an  increase  of  sensibility  would  be  possible  only  by  a  diminu- 
tion of  intelligence  and  will,  the  sum  of  force  in  the  living  being 
remaining  constant  amid  all  these  transformations.  The  magnifi- 
cent synthesis  contained  in  Herbert  Spencer's  First  Principles 
reduces  all  phenomena  without  exception  to  the  law  of  equivalence. 


254  Heredity. 

'  No  thought,  no  feeling,'  says  the  author,  '  is  ever  manifested, 
save  as  the  result  of  a  physical  force.  This  principle  will  before 
long  be  a  scientific  common  place.' 

""  They  who  hold  this  doctrine  observe  that  nervous  force,  which 
ultimately  results  from  nutrition,  must,  after  it  is  produced,  be 
expended  in  one  or  other  of  these  three  ways  :  either  by  acting  on 
the  viscera,  the  heart,  or  the  digestive  organs,  as  is  the  case  in 
deep  emotion;  or  by  acting  on  the  muscles  and  producing  move- 
ments, gestures,  and  various  expressions  of  the  physiognomy ;  or 
by  causing  the  excitation  to  pass  to  some  other  part  of  the  nervous 
system,  and  hence  result  those  successive  states  which  make  up 
consciousness.  Sensations  excite  ideas  and  emotions ;  the  latter 
in  turn  awaken  other  ideas  and  emotions,  and  so  on — that  is  to 
say,  the  tension  existing  in  certain  nerves,  or  groups  of  nerves, 
when  they  give  us  sensations,  ideas,  or  emotions,  produces  an 
equivalent  tension  in  some,  other  nerves,  or  groups  of  nerves,  with 
which  they  are  connected. 

But  the  facts  cited  in  support  of  this  thesis  do  not  appear  to  us 
to  be  all  equally  conclusive.  Some  of  them  are  no  doubt  trans- 
formations, but  then  others  are  rather  correspondences.  Thus,  the 
pain  which  is  transformed  into  cries  and  extravagant  contortions  is 
of  short  duration ;  pain  which  endures  is  reticent  of  expression. 
And  the  same  is  to  be  said  of  anger.  But  in  certain  cases — for 
example,  in  the  cerebral  excitation  produced  by  hasheesh  or  opium 
— it  is  not  quite  certain  that  between  the  nervous  state  and  the 
mental  state  there  exists  equivalence,  transformation,  and  not 
simply  correspondence. 

This  doctrine  of  the  correlation  of  physical  forces  and  thought 
is  as  yet  hardly  more  than  an  outline.  It  is  still  in  the  qualitative 
period,  and  it  is  doubtful  whether  it  will  very  soon  enter  on  the 
quantitative  period,  which  alone  can  constitute  it  a  science.  It  is 
however  a  promising  field,  and  one  well  adapted  to  exercise  free 
and  daring  minds.  If  it  could  be  demonstrated  scientifically,  it  is 
evident  that  then  the  problem  of  the  relations  between  the  physical 
and  the  moral  would  come  before  us  in  a  new  aspect :  it  would  be 
only  a  particular  case  of  the  law  of  the  correlation  of  forces.  We 
need  not  say  that  such  a  solution,  restricted  to  experience,  would 


Relations  between  the  Physical  and  the  Moral.     255 

be  neither  spiritualistic  nor  materialistic,  for  those  at  least  who 
care  for  the  preciseness  of  the  terms  they  employ.1 

But  not  to  dwell  upon  a  problem  which  cannot  be  incidentally 
discussed,  we  will  endeavour  to  deduce  a  conclusion  from  all  that 
has  been  said,  which  shall  be  based,  so  far  as  possible,  on  experience. 
It  appears  that  all  contemporary  schools,  when  we  eliminate  that 
which  appertains  to  the  exclusive  point  of  view  of  each,  tend  more 
and  more  to  consider  physical  and  moral  phenomena  as  identical. 
This  conclusion  seems  perfectly  natural,  especially  to  those  who 
take  the  ground  of  experience  ;  so  that  we  may  say — at  least,  so  far 
as  current  language  will  enable  us  to  express  ideas  which  are 
opposed  to  current  opinions — that  the  physical  is  the  moral  looked 


1  We  may  cite,  in  confirmation  of  what  we  have  said,  some  remarkable  reflec- 
tions of  the  great  English  physicist,  Tyndall.  'Granted,'  says  he,  'that  a 
definite  thought  and  a  definite  molecular  action  in  the  brain  occur  simulta 
neously ;  we  do  not  possess  the  intellectual  organ,  nor  apparently  any  rudiment 
of  the  organ,  which  would  enable  us  to  pass  by  a  process  of  reasoning  from 
the  one  to  the  other.  They  appear  together,  but  we  do  not  know  why.  Were 
our  minds  and  senses  so  expanded,  strengthened,  and  illuminated  as  to  enable 
us  to  see  and  feel  the  very  molecules  of  the  brain  ;  were  we  capable  of  following 
all  their  motions,  all  their  groupings,  all  their  electric  discharges,  if  such  there 
be  ;  and  were  we  intimately  acquainted  with  the  corresponding  states  of  thought 
and  feeling,  we  should  be  as  far  as  ever  from  the  solution  of  the  problem, 
"  How  are  these  physical  processes  connected  with  the  facts  of  consciousness?  " 
The  chasm  between  the  two  classes  of  phenomena  would  still  remain  intellectu- 
ally impassable.  Let  the  consciousness  of  love,  for  example,  be  associated  with 
a  right-handed  spiral  motion  of  the  molecules  of  the  brain,  and  the  consciousness 
of  hale  with  a  left-handed  spiral  motion.  We  should  then  know  when  we  love 
that  the  motion  is  in  one  direction,  and  when  we  hate  that  the  motion  is  in  the 
other;  but  the  "why  "  would  remain  as  unanswerable  as  before. 

'  In  affirming  that  the  growth  of  the  body  is  mechanical,  and  that  thought,  as 
exercised  by  us,  has  its  correlative  in  the  physics  of  the  brain,  I  think  the 
position  of  the  "  materialist  "  is  stated,  as  far  as  that  position  is  a  tenable  one. 
I  think  the  materialist  will  be  able  finally  to  maintain  this  position  against  all 
attacks  ;  but  I  do  not  think,  in  the  present  condition  of  the  human  mind,  that 
he  can  pass  beyond  this  position.  I  do  not  think  he  is  entitled  to  say  that  his 
molecular  groupings,  and  his  molecular  motions,  explain  everything.  In  reality 
they  explain  nothing.  The  utmost  he  can  affirm  is  the  association  of  two 
classes  of  phenomena,  of  whose  real  bond  of  union  he  is  in  absolute  ignorance. 
The  problem  of  the  connection  of  body  and  soul  is  as  insoluble  in  its  modern 
form  as  it  was  in  the  prescientific  ages.'  Fragments  of  Science,  vi. 
12 


256  Heredity. 

at  from  without,  and  that  the  moral  is  the  physical  looked  at  from 
within.  The  difference  between  physical  and  moral  is  subjective, 
not  objective ;  it  pertains  not  to  their  own  nature,  but  to  our  way 
of  viewing  them.  Physics  has  demonstrated  that  heat,  light,  and 
sound  appear  to  us  as  different,  only  because  each  of  them  is 
addressed  to  a  different  sense,  so  that  all  the  difference  comes  from 
ourselves.  The  psychologist  ought  to  see  that  the  physical  and 
the  moral  appear  different  to  us,  only  because  the  one  is  cognized 
by  the  external  senses  and  under  the  condition  of  time  and  space, 
and  the  other  by  the  inner  sense,  under  the  condition  of  time  ;  so 
that  all  the  difference  comes  from  ourselves.  Thus  the  absolute, 
under  its  unconditioned  form,  would  be  entirely  beyond  our  reach, 
and  the  conditioned  forms  in  which  it  is  manifested  to  us  in  experi- 
ence would  be  opposites  only  by  an  illusion  of  our  thought. 

Perhaps  we  might  proceed  further,  and  draw  an  important 
deduction.  If  we  admit  the  identity  of  physical  and  moral  pheno- 
mena ;  if  we  observe  that  all  that  is  in  the  living  being  forms  a 
continuous  series  from  perfect  unconsciousness,  if  there  be  such  a 
thing,  to  perfect  consciousness  ; — if,  again,  there  be  such  a  thing;  if 
it  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  unconscious  is  the  abyss  into  which 
everything  enters  and  from  which  everything  proceeds,  the  very 
root  of  all  our  mental  life,  and  that  our  personality  is  like  a  wan- 
dering light  on  a  vast  and  sombre  lake,  where  it  appears  as  though 
swallowed  up  each  moment,  then,  perhaps,  we  shall  be  inclined  to 
admit  that  the  physical  order  and  the  moral  order,  which  in  our 
consciousness  appear  to  be  different  things,  are  identical  in  the 
unconscious ;  that  conscious  duality  is  derived  from  an  unconscious 
unity,  so  that  in  the  unconscious,  matter  and  thought,  object  and 
subject,  external  and  internal,  are  one.  This  special  reconciliation 
of  the  physical  and  moral  in  man  would  thus  lead  to  the  recon- 
ciliation of  the  object  in  general  with  the  subject  in  general,  of  the 
universe  with  thought 

This,  it  is  true,  is  a  metaphysical  hypothesis,  but  then  it  is 
neither  possible  nor  desirable  to  give  up  metaphysics  and  hypo- 
thesis. This  hypothesis  has  been  put  forward  by  men  who  are  as 
sturdy  upholders  of  experience  as  are  to  be  found,  and  who  have 
treated  psychology  as  a  natural  science.  '  If  we  admit,'  says  Wundt, 
'  the  identity  of  physical  and  psychical  facts,  then  the  former  will 


Relations  between  the  Physical  and  the  Moral.     257 

come  under  the  laws  of  mechanics,  and  the  latter  to  those  of 
logic,  and  it  can  be  shown  that  these  two  kinds  of  laws  are  iden- 
tical, and  that  the  inner  experience  apprehends  as  a  logical 
necessity  what  the  outer  experience  perceives  as  a  mechanical 
necessity.'  '  This,'  says  he,  in  another  place,  '  is  what  the  analysis 
of  the  process  of  sensation  comes  to,  viz.  that  logical  necessity  and 
mechanical  necessity  differ  not  in  their  essence,  but  simply  accord- 
ing to  our  way  of  regarding  them.  That  which  is  given  to  us 
by  psychological  analysis  as  a  continuity  of  logical  operations 
(Schliisse\  is  given  us  also  by  physiological  analysis  as  a  continuity 
of  mechanical  effects  (Kraflwirkungen).  .  .  .  Logic  and  mechan- 
ism are  identical ;  they  are  both  only  the  form  of  essentially  the 
same  contents  (gleichartigen  Inhalt).1 


CHAPTER  II. 

THE   RELATIONS    BETWEEN   THE   PHYSICAL   AND    THE    MORAL. 
A   PARTICULAR   CASE. 

WE  have  just  seen  how  the  question  of  the  general  relations  of 
the  physical  and  the  moral  presents  itself  in  our  day.  We  would 
now  pass  from  the  theory  to  the  facts,  to  consider  a  particular  case, 
to  resolve  a  single  question,  one,  however,  of  capital  importance 
for  the  matter  in  hand.  The  question  is  this  : — 

Must  it  be  admitted  that  every  psychological  state,  of  whatever 
kind,  has  always  a  physiological  state  for  its  antecedent  ? 

The  correlation  of  the  physical  and  the  moral  is  universally 
admitted,  but  this  belief,  when  examined,  is  very  vague  and  very 
inexact  The  general  view,  and,  what  is  more  serious  still,  many 
philosophical  treatises,  seem  to  admit  that  this  correlation  holds 
good  only  in  the  gross,  so  to  speak,  and  that  frequently  the  body 
and  the  soul  live  each  for  itself.  A  few  striking  cases  on  either 
side  are  considered,  all  the  rest  being  cast  in  the  shade  and  for- 
gotten. But,  in  fact,  the  thing  is  quite  otherwise.  Facts  tend  to 

1  Menschen  und  Thuvsede,  I2th  lecture,  p.  200,  and  57th  Lecture,  p.  437. 


258  Heredity. 

show  more  and  more  conclusively  that  this  correlation  is  as  com- 
plete as  possible ;  that  it  is  constant ;  that  it  is  to  be  seen  even  in 
the  most  insignificant  cases,  and  that  it  admits  of  no  exception. 
It  is  of  great  importance  for  us  to  establish  this  truth  here  :  for  if 
we  could  succeed  in  showing  it  to  be  highly  probable — as  yet  we 
cannot  hope  for  certainty — that  every  psychological  state  supposes 
a  physiological  antecedent,  a  considerable  advance  would  have 
been  made  in  our  inquiry  into  the  causes.  In  the  order  of  pheno- 
mena, all  our  science  consists  in  demonstrating  permanent  co- 
existences and  permanent  successions.  Suppose  this  permanent 
co-existence  of  a  physiological  and  a  psychological  state  estab- 
lished, we  can  then  go  further,  and  draw  the  deduction  that  in 
every  individual  an  habitual  mental  state  must  answer  to  an 
habitual  nervous  state.  The  mental  constitution  of  a  poet  and 
that  of  a  mathematician  imply  each  a  physiological  organization 
differing  from  the  other  in  certain  points.  We  can  go  further,  and 
extend  to  the  species  what  has  just  been  said  of  the  individual. 
The  permanence  of  a  certain  turn  of  mind  in  a  family  during 
several  generations  supposes  the  permanence  of  certain  correspond- 
ing physiological  characters  during  the  same  number  of  genera- 
tions. This  leads  us  in  the  direction  of  the  required  answer,  for 
to  resolve  a  problem  is  to  translate  a  proposition  which  implicitly 
contains  a  truth  into  another  which  gives  a  glimpse  of  it,  and 
this  in  turn  into  another  which  exhibits  it  clearly. 

For  the  present,  let  it  suffice  to  establish  our  premisses.  Evi- 
dently experience  only  can  decide  whether  every  psychological 
state  is  connected  with  a  physiological  state ;  this  is  a  question 
of  fact  rather  than  of  theory.  Still,  we  cannot  enumerate  all  pos- 
sible cases ;  we  cannot  take  all  the  states  of  consciousness  in 
succession  and  show  that  they  correspond,  each  with  a  particular 
nervous  state.  Such  a  demonstration  would  be  endless,  and  it 
would,  moreover,  be  in  many  cases  impossible.  We  must,  then,  in 
accordance  with  Bacon's  precept,  confine  ourselves  to  a  few 
selected,  striking,  decisive  facts,  to  expcrimcnta  lucifera  which  may 
serve  as  a  basis  for  a  sound  induction.  We  will,  then,  show  from 
examples  that  sentiments  and  ideas  are  referable  to  certain  states 
of  the  organs,  though  at  first  sight  they  would  seem  to  be  entirely 
independent  of  them. 


Relations  between  the  Physical  and  the  Moral.     259 


L 

At  the  lowest  grade  of  psychological  life,  we  meet  with  that 
infinite  number  of  faint  perceptions,  scarcely  conscious,  of  which 
the  aggregate  constitutes  for  every  one  that  general  feeling  of 
existence,  that  Gemeingefuhl,  which  is  the  ground  on  which  our 
clear  perceptions  and  our  ideas  are  incessantly  projected.  This 
confused  feeling,  which  is  the  resultant  of  a  crowd  of  infinitesimal 
sensations,  as  the  roar  of  the  sea  is  the  resultant  of  the  noise  of 
each  wave,  is  so  well  described  by  L.  Peisse,  in  his  Notes  on  Caba- 
nis,  that  we  cannot  do  better  than  transcribe  the  passage. 

'  Is  it  quite  certain  that  we  have  absolutely  no  consciousness  of 
the  exercise  of  the  organic  functions  ?  If  we  mean  a  clear,  dis- 
tinct, and  locally  determinable  consciousness,  like  that  of  external 
impressions,  it  is  plain  that  we  do  not  possess  it';  but  we  may  have 
an  obscure,  dim,  and,  so  to  speak,  latent  consciousness  of  them, 
analogous  to  our  consciousness  of  the  sensations  which  call  forth 
and  accompany  the  respiratory  movements,  sensations  which, 
although  incessantly  repeated,  pass  as  though  they  were  not  per- 
ceived. May  we  not,  indeed,  regard  as  a  distant,  feeble,  and  con- 
fused echo  of  the  universal  vital  labour  that  remarkable  feeling 
which,  without  cessation  or  remission,  certifies  us  of  the  actual 
existence  and  presence  of  our  own  bodies  ?  This  feeling  is  nearly 
always,  though  improperly,  confounded  with  those  accidental  and 
local  impressions  which,  while  we  are  awake,  stimulate  and  keep 
up  the  play  of  sensibility.  These  sensations,  though  they  are 
incessant,  make  but  fugitive  and  transient  appearances  on  the  stage 
of  consciousness,  while  the  feeling  of  which  we  speak  endures  and 
persists  beneath  those  shifting  scenes.  Condillac  well  named  it 
the  fundamental  sentiment  of  existence,  and  Maine  de  Birau  the 
feeling  of  sensitive  existence.  In  virtue  of  it,  the  body  is  ever 
present  to  the  ego  as  its  own,  and  the  mental  subject  feels  and 
perceives  that  it  exists  in  some  sort  locally  within  the  limited 
extent  of  the  organism.  It  is  a  perpetual  and  unfailing  monitor, 
making  the  state  of  the  body  ever  present  to  the  consciousness, 
and  it  manifests  in  an  unmistakable  way  the  indissoluble  con- 
nection of  psychical  with  physiological  life.  In  the  ordinary  state 
of  equilibrium  which  constitutes  perfect  health,  this  iceling  is,  as 


260  Heredity. 

we  have  said,  continuous,  uniform,  and  ever  the  same,  and  hence 
it  is  that  the  ego  does  not  perceive  it  as  a  distinct,  special,  local 
sensation.  To  be  distinctly  perceived,  it  must  acquire  a  certain 
intensity,  and  then  it  is  expressed  by  a  vague  impression  of  general 
well-being,  or  general  discomfort,  the  former  indicating  simple 
exaltation  of  physiological  vital  action,  the  latter  its  pathological 
perversion ;  but  in  this  case  it  soon  is  localized  in  the  form  of  par- 
ticular sensations  pertaining  to  such  or  such  a  region  of  the  body. 
At  times  it  is  revealed  in  a  more  indirect,  though  far  more  evident 
way,  when  it  has  just  failed  at  a  given  point  of  the  organism,  for 
instance,  in  a  limb  struck  with  paralysis.  The  member  in  question 
still  belongs  materially  to  the  living  aggregate,  but  it  is  no  longer 
included  in  the  sphere  of  the  organic  ego,  if  the  expression  is  per- 
missible. It  ceases  to  be  felt  by  this  ego,  as  its  own,  and  the 
fact  of  this  separation,  though  negative,  is  interpreted  by  a  very 
special  positive  sensation  known  to  all  who  have  ever  suffered  a 
total  numbness  of  any  part  of  the  body,  produced  whether  by  cold 
or  by  compression  of  the  nerves.  This  sensation  is  nothing  else 
save  the  expression  of  that  sort  of  void  or  loss  which  occurs  in  this 
universal  feeling  of  the  bodily  life  ;  it  proves  that  the  vital  state  of 
that  member  was  really,  though  obscurely,  felt,  and  that  it  con- 
stituted one  of  the  partial  elements  of  the  general  feeling  of  life  in 
the  organic  whole.  Thus  it  is  that  a  continual  and  monotonous 
noise,  like  that  of  a  carriage  in  which  we  are  shut,  is  soon  unno- 
ticed though  it  is  still  heard,  for  if  it  stop  suddenly  the  cessation  is 
at  once  perceived.  This  analogy  may  help  us  to  understand  the 
nature  and  working  of  the  fundamental  sentiment  of  organic  life, 
which,  on  this  hypothesis,  would  be  but  the  resultant  in  confuso  of 
the  impressions  made  at  all  points  of  the  living  body  by  the  inward 
movement  of  functions  carried  to  the  brain,  whether  directly  by 
the  cerebro-spinal  nerves,  or  indirectly  by  the  nerves  of  the  gang- 
lion ic  system. 

Therefore  it  is  not  proved  that,  in  the  strict  sense,  the  organic 
functions  are  performed  absolutely  without  our  knowledge,  as 
Cabanis  asserts. 

This  GemeingefiiM,  of  which  the  mass  of  men  take  no  note,  and 
which  too  many  psychologists  have  neglected,  is  nevertheless  the 
groundwork  of  our  mental  life.  If  in  psychological  analysis  we 


Relations  between  the  Physical  and  the  Moral.     261 

could  employ  the  microscope,  it  would  resolve  this  general  state  into 
a  myriad  of  particular  states,  themselves  the  effects  of  a  myriad 
of  vague  excitations  of  the  organism.  Thus,  then,  this  general 
feeling  of  existence  is  referable  to  elementary  psychological  states, 
of  which  each  has  its  physiological  antecedent 

IL 

If  from  this  obscure  region  we  pass  into  the  full  light  of  con- 
sciousness, we  have  the  same  result  In  the  order  of  the  sentiments, 
as  in  that  of  ideas,  the  phenomena  that  are  purest,  most  quint- 
essential and  freest  from  matter,  have,  like  others,  their  organic 
conditions.  Some  facts  which  we  will  cite  will  give  us,  with  regard 
to  this  point,  an  amount  of  information  that  never  could  be  divined 
by  all  the  theories  in  the  world  unaided  by  experience.  We  will 
begin  with  the  sentiments. 

All  must  admit  that  many  of  the  sentiments  and  passions  de- 
pend upon  a  certain  state  of  the  organs.  Most  languages,  indeed, 
employ  words  signifying  '  heart '  and  '  bowels,'  to  denote  our  emo- 
tions. But  it  will  be  found  that  to  many  sentiments  is  attributed 
the  privilege  of  being  purely  spiritual 

Thus,  love.  There  is  hardly  any  passion  that  is  more  intimately 
associated  with  the  organ.  Yet  it  has  been  supposed  that  under  a 
certain  form,  called  platonic,  or  ideal  love,  there  arises  a  purely 
mental  state,  having  nothing  in  common  with  the  senses.  The 
truth  is,  that  love  in  man  differs  widely  from  the  appetite  of  the 
brute,  as  in  a  great  measure  it  is  the  work  of  the  imagination  and 
of  the  mind,  because  it  is  a  complex  sentiment,  resulting  from  the 
fusion  of  many  simple  sentiments.  An  able  psychologist  of  our 
own  day  who  has  analysed  it,  finds  in  it,  besides  a  physical  senti- 
ment, a  sense  of  the  beautiful,  affection,  sympathy,  admiration, 
love  of  approbation,  self-love,  love  of  possession  and  of  liberty. 
Now  we  will  show  hereafter  that  all  intellectual  states  have  their 
physiological  conditions.  The  physical  sentiment,  which  is  the 
starting-point  of  love,  is  masked  by  numerous  states  of  con- 
sciousness more  intense  than  itself;  but  it  exists,  notwithstanding, 
with  those  organic  excitations  peculiar  to  it  Facts  to  be  found  in 
medical  works  leave  no  doubt  as  regards  this  question,  and  prove 
that,  though  the  spirit  at  first  is  master,  the  flesh  at  last  prevails. 


262  Heredity. 

'A  young  man,  devoted  from  an  early  period  of  his  life  to 
business,  and  who  at  the  age  of  twenty-six  had  never,  though  occa- 
sions were  not  wanting,  felt  any  desire  for  those  pleasures  which 
are  pursued  with  such  mad  ardour  by  so  many  others,  was  suddenly, 
and  without  any  appreciable  cause,  seized  with  a  sort  of  amorous 
fury.  He  began  to  idolize  all  womankind,  but,  as  he  was  careful 
to  say,  with  the  best  intentions,  and  in  all  honour,  not  having  even 
the  slightest  thought  of  the  physical  pleasure  given  by  the  pos- 
session of  them.  He  cherished  these  feelings  in  secret,  and  for 
several  months  he,  concealed  them  from  every  one.  His  education 
and  his  station  in  life  made  this  course  obligatory  on  him.  Soon 
there  arose  in  his  mind  erotic  fancies,  of  which  he  was  inwardly 
ashamed,  and  against  which  he  struggled  with  all  his  might.  But 
so  possessed  was  he  with  them,  that  his  reason  was  not  long  able 
to  resist  the  assault.  To  mental  disorder  there  soon  were  added 
unmistakable  signs  of  softening  of  the  brain  :  a  violent  maniacal 
delirium  then  appeared,  ending  in  death.' l 

We  will  place  side  by  side  with  this  ideal  form  of  love,  mystical 
love,  concerning  which  we  have  the  same  remarks  to  make.  On 
reading  the  principal  treatises  on  religious  and  philosophic  mysti- 
cism, often  so  full  of  poetry,  and  so  curious  as  the  product  of  fine 
analyses,  we  cannot  but  recognize  a  variation  of  ordinary  love, 
and  the  senses  have  there  so  active  a  part,  that  both  forms  often 
speak  the  same  language.  Spiritualistic  philosophers  themselves, 
among  others  Cousin,  have  well  shown  that  mysticism  is  never 
nearer  the  senses  than  when  it  supposes  itself  to  be  very  distant 
from  them. 

Moreau,  in  his  Physiologic  Morbide,  gives  a  curious  instance  of 
this  erratic  love,  which  mistakes  its  true  origin.  '  I  have  had  under 
my  eyes  for  several  months,'  says  he, '  and  have  been  able  to  study 
thoroughly,  a  young  woman,  who  in  another  age,  and  under  other 
conditions  of  family  and  surroundings,  would  certainly  have  ranked 
with  the  Chantals  and  the  Guyons.  I  will  content  myself  with 
citing  literally  and  without  alteration  certain  passages  from  sundry 
letters  written  by  her,  which  show  how  far  she  was  mistaken  as  to 
the  true  character  of  the  sentiments  which  possessed  her.' 

1  Moreau  of  Tours,  Psychologie  Morbide,  pp.  259 — 284. 


Relations  between  the  Physical  and  the  Moral.     263 

We  will  quote  one  passage,  and  that  not  from  among  the  strong- 
est, referring  the  reader  for  further  specimens  to  the  book  itself: — 

' "  I  went  to  bed  with  such  a  swelling  of  all  the  organs  that  I  was 
dull  and,  as  it  were,  stupefied.  I  gently  kissed,  like  a  little  dog  that 
is  beaten,  the  hand  of  my  Master ;  and  then,  as  is  my  custom  on 
every  occasion  of  danger,  I  looked  on  that  dear  Master  with  a 
burning  gaze  of  love  and  trustfulness,  and  going  quite  out  of  my 
own  hateful  personality,  I  reposed  in  him  all  my  true  life,  so  that 
I  went  to  sleep  in  consequence  of  this  practical  death,  and  at  once 
I  was  no  more  conscious  of  myself  than  I  should  have  been  had  I 
died  outright  I  awoke,  however,  for  a  moment  in  the  night,  but  as 
I  was  no  better,  I  took  refuge  again  in  my  dear  Master 

'  "  I  meditated  on  the  meditations  of  Saint  Frangois  de  Sales  on 
the  Song  of  Songs,  at  my  morning  prayer.  One  night,  therefore,, 
while  wide  awake,  I  felt  myself  in  suspense  in  the  midst  of  all  my 
enjoyments,  and  awaiting,  with  a  sort  of  terror,  what  the  Lord 
would  say.  I  saw  him  most  vividly  as  he  is  described  in  the  Song 

of  Songs He  lay  down  near  me,  put  his  feet  on  my  feet, 

laid  his  hands  on  mine  and  enlarged  his  thorny  crown,  where  he 
pressed  his  head  to  mine ;  then,  while  giving  me  a  lively  sense  of 
the  pains  of  his  nails  and  his  thorns,  touching  my  lips  with  his  own, 
and  giving  me  the  divinest  kiss  of  a  divine  spouse,  he  breathed 
irto  my  mouth  a  delicious  breath,  which  pouring  over  my  whole 
being  a  refreshing  vigour,  rejoiced  it  all  over  with  an  incomparable 
thrill,  and  won  it  for  him  without  reserve.'  x 

We  need  not  describe  the  influence  of  mutilation  on  the  senti- 
ments in  general,  on  the  direction  of  the  mind.  In  the  case  of 
animals,  while  making  them  weaker,  it  makes  them  also  more 
docile  and  better  suited  for  use  by  man.  *  It  is  well  known,'  says 
Cabanis,  'that  eunuchs  are  the  vilest  class  of  the  whole  human 
race  :  they  are  cowardly  and  deceitful  because  they  are  weak, 
envious  and  spiteful  because  they  are  unfortunate,  yet  their  mind 
is  conscious  of  the  lack  of  those  impressions  which  give  so  much 
activity  to  the  brain,  and  which  animate  it  with  extraordinary  life.' 

Then  there  are  the  hermaphrodites.  All  who  have  studied 
them  in  their  moral  characteristics,  are  aware  that  the  individual 

1  Ibid.  pp.  269 — 277. 


264  Heredity. 

hermaphrodite  usually  possesses  all  the  psychological  tastes  which 
appertain  to  the  predominant  sex  :  thus  the  masculine  hermaphro- 
dite likes  tobacco,  brandy,  and  women.  Neuter  hermaphrodites 
have  been  known  to  engage  with  equal  pleasure  in  the  violent 
sports  of  boys,  and  in  the  quieter  amusements  of  girls.1 

We  have  now  to  consider  another  category  of  passions,  w^iich 
are  not  connected  in  the  same  way  with  the  organs — namely,  am- 
bition, avarice,  love  of  truth ;  in  a  word,  those  sentiments  which  are 
called  intellectual.  These  are  very  complex  sentiments,  consist- 
ing of  a  number  of  heterogeneous  elements,  but  in  which  ideas 
play  the  chief  part  Yet  it  is  certain  that  they  are  accompanied 
by  pleasure  or  pain,  and  that  these  two  phenomena,  under  what- 
ever form,  are  never  entirely  separable  from  the  organism.  Besides, 
ideas  themselves  have  their  physiological  antecedents ;  they  have 
their  condition  in  a  cerebral  state,  as  we  shall  see  on  looking  at 
our  problem  from  another  point  of  view. 

in. 

Every  intellectual  state  has  for  its  condition  and  antecedent  a 
physiological  state. 

First,  as  regards  the  phenomena  of  perception,  memory,  and 
imagination,  the  fact  is  so  plain  that  there  is  no  need  for  us  to 
dwell  upon  it 

But  when  the  question  is  with  regard  to  the  higher  modes  of 
thought,  such  as  comparison,  abstraction,  generalization,  judgment, 
reasoning,  will,  the  answer  is  more  difficult  It  will  be  admitted 
that  idiocy,  insanity,  ecstasy,  general  paralysis,  and  delirium  always 
have  their  cause  in  a  state  of  the  brain.  It  will  further  be  ad- 
mitted that  the  development  of  the  understanding  depends  on  the 
weight,  form,  and  chemical  constitution  of  the  brain,  and  on  the 
number  of  its  convolutions,  though  with  regard  to  this  point  much 
obscurity  still  exists.  But  there  is  generally  much  repugnance  in 
admitting  that  the  meditation  of  a  Newton  or  a  Spinoza  on  ab- 
stract truths  implies  a  corresponding  cerebral  state,  and  we  must 


1  Dictionnaire  da  Sciences  Naturtlla,  Art.  'Hermaphrodisme.'  On  all  these 
questions  consult  Cabanis,  pp.  222,  223,  253  (Peisse's  edition) ;  Moreau,  329 ; 
Coste,  D&vchppement  da  Corps  Organists,  vol.  i.  pp.  232 — 239. 


Relations  between  tJie  Physical  and  the  Moral,     265 

confess  that  physiology  is  far  from  being  in  a  position  to  say 
precisely  to  what  mode  of  nerve-vibration  a  given  mode  of 
thought  answers.  Yet  we  think  that  there  is  one  fact  which 
settles  the  question — that  we  cannot  think  without  words.  To 
think  is  to  form  a  judgment ;  to  judge  is  to  abstract  or  generalize, 
•  and  these  operations  cannot  be  performed  without  signs.  The 
sign  is  a  kind  of  image — the  substitute  for  an  image — and  it 
depends  on  the  brain,  as  is  proved  in  aphasia,  and  all  disorders 
of  the  memory  which  prevent  our  using  signs.  The  most  abstract 
reflections,  therefore,  in  so  far  as  they  are  connected  with  signs, 
presuppose  a  corresponding  cerebral  state.1 

In  support  of  these  general  considerations,  which  are  based  on 
experience,  we  may  cite,  as  in  the  case  of  the  sentiments,  some 
curious  facts. 

Thus  Dr.  Dumont,  a  physician  of  the  Hospital  des  Quinze- 
Vingts,  has  inquired  into  the  influence  of  blindness  on  the  intel- 
lectual faculties.  Of  two  hundred  and  twenty  blind  persons 
with  whose  lives  he  was  perfectly  familiar,  twenty-seven  showed 
intellectual  disorders — not  including  among  these  those  affected 
with  any  appreciable  cerebral  lesion. 

Dr.  Renaudin  'has  observed  the  highly  instructive  case  of  an 
intermittent  cutaneous  anaesthesia  that  influenced  the  character 

and  the  intellect  of  the  patient  'A  youth,  Arthur  ,  had 

always  given  perfect  satisfaction  to  his  parents.  Gifted  with  or- 
dinary understanding,  he  had  begun  his  elementary  studies  with 
some  success.  Suddenly  his  faculties  lost  their  energy,  and  he 
became  so  unruly  that  he  was  expelled  the  school.  He  might 
have  been  considered  an  ordinary  bad  boy,'  says  M.  Renaudin, 
'  but  as  I  continued  my  investigation  I  found  in  him  a  complete 
insensibility  of  the  skin,  and  I  concluded  that  this  was  the  patho- 
logical explanation  of  the  fact  Nor  was  I  mistaken,  Arthur 
has  since  been  sent  to  Mare'ville,  and  from  direct  observation  I 
have  become  still  more  confirmed  in  this  opinion,  because  the 
cutaneous  anaesthesia  being  somewhat  intermittent,  it  has  been 


1  We  can  think  without  language,  but  not  without  some  mode  or  other  of 
physical  expression.  The  famous  Laura  Bridgman  was  always  moving  her 
fingers  in  her  dreams  and  during  her  waking  reflections. — (Maudsley,  p.  417.) 


266  Heredity. 

easier  to  appreciate  its  influence  on  the  mind  of  the  patient ;  when 
it  ceases,  he  is  docile  and  affectionate.  When  it  reappears,  his 
evil  instincts  return,  and  we  have  had  reason  to  know  that  they 
might  have  led  him  even  to  murder.' 

It  has  been  observed  that  when  there  is  perfect  physical  similarity 
between  twins,  which  is  not  rare,  it  is  always  accompanied  with  • 
moral  similarity.  Moreau  saw  at  Bicetre  two  young  men  who  were 
so  much  alike  that  one  would  be  taken  for  the  other.  They  both 
possess  the  same  monomania,  the  same  dominant  ideas,  the  same 
hallucinations  of  hearing ;  they  never  speak  to  any  one,  nor  do 
they  communicate  with  one  another.  'An  exceedingly  curious  fact, 
often  observed  by  the  attendants  and  by  myself,  is  this  :  from  time 
to  time,  at  irregular  intervals  of  two,  three,  or  more  months, 
without  appreciable  cause,  and  by  the  entirely  spontaneous  action 
of  their  malady,  a  very  marked  change  occurs  in  both  brothers  at 
the  same  period ;  often  on  the  same  day  they  quit  their  habitual 
state  of  stupor  and  prostration  and  earnestly  entreat  the  physician 
to  give  them  their  freedom.  I  have  seen  this  repeated  even  when 
the  two  brothers  were  separated  from  one  another  by  a  distance 
of  several  miles.' l 

The  phenomenon  of  suggestion  also,  as  produced  in  magnetized 
subjects,  and  in  the  state  of  catalepsy  or  hypnotism,  supplies 
decisive  facts  in  support  of  our  proposition.  Ordinarily,  the  ideas, 
sentiments,  and  volitions  suggest  the  sign,  and  are  interpreted  by 
it;  here,  on  the  contrary,  the  sign  suggests  the  idea,  the  sentiment, 
the  volition.  The  phenomenon  is  reversed.  Thus,  by  placing 
the  magnetized  person  on  his  knees,  the  thoughts  of  humility  and 
reverence  are  suggested;  by  lifting  up  his  lips  and  his  eyelids  in  a 
certain  way,  he  is  rendered  proud  and  haughty;  by  raising  his  arms 
into  the  air,  or  clasping  his  hands  on  some  object,  he  is  made  to 
think  that  he  is  climbing.  Carpenter  has  collected  a  number  of 
facts  of  this  kind. 

It  may  therefore  be  said  that  experience  supplies  decisive  facts 
to  confirm  our  proposition,  that  every  psychological  phenomenon 
has  a  physiological  antecedent.  It  cannot  be  asserted  on  sound 
logical  grounds  that  this  is  certain.  To  make  it  so,  the  proposition 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  172.  See  an  analogous  fact  in  Trousseau,  Clinique  Mldicale, 
»•  253- 


Physiological  and  Psychological  Heredity.     267 

should  either  be  strictly  deduced  from  some  unquestionable 
biological  law,  or  else  it  would  have  to  be  possible  to  give 
experimental  proof  of  it  in  all  possible  cases.  We  can  do  neither 
of  these  things.  But  we  hold  that  this  thesis  possesses  all  the 
probability  that  accompanies  the  inductive  process  ;  we  hold  that 
were  our  science  sufficiently  advanced,  we  could,  the  state  of  the 
brain  being  given,  thence  deduce  the  corresponding  thought  or 
sentiment ;  and,  conversely,  the  sentiment  or  thought  being  given, 
we  could  deduce  the  state  of  the  brain.  Leibnitz,  whose  genius 
was  all-penetrating,  had  a  glimpse  of  this  truth  at  a  period  when 
science  scarce  allowed  a  suspicion  of  its  existence.  'All  that 
ambition  led  Caesar's  mind  to  do  is  represented  also  in  his  body ; 
there  is  a  certain  state  of  the  body  which  answers  even  to  the 
most  abstract  reasonings.' 

We  might  have  deduced  our  proposition  from  what  was  before 
said ;  for  if  it  be  admitted  that  the  physical  and  the  moral  differ 
not  objectively  but  subjectively — not  in  their  nature,  but  as  to  the 
mode  in  which  they  are  known  to  us ;  if  vital  phenomena  are 
on  the  one  hand  specially  mental,  and  on  the  other  specially 
physical,  but  yet  such  that  each  of  them,  taken  in  its  totality,  is 
ever  both  physical'  and  mental ;  then  it  is  plain  that  every  psych- 
ological phenomenon  supposes  a  corresponding  physiological  state. 
But  we  have  thought  it  best  to  establish  this  truth  directly,  and  by 
experience,  independently  of  all  hypotheses.  We  need  only  add 
that  here,  as  everywhere,  our  solution  is  restricted  to  phenomena, 
and  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  ultimate  reasons  of  things. 


CHAPTER  III. 

PHYSIOLOGICAL  AND   PSYCHOLOGICAL  HEREDITY. 
L 

IF  we  sum  up  what  has  been  said  in  the  two  foregoing  chapters, 
we  shall  see  that  in  consequence  of  these  researches  the  problem, 
What  is  the  cause  of  psychological  heredity  ?  is  very  much  sim- 
plified. 

In  the  first  place,  we  endeavoured  to  show  that  the  general 


268  Heredity. 

relations  of  the  physical  and  the  moral  may  be  conceived  as  a 
relation  of  equivalence,  so  that  in  the  last  analysis  there  exists 
only  one  species  of  phenomena,  neither  material  nor  spiritual,  but 
which,  from  a  purely  human  point  of  view,  we  call  physiological 
when  we  grasp  them  from  without  and  through  the  senses,  and 
psychological  when  we  grasp  them  from  within  and  through  the 
consciousness.  As  we  have  remarked,  however,  this  is  but  an 
hypothesis,  the  value  of  which  will  be  better  and  better  deter- 
mined in  the  progress  of  the  sciences ;  but  the  fate  of  which  is  of 
no  importance  for  the  experimental  portion  of  our  thesis. 

In  the  next  place,  passing  from  speculation  to  facts,  from  meta- 
physics to  biology,  we  showed,  on  the  ground  of  experience,  that 
it  is  extremely  probable,  if  not  certain,  that  every  mental  state 
implies  a  corresponding  nervous  state,  and  vice  versa ;  so  that, 
were  our  science  more  perfect,  we  might  from  the  mental  state  of 
a  being  infer  the  nervous  state,  and  from  the  nervous  state  infer 
the  mental  state. 

If  these  premisses  be  accepted,  the  problem  of  the  cause  may 
be  more  clearly  stated.  In  fact,  all  our  science  consists  in  ap- 
prehending relations  between  simple  phenomena  or  groups  of 
phenomena.  We  have  here  two  groups  of  phenomena,  the  one 
physiological  and,  above  all,  nervous,  the  other  psychological ; 
from  the  standpoint  of  heredity  there  can  only  subsist  between 
these  one  or  other  of  these  three  relations  : — 

1.  A  simple  relation  of  simultaneity,  physiological  and  psycho- 
logical heredity  being  parallel,  though  entirely  independent  of  one 
another. 

2.  A  relation  of  causality,  psychological  heredity  being  con- 
sidered as  the  cause,  and  physiological  heredity  as  the  effect 

3.  Another  relation  of  causality,  but  with  physiological  heredity 
as  the  cause,  and  psychological  heredity  as  the  effect 

We  will  not  stop  to  examine  the  first  hypothesis,  which  appears 
to  us  to  be  an  artificial  question.  It  rests  on  the  strange  notion  of 
*wo  substances,  the  body  and  the  soul,  perfectly  distinct,  entirely 
different,  and  so  alien  to  one  another,  that  it  is  matter  for  sur- 
prise to  find  them  travelling  together  and  in  constant  relations 
with  one  another.  The  question  might  have  been  put  in  this 
form  in  the  seventeenth  century,  but  in  the  present  state  of  science 


Physiological  and  Psychological  Heredity.     269 

it  is  no  longer  acceptable ;  and  it  would  not  be  rash  to  assert  that 
the  great  minds  who  in  that  age  professed  this  dualism  would  now 
be  the  first  to  reject  it.  We  have  seen  that  in  our  time  there  is  a 
growing  tendency  to  admit  an  intimate  correlation,  a  mutual  inter- 
change between  the  two  orders  of  phenomena,  so  that  the 
difficulty  is  not  to  unite  but  to  separate  them ;  and  we  could  not 
explain  why  this  radical  dualism  is  still  so  accredited,  did  we  not 
know  that  it  is  yet  more  difficult  to  extirpate  an  old  error  than  to 
bring  a  new  truth  into  acceptance. 

Without  insisting  on  this  hypothesis,  which  in  itself  alone  in- 
cludes all  the  difficulties  of  both  the  others,  let  us  proceed  to 
examine  them. 

i.  It  might  be  held  that  psychological  heredity  is  the  cause  of 
physiological  heredity.  This  proposition  is  evidently  the  one  that 
is  maintained  by  the  idealists  and  the  animists.  We  are  not  aware 
that  they  have  laid  it  down  in  precise  and  explicit  form,  and  this 
no  doubt  because  they  have  been  very  little  concerned  with  the 
problem  of  heredity,  which  is  chiefly  physiological.  And,  indeed, 
it  is  worthy  of  remark  that  while  spiritualistic  philosophy  has  been 
much  occupied  with  the  future  destiny  of  the  soul,  it  has  bestowed 
very  little  thought  on  its  origin.  It  has  always  inquired  whither 
we  are  going,  and  but  seldom  whence  we  come.  And  yet  these 
two  problems  are  intimately  connected,  and  are  both  equally 
mysterious. 

Theologians  have  taken  more  pains  to  work  out  this  question. 
It  is  one  that  is  closely  connected  with  the  foundation  whereon 
Christianity  rests,  the  transmission  of  original  sm.  Their  opinions 
are  not  very  harmonious,  but  are  of  no  importance  here.  They 
may  be  reduced  under  two  heads. 

Some  have  taught  that  God,  the  only  and  the  immediate  origin 
of  souls,  creates,  at  the  instant  of  conception,  a  special  soul  for 
the  body  which  comes  into  being. 

Others  hold  that  all  souls  are  sprung,  like  all  bodies,  from  the 
first  man,  and  that  they  are  propagated  in  the  same  way — that  is,  by 
generation.  This  would  seem  to  be  the  opinion  of  the  majority. 
Tertullian,  St.  Jerome,  and  Lutller  held  it,  as  also  two  philosophers, 
Malebranche  and  Leibnitz.  The  latter  held  it  to  be  'the  only 
doctrine  wherein  philosophy  can  harmonize  with  religion.' 


2  7O  Heredity. 

If  we  might  be  allowed  to  have  an  opinion  on  this  subject,  we 
should  say  that  the  second  opinion  would  appear  the  more  or- 
thodox. But  we  will  take  the  philosophical  point  of  view,  and 
since  the  idealists  say  nothing  about  the  relation  between  the  two 
forms  of  heredity,  we  shall  have  to  indicate  that  relation  ourselves. 
In  their  system,  their  logic  would  lead  us  to  view  this  relation  as 
follows  : — 

We  will  start  with  the  fertilized  ovum,  that  source  of  every- 
thing that  lives.  This  ovum  is  not  merely  an  aggregation  of 
molecules,  which  the  physiologist  studies  under  the  microscope ; 
it  is  also,  and  above  all,  a  force,  that  is  to  say,  a  manifestation  of  the 
soul.  Admit  if  you  will  (for  we  idealists  have  no  great  liking  for 
this  hypothesis)  that  this  soul  inherits  from  its  parents  certain 
determinate  forms  of  sensitive,  intellectual,  and  voluntary  activity, 
and  that  it  contains  these  virtually.  The  soul  thus  constituted 
now  sets  about  fashioning  its  body.  Follow  its  labours  from  that 
moment  which  caused  Harvey  so  much  astonishment,  when  he 
saw  slender  threads  like  those  of  a  spider's  web,  stretch  out  from 
one  corner  to  another  of  the  matrix,  and  then  saw  this  network 
forming  a  sac  which  held  a  white  liquid  in  which  appeared  the 
Punctum  saliens.  Follow  this  evolution,  whose  aspect  changes 
sometimes  from  hour  to  hour,  and  whose  instability  affects  the 
most  essential  no  less  than  the  most  accessory  portions,  so  that 
it  might  be  said  that  the  unseen  workman  is  feeling  his  way,  and 
that  he  completes  his  work  only  after  many  a  mistake.  Pursue 
your  observations  to  the  moment  when  embryonic  life  is  at  an  end 
and  extra-uterine  life  begins,  and  then  see  how  evolution  still  goes 
on,  until  the  being  'is  fully  constituted ;  and  you  must  confess, 
perhaps  unwillingly,  that  all  this  is  wonderful  work,  which,  in  spite 
of  errors,  anomalies,  and  deviations,  is  not  the  effect  of  chance, 
and  that  it  is  not  without  intelligence,  though  without  conscious- 
ness. And  observe :  here  the  soul  is  the  cause,  the  organism  the 
effect;  consequently,  the  conclusion  is  quite  natural  that  the  nature 
of  the  soul  implies  that  of  the  body,  and  that  the  ground  of 
physiological  heredity  is  to  be  sought  in  psychological  heredity. 

Thus,  as  we  believe,  and  without  weakening  it  at  all,  this  pro- 
position might  be  maintained.  As  for  transcendental  idealism, 
which  regards  as  simply  physiological  all  that  does  not  appertain 


Physiological  and  Psychological  Heredity.     271 

to  pure  intellect  'beyond  time  and  space,'  we  have  already  spoken 
of  it  when  treating  of  the  heredity  of  the  intellectual  faculties. 

If  we  examine  this  doctrine,  we  shall  find  that  it  is  with  it  as 
with  all  metaphysical  hypotheses  ;  we  might  refute  it,  but  we  can- 
not extirpate  it.  The  great  objection  appears  reducible  to  this : 
that  the  idea  of  generation,  which  is  its  basis,  is  utterly  unintelli- 
gible from  the  idealistic  point  of  view.  The  idea  of  generation, 
in  the  psychological  sense,  might  be  understood  in  the  hypothesis 
of  the  equivalence  or  mutual  transformation  of  two  groups  of 
phenomena  which  are  regarded  as  essentially  identical.  But  that 
is  not  the  thesis  of  the  idealist.  In  his  view  there  exists  but  one 
only  substance,  thought,  and  of  this  all  others  are  the  manifesta- 
tions. The  idea  of  generation  and  hereditary  transmission  results 
from  experience,  and  can  be  given  only  in  experience ;  if  these 
phenomena  are  full  of  mystery  they  are  none  the  less  real,  since 
we  may  track  their  course,  their  evolution.  But  when  you  apply 
them  to  the  ideal,  the  supersensual  order,  they  represent  nothing ; 
they  are  but  metaphors,  empty  words,  hollow  abstractions,  since 
there  are  no  concrete  things  to  which  they  may  be  referred. 

About  a  century  ago,  Wollaston,  a  spiritualistic,  even  a  Christian 
philosopher,  justly  said  in  his  essay,  The  Religion  of  Nature 
Delineated,  that  in  the  purely  ideal  order,  the  fact  of  generation  is 
unintelligible.  'We  should  have  to  explain  clearly,'  says  he,  'what 
we  mean,  when  we  say  that  a  man  can  transmit  the  soul,  as  it  is 
not  easy  to  conceive  how  thought,  or  how  a  thinking  substance, 
could  be  produced  like  the  branch  of  a  tree.  Indeed,  we  do  not 
see  how  the  expression  can  be  employed,  even  in  a  metaphysical 
sense  We  should  have  to  define  whether  this  generation  proceeds 
from  one,  or  from  both  of  the  parents.  If  from  both,  then  it 
follows  that  one  branch  may  be  the  product  of  two  different  trunks, 
a  thing  unexampled  in  all  nature ;  and  yet  such  a  supposition 
would  be  more  naturally  made  with  reference  to  vines  and  plants, 
than  to  intellectual  beings,  which  are  simple  and  incomposite  sub- 
stances. .  .  .  From  these  considerations  we  are  led  to  the  conclu- 
sion that  there  is  no  other  substance  save  matter ;  that  the  soul, 
resulting  only  from  the  disposition  of  the  body,  must  be  born  with 
it,  of  father  or  mother,  or  both  ;  and  that  the  generation  of  the 
soul  is  a  consequence  of  the  generation  ot  the  body.'  Wollaston 


272  Heredity. 

regards  this  conclusion  as  materialistic,  and,  as  always  occurs  in 
such  a  case,  he  sacrifices  facts  to  hypotheses,  and  argues  against 
heredity.  But,  as  we  need  have  no  fears  of  that  bugbear,  let  us 
examine  the  last  remaining  hypothesis. 

2.  This  hypothesis  regards  physiological  heredity  as  the  cause 
of  psychological  heredity.  Of  course,  we  speak  here  only  of  the 
immediate  and  secondary  cause,  of  cause  in  the  order  of  pheno- 
mena— that  is  to  say,  the  invariable  antecedent  So  understood, 
this  solution  appears  to  us  the  only  one  that  can  be  accepted. 

No  one  questions  the  influence  of  the  physical  on  the  moral, 
only  it  is  commonly  regarded  as  transitory,  momentary,  or  at  least 
constantly  variable.  Thus  an  excessive  absorption  of  alcohol  will 
produce  confusion  of  thought ;  a  certain  nervous  state  will  cause 
delirium ;  the  introduction  of  hasheesh  into  the  organism  will  give 
a  feeling  of  beatitude.  These  and  similar  phenomena  are  very 
striking,  though,  in  fact,  of  no  great  importance.  But  it  is  of  im- 
portance to  remark  that  to  that  habitual,  customary  state  of  the 
organism  which  we  call  temperament,  or  constitution,  there  must 
correspond  an  habitual,  customary  state  of  the  mind.  This  admits 
of  no  doubt,  but  it  is  forgotten.  But  if  we  bear  in  mind  the  truth 
that  the  influence  of  the  physicaKon  the  moral  is  permanent ;  that 
it  is  exerted  by  means  of  infinitesimal,  but  incessantly  renewed 
acts;  that  there  exists  a  necessary  correlation  between  those  two 
orders  of  existence  which  we  call  body  and  soul,  and  this  no  less 
as  regards  secondary  and  transient,  than  as  regards  fundamental 
and  permanent  states,  which  are,  as  it  were,  the  ground  on  which 
phenomena  are  projected :  we  shall  see  that,  a  permanent  phy- 
siological state  implying  a  correspondent  psychological  state, 
physiological  heredity  must  imply  psychological  heredity.  It  were 
puerile  to  object  here  that  oftentimes  a  person  resembles  one  of 
his  parents  in  feature,  form,  and  temperament,  though  differing  in 
mind  ;  for  plainly  the  important  point  here  is  the  heredity  of  the 
organic  conditions  of  the  mind,  i.e.  the  brain.  As  we  have  seen, 
the  organism  is  not  always  transmitted  entire,  and  its  transmission 
presents  many  puzzling  anomalies. 

Physiological  heredity  will  be  admitted  without  hesitation.  It 
seems  perfectly  natural  that  the  organism  which  is  begotten  should 
be  like  that  which  begat  it  This  all  understand,  or  think  they 


Physiological  and  Psychological  Heredity.     273 

understand.  But  why  not  view  psychological  heredity  in  the  same 
way  ?  Apart  from  prejudice,  routine,  and  preconceived  ideas, 
which  will  not  give  way,  the  reason  is  that,  rightly  enough,  people 
find  the  idea  of  generation,  as  applied  to  the  soul,  unintelligible. 
But  all  becomes  plain  if  we  connect  psychological  heredity,  as 
effect,  with  physiological  heredity,  as  cause. 

We  see,  then,  that  this  relation  of  causality  between  the  two 
heredities  is  only  a  particular  case  of  the  relations  of  physical  and 
moral.  Its  only  peculiarity  is,  that  here  psychical  heredity  corre- 
sponds with  permanent  tendencies,  not  only  in  the  individual,  but 
also  in  the  race,  the  family.  Further,  whereas  physiological 
heredity  is  immediate,  psychological  heredity  is  indirect,  mediate. 
The  organism  is  transmitted  directly;  and  if,  together  with  the 
organism,  the  nervous  diathesis  of  the  parents  is  transmitted,  their 
mental  aptitudes  are  likewise  transmitted  by  this  intermediary. 

It  will,  perhaps,  be  asked,  seeing  that  we  assert  a  perfect  corre- 
spondence between  nervous  and  psychical  phenomena,  why  we 
consider  mental  heredity  as  an  effect  of  physiological  heredity. 
Might  we  not  reverse  the  proposition  ? 

We  have  already  combated  that  thesis.  But,  independently  of 
the  negative  reasons  given,  there  is  one  which  seems  to  us  positive. 
It  is,  that  experience  shows  mental  development  to  be  always  and 
everywhere  subject  to  organic  conditions,  while  it  does  not  show 
the  converse  to  be  true  in  a  general  way. 

If  there  is  any  order  of  phenomena  that  is  unequivocally  worthy 
of  being  called  psychological,  it  is  the  facts  of  consciousness.  But 
consciousness  presupposes  for  its  production  definite  organic  con- 
ditions. If  they  do  not  exist,  there  is  no  consciousness ;  and 
when  they  disappear,  consciousness  is  at  an  end.  And  it  may  be 
remarked,  that  as  regards  the  brain,  consciousness  does  not  stand 
in  any  vague,  general  relations.  Though  physiologists  still  debate 
as  to  whether  the  important  point  in  the  brain,  considered  as  a 
psychological  organ,  is  its  weight,  or  its  chemical  constitution,  or 
the  number  of  its  convolutions,  or  its  form,  or  its  type,  it  is  likely 
that  each  of  these  conditions  possesses  a  special  importance  of  its 
own.  Thus,  it  may  be  affirmed  that  an  adult  human  brain  weigh- 
ing less  than  two  pounds  induces  that  mental  state  which  we  call 
idiocy. 


274  Heredity. 

When,  therefore,  we  say  that  mental  evolution  depends  on  cere- 
bral evolution,  and,  consequently,  that  psychological  heredity 
depends  on  physiological,  we  state  a  plain  truth  of  experience,  a 
generalization  drawn  from  an  immense  number  of  facts.  Logically, 
then,  the  onus  probandi  lies  with  idealism ;  it  is  for  the  idealists 
to  upset  our  proposition,  not  for  us  to  disprove  theirs.  This  is 
a  point  in  logic  too  often  overlooked,  to  which  we  would  for  a 
moment  call  attention.  It  sometimes  happens  that  a  good  cause 
is  compromised,  because  we  bring  all  our  strength  to  bear  against 
the  opposite  opinion,  instead  of  simply  defending  our  own.  A 
metaphysician,  reviving  an  opinion  of  Descartes,  might  hold,  as 
I  have  heard  men  hold,  the  hypothesis  of  animals  being  mere 
machines,  and  might  defy  us  to  prove  its  falsity.  It  is  possible  ;  but 
it  is  enough  for  us  to  reply  that  the  metaphysician  has  to  prove  it 
Every  doctrine  that  is  based  on  experience  and  analogy,  and  that 
is  in  accord  with  the  general  laws  of  the  universe,  must  be  re- 
garded as  true  until  the  contrary  is  proved.  Of  course  it  may  be 
false,  but,  at  least,  it  has  in  its  favour  presumptions  that  it  is  true, 
and  its  upholders  are  under  no  obligation  to  refute  the  opposite 
doctrines,  so  long  as  they  are  only  likely  or  probable.  Such,  we 
take  it,  is  our  position  in  regard  to  the  idealistic  thesis.  That  is, 
our  doctrine  rests  on  experience,  against  which  an  a  priori  theory 
is  of  no  weight. 

Still,  we  should  not  be  surprised  if  to  some  it  savours  strongly  of 
materialism.  To  this  difficulty,  we  might  in  the  first  place  reply, 
that  if  it  is  true  it  must  nevertheless  be  accepted,  whatever  its 
character ;  that  it  is  impossible  to  protest  too  strongly  against  an 
unphilosophical  tendency  which  would  judge  doctrines,  not  accord- 
ing to  their  worth,  but  according  to  the  brand  they  bear ;  and  that 
philosophy  cannot  approve  such  a  tendency  without  postponing 
truth  to  something  else — that  is  to  say,  without  committing  suicide. 
We  might  also  remark  that,  for  us,  materialism  is  only  a  phantom 
that  disappears  so  soon  as  you  face  it  resolutely ;  it  is  like  ghosts, 
which  alarm  only  those  who  believe  in  them.  But  it  is  better  tc 
meet  the  difficulty  face  to  face,  and  to  show  that  the  objection  is 
without  force. 

In  the  first  place,  it  is  clear  so  long  as  we  confine  ourselves  to 
the  investigation  of  second  and  immediate  causes — and  we  shall 


Physiological  and  Psychological  Heredity.     275 

again  repeat  that  our  investigation  goes  no  further — the  given  solu- 
tion cannot  be  either  materialistic  or  spiritualistic.  To  connect 
psychological  with  physiological  heredity  is  simply  to  state  a  fact, 
and  it  is  for  experience  alone  to  say  whether  the  affirmation  is 
true  or  false. 

But  if  it  be  desired  at  all  hazards  to  raise  the  insoluble  question 
of  the  ultimate  cause,  this  is  our  answer  :  A  materialistic  doctrine 
is  no  doubt  one  that  desires  to  explain  all  things,  and  in  particular 
the  phenomena  of  mind,  by  the  properties  of  matter,  matter 
being  regarded  as  the  sole  reality.  But  we  have  shown  that  such 
a  doctrine  is  an  utter  illusion,  inasmuch  as  the  concept  of  matter 
is  finally  resolved  into  notions  of  force,  resistance,  colour,  motion, 
and  so  forth,  all  of  which  are  data  of  consciousness ;  so  that  it 
might,  without  paradox,  be  asserted  that  the  substructure  of  matter 
is  mind. 

We  may  remark  that  our  solution  is  perfectly  reconcilable  with 
this  metaphysical  hypothesis — that  is  to  say,  with  the  extremest 
idealism.  In  fact,  the  only  difference  between  us  is  one  only  of 
position ;  we  reason  from  the  standpoint  of  experience,  the  idealist 
from  the  standpoint  of  the  absolute.  We  debate  the  question  only 
within  the  strict  bounds  cf  experience ;  the  idealist  goes  in  search 
of  perfect  integration,  because,  to  his  eyes,  nothing  is  known  so 
long  as  we  know  only  the  relative. 

Further,  it  is  said  that  materialism  is  that  doctrine  which  from 
the  inferior  deduces  the  superior,  from  the  worse  the  better.  Is 
not  this  what  we  have  just  been  doing,  when  subordinating 
mental  heredity  to  organic  ? 

If  the  nature  of  the  matter  be  considered,  it  will  be  seen  that 
this  question  has  no  place  here.  Our  subject  is  only  one  case 
in  the  vast  science  of  the  relations  between  the  physical  and  the 
moral.  That  science  does  not  inquire  what  is  body,  or  what 
spirit,  nor  is  it  required  to  subordinate  either  of  these  to  the 
other.  It  is  naturally  divided  into  two  parts :  the  influence  of  the 
organism  on  mental  manifestations,  and  the  influence  of  mental 
manifestations  on  the  organism.  To  the  first  part  belongs  the 
question  of  heredity.  It  is  thus  only  a  small  portion  of  a  very 
extensive  science,  which  itself  lies  outside  of  metaphysics. 

Heredity,  thus  understood,  appears  to  us  to  be  merely  one  of 


276  Heredity. 

the  many  physiological  influences  to  which  mental  development 
is  subject;  but  it  is  a  mistake  to  suppose  that  this  implies  a 
metaphysical  solution.  It  is  true  that  by  the  law  of  heredity,  the 
higher  is  subordinated  to  the  lower ;  but  it  would  be  to  go  beyond 
experience,  and  to  risk  a  wholly  gratuitous  assertion,  to  assert 
that  heredity  absolutely  proves  the  dependence  of  the  higher  on 
the  lower,  of  the  better  on  the  worse. 


IL 

Thus  to  the  question  originally  stated,  '  What  is  the  cause  oi 
psychological  heredity?'  we  may  reply,  not  transcending  the 
domain  of  experience,  'Physiological  heredity.'  Because  the 
organism,  and  in  particular  the  nervous  system,  is  transmissible, 
therefore  the  various  modes  of  sensation,  instinct,  imagination, 
intellect,  sentiment,  are  also  transmissible.  Psychological  heredity 
being  thus  referred  to  physiological,  as  to  its  immediate  cause, 
we  have  to  inquire  the  cause  of  this  latter,  and  to  ask  how 
physiological  heredity  is  produced. 

In  the  present  state  of  biology  we  cannot  hope  for  any  positive 
explanation  of  heredity.  We  are  reduced  to  hypothesis.  The 
most  recent  of  these,  and  the  best  wrought  out,  is  that  of 
Darwin,  in  his  Variation  of  Animals  and  Plants  under  Domesti- 
cation, the  broad  outlines  of  which  are  found  in  Spencer's 
Principles  of  Biology.  It  bears  the  name  of  pangenesis. 

To  understand  it  aright,  we  must  first  remember  that  con- 
temporary physiology  looks  on  every  living  body,  regardless 
of  its  unity,  as  an  aggregate  of  cells  in  prodigious  numbers,  each 
of  which  has  a  life  of  its  own,  and  possesses  the  fundamental 
properties  of  life — nutrition,  by  which  it  is  ever  assimilating  and 
disassimilating ;  evolution,  by  Avhich  it  grows  in  volume  and  be- 
comes complicated  into  more  perfect  and  more  numerous  parts; 
reproduction,  in  virtue  of  which  each  cell  can  produce  another, 
that  cell  a  third,  and  so  on.  Virchow  has  shown  that  a  single 
cell  may  be  diseased ;  so  that  it  may  be  said  that  this  automatic 
element  plays  in  the  organism  the  same  part  as  the  individual  in 
the  State,  having  a  certain  degree  of  independence,  though  con- 
stituting an  integral  part  of  the  body  social. 


Physiological  and  Psychological  Heredity.     277 

A  curious  instance  of  the  power  of  reproduction  in  the  cell  is 
found  in  the  begonia  phyllomaniaca.  If  a  piece  of  the  leaf  of 
this  plant  be  taken,  and  planted  in  suitable  soil,  maintained  at 
a  proper  temperature,  a  young  begonia  will  spring  from  it ;  and 
so  small  is  the  fragment  that  is  capable  of  producing  an  entire 
plant,  that  a  single  leaf  may  produce  about  one  hundred  plants.1 
Nor  is  this  all,  for  each  plant  so  produced  in  tuni  develops  on 
its  shoots  and  on  its  leaves  myriads  of  similar  cells,  inheriting  the 
same  property  of  becoming,  in  their  turn,  like  plants.  Thus  the 
original  cell,  on  leaving  the  mother  plant,  inherits  not  only 
the  power  of  self-reproduction,  but  multiplies  it,  and  distributes 
it  without  any  diminution  of  its  energy  to  all  the  cells  of  the 
plant  it  produces,  and  this  for  countless  generations. 

To  explain  this  power  of  reproduction  and  hereditary  trans- 
mission in  living  beings  in  general,  Darwin  offers  the  provisional 
hypothesis  of  pangenesis,  '  which  implies  that  each  of  the  atoms 
or  units  constituting  an  organism  reproduces  itself. ' 

It  is  almost  universally  admitted,  he  tells  us,  that  the  cells, 
propagated  by  spontaneous  division,  preserve  the  same  nature 
and  are  ultimately  converted  into  different  substances  and  bodily 
tissues.  Alongside  of  this  mode  of  multiplication,  I  suppose 
that  the  cells,  prior  to  their  conversion  into  formed  and  perfectly 
passive  material,  emit  minute  grains  or  atoms  which  freely  circulate 
through  the  entire  system,  and  when  they  find  sufficient  nutrition 
afterwards  develop  into  cells  like  those  from  which  they  came. 
These  atoms  we  will  call  gemmules.  We  assume  that  they  are 
transmitted  by  parents  to  their  descendants,  and  that  usually  they 
develop  in  the  generation  immediately  following,  though  for  several 
generations  they  may  be  transmitted  in  the  dormant  state  and 
develop  at  a  later  period.  It  is  supposed  that  gemmules  are 
emitted  by  each  cell  or  unit,  not  only  during  its  adult  state,  but 
during  all  its  states  of  development.  Finally,  we  assume  that  the 
gemmules  have  a  mutual  attraction  for  one  another,  and  hence 
their  aggregation  into  germs  and  sexual  elements.  Thus,  strictly 
speaking,  it  is  not  either  the  reproductive  elements  or  the  germs 


A  Herbert  Spencer,  Principles  of  Biology,  vol.  i.  §  65 


2  78  Heredity. 

that  produce  new  organisms,  but  rather  the  cells  themselves,  or 
units  constituting  the  whole  body.1 

It  may  be  observed  that  no  valid  objection  can  be  drawn  from 
the  extreme  minuteness  of  these  gemmules,  our  notions  of  size 
being  purely  relative.  When  we  bear  in  mind  that  the  ascaris 
may  produce  about  64,000,000  cva,  and  a  single  orchid  nearly 
as  many  million  seeds;  and  that  the  organic  particles  emitted 
by  scent-secreting  animals,  and  the  contagious  molecules  of  certain 
diseases,  must  be  of  excessive  tenuity,  the  objection  will  not 
appear  very  weighty. 

Hence,  '  we  must  consider  each  living  being  as  a  microcosm, 
made  up  of  a  multitude  of  organisms  capable  of  self-reproduc- 
tion, of  inconceivable  minuteness,  and  as  numerous  as  the  stars 
of  heaven.'  This  hypothesis  enables  Darwin  to  explain  a  great 
number  of  phenomena,  very  different  in  appearance,  which,  how- 
ever, physiology  regards  as  essentially  identical.  Among  these 
we  may  name  gemmiparity,  or  reproduction  from  buds,  fissiparity, 
where  reproduction  is  effected  by  spontaneous  or  artificial  division, 
sexual  generation,  parthenogenesis,  alternate  generation,  the  de- 
velopment of  the  embryo,  repair  of  the  tissues,  growth  of  new 
members  in  place  of  those  which  are  lost  (as  occurs  in  the  case 
of  the  lobster,  the  salamander  and  the  snail) — in  short,  all  modes 
of  reproduction  whatsoever,  and  all  the  modes  and  all  the  varieties 
of  heredity. 

We  have  seen  that  a  distinction  may  be  drawn  between  characters 
which  are  developed  and  those  which  are  simply  transmitted. 
Transmission  may  take  place  without  development,  as  is  proved 
by  the  very  numerous  facts  of  atavism  and  reversional  heredity, 
whether  under  the  direct  or  the  collateral  form.  Thrs  phenome- 
non, which  we  have  compared  with  alternate  generations,  is  very 
well  explained  by  Darwin's  hypothesis.  The  common  fact  of  a 
grandfather  transmitting  to  his  grandson,  by  his  daughter,  cha- 
racters which  she  does  not  or  cannot  possess,  can  only  be  under- 
stood on  the  supposition  that  in  the  daughter  they  exist  in  the 
latent  state;  or,  to  give  a  physiological  basis  to  this  idea,  gemmules 


1  Darwin,  Variation,  etc,,  vol.  ii.  chap.  xvii. 


Physiological  and  Psychological  Heredity.     279 

are  transmitted  to  the  second  generation,  and  preserved  there, 
which  are  developed  only  in  the  third. 

Darwin  also  explains  how  modifications  of  bodily  or  mental 
habits  may  be  hereditary.  '  According  to  our  view,  we  need  only 
suppose  that  certain  cells  come  to  be  modified,  as  well  in  their 
structure  as  in  their  functions,  and  then  they  give  out  gemmules 
similarly  modified  .  .  .  When  a  psychic  attribute,  a  mental  habit, 
or  insanity  is  hereditary,  we  must  hold  that  there  has  really  taken 
place  a  transmission  of  some  effective  modification,  and  this,  on 
our  hypothesis,  would  imply  that  gemmules  springing  from  modified 
nerve-cells  are  transmitted  to  the  descendants.'  Of  course  these 
modified  habits  become  fixed  only  in  time,  since  the  organism 
must  subsist  amid  novel  conditions  for  a  considerable  period,  so 
that  these  may  act  upon  it,  modify  its  cells,  and  make  possible  the 
transmission  of  a  larger  and  larger  number  of  modified  cells. 

In  the  preceding  remarks  we  have  reasoned  only  from  physio- 
logical data.  But  we  know  that  in  the  question  of  heredity  the 
antithesis  of  psychological  and  physiological  is  a  simple  difference 
of  standpoint  These  cells  and  gemmules  are  not  brute,  inani- 
mate matter ;  they  are  possessed  of  force,  of  life,  of  tendencies,  and 
we  have  seen  that  it  is  as  difficult  to  conceive  of  the  material 
without  the  spiritual  as  of  the  spiritual  without  the  material.  There- 
fore the  hypothesis  is  applicable  as  well  to  mental  as  to  organic 
heredity,  and  if  it  holds  good  for  the  one,  it  holds  good  also  for 
the  other.  It  may,  in  fact,  be  seen  how  well  the  two  orders  appear 
to  correspond. 

In  the  physiological  order,  at  its  lowest  stage,  we  have  as  an 
irreducible  element  the  cell,  or  physiological  unit,  possessed  of  a 
life  of  its  own.  From  the  consensus  of  countless  lives  of  this  kind 
results  the  general  life  of  the  being  whose  unity  appears  to  us  as 
a  resultant,  a  harmony.  This  harmony,  in  proportion  as  we  ascend 
the  scale  of  organisms,  tends  more  and  more  to  perfect  unity,  with- 
out ever  reaching  that  ideal. 

In  the  psychological  order,  at  its  lowest  stage,  we  have  as  the 
irreducible  element  or  psychological  unit,  force  as  it  exists  in  every 
cell,  or,  at  least,  nerve-power  as  it  exists  in  every  nerve-cell.  From 
the  consensus  of  all  these  infinitesimal  psychical  acts,  centralized 
in  the  ganglia,  and  afterwards  in  the  brain,  results  psychological 
18 


2  So  Heredity. 

life,  which,  in  proportion  as  we  ascend  the  scale  of  being,  passes 
from  the  simultaneous  to  the  successive  form — which  is  the  neces- 
sary condition  of  consciousness — and  tends  more  and  more  to- 
ward perfect  unity,  personality,  the  ego,  without  ever  attaining  it 
absolutely. 

Thus  the  parallelism  is  complete  between  these  two  orders  of 
facts,  which  at  bottom  are  only  one ;  and  so  we  can  understand, 
or  at  least  suspect,  how  the  two  orders  of  heredity  may  flow  from 
the  same  cause.1  Enough,  however,  has  been  said  hypothetically, 
and  we  must  conclude. 

To  sum  up  :  we  think  we  have  proved  that  psychological 
heredity  has  its  cause  in  physiological  heredity,  and  that  this 
cannot  be  reasonably  disputed.  The  two  heredities,  being  thus 
reduced  to  one,  we  again  sought  for  the  cause  of  heredity,  and 
found  only  a  hypothesis,  probable  indeed,  but  which,  lying  beyond 
the  limits  of  experience,  cannot  be  verified.  The  definite  result  of 
these  researches — and  the  point  is  so  important  that  it  must  be 
again  and  again  repeated — is  that  heredity  is  identity  as  far  as  is 
possible  ;  it  is  one  being  in  many.  '  The  cause  of  heredity,'  says 
Hackel,  '  is  the  partial  identity  of  the  materials  which  constitute 
the  organism  of  the  parent  and  child,  and  the  division  of  this 
substance  at  the  time  of  reproduction.'  Heredity,  in  fact,  is  to  be 
considered  only  as  a  kind  of  growth,  like  the  spontaneous  division 
of  a  unicellular  plant  of  the  simplest  organization. 

Having  studied  the  Facts,  the  Laws,  and  the  Causes,  we  have 
now  to  look  at  the  practical  side  of  heredity,  the  Consequences. 

1  Compare  the  very  bold  and  ingenious  hypothesis  of  Herbert  Spencer  (Psy- 
chology, 2nd  Edition,  §  139),  of  which  the  following  is  the  substance.  Our 
sciences,  our  arts,  our  civilization,  all  social  phenomena,  however  multitudinous 
and  complicated,  are  reduced  on  final  analysis  to  a  certain  number  of  feelings 
and  thoughts.  These  in  turn  are  referred  to  the  primitive  sensations,  to  the 
data  of  the  five  senses.  The  senses  are  reducible  to  touch.  Physiology  goes 
far  to  confirm  the  saying  of  Democritus,  that  all  the  senses  are  modifications  of 
touch.  Touch  itself  has  its  basis  in  those  primordial  properties  which  distin- 
guish organic  from  inorganic  matter.  And  many  facts  point  to  the  conclusion 
that  sensibility  of  all  kinds  takes  its  rise  out  of  those  fundamental  processes 
v>f  integration  and  disintegration,  in  which  life  in  its  primitive  form  consists. 


PART    FOURTH. 

THE  CONSEQUENCES. 

Thus  out  of  savages  come  at  length  our  Newtons  and  Shakespeares. 

Herbert  Spencer. 


CHAPTER  I. 

HEREDITY  AND   THE  LAW  OF   EVOLUTION. 
I. 

THE  idea  of  progress  is  quite  modern.  Its  originators  in  the 
seventeenth  century  were  Bacon,  Descartes,  Pascal,  and,  above  all, 
Leibnitz.  In  the  eighteenth  century  it  was  the  object  of  a  lively 
faith  for  all  the  philosophers  of  that  period.  In  the  nineteenth 
century  it  has  become  almost  a  commonplace.  Still,  in  its  current 
form,  it  is  vague  and  incomplete. 

First,  it  is  vague.  The  word  progress  has  no  very  definite 
meaning.  For  some  it  represents  merely  the  act  of  advancing,  for 
others  it  means  improvement,  which  is  a  very  different  thing. 
Moreover,  the  common  view  accepts  progress  as  a  fact,  without 
inquiring  after  its  law,  its  cause.  Is  it  a  chance  product,  or  has  it 
a  law,  and  if  so,  what  is  the  law  ?  What  is  the  hidden  form  in 
the  nature  of  things  ?  What  the  productive  power  that  determines 
its  being  ?  These  questions  are  not  even  asked. 

It  is  incomplete,  and  this  is  a  still  graver  defect.  By  an  un- 
scientific illusion,  but  one  that  is  perfectly  natural  to  man,  we  look 
at  progress  only  from  the  human  point  of  view.  In  the  view  of 
nearly  every  one  progress  means  the  transition  from  bad  to 
middling,  from  middling  to  good,  from  good  to  better — in  short, 
improvement.  As  history  shows  that  humanity  generally  advances 
from  the  less  to  the  more  perfect,  as  we  see  that  as  time  goes  on 
manners  tend  to  become  milder,  life  easier,  habits  more  moral,  social 
institutions  more  just,  political  institutions  more  liberal,  knowledge 
more  diffused,  and  beliefs  more  reasonable,  we  conclude  that  in 
spite  of  all  retrogressive  movements,  in  spite  of  exceptions,  illu- 
sions, and  disappointments,  the  victory  after  all  is  with  progress — 
that  is  to  say,  the  improvement  of  man  and  his  moral  surroundings  j 


284  Heredity. 

and  we  say  with  Herder,  that  humanity  is  like  a  drunken  man, 
who,  after  many  a  step  forward  and  many  a  step  backward,  yet  at 
last  reaches  his  destination.  Progress,  so  understood,  is  a  human 
fact,  restricted  to  the  sphere  of  the  moral  and  political  sciences, 
and  limited  to  history,  as  having  the  same  bounds  as  liberty. 

A  more  exact,  and  at  the  same  time  a  broader,  view  would  lead 
us  to  see  in  human  progress  only  a  part  of  the  total  progress,  and 
to  substitute  for  this  equivocal  expression  the  more  appropriate 
terms,  evolution  or  development  This  substitute  is  highly 
important,  for  in  the  place  of  a  human,  subjective,  hypothetical 
opinion,  it  sets  a  cosmic,  objective,  scientific  system.  Progress  no 
longer  appears  as  the  law  of  humanity  only,  but  as  the  law  of 
universal  nature. 

The  idea  of  evolution  in  this  wide  and  trus  sense  will  doubtless 
ever  be  considered  one  of  the  grandest  philosophic  conceptions  of 
the  nineteenth  century.  Born  of  the  study  of  the  natural  sciences, 
of  religions,  languages,  history,  of  all  that  changes  and  lives,  it  has 
in  turn  given  to  these  studies  a  new  meaning,  has  quickened  and 
renovated  them.  Hegel  was  the  first  to  attempt  the  grand  syn- 
thesis which  must  one  day  reduce  all  things  under  the  law  of  a 
perpetual  coming  into  being.  His  metaphysical  hypothesis  may 
have  perished,  as  so  many  more  have  perished,  but  the  radical  idea 
of  his  system  remains.  Better  still,  new  aspects  of  the  law  of 
evolution  have  since  appeared  in  the  whole  field  of  science.  To 
cite  only  one  instance,  the  bold  hypothesis  which  takes  its  name 
from  Darwin  has  given  a  new  shape  to  the  question  of  the  origin 
of  species,  and  has  brought  it  to  bear  on  the  highest  problems  of 
philosophy. 

The  latest  essay  in  philosophical  synthesis  based  on  the  idea  of 
evolution  is  the  work  of  Herbert  Spencer.  This  synthesis,  the 
outlines  of  which  are  given  in  his  essays,  while  its  definite  form  is 
given  in  his  first  principles,  is  intended  to  cover  and  explain  in 
detail  the  phenomena  of  biology,  psychology,  sociology,  and 
morals.  It  not  only  possesses  the  merit,  as  being  recent,  of  includ- 
ing a  larger  number  of  facts  and  of  partial  doctrines  ;  its  true  merit 
consists  in  substituting  for  Hegel's  subjective,  metaphysical  method 
an  objective,  scientific  one — the  method  of  the  natural  sciences. 
Thus  the  law  of  evolution — stripped  of  all  teleological  ideas,  and 


Heredity  and  the  Law  of  Evolution.        285 

having  as  its  result  not  man's  welfare  but  the  necessary  develop- 
ment of  the  cosmos  ;  not  progress  in  the  purely  human  sense,  and 
our  advance  toward  perfection,  but  the  advance  of  the  universe 
toward  an  ever-increasing  complexity — may  be  referred  to  the 
laws  of  mechanics,  to  the  ultimate  laws  of  motion  j  and  thus  the 
problem  of  the  universe,  considered  from  the  standpoint  o* 
evolution,  becomes  a  problem  of  dynamics. 

It  would  carry  us  beyond  our  subject  to  sketch  this  antithesis 
here.  It  will  suffice  for  us  to  note  its  chief  features,  and  to  indicate 
the  cause  and  the  law  of  evolution. 

Considered  in  general,  every  evolution  may  be  defined  as  an 
integration ;  and  this  explains,  in  a  certain  sense,  how  it  is  always 
a  transition  from  less  to  greater.  Its  law  is  the  transition  from 
the  homogeneous  to  the  heterogeneous,  from  the  uniform  to  the 
multiform,  from  the  less  to  the  more  coherent,  from  the  indefinite 
to  the  definite — these  various  expressions  indicating  the  various 
'  aspects  of  one  and  the  same  change,  which  is  essentially  identical. 
Thus  it  is  that  in  astronomy  evolution  explains  the  transition  from 
the  almost  homogeneous  primitive  nebulae  to  our  solar  system,  with 
its  planets  and  satellites  varying  so  widely  in  density,  velocity  and 
distance  from  the  centre  ;  in  geology,  the  transition  from  the  rela- 
tively homogeneous  primitive  igneous  mass  to  the  earth  as  it  is, 
the  surface  of  which  alone  appears  to  us  so  heterogeneous ;  in 
biology,  the  transition  from  the  inferior  organisms  of  the  primitive 
ages  to  the  multiform  fauna  and  flora  of  the  present ;  in  psych- 
ology, the  transition  from  undeveloped  and  embryonic  forms  of 
mind  to  states  more  and  more  complex ;  in  sociology,  the  transition 
from  the  simple  societies  of  primitive  times  to  the  most  complicated 
and  most  heterogeneous  societies  of  our  epoch  ;  in  history,  the 
development  of  languages,  mechanic  arts  and  fine  arts,  and  their 
ever  multiplying  subdivisions. 

Thus  evolution  consists  -in  an  integration,  a  transition  from 
simple  to  complex.  But  this  uniform  process  presupposes  some 
fundamental  necessity  from  which  it  results.  This  universal  law 
implies  a  universal  cause.  The  reason  of  this  universal  trans- 
formation of  homogeneous  into  heterogeneous  is  this,  that  every 
active  form  produces  more  than  one  change,  and  every  cause  more 
than  one  effect  Thus  a  shock  will  produce  motion,  sound,  heat, 


286  Heredity. 

and  light  A  little  small-pox  virus  in  the  organism  will  produce 
very  numerous  morbid  phenomena.  An  economic  reform  will 
lead  to  many  industrial  and  social  consequences.  Everywhere,  in 
short,  even  when  the  cause  is  simple,  the  effects  are  manifold. 

Evolution  thus  understood,  and  both  as  to  its  law  and  as  to  its 
cause  reduced  to  *  a  purely  physical  interpretation '  of  phenomena, 
offers  a  scientific  character  which  is  not  possessed  by  the  current 
doctrine  of  progress.  Then,  too,  the  latter,  being  concerned  only 
with  human  welfare,  and  considering  that  as  the  final  cause  of  all 
change,  finds  itself  much  embarrassed  in  view  of  sundry  incontest- 
able facts  which  show  that  humanity  at  certain  periods  stays  and 
retraces  its  steps.  Evolution  explains  these  facts.  The  develop- 
ment theory,  as  Lyell  well  observes,  implies  no  necessary  progres- 
sion. It  is  possible  for  a  new  race  to  be  of  simpler  structure,  and 
of  less  developed  understanding,  than  those  which  it  displaces  ;  a 
slight  advantage  is  sufficient  to  insure  it  the  victory  over  its  rivals. 
The  law  of  evolution  accounts  equally  well  for  progress  and  for 
what  is  called  degradation — that  is,  a  retrograde  movement  towards 
an  inferior  structure,  or  a  lower  form  of  dynamism.  It  is  sufficient 
if  a  being  so  degraded,  whether  physically  or  morally,  is  better 
adapted  to  its  new  conditions  of  existence  than  a  being  more  highly 
endowed. 

Now  that  we  have  fixed  a  precise  meaning  on  the  words  evolu- 
tion, development,  and  progress,  we  can  see  how  this  law  governs 
the  whole  question  of  the  consequences  of  heredity.  In  this 
portion  of  our  work  we  propose  to  show  how  heredity  has  con- 
tributed to  the  formation  of  certain  intellectual  or  sensitive 
faculties,  and  of  certain  moral  habits.  We  can  now  have  a 
glimpse  of  this  truth.  Heredity  and  evolution  are  the  two  neces 
sary  factors  of  every  stable  modification  in  the  domain  of  life. 

Suppose  evolution  without  heredity,  and  every  change  becomes 
transitory  :  every  modification  whatever,  whether  of  good  or  bad, 
useful  or  hurtful,  disappears  with  the  individual.  Evolution  con- 
fined within  these  narrow  limits,  loses  all  significance  and  all  force ; 
it  is  nothing  but  an  accident,  without  any  value. 

Suppose  heredity  without  evolution,  and  there  is  nothing  but 
the  monotonous  conservation  of  the  same  types,  fixed  once  for  all 
Physiological  characters,  instincts,  intellectual  and  moral  faculties, 


Heredity  and  the  Law  of  Evolution.        287 

are  preserved  and  transmitted  without  modification.     Nothing  in- 
creases, nothing  diminishes,  nothing  changes. 

On  the  other  hand,  suppose  both  evolution  and  heredity,  and 
then  life  and  variation  become  possible.  Evolution  produces 
physiological  and  psychological  modifications ;  habit  fixes  these  in 
the  individual,  heredity  fixes  them  in  the  race.  These  modifica- 
tions as  they  accumulate,  and  in  course  of  time,  become  organic, 
make  new  modifications  possible  in  the  succession  of  generations ; 
thus  heredity  becomes  in  a  manner  a  creative  power.  This  fact 
of  the  heredity  of  acquired  modifications  has  made  its  appearance 
often  in  the  course  of  the  present  work  ;  though  we  shall  have  to 
examine  it  in  detail  further  on,  it  will  be  useful  to  dwell  upon  it 
here  for  a  little  while,  as  it  will  give  us  a  better  understanding  of 
the  relations  between  heredity  and  the  law  of  evolution. 

In  the  physiological  introduction  we  showed  that  acquired 
modifications  can  certainly  be  transmitted.  We  have  seen,  for 
instance,  that  animals  artificially  made  epileptic  transmit  that 
morbid  disposition  to  their  descendants.  We  have  also  seen 
that  this  point  is  possessed  of  some  difficulty,  for  facts  seem  to 
show  that  these  deviations  from  the  type  tend  to  return  to  the 
normal  state,  and  that  the  law  is,  that  accidental  states  are  not 
perpetuated,  but  that,  after  subsisting  for  a  few  generations  at 
longest,  they  first  grow  fainter,  and  then  disappear.  Thus  we 
should  return  to  the  difficulty  we  met  at  the  outset,  that  we  should 
have  evolution  without  heredity,  or  at  best  with  only  a  restricted 
heredity,  yielding  no  results  of  any  importance.  The  difficulty, 
however,  is  only  an  apparent  one.  Even  were  we  to  accept  the 
hypothesis  of  a  return  to  the  primitive  type,  which  is  the  one  most 
at  variance  with  our  theory,  it  will  be  observed  that  this  return 
has  no  place  except  when  a  race  is  left  to  itself.  The  experience 
of  breeders  shows  that  certain  physiological  characters  can  be 
thoroughly  fixed  and  perpetuated  by  continual  selection,  notwith- 
standing some  exceptions  and  cases  of  reversion ;  but  education 
acts  upon  the  mental  faculties  precisely  as  the  breeder's  art  acts 
on  the  organism  and  its  functions.  We  shall  see  that  the  capacity 
for  seizing  abstract  ideas,  and  for  complying  with  the  conditions 
of  civilized  life,  becomes  fixed  only  after  a  considerable  length  of 
time  in  certain  races ;  these,  left  to  themselves,  return  also  to  the 


288  Heredity. 

primitive  type.  Thus  there  is  established  in  the  individual,  between 
the  heredity  of  the  natural  characters  and  that  of  the  acquired 
characters,  a  conflict,  in  which  nature  must  win  if  art  does  not 
counteract  it  Bacon's  saying  is  true  of  heredity,  as  of  all  natural 
laws  :  Natura  non  nisi  parendo  vinciiur.  But  with  the  aid  of  art, 
under  the  constant  influence  of  education,  or  of  the  same  moral 
environment,  acquired  characters  become  fixed;  and  then  there 
is  established  in  our  psychical  constitution  a  second  nature,  so 
intimately  blended  with  the  former,  that  usually  they  cannot  be 
distinguished. 

To  sum  up :  without  the  law  of  evolution,  nothing  is  simpler 
than  to  determine  the  consequences  of  heredity.  It  would  not  be 
worth  while  to  study  them  separately,  for  they  would  consist  only 
in  the  indefinite  conservation  of  the  same  specific  characters.  But 
with  evolution  all  is  different  The  living  being  tends  incessantly 
to  be  modified  by  causes  both  internal  and  external.  The  internal 
causes  determine  those  spontaneous  modifications  of  the  organism 
and  of  the  dynamism  \vhich,  as  we  have  seen,  some  authors  explain 
by  a  law  of  spontaneity,  such  as  a  new  physical  character,  or  a  new 
mental  aptitude.  By  external  causes  we  mean  the  action  of  cir- 
cumstances, which  have  as  strong  an  influence  on  the  moral  as  on 
the  physical  being,  and  which  in  time  tend  to  fashion  it  in  a  certain 
manner.  In  the  battle  of  life,  the  struggle  for  existence,  that  great 
biological  fact  which  Darwin  has  so  well  established  that  his 
adversaries  themselves  have  accepted  it,  these  modifications  con- 
stitute for  the  individual  a  probability  of  its  survival,  if  by  them 
it  is  better  adapted  to  new  conditions.  They  render  it  possible 
for  the  living  being  in  the  first  place  to  subsist,  and  then  to 
perpetuate  itself.  Heredity,  which  is  essentially  a  conservative 
force,  tends  to  transmit  to  the  descendants  the  whole  nature  of 
their  parents ;  as  well  every  deterioration,  physical,  mental,  and 
moral,  as  every  physical,  mental,  and  moral  amelioration.  The 
blind  fatality  of  its  laws  regulates  not  alone  progress,  but  also 
decay. 

Man,  therefore,  as  he  comes  into  the  world,  is  not  the  impres- 
sionless  statue  dreamt  of  by  Bonnet  and  Condillac.  Not  only  is 
he  possessed  of  a  certain  constitution,  a  certain  nervous  organi- 
zation, which  predisposes  him  to  feel,  to  think,  and  to  act  after  a 


Heredity  and  the  Law  of  Evolution.        289 

manner  which  is  peculiar  and  personal  to  himself,  but  we  may 
even  affirm  that  the  experience  of  countless  generations  slumbers 
in  him.  So  far  is  he  from  being  homogeneous,  that  all  the  past 
has  contributed  to  his  constituents.  The  present  state  of  his 
mechanism  and  his  dynamism  is  the  result  of  innumerable  modi- 
fications slowly  accumulated ;  and  it  may  be  affirmed  that  were 
heredity  to  act  alone,  and  were  there  no  crossings,  no  spontaneous 
variations,  no  psychical  combinations  or  transformations,  the  secret 
of  which  we  cannot  penetrate,  the  descendants  would  be  necessarily 
inclined  to  feel  and  to  think  as  their  ancestors. 

II. 

This  hasty  statement  shows  that  heredity  is  one  of  the  chief 
factors  of  the  law  of  evolution  ;  that  by  accumulating  slight  differ- 
ences, heredity  produces  effects  apparently  out  of  all  proportion 
with  the  original  causes.  The  living  being  is  subject  to  the  action 
of  its  environment  and  modified  by  it ;  nor  does  man,  considered 
as  a  thinking,  sentient  being,  escape  this  law.  Hence  we  see  at 
one  time  an  amelioration,  at  another  a  deterioration  of  his  faculties. 
Chance,  but  especially  education,  may  develop  his  intellect,  his 
character,  his  imagination,  his  sentiments;  and — since  these  ac- 
quired modifications  are  sometimes  transmitted  by  heredity,  and, 
in  fact,  taking  everything  into  account,  are  mostly  transmitted — 
we  may  say  that  the  evolution  of  the  psychical  faculties  is  a  law  of 
the  intellectual  world,  and  that  the  gain  made  by  each  generation 
is  to  the  advantage  of  those  which  follow.  But  where  man  has 
discovered  a  law — that  is,  an  invariable  rule — which  governs  a 
group  of  phenomena,  if  these  phenomena  are  within  his  reach,  or 
come  under  his  control,  he  can  modify  them,  because  he  holds 
in  his  hands  the  mainspring  that  moves  and  governs  them.  Thus 
he  is  acquainted  with  the  laws  of  heredity :  he  knows  that  they 
exist  and  act,  notwithstanding  many  exceptions  which  mask  their 
action.  Can  he  turn  them  to  account  ?  Can  he  employ  them  for 
the  perfecting  of  his  species  ?  Let  us  put  the  question  in  clearer 
and  more  explicit  terms.  The  starting-point  is  a  race  of  medium 
intelligence,  morality,  and  artistic  and  industrial  capacity.  The 
goal  is  a  race,  quick  of  comprehension  and  expert  in  action,  well- 
disciplined,  of  gentle  manners,  and  easily  adapting  itself  to  the 


290  Heredity. 

complicated  forms  of  civilization.  The  problem  is,  how  we  are  to 
raise  the  masses  to  the  level  of  those  who,  at  the  outset,  were 
greatly  above  them.  Can  this  be  done  ? 

We  would  observe,  first  of  all,  that  so  far  is  this  aspiration  from 
being  chimerical,  that  every  effort  of  civilization  has  it  and  it  alone 
in  view.  But  the  end  is  attained  by  means  of  education,  an 
external  agency,  different  from  heredity,  which  acts  from  within. 
As  we  view  it,  education  is  unequal  to  this  task.  There  remains, 
in  some  natures,  a  substratum  of  unintelligent  savagery  which 
may  be  overlaid  by  civilization,  but  never  done  away.  Hereditary 
transmission  alone  could  modify  them.  We  will  return  to  this 
point  hereafter.1 

From  the  psychological  standpoint,  therefore,  the  only  one  that 
concerns  us  here,  the  question  takes  this  form  :  Can  we,  by  means 
of  selection  and  heredity,  increase  in  a  race  the  sum  of  its  in- 
telligence and  morality  ? 

Heredity  is  an  effect — it  depends  on  generation,  and  generation 
depends  on  the  nature  of  the  agents;  it  is,  therefore,  at  the  root  of 
the  matter.  How  assort  the  parents  with  a  view  to  the  ameliora- 
tion of  the  race  ?  This  question,  simple  as  it  appears,  has  given 
rise  to  inextricable  disputes,  which  we  thus  summarize  : — 

Suppose  a  large  family,  gifted  physically  and  morally,  its  members 
healthy,  strong,  intelligent,  active ;  assign  to  them  all  some  one 
talent,  that  for  the  stage,  for  instance,  as  in  the  Kemble  family. 
Ought  the  members  to  intermarry  with  one  another  in  order  to 
fix  this  talent  definitively,  and  to  make  it  organic,  so  to  speak? 
Some  will  call  such  a  union  desirable,  others  detestable.  There  is 
an  eager  contest  in  our  day  over  this  question  of  consanguineous 
marriages.  Ancient  legislation,  evidently  giving  expression  to  the 
prevailing  opinions,  and  which  must  have  been  based  as  well  on 
experience  as  on  prejudice,  is  not  at  all  unanimous  on  this  point. 
Consanguineous  marriages  are  condemned  by  the  laws  of  Manu, 
the  Mosaic  code,  the  laws  of  Rome,  the  decrees  of  the  Christian 
councils,  and  the  texts  of  the  Koran.  Thus  opinion  has  been 
adverse  to  them  among  nearly  all  civilized  peoples;  yet  the  ancient 
laws  of  the  Persians  and  of  the  Egyptians  permitted  the  marriage 

1  See  chap.  iii.  §  a. 


Heredity  and  the  Law  of  Evolution.        291 

of  the  nearest  relatives.  In  Syria  consanguineous  marriages  were 
common,  at  least  in  the  reigning  families,  from  the  earliest  times 
down  to  the  end  of  the  Seleucidoe.  As  for  savage  races,  such 
as  the  Samoiedes,  Tartars,  Caribs,  American  Indians,  etc.,  their 
customs  in  one  place  allow  such  marriages,  in  another  proscribe 
them.  Passing  from  the  practical  domain  of  customs  to  the 
theoretic  domain  of  science,  we  meet  with  the  same  state  of 
indecision.1 

According  to  Darwin,  the  consequences  of  close  interbreeding 
in  animals,  carried  on  for  too  long  a  time,  are  generally  believed 
to  be  loss  of  size,  of  vigour,  and  of  fertility.  He  cites  the  opinions 
of  several  breeders  in  confirmation  of  this.  Yet  'with  cattle  there 
can  be  no  doubt  that  close  interbreeding  may  be  long  carried  on 
advantageously  with  respect  to  external  characters,  and  with  no 
manifestly  apparent  evil  as  far  as  constitution  is  concerned.' 
Bates,  a  well-known  breeder,  says  that  'interbreeding  with  bad 
stock  is  ruinous  and  disastrous,  but  with  first  class  cattle  it  may 
be  practised  safely  within  certain  limits.'  A  flock  of  sheep  has 
been  kept  up,  in  France,  during  sixty  years  without  the  intro- 
duction of  a  single  strange  ram.  With  pigs  on  the  other  hand 
long  continued  interbreeding  is  attended  with  the  most  disastrous 
results.  '  Mr.  J.  Wright,  well  known  as  a  breeder,  crossed  a  boar 
with  his  daughter,  granddaughter,  and  great-granddaughter,  and  so 
on  for  seven  generations ;  the  result  was,  that  in  many  instances 
the  offspring  were  sterile,  others  died,  and  among  those  which 
survived  a  certain  number  were  idiotic,  incapable  of  sucking,  or 
walking  straight.'  As  regards  birds,  Danvin  finds  a  considerable 
number  of  proofs  which  condemn  unions  between  the  same  blood. 
He  refuses  to  consider  the  question  as  it  concerns  man,  '  since  it 
is  there  surrounded  by  prejudice,'  still  he  seems  not  to  be  in  favour 
of  consanguineous  marriages. 

Other  authors  condemn  them  without  reserve,  among  these 
Prosper  Lucas  and  Dr.  Boudin.  The  latter,  taking  his  stand  on  a 
great  number  of  facts  and  figures,  considers  them  as  the  undoubted 
cause  of  very  many  morbid  phenomena,  several  of  which  concern 

1  Lucas,  vol.  ii.  p.  903 ;  Bulletins  de  la  Sodttt  d1  Anthropolo^ic,  vols.  i.  iii. 
iv.  and  vi.  ;  Darwin,  Variatwn,  etc.,  vol.  ii.  ch.  xvii. 


292  Heredity. 

the  mental  life,  as,  for  instance,  deaf-muteness,  idiocy,  and  epilepsy. 
In  his  view,  consanguinity  is  of  itself  essentially  baneful,  and  deter- 
mines, without  the  concurrence  of  any  other  morbific  cause,  the 
appearance  of  many  grave  diseases  and  infirmities.1 

'  History,'  says  Lucas, '  witnesses  to  the  disastrous  consequences 
which  it  brings  on  man.'  '  Aristocracies  obliged  to  recruit  their 
numbers  from  among  themselves  become  extinct,'  says  Niebuhr ; 
'in  the  same  way  often  passing  through  degeneracy,  insanity, 
dementia  and  imbecility.'  Esquirol  and  Spurzheim,  at  least,  give 
this  reason  for  the  frequency  of  mental  alienation  and  of  its 
heredity  among  the  great  families  of  France  and  England.  Deaf- 
muteness  in  humbler  families  appears  also  to  have  the  same  origin. 

It  would  not  perhaps  be  rash  to  see  an  effect  of  consanguinity 
in  the  premature  decline  of  the  Lagidae,  and  of  the  Seleucidae. 
The  Lagidae  from  Ptolemy  Soter  down  to  Cleopatra  and  Caesarion 
( — 323  till  3°)  reckon  sixteen  sovereigns,  and  the  Seleucidae,  from 
Seleucus  Nicator  to  Antiochus  Asiaticus  ( — 311  till  64)  reckon 
twenty.  They  often  married  their  sisters,  their  nieces,  or  their  aunts. 
Moreover,  when  the  marriages  were  not  consanguineous,  alliances 
were  formed  between  these  two  effete  families,  the  Lagidse  nearly 
always  marrying  Seleucidae,  and  the  Seleucidae  marrying  Lagidae. 
Now,  it  is  certain  that  these  races  were  in  a  state  of  perpetual 
decay,  in  proportion  as  they  became  more  remote  from  their  two 
or  three  first  founders. 

To  these  many  reasons  against  consanguineous  marriages 
nothing  but  exceptional  cases  seem  to  be  opposed.  Burdach 
attributes  good  results  to  consanguinity,  but  only  among  animals. 
Dr.  Bourgeois  wrote  the  history  of  his  own  family,  which  was  the 


1  Memoir  de  la  Socittt  d'Anthrofologie.  According  to  Dr.  Boudin,  the  danger 
of  consanguineous  marriages  is  shown  by  the  following  facts.  In  Berlin  there 
were 

in  10,000  Catholics     3  deaf-mutes 

in  10,000  Protestants  6         „ 

in  10,000  Jews          27         „ 

In  the  United  States,  in  1840,  the  negro  population,  who  were  given  to  pro- 
miscuity, showed  in  Iowa  91  times  as  many  deaf-mutes  as  the  whites. 

These  figures,  and  the  inferences  drawn  from  them,  have  been  questioned 
See  Bulletins  de  la  Sod'ete  TAnthropologie,  vols.  iii.  and  iv. 


Heredity  and  the  Law  of  Evolution.        293 

issue  of  a  union  in  the  third  degree  of  consanguinity.  In  the 
course  of  one  hundred  and  sixty  years  there  were  ninety-one 
marriages  in  that  family,  sixteen  of  them  consanguineous,  and 
yet  there  resulted  neither  infirmity  nor  sterility.  Similar  facts  are 
cited  by  MM.  Voisin  and  Dalby.  There  are  two  small  French 
islands,  Batz  and  Brehat,  in  which  consanguineous  marriages  are 
very  frequent,  yet  the  population  is  healthy  and  vigorous. 

The  two  opinions  may,  perhaps,  as  M.  de  Quatrefages  observes, 
be  reconciled.  The  tendency  of  heredity  is  to  reproduce  the 
whole  being ;  the  child  is  only  a  resultant,  a  compromise  between 
the  tendencies  of  both  the  parents.  If  these  tendencies  are  the 
same,  they  are  all  the  more  evident  in  the  product.  If  the  parents 
enjoy  perfect  health,  consanguinity  will  tend  to  preserve  it  in  their 
descendants,  and  then,  so  far  from  being  prejudicial,  it  will  have 
good  results.  But  that  perfect  equilibrium  which  constitutes 
physical  and  moral  health  may  easily  be  disturbed  in  the  parents, 
and  then  the  consequences  will  become  more  and  more  evident  in 
the  children.  Now,  in  consanguineous  marriages  the  chances  are 
many  that  this  disturbance  of  equilibrium  will  be  of  a  like  nature 
in  both  of  the  parents.  Hence  it  follows  that  in  many  cases  such 
unions  will  be  injurious,  and  all  the  more  dangerous  in  proportion 
as  the  morbid  predispositions  common  to  both  parties  are  more 
marked.  '  The  consequence  we  are  to  draw  from  all  these  facts 
would  appear  to  be,  that  near  relationship  between  father  and 
mother  is  not  in  itself  hurtful,  but  that,  in  virtue  of  the  laws  govern- 
ing heredity,  it  oftentimes  becomes  so ;  and  hence,  in  view  of  the 
eventualities  to  which  consanguinity  leads,  it  is  at  least  prudent  to 
avoid  consanguineous  marriage.' x 

It  would  therefore  appear  that  the  ' in  and  in'  method  adopted 
for  the  improvement  of  the  lower  races  would  have  little  likelihood 
of  success  if  applied  to  man,  and  that  we  must  renounce  this  plan 
of  fixing  and  of  making  organic  certain  intellectual  aptitudes.  The 
process  of  crossing  families  would  probably  be  better.  This  would 
consist  in  selecting  a  pair  out  of  two  different  families,  both  pos- 
sessed in  a  high  degree  of  the  particular  quality,  talent  or  tendency, 
which  it  is  desired  to  transmit  to  the  progeny  in  increased  proper- 

1  Quatrefages,  Rapport  sur  Us  Progrh  de  FAnthropolog if,  p.  461. 


294  Heredity. 

tion.  This  proposed  selection  has  but  rarely  been  attempted,  and 
never  uninterruptedly.  Instances  of  it  might  be  found  in  mediaeval 
times,  in  the  golden  age  of  the  aristocracy.  Often  then,  when  an 
alliance  was  about  to  be  formed,  there  was  required  on  both  sides 
not  only  well-authenticated  noble  descent,  but  also  vigour,  valour, 
courage,  loyalty,  piety — in  short,  all  the  chivalric  virtues  which  it 
was  desired  to  transmit  to  the  children.  It  can  hardly  be  doubted 
that  if  this  selection  were  carried  out  methodically  it  would  lead 
to  good  results  for  the  improvement  of  the  human  race.  Of  course 
there  would  be  many  exceptions,  many  failures,  many  unforeseen 
anomalies,  produced  by  chance,  or  by  reversional  heredity ;  the 
phenomena  of  heredity  are  too  complex  and  too  delicate  to  be 
produced  with  the  mathematical  regularity  of  a  machine;  but 
it  is  probable  that  the  general  result  would  nevertheless  be 
excellent 

Still,  it  may  be  objected  that  any  such  method  as  this  would  be 
only  half  successful.  Grant  that  in  this  way  we  could  perpetuate 
for  the  common  good  a  nearly  constant  sum  of  eminent,  illus- 
trious, or  merely  notable  men,  or  grant,  even,  that  the  number  of 
such  could  be  increased,  there  would  still  remain  a  far  larger 
number  of  inferior  minds  of  which  heredity  would  perpetuate  the 
deficiencies,  just  as,  ex  hypothesi,  it  perpetuates  the  superior 
qualities  of  the  others.  Must  we  dream  that  the  case  admits  of  no 
remedy  ?  Must  we  admit  that  here  the  law  of  competition  is  in 
force,  and  that  it  will  in  course  of  time  stamp  out  whatever  does 
not  rise  to  a  certain  level  ?  May  we  hold  that  crosses  judiciously 
contrived  between  one  class  and  another  might  raise  up  that  which 
is  beneath,  without  lowering  that  which  is  above  ?  Would  civiliza- 
tion be  the  gainer?  Or  would  such  crosses  only  produce  a 
uniform  level  of  mediocrity  ?  These  questions  may  be  debated, 
but  not  resolved. 

Some  writers  hold  that  a  physically  and  morally  superior  race, 
when  united  with  an  inferior  one,  lowers  itself  without  raising  the 
other,  so  that  all  such  alliances  would  constitute  a  loss  to  civiliza- 
tion. This  opinion  is  enforced  with  a  hardy  logic  by  the  author  of 
a  voluminous  work  on  the  Inequality  of  Human  Races}-  In  his 

1  De  Gobineau,  Essai  sur  Flntgalitt  da  Rates  Humaines,  4  vols.  8vo. 


Heredity  and  the  Law  of  Evolution.        295 

view,  there  are  three  races  of  men,  perfectly  distinct  and  different, 
not  by  any  mere  external  difference,  but  by  a  radical  and  essential 
one ;  the  blood  of  one  race  is  as  different  from  that  of  another 
'  as  water  is  different  from  alcohol.'  These  three  races  are  the 
black,  the  yellow,  and  the  white.  The  black  race,  which  is  unin- 
tellectual,  sensual,  passionate,  abandoning  itself  to  its  instincts, 
represents,  according  to  M.  de  Gobineau,  the  female  element  The 
yellow  is  the  male  element ;  it  possesses  a  positive  mind,  a  narrow 
intellect,  a  love  of  comfort,  utilitarian  tendencies,  and  totally  lacks 
artistic  aptitude.  The  white  is  the  noble  race,  gifted  with  superior 
faculties,  and  possessing  aptitudes  for  poetry,  sciences,  and  politics. 
Of  this  noble  race  the  noblest  branch  is  the  Aryan,  and  of  this 
branch  the  noblest  family  is  the  Germanic. 

The  first  two  races,  left  to  themselves,  are  totally  incapable  of 
attaining  to  civilization.  This  power  is  possessed  only  by  the  white 
race.  But  in  lifting  the  other  two  out  of  barbarism  the  white  race 
itself  is  degraded  by  contact  with  them.  What  the  other  two 
races  gain  the  white  loses,  just  as  when  an  exquisite  wine  is  mixed 
with  wines  of  inferior  quality.  Nor  is  this  all ;  not  only  is  the 
mongrel  race  inferior  to  the  white,  but  also,  inasmuch  as  every 
cross  is  in  itself  a  cause  of  degradation,  it  follows  that  the  white 
blood,  though  it  does  not  change  in  quantity,  yet  loses  its  virtues 
on  occasion  of  every  new  cross.  From  all  this  the  reader  will 
conjecture  what  our  author  thinks  of  modern  civilization.  An 
epoch  which,  by  travel  and  by  the  multiplied  needs  of  commerce 
and  civilization,  brings  all  peoples  into  mutual  contact,  and  brings 
about  alliances  of  every  description,  is,  in  his  eyes,  a  '  horrible  con- 
fusion.' The  white  race,  which  was  uncontaminated  in  the  time  of 
.the  gods,  still  pure  enough  in  the  heroic  age,  already  tainted  in 
the  days  of  the  aristocracy,  has  now  entered  'the  era  of  unity.' 
When  the  confusion  becomes  complete,  and  when  the  white  blood 
in  every  human  creature  shall  bear  to  that  of  the  other  races  the 
ratio  of  one  to  two,  then  '  the  nations,  or  rather  the  human  herds, 
oppressed  by  a  gloomy  somnolence,  will  live  swallowed  up  in  their 
nullity,  like  buffaloes  ruminating  in  the  stagnant  puddles  of  the 
Pontine  Marshes.  Our  shameful  descendants  will  surrender  to 
vigorous  nature  the  universal  dominion  of  the  earth,  and  the 
human  creature  will  be  no  longer  her  master,  but  only  a  guest, 


296  Heredity. 

like  the  inhabitants  of  the  woods  and  waters.'  Humanity  will 
have  existed  from  twelve  to  fourteen  thousand  years.1 

If  we  accept  M.  de  Gobineau's  doctrine,  and  apply  to  families 
what  he  says  of  races  and  peoples,  the  conclusion  to  be  drawn 
from  it  is  evident  enough.  We  should  say  to  them  :  Beware  of 
all  admixture,  and  preserve  your  blood  pure  at  any  cost  Do  not 
try  to  bring  up  to  your  own  level  inferior  members  of  the  human 
race,  men,  peoples,  or  races,  for  you  would  lose  far  more  than 
they  could  gain.  But  this  conclusion  appears  to  us  very  rash; 
and  though  on  this  point  there  are  many  hypotheses  and  conjec- 
tures, and  but  few  truly  scientific  assertions,  though  the  facts  are 
so  contradictory  as  to  warrant  every  possible  interpretation,  still 
it  seems  to  us  that  there  are  some  very  good  arguments  against 
this  theory  of  pure  races,  this  horror  for  all  admixture. 

In  the  first  place,  I  do  not  think  that,  with  perhaps  the  ex- 
ception of  China,  history  presents  a  single  instance  of  any  great 
civilization,  without  a  preliminary  mingling  of  peoples  and  races. 
Take  the  Arabs,  originally  Asiatic.  So  long  as  the  race  remained 
pure,  it  made  little  or  no  progress.  Mahomet  appeared,  and  then 
they  overran,  as  conquerors,  Asia,  Africa,  and  Spain,  giving  rise  to 
the  great  civilization  of  Persia,  Damascus,  Bagdad,  and  Cordova. 
The  Jewish  people,  rigidly  exclusive  as  they  were,  had  to  admit 
some  Syrian,  Persian,  Phoenician,  and  Greek  elements,  in  order  to 
work  out  their  own  civilization.  Nor  were  the  indigenous  civiliz- 
ations of  the  New  World  exempt  from  this  law.  The  Incas  of 
Peru  were  a  superior  race  that  came  to  that  country  at  a  late 
period  in  its  history,  probably  in  the  thirteenth  century.  The 
Aztecs  in  Mexico,  who  were  conquered  by  Cortes,  had  been  pre- 
ceded by  the  Chichimecs  and  the  Toltecs.  But  not  to  multiply 
instances,  it  is  evident  that  civilization,  being  by  its  nature  a  com- 
plex state,  a  harmony,  many  dissimilar  and  even  unequal  elements 
were  needed  to  form  it  The  more  we  advance  in  the  knowledge 

1  M.  Gobineau's  view  has  been  held  in  a  very  mitigated  form  by  M.  Pcrier, 
who,  in  his  Essai  sur  la  Croisements  Ethniques,  takes  chiefly  the  physiological 
standpoint.  He  also  inclines  to  the  opinion  that  any  race  that  is  endowed 
with  any  natural  gift  loses  much  by  crossing.  The  author,  notwithstanding, 
admits  that  '  the  people  of  purest  blood  is  not  therefore  the  least  civilized,  and 
viceversd.' 


Heredity  and  the  Law  of  Evolution.       297 

of  nature,  the  more  convinced  do  we  become  of  this  truth  :  that 
the  highest  phenomena  of  thought  and  life  are  also  the  most 
complex,  and  that,  as  a  general  rule,  the  inferior  is  always  the 
simpler.  Civilization  has  everywhere  grown  by  contact,  mixtuTe, 
union.  '  The  more  elements  a  people  gains,'  says  M.  Serres,  '  the 
more  it  advances;  the  life  of  a  people  augments  in  proportion  as  its 
characteristics  are  multiplied.'  Nor  is  there  anything  to  prove  that 
when  two  families  or  two  races  combine  the  mixture  is  rudely 
made,  as  in  the  mingling  of  wines.  It  may  be  that  talent,  cha- 
racters, and  new  aptitudes  may  be  revealed  by  the  mere  fact  of 
cross-breeding,  just  as  in  chemistry  two  bodies  which  combine 
form  a  third  possessing  new  properties.  But  ethnic  chemistry  is 
not  sufficiently  advanced  to  warrant  this  opinion,  and  therefore  we 
must  be  content  with  simple  conjecture. 

We  now  return  to  our  original  question :  When  two  elements 
cross,  one  inferior  and  the  other  superior,  does  the  latter  finally 
get  the  mastery,  so  that  in  the  end  there  is  a  clear  profit  for  the 
human  race  ?  This  problem  is  far  from  being  solved,  especially  in 
its  psychic  aspects,  as  psychologists  have  studied  it  only  cursorily 
and  in  a  general  way. 

Half-breeds  have  furnished  the  chief  materials  for  this  study,  for 
in  them  it  is  more  easily  pursued.  The  mixed  elements  being 
widely  different — usually  blacks  and  whites — are  naturally  mag- 
nified, so  that  we  can  study  them,  as  it  were,  through  a  microscope. 

Some  naturalists  regard  these  mixed  races  as  doomed  to  dis- 
appear, either  because  the  race  has  but  little  fecundity,  or  because 
the  individual  possesses  but  little  vital  resistance.  Yet,  according 
to  M.  Omalius  d'Halloy,  if  we  take  the  whole  population  of 
the  globe  as  750,000,000,  the  half-breeds  would  count  at  least 
10,000,000.  In  Mexico  and  in  South  America  they  have  in  three 
centuries  risen  to  be  about  one-fifth  of  the  total  population. 
D'Orbigny,  who  has  closely  studied  man  in  America,  is  a  strong 
partizan  of  cross-breeding  between  nations.  'Among  the  nations 
in  America,'  says  he,  'the  product  is  always  superior  to  the  two 
types  that  are  mixed.'  Finally,  in  Polynesia,  and  in  the  Marquesas 
Isles  in  particular,  while  the  indigenous  population  is  falling  away 
with  fearful  rapidity,  the  half-breeds  are  increasing  in  numbers,  so 
that  this  region  seems  destined  to  be  re-peopled  by  a  race  half 


298  Heredity. 

European  and  half  Polynesian.  If  we  admit,  with  seme  authors, 
that  it  needs  several  generations,  or  even  several  centuries,  for 
a  crossed  race  to  adapt  itself  to  its  surroundings,  and  for  the 
reversional  heredity,  which  goes  back  to  the  primitive  types,  to 
be  firmly  established,  we  can  foresee  the  time  when  the  number 
of  half-breeds  will  be  far  larger  than  it  is  at  present. 

But  what  is  their  mental  value?     Do  they  stand  much  above 
the  inferior  race  or  much  below  the  superior  race  ? 

Darwin  notes  in  some  half-breeds  a  return  towards  the  habits  of 
savage  life ;  but  this,  as  it  seems  to  us,  may  be  only  a  mere  phe- 
nomena of  atavism.  '  Travellers  speak  of  the  degraded  state  and 
savage  disposition  of  crossed  races  of  man.  That  many  excellent 
and  kind-hearted  mulattoes  have  existed  no  one  will  dispute;  and 
a  more  mild  and  gentle  set  of  men  could  hardly  be  found  than  the 
inhabitants  of  the  island  of  Chiloe,  who  consist  qf  Indians  com- 
mingled with  the  Spaniards  in  various  proportions.  On  the 
other  hand,  many  years  ago,  long  before  I  had  thought  of  the 
present  subject,  I  was  struck  with  the  fact  that  in  South  America 
men  of  complicated  descent  between  Negroes,  Indians,  and 
Spaniards,  seldom  had,  whatever  the  cause  might  be,  a  good 
expression.  Livingstone,  after  speaking  of  a  half-caste  man,  on 
the  Zambesi,  described  by  the  Portuguese  as  a  rare  monster  of 
inhumanity,  remarks,  "It  is  unaccountable  why  half-castes,  such 
as  he,  are  so  much  more  cruel  than  the  Portuguese ;  but  such  is 
undoubtedly  the  case."  An  inhabitant  remarked  to  Livingstone, 
"  God  made  white  men,  and  God  made  black  men,  but  the  devil 
made  the  half-castes."  When  two  races,  both  low  in  the  scale,  are 
crossed,  the  progeny  seems  to  be  eminently  bad.  Thus  the  noble- 
hearted  Humboldt,  who  felt  none  of  that  prejudice  against  the 
inferior  races  now  so  current  in  England,  speaks  in  strong  terms  of 
the  Zambos,  or  half-castes  between  Indians  and  Negroes ;  and  this 
conclusion  has  been  arrived  at  by  various  observers.  From  these 
facts  we  may  perhaps  infer  that  the  degraded  state  of  so  many 
half-castes  is  in  part  due  to  reversion  to  a  primitive  and  savage 
condition,  induced  by  the  act  of  crossing,  as  well  as  to  the 
unfavourable  moral  conditions  under  which  they  generally  exist* 1 

Variation,  etc.,  ii.  p.  46. 


Heredity  and  the  Law  of  Evolution.        299 

There  are  other  half-breeds,  however,  who  are  at  least  equal  in 
point  of  intellect  to  their  parents  of  the  superior  race.  In  1789, 
nine  English  sailors  mutinied,  deserted  their  captain,  and  settled 
on  Pitcairn  Island  with  six  Tahitans  and  fifteen  Polynesian  women. 
A  quarrel  soon  arose  among  them.  Five  of  the  white  men  were 
killed,  and  the  women  murdered  the  Tahitans.  The  four  white  men 
and  the  ten  surviving  women  lived  in  a  complete  state  of  polygamy. 
Strife  broke  out  afresh .  between  the  four  Europeans.  Two  were 
killed,  and  the  remaining  two  resolved  to  live  in  peace,  and  to 
regenerate  this  little  community,  born  amid  an  outburst  of  every 
wild  passion.  Captain  Beechy  visited  the  island  in  1825;  he  found 
there  a  population  of  sixty-six  individuals,  remarkable  for  their  fine 
proportions,  their  strength,  their  agility,  their  quick  and  ready  in- 
telligence, their  great  desire  for  instruction  and  for  moral  qualities, 
of  which  he  gives  a  touching  example.  This  community,  con- 
sisting entirely  of  half-breeds,  was  superior  at  least  to  the  vast 
majority  of  the  elements  which  had  given  birth  to  it 

In  Brazil,  where,  as  the  prejudices  of  colour  are  less  strong  than 
elsewhere,  half-breeds  may  aspire  to  position  in  society,  they  have 
shown  a  decided  artistic  superiority  over  the  two  original  races. 
'  Nearly  every  painter  and  musician  in  Brazil  is  a  half-breed. 
They  possess,  also,  a  turn  for  science,  and  many  of  them  have 
become  medical  practitioners  of  high  distinction.' 

In  Venezuela,  says  M.  de  Quatrefages,  mulattoes  have  been  dis- 
tinguished as  orators,  publicists,  and  poets.  One  of  them,  formerly 
Vice-President  of  New  Grenada,  was  a  prominent  writer  and  a 
good  administrative  officer. 

Authors  who  are  by  no  means  favourable  to  half-breeds  admit 
that,  particularly  in  America,  they  possess  considerable  intelligence, 
wit,  and  imagination. 

We  can  draw  no  decisive  conclusion  from  these  facts,  to  which 
we  might  easily  add  many  others ;  not  so  much  because  the 
opinions  are  mutually  contradictory,  as  because  they  are  vague. 
Anthropologists,  who  usually  are  so  minute  and  exact  in  their 
physiological  distinctions,  so  soon  as  they  come  to  consider  mental 
characters,  the  complexity  of  which  is  so  great,  confine  themselves 
to  general  phrases,  which  are  almost  always  the  same.  Some 
naturalists,  however,  have  supposed  that  from  all  these  facts  of 


3oo  Heredity. 

cross-breeding  we  might  deduce  a  law  which  would  give  the 
answer  to  the  question  proposed  in  the  present  chapter.  It  may 
be  thus  stated  : — 

The  mixture  of  two  unequal  races  tends  to  efface  the  less  per- 
fect of  the  two.  When  a  white  man  marries  a  negress,  their  child 
is  a  mulatto.  When  two  mulattoes  of  equal  blood  intermarry,  their 
child  is  whiter  than  themselves.  This  fact  is  an  application  of 
a  general  law  of  nature,  in  accordance  with  which  mixed  forms 
have  a  tendency  to  return  to  the  types  from  which  they  are  sprung, 
and  in  the  struggle  for  life  the  more  perfect  type  prevails.1 

Cases  of  unilateral  crossing  give  some  curious  results.  When 
the  white  is  united  to  the  black,  and  then  with  the  half-bred 
progeny,  the  white  type  is  seen  to  predominate  more  and  more  in 
every  generation.  The  pure  type  reappears  in  the  fifth  generation. 
When  this  unilateral  crossing  takes  place  with  the  pure  negro  on 
the  one  side,  and  successive  generations  of  mulattoes  on  the  other, 
less  time  is  required  to  bring  back  the  perfect  negro  type.  It 
reappears  in  the  third  generation. 

In  a  large  part  of  South  America  (Brazil,  the  Argentine  Repub- 
lic, Paraguay,  etc.)  a  fact  of  great  importance  is  found  occurring 
with  considerable  uniformity.  From  numerous  and  trustworthy 
testimonies  it  appears  that  '  in  that  vast  region,  where  these  two 
races  are  crossed  in  so  large  a  scale,  the  European  type  always 
prevails  in  the  long  run.  In  Brazil,  men  of  "  mixed  blood,"  of  all 
degrees  of  hybridization,  are  numerous,  forming  a  new  population, 
which  is  ever  growing  more  indigenous  and  coming  nearer  to  the 
white  type,  and,  judging  from  what  is  taking  place  all  over  South 
America,  they  will  finally  absorb  all  the  other  elements  of  the 
population.'  M.  de  Quatrefages  is  not  clear  whether  this  fact  is 
to  be  taken  as  a  proof  of  the  ascendancy  of  race.  He  is  rather 
inclined  to  suppose  that  it  is  due  to  conscious  selection  in  cross- 
breeding, the  process  being  as  a  general  rule  unilateral,  and  in 
favour  of  the  white  race.  However  this  may  be,  'it  is  a  result  of 
great  importance,  for  in  this  struggle  between  races,  the  victory 


1  Except  where  it  is  impeded  by  the  action  of  its  surroundings,  as  appears  to 
be  the  case  in  Peru,  where  the  half-breed  population  has  a  strong  tendency  to 
return  to  the  indigenous  type. 


Heredity  and  the  Law  of  Evolution.       301 

will   at  last   be  with    that    race  which    possesses  the    superior 
elements.' 

Should  the  future  verify  these  prognostics,  should  the  white  race, 
after  eliminating  the  two  others,  restore  the  cross  races  to  its  own 
type,  it  will  have  performed,  in  its  own  way,  a  work  of  regeneration; 
then  the  question  with  which  we  began  will  be  definitely  settled, 
and  the  mean  level  of  humanity  will  have  been  greatly  raised,  still 
more  perhaps  by  hereditary  transmission  than  by  the  external 
action  of  education  and  custom. 

in. 

As  we  have  seen,  evolution  in  living  beings,  though  it  generally 
implies  amelioration,  progress,  transition  from  worse  to  better, 
still,  in  its  scientific  sense,  implies  only  the  transition  from  simple 
to  complex,  from  homogeneous  to  heterogeneous ;  and  hence, 
instead  of  progress,  it  sometimes  leads  only  to  diminution  of  force 
and  to  decay.  We  have  now  to  consider  heredity  under  this 
latter  aspect,  as  related  to  the  law  of  evolution. 

Everything  that  has  life  also  declines  and  becomes  extinct  It 
it  doubtless  because  of  this  too  evident  truth  that  the  belief  in  the 
law  of  progress  appeared  so  late  in  man's  history.  First  the  indi- 
vidual disappears,  then  the  family,  then  the  nation ;  and  just  as 
the  individual  makes  use  of  many  bodies  before  he  finally  becomes 
extinct,  so,  too,  the  family  makes  use  of  many  individuals,  the 
nation  many  families,  the  human  race  many  nations.  Perhaps 
humanity  itself  must  disappear  at  last,  made  use  of  by  some 
mightier  force.  It  may  be  that  in  the  evolution  of  the  universe 
humanity  is  but  one  term  in  an  endless  series,  one  link  in  an 
endless  chain. 

If  we  glance  at  any  family  that  has  acted  a  part  in  history,  we 
see  the  following  facts.  Its  origin  is  so  obscure  that  usually  we 
have  to  imagine  or  invent  it ;  it  comes  into  prominence,  grows, 
and  attains  its  climax  in  one,  two,  or  three  generations  at  most ;  it 
then  declines  and  becomes  extinct  Take  the  second  race  of 
Frank  kings.  It  starts  with  Saint  Arnoul,  Bishop  of  Metz,  follows 
an  ascending  series,  Pepin  d'Heristal,  Charles  Martel,  Pepin  the 

1  Quatrefages,  loc.  cit.  p.  457. 


3O2  Heredity. 

Short,  Charlemagne ;  in  the  latter  it  attains  its  most  perfect  develop- 
ment, and  then  it  declines.  The  third  race  starts  with  Robert  the 
Strong,  Count  of  France,  reaches  its  climax  in  Philip  Augustus, 
St  Louis,  and  Philip  the  Fair,  and  then  it  becomes  extinct  in 
three  obscure  kings.  It  is  much  the  same  with  the  Valois  branch, 
sprung  from  Charles  de  Valois,  son  of  Philippe  le  Hardi,  and 
with  the  Angouleme  branch,  sprang  from  Louis  d'Orle'ans,  son  of 
Charles  V.,  which  ended  with  the  feeble  sons  of  Catherine  de 
Medicis.  Then  come  the  Bourbons,  whose  climax  is  indicated 
by  Henri  IV.  and  Louis  XIV.,  and  who  ever  since  have  been  on 
the  decline.  So,  too,  with  the  Guises,  Conde's,  etc.  Nor  are  those 
families  exempt  from  this  law  who  have  acted  a  great  part,  only  on 
a  small  stage,  in  their  own  province  or  their  own  city.  Indeed,  it 
would  not  perhaps  be  inexact  to  say,  with  Dr.  Lucas,  that  '  the 
ascending  movement  of  the  exalted  faculties  of  most  founders  of 
families  is  nearly  always  arrested  at  the  third  generation,  seldom 
goes  on  to  the  fourth,  and  hardly  ever  transcends  the  fifth.'  So  it 
is,  too,  with  nations.  Their  origin  is  obscure ,  they  grow,  attain  the 
full  measure  of  their  power,  and  then  their  fate  brings  them  to 
that  period  where  they  belong  only  to  history ;  and  their  decadence 
is  due,  not  so  much  to  those  vague  causes  to  which  it  is  commonly 
attributed  by  historians,  as  to  a  definite  cause :  the  decay  of  the 
faculties,  physical,  intellectual,  and  moral  (and  of  the  organic 
functions  which  are  their  condition),  if  not  in  all  the  citizens,  at 
least  in  the  majority  of  them. 

Heredity  plays  its  part  in  this  decline.  Though  by  itself,  as  we 
have  seen,  it  can  do  nothing,  being  merely  a  conservative  tendency, 
still  it  is  heredity  alone  that  makes  progress  possible  during  the 
ascendant  epoch  of  evolution.  But  then,  on  the  other  hand,  after 
evolution  has  entered  on  its  downward  period,  heredity  confirms 
and  regulates  the  decline.  One  by  one  it  laid — fatefully,  blindly 
— the  courses  of  the  edifice,  and  one  after  another  it  removes  them 
with  the  same  blind  fatality. 

The  influence  of  heredity  is  either  direct  or  indirect 

Its  direct  influence  is  exerted  through  the  state  of  marriage.     It 

is  not  a  rare  occurrence  for  a  man  of  note  to  marry  a  woman  of 

indifferent  capacity,  out  of  family  or  social  considerations,  or  from 

chance  or  caprice.     It  has  been  observed  that  great  men  often 


Heredity  and  the  Law  of  Evolution.        303 


leave  descendants  unworthy  of  them ;  in  fact,  advantage  has  been 
taken  of  this  fact  in  order  to  call  in  question  hereditary  transmis- 
sion, whereas  we  should  rather  perhaps  find  in  it  a  striking  con- 
firmation of  the  law.  Galton,  in  his  work  on  English  judges,1 
observes  that  of  thirty-one  judges  raised  to  the  peerage  previous  to 
the  close  of  the  reign  of  George  IV.,  nineteen  are  still  represented 
in  the  peerage  by  their  descendants,  and  twelve  peerages  are 
extinct.  Having  minutely  investigated  the  cause  of  this  extinction, 
he  discovered  them  in  social  reasons,  in  motives  of  convenience 
which  led  to  ill-assorted  unions  :  those  peers  whose  families  soon 
disappeared  '  married  heiresses.'  Even  when  unequal  matches  do 
not  produce  such  grave  results  as  these,  it  is  not  to  be  doubted 
that,  in  virtue  of  the  laws  of  heredity,  they  must  cause  a  degenera- 
tion, which,  being  again  and  again  repeated,  must  of  necessity 
bring  about  the  extinction  of  a  gifted  family,  or,  what  is  worse,  its 
mediocrity.  It  is  evident  that  a  son  may  take  after  his  indifferently 
gifted  mother  as  readily  as  after  his  illustrious  father,  and  that,  as 
in  any  case  he  must  be  the  resultant  of  the  two,  the  chance  of  his 
being  inferior  to  his  father  is  as  two  to  one. 

Considered  as  an  indirect  cause  of  decline,  heredity  acts  by  way 
of  accumulation.  Every  family,  every  people,  every  race  brings 
into  the  world  at  their  birth  a  certain  amount  of  vitality,  and  of 
physical  and  moral  aptitudes,  which  in  course  of  time  will  become 
manifest.  This  evolution  has  for  its  causes  the  continual  action 
and  reaction  between  the  being  and  its  surroundings.  It  goes  on 
until  the  family,  people,  or  race  has  fulfilled  its  destiny,  brilliant 
for  some,  distinguished  for  others,  obscure  for  the  majority.  When 
this  sum  of  vitality  and  of  aptitudes  begins  to  fail,  decay  commences. 
This  process  of  decay  may  at  first  be  of  no  moment,  but  heredity 
transmits  it  to  the  next  generation,  from  that  to  the  following  one, 
and  so  on  till  the  period  of  utter  extinction,  if  no  external  cause 
interferes  to  stay  ihe  decay.  Here,  then,  heredity  is  only  an 
indirect  cause  of  degeneration,  the  direct  cause  being  the  action 
of  the  environment,  by  which  term  we  understand  all  action  from 
without — not  only  climate  and  mode  of  life,  but  also  manners, 

1  Pages  130-132.     See  the  concluding  chapter  of  the  work,  with  regard  to 
the  question  whether  great  men  leave  no  posterity. 
It 


304  Heredity. 

customs,  religious  ideas,  institutions,  and  laws,  which  often  are 
very  influential  in  determining  the  degeneration  of  a  race.  In  the 
east,  the  harem,  with  its  life  of  absolute  ignorance  and  complete 
indolence,  has,  through  physical  and  moral  heredity,  led  to  the 
rapid  decay  of  various  nations.  *  We  have  no  harem  in  France,' 
says  a  naturalist,  '  but  there  are  other  causes,  quite  different  in 
their  origin,  which  tend  ultimately  to  lower  the  race.  In  our  day, 
paternal  affection,  with  the  assistance  of  medical  science,  more 
certain,  and  possessed  of  more  resources,  makes  more  and  more 
certain  the  future  of  children,  by  saving  the  lives  of  countless  weak, 
deformed,  or  otherwise  ill-constituted  creatures  that  would  surely 
have  died  in  a  savage  race,  or  in  our  own  a  century  or  two  ago. 
These  children  become  men,  they  marry,  and  by  heredity  transmit 
to  their  descendants  at  least  a  predisposition  to  imperfections 
like  their  own.  Sometimes  both  husband  and  wife  bring  each  a 
share  to  this  heritage.  The  descendants  go  on  degenerating,  and 
the  result  for  the  community  is  debasement,  and,  finally,  the  disap- 
pearance of  certain  groups.' l 

The  only  way  of  getting  a  clear  idea  of  a  case  of  psychological 
and  moral  decay,  hereditarily  transmitted,  is  by  finding  for  it  some 
organic  cause.  The  physiology  and  anatomy  of  the  brain  are  not 
yet  sufficiently  advanced  to  explain  it ;  we  cannot  say  to  what 
change  in  the  brain  such  and  such  a  decay  of  intellect,  or  such  and 
such  a  perversion  of  the  will,  is  to  be  attributed.  But  cerebral 
phenomena  and  psychical  phenomena  are  so  closely  connected 
that  a  variation  of  the  one  implies  a  variation  of  the  other. 

This  being  assumed,  let  us  take  a  man  of  average  organization, 
physically  and  morally.  Let  us  suppose  that,  in  consequence  of 
disease,  outward  circumstances,  influences  coming  from  his  sur- 
roundings or  from  his  own  will,  his  mind  is  impaired,  to  only  a 
trifling  extent  it  may  be,  but  yet  permanently.  Clearly  heredity 
has  nothing  to  do  with  this  decay ;  but  then,  if  it  is  transmitted  to 
the  next  generation,  and  if,  further,  the  same  causes  go  on  acting  in 
the  same  direction,  it  is  equally  clear  that  heredity  in  turn  becomes 
a  cause  of  decay.  And  if  this  slow  action  goes  on  with  each  new 
generation  it  may  end  in  total  extinction  of  intellect 

*  JRevtu  da  Cours  Sdentifiques,  vol.  vL  p.  690. 


Heredity  and  the  Law  of  Evolution.       305 

These  remarks  also  apply  in  every  respect  to  nations  and 
races :  all  that  is  required  is  that  the  destructive  influences  should 
bear,  not  on  an  isolated  individual,  but  upon  a  mass  of  individuals. 
The  mechanism  of  decay  is  identical  in  the  two  cases ;  and  we  are 
justified  in  the  conclusion  that  the  causes  which,  in  the  narrow 
world  of  the  individual  and  the  family,  produce  a  considerable 
diminution  of  the  intellectual  forces,  must  produce  the  like  effect 
in  that  agglomeration  of  individuals  which  constitutes  a  society. 

Historians  usually  explain  the  decline  of  nations  by  their  manners, 
institutions,  and  character,  and  in  a  certain  sense  the  explanation 
is  correct.  These  reasons,  however,  are  rather  vague,  and,  as  we  see, 
there  exists  a  more  profound,  an  ultimate  cause — an  organic  cause, 
which  can  act  only  through  heredity,  but  which  is  altogether  over- 
looked. These  organic  causes  will  probably  be  ignored  for  some 
time  to  come,  but  our  ignoring  them  will  not  do  away  with  them. 
As  for  ourselves,  who  have,  for  purposes  of  our  own,  attempted  to 
study  the  decay  of  the  Lower  Empire — the  most  amazing  instance 
of  decay  presented  by  history — tracing  step  by  step  this  degeneration 
through  a  thousand  years  :  seeing,  in  their  works  of  art,  the  plastic 
talent  of  the  Greeks  fade  away  by  degrees,  and  result  in  the  stiff 
drawing,  and  in  the  feeble,  motionless  figures  of  the  Paleologi ; 
seeing  the  imagination  of  the  Greeks  wither  up  and  become 
reduced  to  a  few  platitudes  of  description  ;  seeing  their  lively  wit 
change  to  empty  babbling  and  senile  dotage ;  seeing  all  the 
characters  of  mind  so  disappear  that  the  great  men  of  their  latter 
period  would  elsewhere  pass  only  for  mediocrities — it  appears  to 
us  that  beneath  these  visible,  palpable  facts — the  only  facts  on  which 
historians  dwell — we  discern  the  slow,  blind,  unconscious  working 
of  nature  in  the  millions  of  human  beings  who  were  decayed, 
though  they  knew  it  not,  and  who  transmitted  to  their  descendants 
a  genii  of  death,  each  generation  adding  to  it  somewhat  of  its  own. 

Thus,  in  every  people,  whether  it  be  rising  or  falling,  there  exists 
always,  as  the  groundwork  of  every  change,  a  secret  working  of 
the  mind,  and  consequently  of  a  part  of  the  organism,  and  this 
of  necessity  comes  under  the  law  of  heredity. 

Here  we  bring  to  a  close  our  general  study  on  the  consequences 
of  heredity.  We  must  next  look  at  the  details.  In  order  to  pro- 
ceed with  the  inquiry  methodically,  we  will  proceed  rVom  causes 


306  Heredity. 

to  effects,  that  is  to  say,  from  sentiments  and  ideas  to  acts,  and 
from  acts  to  social  institutions.  We  will  therefore  study  the  influ- 
ence of  heredity,  first  on  the  constitution  of  the  human  soul,  on 
its  intellectual  states,  its  sentiments  and  passions,  then  on  the 
acts  which  give  outward  expression  to  these  inner  states ;  lastly,  on 
the  institutions  which  result  from  these  acts,  and  which  not  only 
regulate,  but  also  consolidate  them.  Thus  we  shall  have  to  con- 
sider, successively,  the  psychological,  the  moral,  and  the  social 
consequences  of  heredity. 


CHAPTER  II. 

THE   PSYCHOLOGICAL  CONSEQUENCES   OF   HEREDITY. 


THE  study  of  the  psychological  consequences  of  heredity  must 
begin  with  the  instincts.  We  will  not  here  discuss  a  question 
already  treated,1  since  it  will  be  enough  to  state  briefly  the  certain 
or  probable  results  already  obtained. 

If  heredity  acted  merely  the  part  of  a  conservator,  its  conse- 
quences, psychological  or  otherwise,  would  present  no  difficulty 
whatever.  On  the  hypothesis  of  individual  types  created  once  for 
all  with  their  physical  and  moral  attributes,  the  only  consequence 
of  heredity  would  be  the  indefinite  repetition  of  these  types,  with 
some  accidental  deviations — unimportant  facts  of  spontaneity. 
But  the  case  is  very  different  Notwithstanding  the  character  of 
immutability  usually  assigned  to  instincts,  they  may  vary  as  we 
have  seen,  and  their  variations  are  transmissible.  Hence  the  first 
consequence  of  heredity,  that  it  renders  possible  the  acquisition  of 
new  instincts.  This  consequence  rests  on  facts,  and  is  certain  and 
indisputable. 

Another  consequence,  one  that  is  merely  possible,  and  which 
we  have  stated  only  as  an  hypothesis,  is  the  genesis  of  all  instinct 
whatever  by  way  of  heredity.  Instincts,  regarded  as  hereditary 

1  See  Part  I.  ch.  i. 


The  Psychological  Consequences  of  Heredity.     307 

habits,  would  be  the  result  of  the  accumulation  of  psychical  acts 
which,  originally  very  simple,  have,  in  virtue  of  the  law  of  evo- 
lution, passed  from  the  simple  to  the  complex,  from  the  homo- 
geneous to  the  heterogeneous,  thus  giving  rise  to  those  highly 
complex  acts  which  seem  to  us  so  wonderful. 

Hitherto  we  have  restricted  ourselves  to  looking  simply  at  the 
bearings  of  this  doctrine ;  we  are  now  to  meet  with  it  under 
another  form,  and  we  shall  study  its  bearings  here  also. 

n. 

The  same  question,  in  fact,  arises  with  regard  to  the  intellect. 
Here  some  assign  to  heredity  only  a  secondary  influence,  asserting 
that  it  allows  the  transmission  and  accumulation  of  certain  charac- 
ters, and  makes  the  development  of  the  intellect  possible,  in  the 
individual  and  in  the  species. 

Others  go  much  farther,  and  attribute  to  heredity  an  actual 
creative  power.  According  to  them,  the  genesis  of  the  constituent 
forms  of  intellect  and  of  the  laws  and  conditions  of  thought  is  the 
work  of  heredity. 

We  will  first  examine  this  latter  doctrine,  the  most  radical,  the 
most  recent,  the  least  known  out  of  England.  There  it  has  been 
held  by  a  few  contemporary  philosophers,  and  has  given  an 
entirely  new  shape  to  the  famous  problem  of  the  origin  of  ideas. 
If  this  doctrine  be  true,  it  gives  so  important  a  part  to  heredity 
that  we  must  here  discuss  it  fully. 

It  is  one  of  the  great  merits  of  the  school  of  sensationalists  that  it 
early  perceived  the  importance  of  questions  of  genesis.  Through 
all  its  researches  into  the  origin  of  our  cognitions  it  was  really 
concerned  with  the  embryology  of  mind.  It  does  not,  however, 
appear  to  have  been  at  first  clearly  conscious  of  this,  or  it  would  be 
impossible  to  explain  the  conception  of  a  statue  by  Condillac 
and  Bonnet — an  actual  adult  individual,  whose  genesis  could 
not  but  be  illusory  and  artificial.  This  is  as  though  the  physio- 
logist were  to  take  man  at  his  birth,  without  concerning  himself 
about  the  embryonic  period  which  preceded  it  It  is  singular 
to  see  how  superficial,  external,  and  imperfect  are  the  processes 
of  Condillac,  and  with  what  simplicity  he  thinks  the  most  in- 
volved and  complex  phenomena  may  be  explained  and  produced. 


308  Heredity. 

Condillac's  system,  however,  has  been  excellently  criticized  already, 
and  that  by  his  own  school.1  But  whatever  its  defects,  we  have 
reason  to  be  thankful  that  it  took  the  wrong  course,  as  it  led 
to  finding  the  correct  one,  by  suggesting  the  necessity  of  an  em- 
bryology of  mind. 

In  Condillac's  day,  the  various  hypotheses  of  naturalists  with 
regard  to  the  fact  of  generation  might  be  reduced  to  two  chief 
hypotheses,  one  holding  the  pre-existence  of  germs,  and  the  other 
epigenesis. 

The  doctrine  of  the  pre-existence  of  germs  was  the  older,  and,  in 
some  sense,  the  orthodox  hypothesis.  Vallisnieri,  Bonnet,  and 
Spallanzani  maintained  it  in  the  seventeenth  century;  Haller  also 
held  it  It  asserted  that  the  ovum  contains  the  animal  or  the  man 
already  formed,  though  of  infinite  minuteness,  that  all  beings,  each 
with  its  proper  structure,  have  been  contained  in  ova  from  mother 
to  mother  ever  since  the  moment  of  creation ;  that  the  act  of 
generation  merely  gives  them  life  and  makes  them  capable  ot 
growth  and  development.  'They  are,'  says  Maupertuis,  in  his 
Venus  Physique,  '  only  little  statues,  enclosed  one  within  another, 
like  those  works  of  the  lathe  in  which  the  carver  shows  his  skill 
with  the  chisel  by  making  a  hundred  boxes  shut  up  one  within 
another.' 

The  doctrine  of  epigenesis,  on  the  other  hand,  then  represented 
by  Buffon  and  Wolff,  held  that  the  being  is  formed  in  all  its  parts 
in  the  act  of  generation.  The  embryologists  of  the  nineteenth 
century  have  shown  that  originally  the  germs  of  all  organisms  are 

1  Cabanis,  p.  521,  Peisse's  Edition.  It  is  interesting  to  compare  Condillac's 
rude  embryology  with  that  of  the  great  psychologists  of  the  present  time.  It 
Is  given  in  its  completest  form  by  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer  in  his  Principles  of 
Psychology.  The  analysis  begins  with  the  most  complex  cognitions,  and  by 
successive  decompositions  arrives  at  the  simplest  act  of  thinking — viz.  the  per- 
ception of  a  difference.  The  synthesis,  a  very  different  affair  from  Condillac's 
artificial  process,  starts  from  reflex  action,  passing  through  instinct  and  memory, 
and  arrives  at  the  operations  of  reason,  sentiment,  and  will  The  author  thus 
ascends  from  the  conditions  of  a  psychic  state  to  the  state  itself,  from  the  lower 
to  the  higher,  from  vague  and  general  modes  of  mental  activity  to  those  that  are 
precise  and  more  and  more  determinate,  from  the  simple  to  the  complex.  The 
comparison  between  the  two  methods  is  instructive ;  it  just  marks  the  difference 
between  a  truly  scientific  method  and  a  purely  verbal  process. 


Tfie  Psychological  Consequences  of  Heredity.    309 

structureless  and  alike,  and  that  the  development  of  each  germ 
consists  in  acquiring  the  structure  peculiar  to  its  species.  Some 
of  them,  even,  such  as  Menckel  and  Serres,  discovered  in  the 
temporary  and  transient  forms  of  the  embryogeny  of  man  and  the 
other  vertebrates  the  arrested  and  permanent  forms  of  invertebrate 
organisms.  At  least  this  much  is  certain,  that  at  a  certain  point 
of  their  development  the  embryos  of  all  vertebrates,  whether  birds 
or  fishes,  reptile  or  man,  present  only  the  most  general  and  the 
simplest  features  of  the  vertebrate  type.  Nothing  could  differ 
more  widely  than  this  from  the  hypothesis  of '  little  statues '  fully 
formed. 

In  our  opinion,  if  we  look  at  the  theories  on  the  origin  of  our 
cognitions,  that  is,  the  embryogeny  of  mind,  in  the  light  of  these 
two  hypotheses  as  to  the  embryogeny  of  the  body,  the  philosophic 
question  assumes  a  new  aspect 

The  spiritualistic  or  rationalistic  school  holds,  after  its  own 
fashion,  the  pre-existence  of  germs.  Whether,  with  Descartes,  we 
accept  innate  ideas,  or,  with  Leibnitz,  hold  that  arithmetic  and 
geometry  exist  in  us  virtually,  and  that  there  are  graven  on  the 
soul  truths  which  it  has  never  known,  is  to  hold  that  the  soul,  so  long 
as  it  has  existed,  has  possessed  all  its  constituent  elements. 
Experience  perfects  and  completes  it,  but  gives  to  it  very  little 
indeed,  compared  with  what  it  receives.  Just  as,  in  the  hypothesis 
of  the  pre-existence  of  germs,  the  minute  being  is  developed,  but 
does  not  undergo  any  change  in  its  essential  parts,  or  in  the  rela- 
tions between  them,  merely  attaining  greater  size,  filling  up  gaps 
and  acquiring  a  few  accessory  organs ;  so  in  the  spiritualistic 
hypothesis,  experience  merely  causes  us  to  adapt  ourselves  to  the 
fundamental  forms  and  laws  of  the  human  soul,  to  those  ideas  and 
judgments  which  constitute  it,  so  to  speak,  and  which  are  to  the 
mind  what  the  cerebro-spinal  axis  is  to  the  body.  This  analogy 
will  appear  still  more  evident  when  we  remember  that  Leibnitz 
compares  the  human  soul,  previous  to  experience,  to  a  statue  out- 
lined by  the  veinings  in  a  rough  block  of  marble. 

As  for  epigenesis,  its  counterpart  in  philosophy  is  not,  we  take 
it,  ordinary  sensationalism,  but  a  new  system  which  we  are  about 
to  describe  in  the  words  of  Spencer,  Lewes,  and  Murphy,  and 
which  lays  much  stress  on  heredity. 


3 1  o  Heredity. 

These  philosophers  have,  in  the  first  place,  made  an  excellent, 
radical,  and  decisive  criticism  of  the  old  empiricism.  '  To  accept,' 
says  Spencer,  '  the  untenable  assertion  that  prior  to  experience  the 
mind  is  a  blank  is  to  overlook  the  very  root  of  the  question,  viz. 
Whence  comes  the  faculty  of  organizing  sensations  ?  ...  If  at 
birth  there  exists  nothing  but  a  purely  passive  receptivity  of  im- 
pressions, why  could  not  a  horse  receive  the  same  education  as  a 
man  ?  .  .  .  Why  should  not  the  cat  and  the  dog,  subjected  as  they 
are  to  the  same  experiences  obtained  in  domestic  life,  attain  to  the 
same  degree  and  the  same  kind  of  intelligence  ?  Under  its  current 
form,  the  experience  hypothesis  implies  that  the  presence  of  a 
nervous  system  organized  in  a  certain  way  is  an  unimportant  cir- 
cumstance, a  fact  that  need  not  be  taken  into  account,  yet  it  is  the 
most  important  fact  of  all.'1 

Cognition  is  necessarily  the  product  of  two  factors :  first,  we 
have  what  is  presented  to  the  mind,  the  internal  or  external  phe- 
nomena, form,  colour,  agreeable  or  disagreeable  sensations,  etc. ; 
and  then  we  have  what  the  mind  itself  offers — the  laws  of  thought, 
which  connect  the  phenomena,  and  reduce  to  order  this  indis- 
ciplined  and  confused  mass.  This  was  clearly  seen  and  well  shown 
by  Kant  But  the  philosophers  of  whom  we  speak,  while  they 
admire  him,  reproach  him  with  having  regarded  the  laws  of  thought 
as  ultimate,  irreducible,  and  inexplicable  facts,  instead  of  investi- 
gating their  genesis.  '  Kant  and  his  disciples,'  says  Mr.  Lewes, 
'  taking  up  the  adult  human  mind,  considered  its  constituent  forms 
as  initial  conditions}  '  These  forms,'  say  they, '  are  implied  in  each 
individual  experience.'  Certainly,  for  if  they  were  not  so  implied 
they  never  could  be  got  out  of  them.  This  explanation  is  logically 
perfect,  but  it  is  of  no  service  for  psychology,  which  has  to  resolve 
a  question  of  origin.  Reasoning  d  priori,  we  might  say  that  the 
vertebrate  type  is  the  necessary  form  which  makes  the  vertebrate 
possible.  This  will  do  in  anatomy,  but  it  is  false  in  morphology, 
which  shows  that  the  typical  form  results  from  the  successive 
phases  of  the  animal's  development.  Kant  anatomized  cognition 
well  enough,  but  he  disregarded  its  morphology. 

What,  then,  are  these  mysterious  forms  of  thought  ?    Like  the 

1  Psychology,  2nd  ed.,  §  208. 


The  Psychological  Consequences  of  Heredity.    311 

forms  of  life,  they  are  evolutions,  not  preformations.  While  they 
are  the  laws  of  experience,  they  are  at  the  same  time  its  results — 
results  of  the  experience  of  the  race,  and  not  of  the  individual ; 
they  are  the  product  of  heredity.  Let  us  get  a  clear  idea  of  this 
doctrine. 

I  hear  a  bell  ring.  This  fact,  apparently  so  simple,  is  neverthe- 
less highly  complex ;  it  consists  of  a  group  of  sensations,  induc- 
tions, and  sense-images,  each  one  of  which  is  in  itself  a  group. 
Not  to  speak  of  the  primitive  elements,  which  is  not  here  neces- 
sary, and  noting  only  the  simple,  rough,  well-known  facts,  the  sum 
of  which  makes  up  for  us  the  phenomenon,  we  can  tell  the  quality 
of  the  sound  of  a  bell  which  is  rung ;  whether  the  bell  is  large, 
small,  or  medium  sized ;  whether  it  is  near  or  distant,  whether  it  is 
sounded  by  a  hammer  or  by  a  clapper,  whether  it  is  in  this  church 
or  in  that,  etc. ;  finally,  whether  the  sound  continues  for  a  long 
time  or  not.  This  last  fact,  the  continuance  of  the  sensation,  I  take  to 
be  one  of  the  elements  of  the  group, — in  fact,  an  essential  and  funda- 
mental element,  and,  so  to  speak,  the  ground  on  which  all  the  others 
are  projected.  Again,  suppose  I  have  a  tooth  drawn.  This  fact 
also  consists  of  a  group  of  sensations,  sentiments,  and  ideas,  far 
more  complex  than  the  preceding ;  and  here,  too,  we  find  that 
duration  is  an  essential  element  Take  any  fact,  any  experience 
whatever,  and  you  will  always  find  groups  of  sensations,  and 
among  the  elements  of  each  group  you  will  find  duration,  or  time 
— that  is  to  say,  duration  in  its  abstract  and  universal  form,  con- 
sidered objectively. 

I  open  my  eyes,  and  see  before  me  a  fresh  sown  field.  This 
fact,  too,  is  a  group  of  sensations  and  ideas  (colour,  form,  distance, 
etc.),  and  in  this  group  there  is  one  attribute  which,  in  like  manner, 
is  regarded  as  essential — viz.  that  continuity  which,  uniting  together 
all  the  countless  points  of  the  field,  makes  of  them  one  extended 
whole.  This  quality  of  extension  I  find  coupled  with  other 
variable  qualities,  in  an  immense  number  of  objects  which  I  call 
material.  Hence  I  regard  extension  or  space,  i.e.  abstract,  simple, 
possible  extension,  as  a  permanent  attribute  of  all  bodies. 

I  approach  the  fire,  and  it  warms  me  ;  I  smell  an  alkali,  and  it 
catches  my  breath;  I  see  a  cannon  ball  fired,  and  it  knocks  down 
the  wall  it  strikes.  In  these,  and  countless  other  cases  like 


3 1 2  Heredity. 

the  first  fact  is  always  followed  by  the  second.  The  phenomenon, 
taken  in  its  totality,  is  presented  to  us  as  something  made  up  of 
two  groups,  so  arranged  that  the  first  always  necessitates  the 
second;  in  other  words,  in  the  sum  of  qualities  and  relations 
which  make  up  this  inseparable  pair  we  find,  as  an  essential 
element,  the  relation  of  constant  succession  between  the  first  and 
the  second — the  property  that  the  first  is  always  followed  by  the 
second.  This  fundamental  property,  which  is  also  found  in  many 
other  pairs,  is  denominated  causality. 

The  foregoing  analyses  are  not  borrowed  from  the  English 
philosophers,  but  we  think  they  exactly  represent  their  views. 
Now,  if  with  them  we  hold  that  the  mind  is  formed  as  well  by  the 
action  of  external  objects  upon  it  as  by  its  reaction  on  external 
objects ;  if  we  hold  that  accidental,  variable,  changeable  attributes 
must  produce  in  the  organism,  and  hence  on  the  mind,  accidental, 
variable,  changeable  modifications,  but  that  fixed  and  essential 
attributes  must  have  permanent  modifications  answering  to  them  ; 
if  we  observe  that  the  attribute  of  duration  being  found  in  all  the 
groups,  that  of  extension  in  nearly  all,  and  the  relation  of  causality 
in  a  very  large  number  of  couples,  they  must  recur  millions  of 
times  during  the  life  of  each,  and  so,  by  repetition,  tend  to  become 
organic ;  if,  finally,  we  observe  that  these  modifications  are  here- 
ditarily transmitted  to  a  new  individual,  who  in  turn  experiences  the 
same  fixed  and  permanent  impressions,  and  by  him  to  another  and 
another  without  limit,  we  shall  then  be  able  to  understand  the  part 
played  by  heredity  in  the  genesis  of  the  forms  of  thought,  and  to 
see  how  heredity  may  produce,  in  the  second  or  third  generation, 
a  mental  habitude  so  deeply  rooted  as  to  be  rightly  called  innate, 
provided  it  be  borne  in  mind  how  it  has  come  to  be  so. 

'  We  have  seen,'  says  Herbert  Spencer,1  '  that  the  establishment 
of  those  compound  relief  actions,  called  instincts,  is  compre- 
hensible on  the  principle  that  inner  relations  are,  by  perpetual 
repetition,  organized  into  correspondence  with  outer  relations.  We 
have  now  to  observe  that  the  establishment  of  those  consolidated, 
those  indissoluble,  those  instinctive  mental  relations  constituting 
our  ideas  of  space  and  time,  is  comprehensible  on  the  same 

1  Psychology,  2nd  ed.,  §  208. 


The  Psychological  Consequences  of  Heredity.    313 

principle.  For  if  even  to  external  relations  that  are  often  ex- 
perienced during  the  life  of  a  single  organism,  answering  internal 
relations  are  established  that  become  next  to  automatic — if  such , 
a  combination  of  psychical  changes  as  that  which  guides  a  savage 
in  hitting  a  bird  with  an  arrow  becomes,  by  constant  repetition,  so 
organized  as  to  be  performed  almost  without  thought  of  the  pro- 
cess of  adjustment  gone  through ;  and  if  skill  of  this  kind  is  so 
far  transmissible  that  particular  races  of  men  become  characterized 
by  particular  aptitudes,  which  are  nothing  else  than  partially  or- 
ganized psychical  connections — then,  if  there  exist  certain  external 
relations  which  are  experienced  by  all  organisms,  at  all  instants  of 
their  waking  lives — relations  which  are  absolutely  constant — there 
will  be  established  answering  internal  relations  that  are  absolutely 
constant,  absolutely  universal.  Such  relations  we  have  in  those  of 
space  and  time.  ...  As  the  substrata  of  all  other  relations  in 
the  non-Ego,  they  must  be  responded  to  by  conceptions  that  are 
the  substrata  of  all  other  relations  in  the  Ego.  Being  the  constant 
and  infinitely  repeated  elements  of  thought,  they  must  become  the 
automatic  elements  of  thought — the  elements  of  thought  which  it 
is  impossible  to  get  rid  of — the  '  forms  of  intuition.' 

From  this  brief  statement  of  the  question  it  is  easy  to  see  that 
it  is  one  of  the  highest  in  all  philosophy,  as  being  concerned  with 
the  genesis  of  thought  itself.  Here  we  arrive  at  a  first  cause  :  we 
leave  facts  and  enter  on  metaphysics. 

Thought  is,  in  fact,  one  of  the  forms  of  the  unknowable — indeed, 
the  most  mysterious  of  them  all.  A  little  reflection  suffices  to 
show  this.  It  is  certain  that  the  exterior  world,  the  object,  is 
knowable  only  in  so  far  as  it  is  reducible  to  thought;  that  it  has 
no  existence  for  us,  save  on  that  same  condition ;  that  in  it  we 
see  only  a  sum  of  phenomena  governed  by  laws ;  and  as  the 
phenomena  are  resolved  into  perceptions,  and  the  laws  into  ratio- 
cinations, therefore  the  whole  universe  may  be  resolved  into 
psychological  states.  To  say,  with  the  idealists,  that  thought  is 
the  measure  of  all  things,  so  that  the  limits  of  our  thought  are 
also  the  limits  of  reality,  is  certainly  a  gratuitous  hypothesis  ;  for 
we  cannot  be  certain  that  beyond  all  actual  or  possible  cognition 
of  ours  there  are  not  actual  existences  for  ever  unknowable,  and 
we  have  no  warrant  for  making  human  thought  the  absolute 


314  Heredity. 

thought  Cut  when  we  say,  in  a  purely  relative  sense,  that  our 
thought  is  for  us  the  measure  of  being,  we  enunciate  an  un- 
questionable truth,  almost  a  truism ;  and  from  this  purely  human 
point  of  view  we  may  affirm  that  the  world  has  no  existence  for 
us,  except  in  so  far  as  it  is  thinkable.  The  world  is  a  system  of 
unknown  qualities  which  we  explain  with  the  assistance  of  another 
unknown  quality,  thought ;  the  latter,  however,  still  remains  the  x 
of  an  unsolvable  equation. 

If,  then,  we  see  that  thought  is  both  an  ultimate  cause  in  meta- 
physics and  an  ultimate  principle  in  logic,  we  must  not  be  surprised 
at  finding  it  impossible  to  answer  that  apparently  simple  question, 
What  is  thought  ?  We  are  utterly  unable  to  go  beyond  external 
and  superficial  explanations,  and  to  get  at  the  essence  of  thought 

Under  its  phenomenal  form,  thought  is  a  simplification.  To 
think  is  to  simplify,  to  reduce  plurality  to  unity.  All  the  objects 
of  our  states  of  consciousness  must  be  either  concrete  or  abstract, 
and  we  cannot  get  at  either  of  these  but  by  a  process  of  simpli- 
fication. In  the  first  place,  those  objects  which  we  call  concrete — 
a  house,  a  man,  a  star — are  extended,  and  yet  can  enter  into  our 
thought  only  under  the  form  of  a  simple  series,  only  under  the 
condition  of  time.  We  know  not  how  an  act  which  has  no  ex- 
tension can  represent  an  extended  object — how  time  can  for  us 
take  the  place  of  space.  But  it  is  certain  that  concrete  objects 
are  knowable  for  us  only  on  this  condition,  and  that  to  refer  space 
to  time  is  to  refer  the  complex  to  the  simple — to  simplify. 

To  obtain  our  abstract  cognitions  we  must  abstract,  generalize, 
induce  and  deduce,  and  all  these  operations  in  the  last  analysis 
amount  to  classification  according  to  resemblances  and  differences, 
or  to  simplification.  Thought,  therefore,  is  the  unifying  principle 
which  reduces  to  order  the  chaos  of  the  universe.  To  think  is 
to  unify. 

But  this  unification  is  but  the  process,  the  mechanism  of  thought 
When  we  speak  of  our  cognition  of  thought,  we  mean  only  the 
forms  of  thought  We  cannot  go  beyond  this,  nor  can  we  know 
how,  by  means  of  our  consciousness,  there  is  formed  in  our  minds 
a  world  answering  to,  though  not  resembling,  all  that  is  without 
us.  All  discussion,  therefore,  with  regard  to  the  nature  of 
thought,  is  concerned  only  with  its  forms;  and  when  we  assert 


The  Psychological  Consequences  of  Heredity.    3 1 5 

that  these  forms  are  the  result  of  heredity,  we  assert  that  thought 
itself,  as  a  phenomenon,  is  a  result  of  heredity. 

As  we  have  seen,  the  associationist  school,  while  agreeing  with 
Kant  as  to  the  necessity  of  certain  forms  (time,  space,  causality) 
in  order  to  connect  experience  and  to  constitute  thought,  differs 
from  that  philosopher  by  holding  these  forms  to  be  the  result  of  an 
evolution.     The  difference  is  more  radical  than  would  at   first 
sight  appear,  for  in  Kant's  hypothesis  it  is  the  forms  of  the  subject 
that  give  shape  to  the  object,  while  in  the  other  hypothesis  the 
object  gives  shape  to  the  subject :  in  the  view  of  the  one  the 
universe  is  dependent  on  thought,  in  that  of  the  other  thought  is 
dependent  on  the  universe.     We  would  observe,  by  the  way,  that 
the  criticism  made  in  France  on  the  association  psychology  is 
not  well  founded.     The  law  of  the  association  of  ideas,  it  is  said, 
having  been  discovered  first,  the  only  originality  of  this  system  of 
psychology  is  that  it  has  generalized  that  law,  and  endeavoured 
to  bring  under  it  all  the  operations  of  thought.     But  this  is  a  mis- 
conception in  regard  to  the  true  originality  of  this  school,  which 
is  very  different     To  assert,  as  this  school  does,  that  the  cause  of 
our  internal  nexus  exists  in  nextts  which  is  external ;  that  when  two 
phenomena  are  rarely  associated  in  the  object  they  are  also  rarely 
associated  in  the  subject,  and  that  when  they  are  always  associated 
in  the  object  they  are  always  associated  in  the  subject,  is  to  assert, 
in  opposition  to  Kant,  that  the  laws  of  cognition  depend  abso- 
lutely on  the  laws  of  nature,  to  import  mechanism  into  the  intel- 
lect,  and   to   subject  the   intellect  itself  to  mechanism   as  the 
ultimate  law  governing  its  phenomenal  development 

Moreover,  the  hypothesis  of  a  genesis  of  the  '  forms  of  thought ' 
by  continuous  evolution  is  not  characteristic  of  the  whole  asso- 
ciationist school,  but  only  of  those  adherents  of  it  who  accept 
universal  evolution.  We  regard  it  as  a  simple  hypothesis,  and 
only  desire  to  show  that  it  is  not  so  inadmissible  as  it  may  at  first 
appear. 

Starting  from  the  hypothesis  of  a  primordial  nebula,  we  see  that 
the  universe  must  have  endured  thousands  and  thousands  of  years, 
during  which  nothing  existed  but  physical  and  chemical  pheno- 
mena. We  cannot  tell  when  or  how,  or  by  what  series  of  blind 
attempts  and  essays  life  could  be  produced.  Neither  do  we  know 


3 1 6  Heredity. 

how  the  transition  was  brought  about  from  the  physiological  to 
the  psychological  epoch — from  the  period  of  no  thought  to  the 
period  of  thought.  The  development  school,  however,  is  bound 
to  maintain  this  ascending  evolution.  This  was  perceived  even 
by  Lamarck,  and  he  boldly  supposes  the  existence  of  a  primitive 
race  of  non-sentient  animals.  '  In  producing  life,'  says  he,  '  nature 
did  not  abruptly  set  up  so  high  a  faculty  as  that  of  sense.  Nature 
did  not  possess  the  means  of  creating  this  faculty  in  the  imperfect 
animals  belonging  to  the  earliest  classes  of  the  animal  kingdom.' x 
When  we  consider  from  the  biological  point  of  view  the  pheno- 
mena of  mental  activity,  and  compare  them  with  purely  vital 
facts,  we  find  that  both  possess  in  common  this  essential  point, 
that  they  are  a  correspondence.  Herbert  Spencer  has  shown  how 
physiological  life  consists  of  a  correspondence  between  a  being 
and  its  environment,2  and  how  in  the  sum  of  actions  and  reactions 
which  constitute  life  there  is  a  continual  adjustment  of  internal  to 
external  relations,  so  that  the  degree  of  life  varies  as  the  degree  of 
correspondence,  perfect  life  being  perfect  correspondence.  But 
mental  life  is,  like  bodily  life,  a  correspondence.  To  think,  or  to 
have  a  cognition,  is  to  have  in  our  mind  a  certain  state  corres- 
ponding to  a  certain  state  without ;  and  this  correspondence  also 
is  found  in  all  possible  degrees,  from  the  zoophyte  to  man,  so  that 
the  degree  of  cognition  is  measured  by  the  degree  of  correspond- 
ence. Between  life  and  thought,  therefore,  there  are  other 
differences  than  that  between  a  partial  and  a  total  correspondence, 
between  a  correspondence  imperfectly  unified  (life)  and  a  corres- 
pondence perfectly  unified  (consciousness) ;  finally,  and  here  is  the 
mystery,  between  an  unconscious  and  a  conscious  correspondence. 
If  we  could  know  how  the  simultaneous  becomes  successive,  and 
how  plurality  becomes  unity,  then  we  could  tell  how  thought 
results  from  life.3  They  suppose  that  they  have  explained  this 

1  Philosophic  Zoohgique,  Discours  Preliminaire,  7. 

*  Principles  of  Biology.     For  instance,  there  must  be  in  a  plant  certain 
changes  answering  to  the  changes  of  its  environment  (humidity,  dryness,  etc. ). 

*  An  author  who  holds  the  genesis  of  the  forms  of  thought  through  evolution 
iias  developed  the  singular  hypothesis  that  it  is  possible  to  'think  in  space.' 
(Murphy,  Ifabit  and  Intelligence,  ch.  xxxvii.)     For  this,  says  he,  it  would  suffice 
that  a  mind,  in  place  of  thinking  as  our  mind  docs,  with  words  succeeding  one 


Tke  Psychological  Consequences  of  Heredity.    317 

metamorphosis  by  heredity.  Though  we  do  not  mean  to  give 
any  advantage  to  this  theory,  still  we  must  observe  that  thought 
is  impossible  except  with  the  aid  of  certain  forms  to  serve  as 
schemata ;  that  if  these  forms  are  annexed  to  a  certain  state  of  the 
brain,  as  is  probably  the  case,  and  if  this  state  of  the  brain  is  itself 
the  result  of  a  gradual  evolution,  then  the  conclusion  is  all  but 
inevitable  that  the  forms  of  thought  are  the  result  of  an  evolution 
in  the  species.  Gratiolet,  whose  immaterialism  (spiritnalisme)  has 
never  been  called  in  question,  used  to  say  that  to  him  '  it  was 
evident  that  the  ontological  analysis  of  philosophers,  and  especially 
that  prime  distinction  between  the  ideas  of  time  and  space,  were 
inscribed  in  advance  among  the  preordinations  of  the  animal 
organism.'  Admit  evolution  also,  and  development  has  nearly 
gained  its  cause. 

On  this  hypothesis,  thousands  and  thousands  of  years  rolled 
away  before  thought  could  appear  on  earth.  Neither  animals  un- 
provided with  a  nervous  system  (bryozoa),  nor  those  whose  ganglia 
are  nearly  independent  of  one  another  (asterias),  nor  those  in  which 
there  is  just  a  beginning  of  unity,  could  have  arrived  at  conscious 
ness :  their  physical  life  must  be  a  confused  state  in  which  the 
subject  is  not  distinguished  from  its  object.  It  is  only  in  the 
higher  animals,  and  perhaps  in  man  alone,  that  the  brain,  resulting 
from  a  gradual  evolution,  and  shaped  by  countless  actions  and 
reactions  which  have  been  preserved  and  transmitted  by  heredity, 
could  become  the  instrument  of  thought. 

Thus  the  doctrine  of  development  rigorously  applies  to  the 
world  of  thought  the  same  hypothesis  as  to  the  world  of  life.  On 
the  one  hand,  it  deduces  all  species  from  three  or  four  primitive 
types,  or  it  may  be  from  only  one.  On  the  other  hand,  from  a 
few  very  simple  psychical  acts,  it  may  be  from  only  one,  it  deduces 
the  endless  variety  of  instincts  and  intelligences  of  sentiments 
and  passions.  We  have  endeavoured  to  show  how  this  hypothesis 


another  in  time,  should  think  by  means  of  figures  traced  in  space.  But  even  in 
that  case  we  should  have  thinking  in  both  time  and  space,  and  not  in  space 
alone.  It  is  useless  to  dwell  upon  an  hypothesis  of  which  the  verification  is 
impossible,  and  which,  farther,  is  in  contradiction  with  the  essential  condition 
of  thought,  viz.  unity. 


3 1 8  Heredity. 

is  to  be  understood,  and  on  what  grounds  it  rests ;  for  our  own 
part,  we  neither  accept  nor  reject  it 

If  we  are  to  accept  it,  it  must  be  verifiable  by  experience,  or 
demonstrable  by  logic.  Experimental  verification  would  consist 
in  showing  that  it  agrees  with  all  the  facts,  and  that  it  can  be 
brought  entirely  under  their  control ;  but  it  is  impossible  to 
show  any  such  thing.  Logical  demonstration  would  consist  in 
showing  that  this  one  hypothesis,  exclusive  of  all  others, 
explains  the  facts ;  but  this  demonstration  per  absurdum  is  im- 
possible. 

If  we  are  to  reject  it,  the  hypothesis  must  involve  some  logical 
contradiction ;  but  this  is  not  the  case.  It  is  true  that  it  is  difficult 
to  understand  how  no-thought  can  become  thought,  but  without 
attempting  to  explain  this,  we  may  bear  in  mind  that  this  transition 
is  progressive,  and  that  life  and  thought  share  in  common  this 
essential  character,  that  they  are  a  correspondence  produced  by  a 
series  of  actions  and  reactions.  Moreover,  this  evolutional  genesis 
of  the  forms  of  thought,  which  the  doctrine  of  development  applies 
to  the  species,  is  admitted  by  all  as  applying  to  the  individual. 
The  individual  cannot  think  (in  the  proper  sense  of  the  word) 
until  his  brain  is  developed ;  and  if  thought,  in  its  true  sense, 
possessed  of  all  its  constituent  forms,  comes  into  being  in  an 
instant — which  is  doubtful — we  do  not  see  why  this  bright  flash  in 
the  night  of  the  unconscious  should  not  have  lighted  up  the  species 
also,  at  some  definite  instant  To  say  that  the  objects  of  the  con- 
stituent forms  of  thought — space,  time,  causality — could  not  have 
modified  the  brain,  because  they  have  no  concrete  existence  in 
nature,  as  have  a  stone  or  a  dog,  is  not  to  present  a  difficulty  ;  for 
if,  with  Leibnitz,  we  regard  them  as  relations  it  is  quite  natural  that 
the  brain  should  be  modified,  not  only  by  things,  but  by  the  rela- 
tions between  things. 

These  two  opposite  theories — the  one  regarding  thought  as  the 
essential  causality  to  which  nature  is  a  secondary  causality,  and 
the  other  regarding  nature  as  the  essential  causality  and  thought 
as  secondary — might  perhaps  be  reconciled  by  admitting  the 
identity  of  mechanism  and  logic,  of  intelligence  in  nature  and 
intelligence  in  thought  We  have  already  alluded  to  this  doctrine 
but  this  is  not  the  place  to  set  it  forth. 


The  Psychological  Consequences  of  Heredity.    319 


in. 

We  have  now  seen  how,  on  certain  hypotheses,  heredity  con- 
tributes towards  the  creation  of  intelligence.  We  now  propose  to 
turn  aside  from  this  radical  solution,  and  to  inquire  how  it  contri- 
butes towards  its  development.  We  here  use  the  word  intelligence 
in  a  sense  at  once  common  and  philosophic,  as  that  faculty  of 
judgment,  ratiocination,  and  abstraction  which  in  conduct  is 
denominated  prudence,  good  sense,  tact,  dexterity,  penetration; 
in  art,  inventiveness,  taste ;  in  science,  the  faculty  for  discovery, 
for  generalization,  and  for  detecting  relations.  Having  already 
proved  by  sundry  facts  from  normal  and  morbid  psychology  and 
from  history  the  existence  of  intellectual  heredity,  we  will  take  it 
for  granted  here  as  an  empiric  law,  and  we  will  investigate  its 
consequences. 

If  we  consider  heredity  under  purely  ideal  conditions,  nothing 
can  be  simpler  than  to  determine  its  consequences  :  it  fixes  and 
preserves  the  modes  of  intelligence  as  they  appear.  Thus  some 
variety  of  the  intelligence — humour,  for  instance — appears  in  an 
individual  either  by  spontaneous  variation,  or  by  that  chance 
concurrence  of  causes  which  has  been  called  spontaneity  :  now 
if  heredity  alone  were  at  work  it  would  transmit  this  mental 
modification  uninterruptedly  to  all  the  succeeding  generations. 
But,  as  we  have  seen,  it  meets  with  hindrances  of  every  descrip- 
tion, which  tend  to  weaken  or  even  to  destroy  it  Yet  if,  in- 
stead of  considering  isolated  cases  where  heredity  appears  to  be 
at  fault,  we  consider  a  large  number  of  cases ;  if  we  invoke  what 
has  been  called  the  law  of  numbers,  the  exception  disappears,  the 
accidental  vanishes,  and  the  law,  or,  in  other  words,  the  essential 
character,  takes  the  chief  place.  Thus  it  is  that  heredity  con- 
tributes to  the  formation  of  national  character.  _  A  certain  turn  of 
mmd  may  easily  fail  to  be  perpetuated  in  a  family;  but  if  it  is 
common  to  a  tribe,  a  people,  a  race,  it  is  safe  to  say  that  it  must 
be  perpetuated.  We  have  seen  how  closely  at  bottom  the  French 
mind  resembles  the  Gallic  mind,  as  described  by  Strabo,  Diodorus 
Siculus,  and  other  ancient  historians.  Thus,  in  the  formation  and 
conservation  of  the  special  character  of  a  family  or  of  a  nation, 
heredity  is  a  very  important  factor.  But  not  to  dwell  here  on  this 


320  Heredity. 

point,  which  is  not  so  much  a  consequence  of  heredity  as  the  law 
itself,  under  its  most  perfect  form,  we  pass  on  to  the  consideration 
of  another  still  more  curious  point,  not  so  well  known,  and  more 
difficult  to  prove,  but  which,  from  its  bearing  on  intelligence,  con- 
stitutes an  important  consequence  of  heredity.  It  may  thus  be 
stated  under  an  ideal  form,  that  is,  without  taking  into  account  the 
exceptions  :  heredity,  acting  by  way  of  accumulation,  augments 
intelligence  in  successive  generations,  and  thus  makes  it  capable 
of  fresh  developments. 

This  we  will  now  endeavour  to  prove. 

We  will  first  point  out  the  physiological  grounds  of  the  fact 
under  consideration.  It  is  well  known  that  every  organ  is 
developed  by  exercise  :  in  the  blacksmith  the  muscles  of  the 
arms ;  in  the  pedestrian,  those  of  the  legs.  The  organ  produces 
the  function,  but  the  function  in  turn  reacts  on  the  organ  and 
develops  it  We  can  scarcely  doubt  that  this  holds  good  with 
regard  to  the  brain,  that  it  grows  by  exercise,  and  that  this  aug- 
mentation is  transmissible  by  heredity.  Dr.  Brocas,  on  the 
strength  of  various  researches,  says  that  the  capacity  of  the  skull, 
and  consequently  the  volume  of  the  brain,  corresponds  with  the 
degree  of  intelligence  of  the  different  races  :  the  largest  are  found 
in  the  white  race,  then  in  the  Caucasian,  next  in  the  negroes  of 
Africa — the  Australian  negro  holds  the  last  rank.  Albert,  of 
Bonn,  says  that  having  dissected  the  brains  of  several  persons 
who  had  for  years  been  accustomed  to  mental  work,  he  found  in 
all  the  cerebral  substance  very  firm,  and  the  grey  matter  and  the 
convolutions  highly  developed.  *  The  augmentation  of  the  mass 
of  the  brain,'  he  says,  '  is  proved  partly  by  the  difference  existing 
between  cultured  and  uncultured  people,  and  partly  by  the  in- 
creased volume  of  brain  which  results  from  the  progress  of 
civilization  in  Europe ;  an  increase  which  accumulates,  by  reason 
of  heredity,  in  a  degree  which  admits  of  demonstration.'  (Mit 
Hiilfe  der  Vcrcrbung  sich  so  writ  snmmiri,  doss  es  constatirt  werdcn 
kann.)  In  fact,  we  find  that  among  the  educated  classes  the 
size  of  the  head  is  usually  large,  and  that  the  contrary  is  the 
case  among  the  uneducated.  Finally,  there  is  a  fact  which  directly 
concerns  the  question  in  hand :  excavations  made  in  cemeteries 
show  that  the  size  of  skulls  has  increased  since  the  Middle  Ages. 


The  Psychological  Consciences  of  Heredity.    321 

Dr.  Broca  compared  together  one  hundred  and  twenty-five 
skulls  from  the  crypt  of  the  old  church  of  Saint-Barthe'lemi,  in  Paris 
(twelfth  century),  one  hundred  and  twenty-five  skulls  from  the 
Cimetiere  des  Innocents,  used  from  the  thirteenth  to  the  eighteenth 
century,  and  one  hundred  and  twenty-five  skulls  from  the  old 
Cimetiere  de  1'Ouest,  open  from  1788  till  1824. 

Here  are  the  results  of  this  comparison,  so  far  as  regards  the 
mean  capacity  of  the  crania. 

Mean  Capacity. 

Skulls  of  the  twelfth  century      84777  cubic  inches 
„        Cim.  des  Innocents    83*783     „         „ 
„       Nineteenth  century    86*901     „        „ 

It  will  be  seen  that  the  mean  capacity  of  the  skulls  belonging  to 
the  present  century  possesses  a  decided  superiority.  As  regards 
the  inferiority  of  the  skulls  from  the  Cimetiere  des  Innocents  to 
those  of  the  twelfth  century,  Dr.  Broca  explains  it  by  observing 
that  the  crypts  of  the  church  of  the  'Cite'  were  used  by  the 
upper  classes  ;  while  as  for  the  crania  from  Les  Innocents,  it  is 
beyond  doubt  that  they  belong  to  the  lower  classes,  Philip 
Augustus  having  presented  that  plot  of  ground  to  the  city  of 
Paris  as  a  burying  place  for  the  poor. 

Resting  on  these  physiological  data,  Gall  and  his  disciples,  as 
also  Auguste  Comte,  Pritchard,  and  others  in  more  recent  times, 
have  held  that  the  mental  faculties  are  capable  of  augmentation, 
inasmuch  as  they  are  transmissible.  The  conclusion  appears 
logical.  Intelligence  has  for  its  condition,  for  its  chief  organ,  the 
brain ;  the  brain  grows  by  exercise,  and  this  growth  is  transmissible 
by  heredity.  Hence  it  is  perfectly  fair  to  conclude  that  every 
modification,  every  improvement  of  an  organ,  imports  a  modifica- 
tion, an  improvement  in  function,  and  that  consequently  the 
development  of  the  brain  implies  development  of  the  intelligence. 

But  this  important  fact,  that  progress  of  the  intelligence  is 
possible,  not  only  in  the  individual,  but  also  in  the  race ;  that 
heredity  transmits  and  accumulates  trifling  modifications,  we 
should  wish  to  establish  directly  by  psychological  arguments,  and 
not  by  resorting  to  physiology,  as  we  have  just  done.  It  is  a 
difficult  task,  and  we  can  only  attempt  it 

We  will  first  try  to  understand  upon  what  condition  the  progress 


322  Heredity. 

of  intelligence  takes  place  in  the  individual.  It  proceeds  by  a 
gradual  evolution.  The  mind  can  at  first  grasp  simple  facts,  then 
more  complex  ones,  next  simple  relations,  and  then  relations  more 
and  more  complicated.  Each  stage  of  this  progress  has  its  con- 
dition in  an  anterior  progress,  which  must  have  been  realized 
previously,  and  which  alone  makes  the  following  one  possible. 
The  intelligence  may  be  compared  to  a  building,  in  which  each 
course  of  masonry  must  be  laid  securely  in  order  to  receive 
another.  Or,  if  with  certain  contemporary  philosophers  we  com- 
pare the  act  of  cognition  to  a  correspondence  between  the  in- 
ternal states  of  the  subject  and  the  external  states  of  the  object, 
we  may  say  that  the  mind  must  first  correspond  with  very  simple 
relations  in  order  to  rise  to  those  which  are  highly  complex. 

This  difference,  about  which  there  is  no  question  in  theory,  is 
forgotten  in  practice.  Doubtless  where  there  are  problems  strictly 
dependent  on  one  another,  as  in  mathematics,  the  mind  cannot 
but  follow  the  natural  course ;  but  in  the  domain  of  the  social  and 
political  sciences,  nothing  is  more  common  than  for  people  to  begin 
at  the  end.  Hence  so  many  vain  theories  and  erroneous  doctrines, 
the  mind  being  unable  to  understand  what  is  complex,  since  it 
has  not  first  grasped  what  is  simple.  For  it  is  a  mistake  to 
suppose  that  it  is  sufficient- to  bring  a  gifted,  intelligent  mind  face 
to  face  with  such  and  such  facts,  and  that  it  will  understand  them 
at  once.  A  thousand  instances  prove  the  contrary.  Let  a  person, 
intelligent,  but  of  imperfect  culture,  read  Grecian  or  Roman 
history,  and  we  are  surprised,  amazed,  at  the  misinterpretations 
he  will  make  of  it.  The  Middle  Ages  abounded  in  blunders  of 
this  sort  whenever  an  attempt  was  made  to  describe  a  world 
different  from  that  which  then  existed.  See  how  the  Trojan  war, 
Caesar  and  Alexander  are  travestied  in  the  poems  of  chivalry,  or  in 
the  quaint  pictures  of  the  fifteenth  century. 1  This  is  shown  still 
better  by  an  example  from  savage  life.  A  native  of  New  Zealand, 
intelligent  and  curious,  connected  with  the  chief  families  of  his 
country,  accompanied  an  English  traveller  to  London  for  educa- 


1  For  example,  see  at  the  Campana  Museum  the  adventures  of  Theseus 
and  Ariadne,  with  cavaliers,  pages,  churches,  goiliic  houses,  narrow  streets, 
battlements,  etc. 


The  Psychological  Consequences  of  Heredity.    323 

tion,  but  owing  to  the  imperfect  development  of  his  mind  he  could 
understand  nothing  of  our  European  civilization,  and  interpreted 
everything  according  to  the  notions  of  a  savage.  Thus,  when  a 
rich  man  passed,  he  would  say,  'That  man  has  a  good  deal  to  eat,' 
unable  to  understand  wealth  in  any  other  way. 

The  mind  must  certainly  be  first  moulded  by  previous  culture 
in  order  to  enter  on  complex  questions,  and  this  is  true  of  the 
species  no  less  than  of  the  individual.  In  the  individual  all 
progress  of  the  intellect  becomes,  when  fixed  by  memory,  the  basis 
and  the  condition  of  further  progress ;  in  the  species  all  progress 
of  the  intelligence  becomes,  when  fixed  by  heredity,  the  basis  and 
the  condition  of  further  progress.  Heredity  plays,  in  regard  to 
the  species,  nearly  the  same  part  that  memory  plays  in  regard  to 
the  individual. 

If  in  our  literary  history  we  make  some  unexpected  comparison 
— as,  for  example,  between  men  of  letters  of  the  fifth  century  and 
those  of  the  eighteenth ;  between  Gregory  of  Tours  and  Tredega- 
rius,  etc.,  and  Voltaire,  Diderot  and  the  whole  Encyclopedistes ; 
or  between  the  court  of  Charlemagne  and  our  romantic  movement 
of  the  nineteenth  century — the  discord  is  so  complete,  the  contrast 
so  great,  that  the  comparison  seems  to  be  simply  whimsical.  There 
is,  between  the  intellectual  forms  of  the  two  epochs  compared,  an 
immense  difference,  which  it  is  usually  said  proceeds  from  progress 
and  civilization. 

We  are  told,  and  it  is  proved  to  us,  how  the  French  mind 
reached  its  apogee  after  much  groping  and  many  efforts  and 
failures.  But  this  progress  is  explained  altogether  by  external 
causes—  the  influence  of  Christian  beliefs,  the  crusades,  great  dis- 
coveries, Greek  and  Latin  culture,  the  Renaissance,  etc.  But 
there  is  also,  it  seems  to  us,  an  internal  cause  of  which  we  hear 
nothing;  the  gradual  transformation  of  the  intelligence  by  heredity. 
The  average  French  mind  in  the  sixth  and  ninth  centuries  was 
capable  only  of  a  certain  degree  of  culture ;  beyond  that  it  under 
stood  nothing,  and  distorted  everything,  after  the  manner  of  the  New 
Zealand  savage.  But  this  average  mental  constitution,  improved 
by  culture,  was  bequeathed,  principal  and  interest,  to  the  next 
generation,  and  so  on  for  ten  or  twelve  centuries. 

This  is  no  mere  hypothesis,  although  it  would  be  difficult  to 


324  Heredity. 

establish  it  to  demonstration.  Yet,  if  we  open  the  Collection  dcs 
Histories  de  Gaule  et  de  France,  and  if,  glancing  at  the  chronicles 
and  memoirs  of  the  Middle  Ages,  we  disregard  the  subjects  which 
have  specially  engaged  the  minds  of  historians — accounts  of  battles, 
sieges,  captures  of  hamlets,  alliances  and  treaties  of  peace — and 
direct  our  attention  to  what  they  often  regard  as  of  no  importance 
for  history — that  is  to  say,  anecdotes,  miracles,  and  dreams  which 
give  every  minute  and  individual  detail — we  cannot  fail  to  arrive 
at  the  conclusion  that  the  state  of  the  intellect  was  not  then  the 
same  as  to-day,  and  that  the  difference  between  the  two  epochs  is 
constitutional,  organic.  It  is,  however,  difficult  to  define  in  what 
the  difference  consists.  It  would  require  an  acute  mind,  well 
acquainted  with  medical  science,  and  possessed  of  good  psycho- 
logical insight,  to  define  it  exactly.  In  general  terms,  it  may  be 
said  that  it  consists  in  this,  that  the  Middle  Ages  felt  what  the 
eighteenth  century  has  thought ;  that  in  the  one  the  affections  pre- 
dominated, in  the  other  reason;  that  a  brain  in  the  Middle  Ages 
was  full  of  sensations  and  images,  in  the  eighteenth  century  it 
was  full  of  abstractions  and  ideas. 

Certainly  in  no  period  have  men  dwelt  more  in  the  region  of 
imagination,  sentiment,  and  dreams.  This  is  abundantly  shown 
in  Gothic  art,  in  chivalry,  in  the  writings  of  Dante  and  of  the 
various  schools  of  mystics.1  With  the  exception  of  a  few  extra- 
ordinary minds  and  a  few  dry  school-men,  that  whole  period  lived 
altogether  in  sentiment  The  circumstances  of  the  times  were 
favourable  to  this  state  of  things — constant  wars,  battles,  sieges 
pillage,  violent  emotions  of  every  kind.  The  sentiment,  con- 
tinually excited  and  quickened,  became  exaggerated  like  an  hyper- 
trophied  organ.  Hence  this  curious  result,  that  the  excessive 
development  of  sensitiveness  checked  the  development  of  the 
intelligence.  In  this  feverish  storm  of  emotions  and  impressions, 
cool,  calm  judgment  appeared  at  a  disadvantage.  Then  were  the 
minds  of  children  in  the  bodies  of  men.  Whereas  we  find  our- 
selves, from  the  period  of  infancy,  in  an  atmosphere  of  science, 


1  E.g.  the  schools  of  St.  Victor,  St.  Bernard,  Gerson,  etc.,  and  the  great 
German  mystics  of  the  I4th  century,  Eckardt,  Tauler,  and  Henry  Suso.  We 
might  mention  also  Raymond  Lulle,  whose  life  was  so  romantic  and  eccentric. 


The  Psychological  Consequences  of  Her  edify.    325 

reason,  method  and  rational  explanations,  whose  special  effect  is 
to  develop  the  mind ;  they,  on  the  contrary,  were  the  prey  of  wild 
passions,  tossed  from  pole  to  pole  of  thought,  from  orgies  to 
ecstasies,  by  some  conversion  sudden  as  a  thunderclap.  As 
they  felt  much  and  thought  little,  they  knew  nothing  even  in  old 
age,  whereas  we  even  in  childhood  know  much.  They  died 
young,  we  are  born  old. 

Hence  it  is  that  their  chroniclers  give  those  accounts  of  miracles, 
prodigies,  apparitions  and  dreams  which  succeed  each  other  with- 
out end  or  truce,  sometimes  touching  and  poetic,  oftener  extrava- 
gant and  puerile.  They  are  at  home  in  this  world  of  imagination; 
to  them  a  prodigy  appears  perfectly  simple,  an  apparition  quite 
natural ;  miracle  is,  for  them,  matter  of  course.  These  things 
they  recount  simply,  and  without  the  shadow  of  a  doubt,  as  they 
do  a  siege  or  battle.  The  universe,  which  for  us  is  an  infinitely 
complex  mechanism,  ruled  by  fixed  laws  down  to  its  minutest 
details,  was  for  them  a  wondrous  stage,  whereon  mysterious  person- 
ages moved  the  scenes.  If,  now,  we  bring  all  these  facts  together, 
and  endeavour  to  trace  them  to  their  cause — that  is,  to  the  habitual 
state  of  the  human  soul  which  produced  them — we  shall,  without 
much  difficulty,  find  that  the  chief  characteristic  of  the  Middle 
Ages  was  lively  imagination,  internal  vision.  But  experimental 
psychology  proves,  beyond  the  possibility  of  a  doubt,  that  the 
difference  between  lively  imagination  and  hallucination  is  only  a 
Difference  of  degree ;  so  that,  indeed,  every  great  artist,  every  seer, 
is  more  or  less  subject  to  hallucination.  Hence  we  are  led  to 
conclude  that  the  Middle  Ages  were  ever  on  the  border  of  halluci- 
nation, if  they  did  not  overstep  it.  In  several  of  these  chroniclers' 
stories  we  also  meet  with  the  oppression  of  nightmare,  and  with 
the  painful  visions  accompanying  it ;  for  generally  the  visions  are 
painful,  though  usually  so  distinct,  so  full  and  minute  in  detail, 
that  we  feel  that  this  has  been  seen.1 

1  Marvellous  stories  abound  in  nearly  all  these  chronicles,  and  we  might  men- 
tion in  particular,  Gregory  of  Tours,  Frodoardus,  Mathew  of  Westminster, 
Raoul  Glaber,  and  Guibert  de  Nogent  in  his  Life,  The  two  latter  authors  are 
specially  interesting  from  our  present  point  of  view.  It  would  be  impossible 
to  find  hallucination  better  characterized  than  in  the  two  following  narra- 
tives : — 


326  Heredity. 

We  are  now,  after  a  long  circuit,  able  to  resolve  our  problem 
and  to  reach  a  conclusion.  It  may  be  remembered  that  we  have 
already  endeavoured  to  show  that  for  every  habitual  mental  state 
there  is  an  habitual  state  of  brain,  and  thence  deduced  the 
fact  that  for  the  mediaeval  state  of  semi-hallucination  there  must 
have  been  a  corresponding  cerebral  state,  and  another  for  the 
precise,  accurate  mind  of  the  eighteenth  century.  This  transition 
was  effected  by  a  slow  progress — that  is  to  say,  that  education  and 
culture  produced  in  the  mind  and  brain  trifling  though  stable 
modifications,  which  were  handed  down,  preserved,  and  accumu- 
lated by  heredity.  Thus  was  formed  an  average  intellectual  con- 
stitution, more  and  more  able  to  conceive  abstract  ideas,  and 
consequently  less  and  less  able  to  perform  mental  operations  by 
means  of  visions  and  impressions. 

It  has  often  been  observed  that  among  the  inferior  races  children 
who  are  sent  to  school,  or  whom  an  effort  is  made  to  instruct,  at 
first  show  a  surprising  facility,  but  this  suddenly  ceases.  Thus, 
the  Sandwich  Islanders  have  an  excellent  memory,  learn  by 

'  One  night,  before  matins,  I  saw  before  me,  at  the  foot  of  my  bed,  an  ugly 
little  monster  in  human  form.  He  appeared  to  me  to  be  of  middle  stature, 
with  skinny  neck,  slender  figure,  deep-black  eyes,  narrow,  wrinkled  fore- 
head, flat  nose,  wide  mouth,  swollen  lips,  short,  weak  chin,  goat's  beard, 
narrow  pointed  ears,  unkempt,  lank  hair,  teeth  like  those  of  a  dog,  sharp  pole, 
prominent  chest,  a  hump  on  his  back,  pendant  buttocks,  and  dirty  garments. 
He  seized  the  side  of  the  bed  whereon  I  lay,  shook  it  with  fearful  violence, 
and  kept  saying  :  You  have  not  long  to  remain  here.  Suddenly  I  awoke  in 
alarm.  ...  I  leaped  out  of  my  bed,  ran  to  the  monastery,  threw  myself 
at  the  foot  of  the  altar,  and  there  remained  prostrate  for  a  long  time,  frozen  stiff, 
as  it  were,  with  fright. '  R.  Glaber,  Book  v.  ch.  i. 

He  saw  the  same  devil  on  two  other  occasions.  We  find  all  the  horror  of 
nightmare  in  the  following  narrative  from  Guibert  de  Nogent : — 

1  On  a  certain  night,  having  been  awakened  by  my  sufferings — it  was  in 
winter,  I  believe — as  I  lay  in  my  bed,  thinking  I  should  be  in  greater  safety 
owing  to  the  proximity  of  a  lamp  which  gave  a  bright  light,  lo,  all  of  a  sudden, 
amid  the  profound  silence  of  the  night  I  thought  I  heard  several  voices  from 
above.  At  the  same  moment  my  head  received  a  shock  as  though  I  were 
dreaming ;  I  lost  the  use  of  my  senses,  and  thought  I  saw  a  certain  dead  person 
appear,  the  while  some  one  shouted  out  that  he  had  died  in  the  bath.  Alarmed 
at  this  apparition,  I  leaped  from  my  place  and  uttered  a  cry  ;  I  saw  that  my 
lamp  was  out,  and  amid  the  fearful  gloom  discerned  the  demon,  in  his  proper 
shape,  standing  erect,  and  beside  the  dead  man.'  Guibert  de  Nogent,  i.  xv. 


The  Psychological  Consequences  of  Heredity.    327 

heart  with  wonderful  rapidity  ;  but  cannot  use  their  thinking 
faculties.  '  In  childhood,'  says  Sir  Samuel  Baker,  'the  young 
negro  is  more  advanced  than  the  white  of  the  same  age,  but  his 
mind  does  not  bear  the  fruit  of  which  it  gave  promise.'  '  In  New 
Zealand,'  says  Thompson,  'children  of  ten  years  are  more  intel- 
ligent than  English  children ;  still,  very  few  New  Zealanders  are 
capable  of  receiving,  in  their  higher  faculties,  a  culture  equal  to 
that  of  the  English.'  One  of  the  reasons  given  in  the  United 
States  for  not  educating  negro  children  with  the  whites  is,  that 
after  a  certain  age  their  progress  does  not  correspond ;  the  intel- 
ligence of  the  negro  appearing  to  be  incapable  of  going  beyond  a 
certain  point.  Now  if  these  facts  are  not  to  be  attributed  to  an 
incurable  defect  of  the  nature,  we  have  here  an  argument  in  favour 
of  heredity.  These  savage  minds  are,  as  it  were,  uncultivated 
lands,  which  can  only  be  broken  up  by  the  continuous  toil  of 
generations.  Hence  it  is  that  in  India  the  children  of  Brahmins, 
sprung  from  a  class  that  has  long  been  cultivated,  display  intel- 
ligence, insight,  docility ;  while,  according  to  the  experience  of 
missionaries,  children  of  the  other  castes  are  considerably  their 
inferiors  in  these  respects.  Again,  a  nation  cannot  with  impunity 
be  robbed  of  the  most  intelligent  and  the  bravest  of  its  population, 
for  that  is  a  selection  in  the  wrong  way,  and  its  consequences  are 
deplorable.  '  By  martyrdom  and  imprisonment,'  says  Gallon, 
'the  Spanish  nation  was  drained,  of  free-thinkers  at  the  rate  of 
1,000  persons  annually,  for  the  three  centuries  between  1481  and 
1781 ;  an  average  of  100  persons  having  been  executed  and  900 
imprisoned  every  year  during  that  period.  The  actual  data  during 
those  300  years  were  32,000  burnt,  17,000  persons  burnt  in  effigy 
(I  presume  they  mostly  died  in  prison  or  escaped  from  Spain), 
and  291,000  condemned  to  various  terms  of  imprisonment  and 
other  penalties.  It  is  impossible  that  any  nation  could  stand  a 
policy  like  this  without  paying  a  heavy  penalty  in  the  deterioration 
of  its  breed,  as  has  notably  been  the  result  in  the  superstitious, 
unintelligent  Spanish  race  of  the  present  day.' 

Not  to  accumulate  further  examples,   we  may  now  conclude 

with  the  remarkable  words  of  Herbert  Spencer,  which  sum  up  the 

intellectual   consequences   of  heredity  no   less   than  its  organic 

conditions :  '  The  human  brain  is  an  organized  register  of  infinitely 

15 


328  Heredity. 

numerous  experiences  received  during  the  evolution  of  life,  or, 
rather,  during  the  evolution  of  that  series  of  organisms  through 
which  the  human  organism  has  been  reached.  The  effects  of  the 
most  uniform  and  frequent  of  these  experiences  have  been  suc- 
cessively bequeathed,  principal  and  interest ;  and  have  slowly 
amounted  to  that  high  intelligence  which  lies  latent  in  the  brain 
of  the  infant — which  the  infant  in  after  life  exercises,  and  perhaps 
strengthens  or  further  complicates — and  which,  with  minute 
additions,  it  bequeaths  to  future  generations.  And  tlus  it  hap- 
pens that  the  European  inherits  from  twenty  to  thirty  cubic  inches 
more  brain  than  the  Papuan.  Thus  it  happens  that  faculties, 
as  of  music,  which  scarcely  exist  in  some  inferior  human  races, 
become  congenital  in  superior  ones.  Thus  it  happens  that  out  of 
savages  unable  to  count  up  to  the  number  of  their  fingers,  and 
speaking  a  language  containing  only  nouns  and  verbs,  arise  at 
length  our  Newtons  and  Shakespeares.' 

IV. 

All  that  has  been  said  of  the  intelligence  may  be  applied  to  the 
sentiments.  We  have,  even,  in  some  measure  anticipated  that 
subject,  for  it  was  impossible  to  borrow  facts  from  history  which 
should  not  be  concrete,  synthetic — that  is  to  say,  mixed  with 
sentiments  and  ideas ;  it  is  only  the  analytic  method  of  psychology 
which  separates  these  two  elements,  almost  always  intimately 
united. 

If  I  think  of  any  triangle,  a  sphere,  a  parabola,  an  algebraic 
operation,  or  any  other  mathematic  truth,  the  result  for  me  is  a 
cognition,  and  nothing  more.  But  most  of  the  objects  of  which 
we  think,  or  which  we  perceive,  produce  in  us  an  agreeable  or  a 
disagreeable  state — i.e.  a  sentiment — simultaneously  with  their 
cognition.  Though  we  class  them  under  the  general  heads  of 
pleasure  and  pain,  the  sentiments  are  infinite  in  number,  in 
shades,  in  intensity,  etc.  It  may  be  said  that  every  sentiment — 
not  including  those  altogether  inferior  modes  of  sensitive  action 
which  are  little  more  than  instincts — implies  at  least  an  indistinct 
cognition.  In  that  low  region  of  the  unconscious,  sentiment  and 
thought  seem  blended  in  indiscriminate  unity,  where  they  cannot 
be  reaphed  directly  by  any  of  our  means  of  cognition.  But  so 


The  Psychological  Consequences  of  Heredity.    329 

soon  as  consciousness  awakens,  sentiment  has  always  an  object ; 
it  is  always  referable  to  a  known  or  to  a  supposed  cause ;  it 
accompanies  cognition ;  it  wraps  it  round ;  it  is,  as  it  were,  its 
radiation.  Thus  the  evolution  of  intelligence  and  that  of  senti- 
ment are  parallel.  Just  as  intelligence  begins  with  slight  per- 
ceptions, both  very  simple  and  very  gross,  and  by  a  process  that 
goes  on  for  ages  becomes  able  to  embrace  the  system  of  the  uni- 
verse, and  to  state  some  complex  problem  in  social  philosophy ; 
so  sentiment  starts  with  a  very  simple  and  very  general  manifesta- 
tion, as  the  instinctive  love  of  an  animal  for  its  young,  and  thence 
rises  to  the  most  refined,  exquisite,  and  cultured  forms — the  religious 
sentiment  of  Schleiermacher,  and  the  aesthetic  sentiment  of 
Goethe  or  Heinrich  Heine.  And  this  transition  from  simple 
to  complex  is  brought  about,  in  the  case  of  sentiment  as  in  that 
of  intelligence,  by  an  integration,  a  fusion  into  one  harmonious 
whole  of  many  simple  sentiments.  It  would  require  a  power 
of  analysis  such  as  not  even  contemporary  psychology  yet  appears 
to  possess,  to  trace  back,  by  successive  decompositions,  the  sen- 
timent of  nature,  as  found  in  the  great  poets  of  the  nineteenth 
century,  to  the  very  simple  sentiments  and  perceptions  which 
are  its  basis. 

Certain  forms  of  sentiment  are  totally  wanting  among  primi- 
tive peoples.  In  the  Australian  language  there  are  no  words  to 
translate  justice,  sin,  crime.  These  people  understand  neither 
generosity,  pity,  nor  clemency.  They  regard  revenge  as  a  duty. 
The  reason  is  that  their  understanding  cannot  grasp  the  highly 
complicated  moral  relations  from  which  these  notions  are  derived. 
It  has  also  been  observed  that  certain  sentiments  of  a  refined 
nature,  such  as  melancholy,  charity,  and  the  profound  sentiment 
of  nature,  have  their  rise  at  a  later  period  in  history.  The 
reason  of  this  is  easy  to  find :  they  presuppose  the  acquisition  of 
many  notions,  each  one  of  which  is  highly  complex.  The  human 
soul  must  first  have  the  idea  of  the  infinite,  of  a  vague  and  mys- 
terious beyond,  to  feel  the  painful  depression  and  the  refined 
emotion  which  that  idea  excites.  It  must  have  got  beyond  the 
narrow,  local  ideas  of  antiquity  with  regard  to  the  tribe,  the  city, 
or  the  country,  in  order  to  experience  a  broader  sentiment  em- 
bracing all  humanity.  The  sentiment  of  charity  also — which  is, 


33°  Heredity. 

however,  very  ancient  among  Buddhists  in  the  east — had  its  rise 
among  a  few  chosen  souls,  philosophers  or  poets,  then  broadened 
out  and  developed,  and  during  the  first  three  centuries  of  the 
Christian  era  it  spread  out  into  the  world  under  the  influence  of 
the  broader  ideas  and  the  gentler  characters  which  then  prevailed. 
Humboldt,  in  his  Cosmos,  shows  that  the  'sentiment  of  nature 'is  a 
thing  known  only  to  the  moderns  in  the  west 

We  might  endeavour  to  show,  were  this  the  proper  place,  that 
under  each  of  these  complex  sentiments  there  are  many  real  or 
imaginary  ideas,  each  one  of  which  produces  in  the  human  soul  a 
simple  sentiment;  that  out  of  the  fusion  of  these  simple  sentiments 
there  is  formed  a  total  sentiment;  but  for  our  present  purpose  it  is 
enough  to  have  shown  that  the  evolution  of  sentiment  is  closely 
connected  with  that  of  the  intelligence.  The  conclusion  is,  that 
if  heredity  is  the  condition  of  the  specific  development  of  intelli- 
gence, and  if  the  evolution  of  sentiment  is  in  strict  accord  with  that 
of  intelligence,  then  the  sentiments  too  depend  on  heredity.  And 
here  again  progress  is  secured,  not  only  by  the  external  influence 
of  manners  and  customs,  but  also  by  the  internal  influence  of 
heredity. 

Among  acquired  sentiments  which  have  been  hereditarily  aug- 
mented, we  may  mention  that  of  fear  in  many  wild  animals.  Thus, 
'  when  the  Falkland  Islands  were  first  visited  by  man,  the  large 
wolf-like  dogs  ( Cams  antardiais)  fearlessly  came  to  meet  Byron's 
sailors,  who,  mistaking  this  ignorant  curiosity  for  ferocity,  ran  into 
the  water  to  avoid  them  ;  even  recently  a  man,  by  holding  a  piece 
of  meat  in  one  hand  and  a  knife  in  the  other,  could  sometimes 
stick  them  at  night  On  an  island  in  the  Sea  of  Aral,  when  first 
discovered  by  Butakoff,  the  saigak  antelopes,  generally  very  timid 
and  watchful,  instead  of  flying  from  the  men,  looked  at  them  with 
a  sort  of  curiosity.  So  again,  on  the  shores  of  the  Mauritius,  the 
manatee  was  not  at  first  in  the  least  afraid  of  man  ;  and  thus  it  has 
been  in  several  quarters  of  the  world  with  seals  and  the  morse. 
The  birds  of  several  islands  have  very  slowly  acquired  and 
inherited  a  dread  of  man.  At  the  Galapagos  Archipelago  I 
pushed  with  the  muzzle  of  my  gun  hawks  from  a  branch,  and  held 
out  a  pitcher  of  water  for  other  birds  to  alight  on  and  drink.' x 

1   Variation,  etc.,  vol.  i.  ch.  i. 


The  Psychological  Conscqtiences  of  Heredity.    331 

The  sentiment  of  music  is  reckoned  by  Herbert  Spencer  among 
those  which  are  formed  by  hereditary  accumulation.  '  The  habitual 
association  of  certain  cadences  of  human  speech  with  certain 
emotions,  has  slowly  established  in  the  race  an  organized  and 
inherited  connection  between  such  cadences  and  such  emotions. 
The  combination  of  such  cadences,  more  or  less  idealized,  which 
constitutes  melody,  has  all  along  had  a  meaning  in  the  average 
mind,  only  because  of  the  meaning  which  cadences  had  acquired 
in  the  average  mind.  By  the  continual  hearing  and  practice  of 
melody,  there  has  been  gained  and  transmitted  an  increasing 
musical  sensibility.'  When  we  call  to  mind  that  Mozart,  Beeth- 
oven, Hummel,  Haydn,  and  Weber,  were  the  sons  of  distinguished 
composers  and  musicians,  and  if  we  note  the  surprising  instance 
of  the  Bachs,  we  can  hardly  consider  these  facts  to  be  spon- 
taneous variations.  They  '  can  be  ascribed  to  nothing  but  in- 
herited developments  of  structure,  caused  by  augmentations  of 
function.' l 

And  Galton,  assuming  the  standpoint  of  the  heredity  of  the 
sentiments,  with  its  consequences,  passes  this  severe  judgment 
on  the  Middle  Ages.  '  The  long  period  of  the  dark  ages  under 
which  Europe  has  lain  is  due,  I  believe,  in  a  very  considerable 
degree,  to  the  celibacy  enjoined  by  religious  orders  on  their 
votaries.  Whenever  a  man  or  woman  was  possessed  of  a  gentle 
nature  that  fitted  him  or  her  to  deeds  of  charity,  to  meditation,  to 
literature,  or  to  art,  the  social  condition  of  the  time  was  such  that 
no  refuge  was  possible  elsewhere  than  in  the  bosom  of  the  Church. 
But  the  Church  chose  to  preach  and  exact  celibacy ;  the  conse- 
quence was  that  these  gentle  natures  had  no  continuance ;  and 
thus,  by  a  policy  so  singularly  unwise  and  suicidal  that  I  am 
hardly  able  to  speak  of  it  without  impatience,  the  Church  brutalized 
the  breed  of  our  forefathers.  She  acted  precisely  as  if  she  had 
aimed  at  selecting  the  rudest  portion  of  the  community  to  be  alone 
the  parents  of  future  generations.  She  practised  the  arts  which 
breeders  would  use  who  aimed  at  creating  ferocious,  currish  and 
stupid  natures.  No  wonder  that  club  law  prevailed  for  centuries 
over  Europe ;  the  wonder  rather  is,  that  enough  good  remained  in 

1  Spencer,  Biology,  i.  §  82. 


332  Heredity. 

the  veins  of  Europeans  to  enable  their  race  to  rise  to  its  present 
very  moderate  level  of  natural  morality.' l 

Without  dwelling  any  longer  on  the  part  played  by  heredity  in 
the  evolution  of  the  sentiments,  we  will  now  consider  certain 
curious  phenomena  of  reversion,  or  atavism. 

We  are  sometimes  astonished  to  see  how  obstinately  the  warlike 
and  nomadic  instincts  which  characterize  savage  life  persist  in 
certain  civilized  persons,  and  how  difficult  it  is  for  certain  natures 
to  adapt  themselves  to  that  complex  environment,  the  result  of  a 
host  of  opinions  and  habits,  which  we  call  civilization.  Here  we 
cannot  but  recognize  a  root  of  primitive  savagery,  preserved  and 
vivified  by  heredity. 

Thus,  the  taste  for  war  is  a  sentiment  very  general  among 
savages  :  for  them  life  is  warfare.  This  instinct,  common  to  all 
primitive  people,  has  been  of  service  in  the  progress  of  humanity, 
if,  as  we  may  well  believe,  it  has  insured  the  victory  of  the  stronger 
and  more  intelligent  races  over  those  less  gifted.  But  these  war- 
like instincts,  preserved  and  accumulated  by  heredity,  have  become 
a  true  cause  of  destruction,  of  carnage,  and  of  ruin.  After  having 
served  to  create  social  life,  they  are  no  longer  of  any  use  but  to 
destroy  it;  after  having  assured  the  triumph  of  civilization,  they  now 
only  contribute  toward  its  overthrow.  Even  when  these  instincts 
do  not  bring  two  nations  into  conflict,  they  manifest  themselves  in 
ordinary  life  in  certain  individuals,  by  a  quarrelsome,  contentious 
disposition,  which  leads  often  to  revenge,  to  duels,  and  to  murder. 

So,  too,  with  regard  to  the  love  of  adventure :  savage  races  possess 
this  to  such  a  degree  that  they  launch  out  into  the  unknown  with 
all  the  thoughtlessness  of  children.  No  doubt  this  love  of  ad- 
venture has  still  a  rightful  place  even  in  the  most  advanced  civili- 
zations, and  it  would  be  a  great  misfortune  for  humanity  were  it  to 
disappear.  Yet  it  cannot  be  denied  that  this  enterprising,  reckless 
spirit,  serviceable  as  it  is  at  first  in  opening  new  worlds  to  com- 
merce, travel,  science,  and  art,  has  for  some  men  been  only  a 
source  of  vain  or  ruinous  excitement,  the  only  one  which  circum- 
stances permit  them — like  gaming,  speculation,  and  intrigue,  or 
the  selfish,  turbulent  ambition  of  conquerors,  who  sacrifice  whole 
nations  to  their  caprice. 

1  Hereditary  Genius,  p.  357. 


The  Psychological  Consequences  of  Heredity.    333 

'We  sometimes  see  the  reappearance,  in  remote  descendants, 
of  ancient  race-instincts  that  for  many  generations  have  lain 
dormant  or  hidden,  but  which  now  come  to  light  as  an  unac- 
countable return  to  the  moral  type  of  the  ancestors.  The  higher 
classes  of  society  furnish  us  with  the  most  striking  instances  of  this; 
as  if  the  leisure  and  independence  which  their  wealth  assures  to 
them,  exempting  them  from  the  influence  of  the  local  environment 
and  the  present  conditions  of  the  life  of  their  race,  set  at  liberty 
psychical  forces  which  are  held  in  check  among  their  contem- 
poraries. Thus  an  irresistible  instinct  for  theft  not  only  is  some- 
times manifested  among  the  children  of  cultivated  races,  in  whom 
it  is  usually  soon  corrected  by  education,  but  even  at  times  persists 
in  adults,  and  with  irresistible  force  betrays  women  belonging  to 
our  ancient  noble  castes  into  offences  hardly  excusable  by  their 
inability  to  conquer  fate  or  evidently  fatalistic  character — unhappy 
heiresses  of  the  old  instincts  of  our  barbarous  conquerors. 

*  So,  too,  with  that  passionate  love  of  hunting,  which  is  no  longer 
of  use  under  our  present  social  conditions;  which  exists  more  or 
less  as  an  instinct  in  every  child;  which  even  persists  and  develops 
so  readily  in  every  adult  possessed  of  the  means  of  indulging  it, 
and  inspires  all  our  fashionable  youth,  and  the  remnants  of  our  terri- 
torial nobility  ;  it  can  only  be  explained  by  the  blind  and  predes- 
tined heredity  of  race-instincts  that  have  long  survived  their  utility, 
in  the  descendants  of  peoples  for  whom  these  same  instincts  were 
long  essential  conditions  of  life.  Here,  then,  we  have  merely 
phenomena  of  atavism,  which  preserves,  or  bring  to  light  at  in- 
tervals, the  psychical  characteristics  of  remote  ancestors.'1 

It  would  be  hard  to  find  a  more  striking  example  of  the  tenacity 
of  savage  instincts,  and  of  their  tendency  to  reappear,  than  is  found 
in  the  following  narrative  from  a  voyage  to  the  Philippine  Islands : — 

'  These  savages  have  ever  been  distinguished  from  the  other 
Polynesian  races  by  their  unconquerable  love  of  freedom.  The 
repugnance  of  the  Negritos  (as  the  Philippine  Islanders  are  called) 
to  everything  that  could  subjugate  them  or  make  them  live  by  rule, 
will  make  them  always  objects  of  interest  to  the  traveller.  Here 
is  an  instance  of  their  love  of  independence  : — 

1  Origine  de  FHomme  ct  de  Sociitts,  par  Mine.  Roycr,  ch.  iv. 


334  Heredity. 

'  In  a  raid  made  on  the  Isle  of  Lugon  by  native  soldiers,  under 
the  orders  of  a  Spanish  officer,  a  young  black  about  three  years 
old  was  taken  prisoner.  He  was  carried  to  Manilla,  An 
American  having  offered  the  authorities  to  adopt  him,  the  boy 
was  baptized  and  named  Pedrito. 

'When  he  was  of  proper  age  to  receive  some  instruction,  an 
effort  was  made  to  give  him  as  good  an  education  as  is  to  be  got 
in  those  remote  regions.  Old  residents  in  the  island,  who  knew 
the  Negrito  character,  laughed  in  their  sleeves  at  the  attempts  made 
to  civilize  Pedrito.  They  predicted  that  sooner  or  later  the  young 
savage  would  go  back  to  his  mountains.  His  adopted  father, 
aware  of  the  jests  made  on  his  care  for  Pedrito,  was  nettled  by 
them,  and  announced  his  intention  of  taking  the  boy  to  Europe. 
He  took  him  to  New  York,  Paris,  and  London,  and  only  brought 
him  back  to  the  Philippines  at  the  end  of  two  years'  travelling. 

'  Gifted  with  all  the  readiness  of  the  black  race,  Pedrito  spoke 
with  equal  fluency  Spanish,  French,  and  English ;  he  would  wear 
on  his  feet  nothing  but  fine,  polished  boots,  and  every  one  at 
Manilla  to  this  day  remembers  the  grave  air,  worthy  of  a  "gentle- 
man," with  which  he  met  the  first  advances  of  persons  who  had  not 
been  introduced  to  him.  Scarcely  two  years  after  his  return 
from  Europe  he  disappeared  from  the  house  of  his  protector.  The 
mockers  triumphed.  We  should  probably  never  have  learned 
what  became  of  the  philanthropic  Yankee's  adopted  son  were  it 
not  for  the  singular  meeting  a  European  had  with  him.  A  Prussian 
naturalist,  a  kinsman  of  the  celebrated  Humboldt,  resolved  to  make 
the  ascent  of  Mount  Marivalis,  not  far  from  Manilla.  He  had 
almost  reached  the  summit  of  the  peak  when  he  all  at  once  found 
himself  in  presence  of  a  swarm  of  little  blacks.  .  .  .  The 
Prussian  was  preparing  to  sketch  a  few  portraits  when  one  of  the 
savages  drew  near  to  him  smiling,  and  asked  him,  in  English,  if 
he  was  acquainted  at  Manilla  with  an  American  of  the  name  of 
Graham.  It  was  our  friend  Pedrito.  He  told  his  entire  history ; 
when  it  was  ended,  the  naturalist  tried,  but  in  vain,  to  induce  him 
to  return  with  him  to  Manilla.' l 

In  missionary  narratives  we  find  abundance  of  similar  facts. 

1  Jtante  des  Deux  Mondes,  15  Juin,  1869. 


Moral  Consequences  of  Heredity.  335 

Thus  the  missionary  societies  sometimes  adopt  Chinese  infants 
and  have  them  educated  in  European  institutions  at  great  expense  : 
they  go  back  to  their  own  country  with  the  resolve  to  propagate 
the  Christian  religion,  but  scarcely  have  they  disembarked  when 
the  spirit  of  their  race  seizes  upon  them,  they  forget  their  promises, 
and  lose  all  their  Christian  beliefs.  It  might  be  supposed  that 
they  had  never  left  China. 1 

To  sum  up,  the  consequences  of  heredity  have  been  found  to 
be  twofold.  Now  it  builds  for  the  future,  making  possible,  by  the 
accumulation  of  simple  sentiments,  the  production  of  sentiments 
more  complex.  Again  it  goes  back  towards  the  past,  setting  up 
again  forms  of  sensitive  activity  once  natural,  now  in  disaccord 
with  their  environment.  For  there  exist  in  the  bottom  of 
the  soul,  buried  in  the  depths  of  our  being,  savage  instincts, 
nomadic  tastes,  -unconquered  and  sanguinary  appetites  which 
slumber  but  die  not  They  resemble  those  rudimentary  organs 
which  have  outlived  their  functions,  but  which  still  remain  as 
witnesses  to  the  slow,  progressive  evolution  of  the  forms  of  life. 
And  these  savage  instincts,  developed  in  man  during  the  past, 
whilst  he  lived  free  amid  the  forests  and  streams,  are  from  time 
to  time  recalled  by  heredity,  by  some  trick  which  we  do  not  under- 
stand, as  though  to  let  us  measure  with  the  eye  the  length  of 
road  over  which  we  have  travelled. 


CHAPTER  III. 

MORAL  CONSEQUENCES   OF   HEREDITY. 
I. 

AT  the  first  step  in  every  study  of  morals  we  meet  the  inextri- 
cable problem  of  free-will.  We  are  the  less  able  to  avoid  it  here, 
since  it  touches  our  subject  at  more  than  one  point  We  have 
already  often  directed  attention  to  the  fatalistic  character  of  heredi- 
tary transmission,  and  the  reader  must  see  that  what  we  give  to 
heredity  we  take  from  free-will,  and  that  heredity  offers  an  abundant 

1  A.  Reville,  Revue  des  Dcttx  Afondes,  I*  Sept1"*'  1869. 


336  Heredity. 

source,  though  hitherto  but  little  explored,  of  arguments  in  favour 
of  fatalism.  This  much  is  certain,  that  heredity  and  free-will  are 
two  opposite  and  irreconcilable  terms.  The  one  creates  in  us 
the  personality,  the  character ;  it  is  the  peculiar  mark  which  dis- 
tinguishes us  from  what  is  not  ourselves  ;  it  is  that  in  us  which  is 
most  essential,  most  intimate.  The  other  tends  to  substitute  the 
species  for  the  person,  to  blot  out  what  is  individual,  and  to  sub- 
ject all  to  the  impersonal  fatalism  of  its  laws,  so  that  we  are 
necessarily  destined  to  feel,  think,  and  act  as  our  fathers,  whose 
thoughts,  apparently  extinct,  re-live  in  us.  In  a  word,  by  free- 
will we  are  ourselves,  by  heredity  we  are  others. 

We  have,  therefore,  to  consider  the  question  of  free-will.  This 
we  will  endeavour  to  do  very  briefly,  dismissing  all  solutions  that 
have  been  disproved,  and  simply  exhibiting  the  question  as  it 
stands  in  the  present  state  of  science. 

The  partisans  and  the  opponents  of  free-will  may  contend  for 
ever  without  agreeing,  provided  each  side  stands  on  its  own  ground 
and  will  not  quit  it  Those  who  hold  the  affirmative  proceed 
subjectively,  saying :  I  have  an  inner  sense  of  my  freedom  of  will, 
therefore  I  am  free.  Those  who  hold  those  negative  proceed  objec- 
tively, saying  :  All  things  are  regulated  according  to  laws  ;  moral 
as  well  as  physical  science  proves  this,  therefore  free-will  is  an 
illusion.  Each  occupies  a  point  of  view  totally  different  from  that 
of  the  other. 

The  argument  of  the  former  seems  at  first  view  decisive,  but  on 
reflection  it  is  found  less  conclusive.  If,  with  the  greater  part  of 
the  philosophers  in  the  last  two  centuries,  we  consider  psychologi- 
cal life  as  limited  to  the  domain  of  consciousness,  and  if  we  identify 
the  soul  with  the  ego,  then  we  may  hold  that  the  various  motives 
of  which  we  are  conscious  are  counsel,  advice,  reasons,  subjects  of 
deliberation,  but  they  are  not  that  which  deliberates,  compares, 
selects ;  and  that,  consequently,  a  voluntary  act  supposes,  besides 
motives,  something  more.  But  if  we  may  hold,  as  we  may  with 
truth,  that  besides  the  conscious  life  there  is  also  an  unconscious 
life  whose  influence  is  very  great  on  our  sentiments,  our  passions, 
our  ideas,  our  activity  in  general,  who  can  tell  what  part  this  uncon- 
scious agent  may  play  in  our  determinations  ?  Hence  the  asser- 
tion, I  have  a  consciousness  that  I  am  free,  therefore  I  am  free, 


Moral  Consequences  of  Heredity.  337 

loses  much  of  its  value,  because  consciousness  supplies  only  a 
portion  of  the  elements  of  the  problem,  and  by  no  means  supplies 
them  all.  Furthermore,  this  unconscious  agency,  which  is  over- 
looked, may  be,  as  we  shall  see,  the  very  groundwork,  the  essence, 
and,  as  it  were,  the  root  of  the  will 

As  for  those  who,  regarding  the  testimony  of  consciousness  as 
secondary,  adopt  an  objective  method,  they  derive  their  arguments 
chiefly  from  two  sources,  physical  and  physiological  phenomena, 
and  historical  and  social  facts. 

The  physical  world,  say  they,  is  subject  to  the  laws  of  a  deter- 
minism which  allows  no  exception.  Experience  proves,  and 
science  demands  this.  Science  is  explanation ;  to  explain  is  to 
determine,  and  to  determine  a  phenomenon  is  to  refer  it  to  its 
immediate  conditions,  or  to  its  laws.  We  have  no  intelligible 
idea  of  a  phenomenon  that  is  produced  spontaneously,  with  nothing 
to  determine  it  to  be,  or  to  be  in  one  way  rather  than  in  another. 
That  would  be  a  creation  ex  nihilo,  a  miracle.  Leibnitz,  and  after 
him  Laplace,  have  very  forcibly  expressed  this  truth.  Physics  and 
chemistry  having  demonstrated  that  nothing  comes  into  being  and 
that  nothing  perishes — neither. matter  nor  force — that  there  occur 
only  transformations,  which  themselves  are  determinable,  the 
idea  of  universal  determinism  has  become  a  scientific  common- 
place. The  principle  of  the  correlation  or  equivalence  of  forces  is 
the  highest  expression  of  this  belief  in  determinism.  Thus  Mr. 
Herbert  Spencer,  taking  his  stand  on  this  principle  of  equivalence, 
reduces  all  phenomena,  without  exception,  to  transformations  of 
motion ;  according  to  him,  social  facts  arise  out  of  certain  psycho- 
logical states,  and  these  out  of  certain  physiological  conditions, 
life  itself  resulting  from  the  play  of  physical  forces  :  '  And  if  it  be 
asked,  whence  these  physical  forces  which  through  the  intermedium 
of  the  vital  forces  produce  the  social  forces  ?  we  reply,  as  we  have 
all  along,  from  solar  radiation.' 

In  a  world  where  all  things  are  so  firmly  linked  together,  what 
place  is  there  for  free-will  ?  What  right  have  you,  say  the  deter- 
minists,  to  break  up  the  series  of  effects  and  causes,  for  the  purpose 
of  bringing  in  an  unintelligible  spontaneity  ?  You  say,  when  I  wish 
to  move  my  arm  I  move  it;  but  this  movement  is  not,  as  you  sup- 
pose, a  creation — it  must  have  already  existed  in  your  organism 


338  Heredity. 

under  a  different  form  ;  and  the  very  act  whereby  you  form  your 
resolution  is  conditioned,  is  subject  to  determinism.  There  is 
ground  for  believing  that  every  mental  state  is  determined  by 
organic  conditions,  and  that  consequently  it  comes  indirectly  under 
the  laws  of  universal  determinism.  Even  though  you  dispute  this, 
you  are  in  no  better  case,  for  at  least  you  must  concede  that  this 
mental  state  depends  on  those  which  precede  it,  and  that  it  is  sub- 
ject to  the  laws  of  association,  called  into  existence  by  association; 
but  these  laws  of  association  are  only  one  form  of  determinism. 

It  has  been  thought  that  this  difficulty  may  be  obviated  by  taking 
the  ground  that,  supposing  the  voluntary  act  to  be  an  effect,  it  is 
not  therefore  a  necessary  effect,  and  that  causality  does  not  always 
imply  constraint,  nor,  consequently,  necessity.  To  us  this  explana- 
tion seems  not  to  go  to  the  root  of  the  question.  The  problem  is 
not  whether  motives  have  or  have  not  the  character  of  coercion, 
but  whether  there  is,  besides  motives  and  determining  causes,  a 
spontaneity  which  belongs  to  the  individual  himself.  We  might, 
indeed,  regard  our  ideas,  sentiments,  and  passions  as  forming  a 
system  of  forces,  each  of  which  tends  to  pass  over  into  action. 
There  would  occur  between  them  action  and  reaction,  attractions 
and  repulsions,  some  of  them  combining  to  act  in  unison,  others 
warring  with  one  another,  while  others  again  are  mutually  neu- 
tralized wholly  or  in  part  On  this  hypothesis  the  voluntary  act 
— the  final  result  of  a  conflict  of  forces — would  not  appear  to  be 
a  constrained  effect,  and  yet  it  would  not  have  even  the  shadow 
of  free-will.  It  would  be  so  far  from  being  free  that,  given  the 
elementary  forces,  we  might  calculate  the  act  as  a  problem  in 
mechanics.  If  free-will  exists,  it  can  only  consist  in  that  property 
of  the  subject  whereby  it  reacts  against  the  determining  causes,  and 
in  consequence  of  this  reaction  determines  certain  acts. 

Before  we  examine  more  closely  this  obscure  question,  which 
will  bring  us  unexpectedly  back  again  to  heredity,  let  us  briefly 
consider  the  difficulties  raised  against  freedom  of  will  by  the  moral 
sciences. 

Considerations  drawn  from  the  general  course  of  history  and 
from  the  sequence  of  historical  facts  are  always  somewhat  vague. 
The  study  of  social  phenomena,  classified  and  computed  in  statistics, 
gives  a  firmer  ground  for  objections.  As  Quetelet,  Buckle,  Wundt, 


Moral  Consequences  of  Heredity.  339 

and  LittreV  have  observed,  all  acts  commonly  regarded  as  result- 
ing from  free-will — such  as  murders,  thefts,  crimes  and  offences  of 
all  kinds,  marriages,  divorces,  suicides — reach  about  the  same 
figure  year  after  year  in  a  given  country.  Thus,  in  Belgium,  in  the 
five  years  1841 — 5  the  average  number  of  marriages  in  cities  was 
2,642  per  annum,  the  utmost  deviations  being  +  46  and  — 136. 
In  France,  during  the  long  period  between  1826  and  1844,  the 
number  of  criminals  per  annum  varied  from  8,237  to  6,299,  and 
so  on. 

It  is  certain  that  we  cannot  glance  at  the  statistics  of  the  various 
human  acts  without  being  struck  with  the  regularity  of  their  occur- 
rence. This  proves  that  man's  causality  is  governed  by  laws 
which  admit  very  little  variation,  but  it  in  no  wise  proves  that  such 
causality  does  not  exist.  We  entirely  believe  in  the  existence  of 
social  and  historical  laws,  but  statistics  cannot  teach  us  whether 
these  laws  stand  alone,  or  whether  there  is  not  besides  an  indeter- 
minate number  of  causes.  As  Wundt  very  well  remarks,  when  we 
extend  our  observations  from  one  man  over  a  whole  population, 
we  eliminate  all  those  causes  which  appertain  only  to  the  individual, 
or  to  a  small  portion  of  the  population.  We  adopt  the  same  pro- 
cedure as  the  physicist,  who,  in  order  to  eliminate  all  accidental 
influences,  always  brings  together  a  great  number  of  observations 
and  thence  deduces  a  law.  But  when  the  statistician,  having  thus 
put  aside  the  individual  influences,  concludes  that  they  have  no 
existence,  it  is  as  though  the  physicist  were  to  conclude  that  the 
accidental  influences  he  eliminated  in  the  general  did  not  exist  in 
the  individual.  The  physicist  may  disregard  these,  since  for  him 
they  have  no  significance ;  but  as  for  the  psychologist — who  raises 
the  question  whether  besides  the  social  influences  there  exist 
causes  of  volition  of  an  individual  nature — he,  of  course,  may  not 
overlook  those  deviations  proper  to  each  particular  case,  for  they 
indicate  the  existence  of  individual  causes.2 

From  what  has  been  said  we  get  little  more  than  negative 
notions  about  free-will,  and,  indeed,  it  is  perhaps  impossible  to  go 


1  The  reader  will  find  some  curious  statistics  in  the  R&vue  de  Philosophit 
Positive,  for  Sept  1868. 
1  Wundt,  vol.  ii.  ch.  56. 


34O  Heredity. 

any  further.  For  our  part,  we  are  inclined  to  regard  free-will  as  a 
noumenon,  and  therefore  an  insoluble  enigma.  Still,  taking  their 
stand  on  the  ground  of  experience,  and  without  any  pretensions  of 
penetrating  to  ultimate  principles,  the  most  recent  psychologists 
(of  the  school  which  treats  psychology  as  a  natural  science)  have 
given  this  question  of  free-will  a  new  aspect,  which  enables  us 
better  to  apprehend  its  relations  with  heredity.  They  all  recognize 
the  necessity  of  admitting  in  man  a  proper  spontaneity,  and  this 
some  of  them  hold  to  be  chiefly  physiological,  others  chiefly  psy- 
chological. In  England  the  chief  exponent  of  these  views  is  Bain, 
in  Germany  Wundt. 

According  to  Bain,1  the  germ  of  the  will  is  to  be  found  in  that 
spontaneous  activity  which  has  its  seat  in  the  nerve-centres,  and 
which  needs  no  impressions  from  without,  nor  any  interior  feeling 
whatever  to  bring  it  into  play.  No  psychologist  before  him  had 
ever  spoken  of  this  spontaneous  activity,  or  of  its  essential  connec- 
tion with  voluntary  acts.  The  first  mention  of  it  is  in  Muller. 
That  physiologist  observes  that  the  foetus  performs  movements 
that  evidently  cannot  depend  on  the  complex  causes  which  deter- 
mine the  movements  of  the  adult  The  cause  of  these  movements 
can  exist  only  in  the  nerve-centres ;  and  as  the  nervous  force  is 
not  equally  distributed  all  over  the  body,  but  is  accumulated  in 
certain  centres,  these  differences  determine  the  foetus  to  move  in 
one  way  rather  than  in  another.  Hence  the  germ  of  will-power  is 
a  spontaneous  excitation;  it  is  a  primordial  fact  of  our  nature;  and 
the  stimulus  proceeding  from  our  sensations  and  sentiments  does 
not  supply  the  internal  power,  but  merely  determines  the  mode 
and  the  measure  of  action. 

While  we  admit  the  psychological  importance  of  this  discovery, 
and  the  merit  of  having  clearly  put  it  forward,  we  do  not  think 
that  it  helps  us  much.  Mr.  Bain  tells  us  nothing  about  the  origin 
of  this  nervous  force,  or  of  the  causes  which  determine  its  accu- 
mulation in  one  place  rather  than  in  another.  But  he  elsewhere 
has  asserted,  and  as  strongly  as  any  one,  that  'the  true  source,  the 
true  antecedent  of  all  muscular  power,  is  a  liberal  expenditure  of 
nervous  and  muscular  energy,  which  in  the  last  resort  derives  from 

1  Bain,  Emotions  and  Will. 


Moral  Consequences  of  Heredity.  341 

a  good  respiration  and  a  good  digestion  ....  that  what  carbon 
in  a  state  of  combustion  is  to  a  steam-engine,  food  and  airare  to 
the  living  organism,  and  that  consciousness,  which  is  produced  by 
the  expenditure  of  power,  is  no  more  the  cause  of  this  power  than 
the  light  from  the  furnace  is  the  source  of  the  movement  of  the 
engine.'  Nor  is  it  easy  to  believe  that  this  spontaneity  does  not 
itself  come  under  mechanical  laws.  Nerve -force  can  be  only  the 
transformation  of  some  prior  physical  force.  The  inequality  of  its 
distribution  over  the  body  must  also  depend  on  physical  or 
mechanical  causes.  Hence  we  do  not  see  what  becomes  of  this 
'  spontaneity,'  acted  on  as  it  is  on  all  sides  by  mechanical  laws. 

Wundt,  in  a  very  remarkable  and  important  work,  full  of  facts 
and  ideas,  which  unites  to  the  experimental  and  positive  method 
of  English  psychology  a  certain  German  boldness  without  rashness, 
puts  the  question  of  free-will  under  a  different  form.  We  have 
already  seen  that  he  protests  against  conclusions  drawn  from 
statistics,  showing  that  in  human  acts  there  is  a  variable  element 
which  statistical  science  may  rightly  enough  overlook,  but  which 
the  psychologist  must  endeavour  to  reassert;  that,  moreover,  if 
statistics  disclose  to  us  the  external  causes  of  voluntary  activity, 
they  leave  us  in  absolute  ignorance  of  its  internal  causes.  These 
internal  causes  constitute  what  Wundt  very  well  denominates  the 
personal  factor  (der  personliche  Factor). 

External  factors,  he  says,  we  denominate  motives,  but  not 
causes  of  will.  '  Between  motive  and  cause  there  exists  an  essen- 
tial difference.  A  cause  necessarily  produces  its  effect,  not  so  a 
motive.  It  is  true  that  a  cause  may  be  neutralized  by  another 
cause,  or  transformed  into  its  effect,  but  in  this  transformation  we 
can  always  track  the  effect  of  the  prior  cause  and  even  measure  it 
A  motive,  on  the  other  hand,  can  only  either  determine  or  not 
determine  the  will ;  in  the  latter  case,  we  have  no  means  of  know- 
ing its  effect  The  uncertainty  of  this  connection  between  the 
motive  and  the  will  is  based  solely  on  the  existence  of  the  personal 
factor.'1 


1  Vorlesungen  iiber  die  Menschen  und  Thierseele,  vol.  ii.  pp.  414,  seq.  See 
also,  Annalist  Fniologica  del  Libero  Arbitrio  C/mano,  by  Dr.  Herzen,  Florence. 
1870. 


342  Heredity. 

What,  then,  is  this  personal  factor  which  thus  mysteriously  breaks 
in  on  the  series  of  causes  and  effects  ?  It  is  '  the  internal  essence 
of  the  personality,  the  character.'  There  we  must  look  for  the 
root  of  will.  '  Character  is  the  sole  immediate  cause  of  voluntary 
activity.  Motives  are  always  only  indirect  causes.  Betwixt  motives 
and  the  causality  of  character  there  is  this  great  difference,  that 
motives  either  are  or  may  readily  become  conscious,  whereas  this 
causality  is  ever  absolutely  unconscious.'  Hence  character — per- 
sonality— must  for  ever  remain  an  enigma,  so  far  as  its  inmost 
nature  is  concerned ;  it  is  the  indeterminable  Ding  an  sick  of 
Kant  '  The  motives  which  determine  the  will  are  a  part  of  the 
universal  concatenation  of  causes ;  but  the  personal  factor,  where- 
with will  commences,  does  not  enter  into  this  concatenation. 
Whether  this  inmost  essence  of  personality,  upon  which,  in  the 
last  resort,  rests  all  the  difference  between  individuals,  is  itself 
subject  to  causality,  we  can  never  decide  on  the  ground  of 
direct  experience.' 

'  When  it  is  asserted  that  the  character  of  man  is  a  product  of 
air  and  light,  of  education  and  of  destiny,  of  food  and  climate, 
and  that  it  is  necessarily  predetermined  by  these  influences,  like 
every  natural  phenomenon,  the  conclusion  is  absolutely  undemon- 
strable.  Education  and  destiny  presuppose  a  character  which  de- 
termines them  :  that  is  here  taken  to  be  an  effect  which  is  partly  a 
cause.  But  the  facts  of  psychical  heredity  make  it  very  highly 
probable  that,  could  we  reach  the  initial  point  of  the  individual  life, 
we  should  there  find  an  independent  germ  of  personality  (Sclbstdn- 
diger)  which  cannot  be  determined  from  without,  inasmuch  as  it 
precedes  all  external  determination.'  * 

We  readily  accept  this  doctrine  of  Wundt  It  possesses  the 
advantage  of  showing,  on  the  one  hand,  that  free-will,  considered 
in  its  essence,  is  a  noumenon ;  and  on  the  other  hand,  that  on  the 
ground  of  experience  the  fatalistic  and  the  ordinary  view  are  not 
irreconcilable ;  but,  inasmuch  as  the  ultimate  roots  of  the  wili 
repose  in  the  unconscious,  we  may  suspect  such  a  reconciliation, 
but  we  cannot  establish  it.  We  will  abide  by  this  conclusion.  We 
have  elsewhere  endeavoured  to  show — and  we  will  not  repeat 

1  Wundt,  vol.  ii.  p.  416. 


Moral  Consequences  of  Heredity.  343 

our  argument — that  psychology,  even  experimental  psychology, 
must  admit  a  certain  element  which  comes  before  us  as  a  fact ; 
this  we  call  the  ego,  the  person,  the  character  :  no  other  word  will 
designate  it  properly,  but  of  it  we  can  only  say  that  it  is  that 
which  in  us  is  inmost,  and  which  distinguishes  and  differentiates 
us  from  what  is  not  ourselves ;  this  it  is  by  which  our  ideas,  our 
sentiments,  our  sensations,  our  volitions  are  given  to  us  as  ours, 
and  not  as  the  phenomena  of  something  outside  ourselves.  And 
we  put  the  question,  whether  the  instinct  of  self-preservation, 
which  is  so  strong  in  animals,  may  not  be  this  individual  principle, 
cleaving  stubbornly  to  existence,  and  struggling  to  maintain  its 
hold  on  life  ? 

If  now  we  study  the  part  played  by  personality,  not  now  in 
psychology,  but  in  history,  the  problem  occurs  in  the  same  terms, 
and  seems  resolvable  in  the  same  way.  The  individual  is  subject 
to  the  laws  of  nature,  both  physical  and  moral,  and  is  governed 
by  them.  But'  beyond  the  almost  boundless  field  of  determinism 
we  have  had  a  glimpse  of  the  possibility,  and  even  the  necessity, 
of  an  autonomy,  a  spontaneity.  So,  too,  in  history,  where  the 
action  of  natural  laws  is  great,  where,  indeed,  it  is  nearly  every- 
thing, we  must  also  assign  its  due  part  to  personality,  as  re- 
presented especially  by  great  men.  'The  expedition  of  Alex- 
ander and  the  poetry  of  Homer  are  both  due  to  individuals. 
But  had  Alexander  never  lived  it  is  probable  that  the  course  of 
history  would  have  been  other  than  it  has  been ;  and  if  Homer 
had  not  lived  perhaps  the  religion  and  the  manners  of  the  Greeks 
would  have  taken  another  form.  .  .  .  Individual  will,  there- 
fore, exerts  a  great  influence  .  .  .*.  yet  this  influence  is  but  a  mo- 
mentary cause.  Homer  changed  the  manners  of  the  Greeks  only 
because  the  Greeks  made  his  poetic  creations  their  own ;  and 
Alexander  could  never  have  made  his  mark  so  deeply  in  history, 
were  it  not  that  his  will  had  the  same  ground  as  the  general  will.' * 

Both  history  and  psychology,  then,  appear  to  lead  us  to  the 
conclusion  that  determinism  does  not  suffice  to  explain  every- 
thing. But  if  we  push  our  inquiries  still  further,  we  are  met  by 
a  fresh  difficulty.  With  regard  to  this  personality — whose  true 


Wundt,  ibid.  p.  408. 


344  Heredity. 

nature  we  despair  of  knowing,  because  it  rests  in  the  unfathom- 
able depths  of  the  unconscious — do  we  at  least  know  whence  it  is, 
what  is  its  origin  ? 

Clearly,  there  can  be  but  two  hypotheses  :  either  we  must  say 
that  at  every  birth  there  is  an  act  of  special  creation,  which  places 
in  each  being  the  germ  of  its  character,  of  its  personality ;  or  we 
must  admit  that  this  germ  is  the  product  of  preceding  generations, 
and  that  it  necessarily  comes  from  the  nature  of  the  parents  and 
from  the  circumstances  of  the  generative  act 

The  first  hypothesis  is  so  unscientific  that  it  is  hardly  worth 
discussing.  Hence  we  have  to  consider  only  the  second. 

Here,  then,  we  find  ourselves  at  the  very  heart  of  the  matter. 
We  imagined  we  were  escaping  from  heredity,  and  now  we  meet 
with  it  in  that  very  germ  which  is  the  one  thing  in  us  which  is 
inmost,  most  essential  and  most  personal.  After  having  shown,  by 
a  long  enumeration  of  facts,  that  the  sensitive  and  intellectual 
faculties  are  transmitted — that  we  may  inherit'  an  instinct,  a 
passion,  a  variety  of  imagination,  as  well  as  consumption,  or 
rickets,  or  long  life — we  expected  that  at  least  one  portion  of 
psychological  life  would  be  found  to  lie  beyond  the  reach  of  deter- 
minism, and  that  character,  personality,  the  ego,  would  be  found 
exempt  from  the  law  of  heredity.  But  heredity,  or  in  other  words 
determinism,  meets  us  on  every  side,  from  within  and  from  without 
Nay,  even  if  with  the  evolutionists  we  recognize  in  heredity  a  force 
which  not  only  preserves,  but  which  also  creates  by  accumulation, 
then  not  only  is  the  character  transmitted,  but  it  is  the  work  of 
fate,  made  up  bit  by  bit,  by  the  slow  and  unconscious  but  ever 
accumulating  toil  of  generations.  The  question  becomes  perfectly 
inextricable — an  enigma  within  an  enigma. 

We  are  not  so  simple  as  to  attempt  its  solution.  We  touch  here 
upon  that  region  of  the  unknowable  to  which  every  inquiry  into 
first  causes  inevitably  leads.  Here  science  ends,  and  it  is  as  little 
scientific  to  hold  with  the  fatalists  that  there  exists  in  the  universe 
only  an  absolute  determinism,  without  exception,  as  to  say  with 
their  opponents  that  determinism  is  only  a  lower  mode  of  ex- 
istence, lying  outside  of  and  beneath  free-will.  Though  the  former 
school  may  show  very  well  that  free-will  is  governed  by  fixed  laws, 
they  can  bring  forward  no  fact  to  decide  whether  the  final  cause  of 


Moral  Consequences  of  Heredity.  345 

all  things  is  mechanism  or  free-will.  To  this  end  the  physiological 
and  psychological  phenomenon  of  generation  would  have  to  be 
without  mystery,  whereas  such  is  not  the  case.  On  the  other 
hand,  when  Schopenhauer  and  his  followers  assert  that  free-will 
lies  without  the  categories  of  causality,  time  and  space,  by  the  aid 
of  which  we  think,  and  that  these  forms  of  thought  are  inappli- 
cable to  it  because  that  in  its  essence  it  is  not  a  phenomenon, 
and  therefore  cannot  fall  into  the  universal  concatenation — they 
advance  a  metaphysical  hypothesis,  perhaps  true,  certainly  in- 
genious and  specious,  but  for  which  verification  is  impossible ; 
they  offer  a  possibility  as  a  reality. 

But  taking,  as  we  do,  the  humble  standpoint  of  experience, 
we  can  only  say  that  if  character — what  Kant  calls  empiric 
character — is  inherited,  it  is  so  only  with  many  exceptions ;  that 
this  heredity  is  even  harder  to  prove  than  that  of  a  simple  mode 
of  psychical  activity;  and  that  in  proportion  as  we  descend 
towards  the  unconscious,  which  is  the  groundwork  of  the  character, 
this  affirmation  becomes  more  and  more  hypothetical,  without, 
however,  being  stripped  of  probability. 

We  can  now  reach  a  practical  conclusion.  The  basis  of  morals 
is  responsibility ;  can  it  be  said  that  heredity  suppresses  this  ? 
There  is  no  universal  reply  to  this  question,  but  we  may  reduce  all 
the  particular  cases  under  two  principal  heads. 

One  of  these  comprises  all  those  cases  where  inherited  ten- 
dencies do  not  possess  an  irresistible  character.  Man  inherits 
from  his  ancestors  certain  modes  of  sensation  and  of  thought,  and 
is  therefore  disposed  to  will,  and  consequently  to  act  as  they  did. 
This  heredity  of  impulses  and  tendencies  constitutes  an  order  of 
internal  influences,  in  the  midst  of  which  the  individual  lives,  but 
which  he  has  the  power  of  judging  and  of  overcoming.  They  do 
not,  any  more  than  any  other  internal  or  external  circumstances, 
imply  the  suppression  of  free-will,  the  abolition  of  the  personal 
factor,  or  the  irresistible  necessity  of  acts.  'In  a  word,  it  is  for 
heredity,  as  for  spontaneity,  to  give  a  more  or  less  sensible  inclina- 
tion to  good  or  evil,  and  consequently  more  or  less  disposition  to 
commit  faults.  But  vice  or  virtue  does  not  depend  on  either;  vice 
or  virtue  is  not  self-existent — they  do  not  consist  in  the  fatal 
nature  of  the  internal  or  external  impulses  acting  on  us,  but  in  the 


346  Heredity. 

mental  and  executive  agreement  of  the  will.  For  all  these  reasons 
they  are  personal — they  depend  on  free-will,  and  are  not  hereditary.' 

The  second  case  is  that  in  which  inherited  tendencies  possess 
an  irresistible  character.  Not  to  speak  of  those  states  of  well- 
defined  insanity  in  which  the  individual  is  aliemis  a  se,  where  per- 
sonality disappears,  assailed  and  finally  overcome  by  fatal  impulses 
or  fixed  ideas,  we  have  seen  indisputable  cases  where  the  tendency 
to  vice  and  to  crime  is  a  heritage  which  descends  with  the  cer- 
tainty of  fate.  The  personal  factor  has  then  no  strength  to  react 
against  these  interior  impulses.  Let  the  reader  recall  the  many 
instances  of  this  kind  cited  under  the  head  of  Heredity  of  Senti- 
ments and  Passions.  In  such  cases  there  is  no  responsibility. 

In  this  unceasing  conflict  which  goes  on  within  us  between 
individual  and  specific  characteristics,  between  personality  and 
heredity,  and,  in  more  general  terms,  between  free-will  and  fate, 
free-will  is  more  frequently  overcome  than  is  commonly  supposed. 
But  this  is  often  not  admitted,  and  as  Burdach  well  observes,  with 
the  excellent  intention  of  proving  to  man  that  he  is  free,  we  too 
often  forget  '  that  heredity  has  actually  more  power  over  our 
mental  constitution  and  our  character  than  all  external  influences, 
physical  or  moral.'  This  we  shall  now  see  under  another  form, 
when  we  inquire  into  the  relations  between  education  and  heredity. 


IL 

Great  stress  has  recently  been  laid  on  the  influence  of  the 
physical  environment.  It  has  been  shown  how  the  climate,  the 
air,  the  character  of  the  soil,  the  diet,  the  nature  of  the  food 
and  drink — all  that  in  physiology  is  comprised  under  the  tech- 
nical terms  drcumfusa,  ingesta,  etc. — shape  the  human  organism 
by  their  incessant  action  ;  how  those  latent,  silent  sensations  which 
do  not  come  into  consciousness,  but  still  are  ever  thronging  the 
nerves  of  sense,  eventually  form  that  habitual  mode  of  the  con- 
stitution which  we  call  temperament 

The  influence  of  education  is  analogous.  It  is  a  moral  environ- 
ment, and  its  result  is  the  creation  of  a  habit  We  might  even 
affirm  that  this  moral  environment  is  as  complex,  as  hetero- 
geneous and  changeable,  as  any  physical  environment  For 


Moral  Consequences  of  Heredity.  347 

education,  in  the  full  and  exact  meaning  of  the  term,  does  not 
consist  simply  of  the  lessons  of  our  parents  and  teachers  :  manners, 
religious  beliefs,  what  we  read,  what  we  hear,  all  these  are  so  many 
silent  influences  which  act  on  the  mind,  just  as  latent  sensations 
act  on  the  body,  and  which  contribute  to  our  education;  that  is  to 
say,  they  cause  us  to  contract  habits. 

But  we  must  not  exaggerate.  Some — such  as  Lamarck  and  his 
daring  predecessors — have  attributed  so  much  to  the  influence  of  the 
physical  environment  as  to  make  it  simply  a  creator ;  and  so  great 
power  has  often  been  attributed  to  education,  that  the  individual 
character  would  be  its  work,  to  the  exclusion  of  all  native  energy. 
Thus  the  expression  of  Leibnitz  was  bold :  Entrust  me  with  educa- 
tion, and  in  less  than  a  century  I  will  change  the  face  of  Europe. 
Descartes  too,  attributing  to  his  method  what  was  the  fruit  of  his 
genius,  goes  so  far  as  to  say  that  '  sound  understanding  (ban  sens) 
is  the  most  widely  diffused  thing  in  all  the  world,  and  all  differences 
between  mind  and  mind  spring  from  the  fact  that  we  conduct  our 
thoughts  over  different  routes.'  The  sensist  school,  in  its  abhor- 
rence for  everything  innate,  has  exaggerated  even  this  view. 
According  to  Locke,  '  out  of  one  hundred  men  more  than  ninety 
are  good  or  bad,  useful  or  harmful  to  society,  owing  to  the  educc- 
tion  they  have  received.'  Helvetius,  carrying  this  view  to  its 
extreme,  holds  that  '  all  men  are  born  equal  and  with  equal  facul- 
ties, and  that  education  alone  produces  a  difference  between  them.' 
With  astonishing  obstinacy  he  propounds  the  incredible  paradox 
that  men  do  not  differ  from  one  another  in  acuteness  of  sense, 
reach  of  memory,  or  capacity  for  attention,  and  that  all  possess  in 
themselves  the  power  of  rising  to  the  highest  ideas  ;  differences  of 
mind  depend  entirely  on  circumstances.1 

It  is  highly  important  that  we  ascribe  to  education  only  what 
belongs  to  it,  and  that  we  vindicate  against  it  the  rights  of  spon- 
taneity, for  the  cause  of  spontaneity  is  our  own.  To  us  spontaneity 
and  heredity  are  one.  Whether  certain  psychic  qualities  result 
from  spontaneous  variation,  or  from  hereditary  transmission,  is  a 
question  of  no  importance.  We  have  only  to  show  that  they  exist 
before  education,  which  may  at  times  transform  them,  but  never 

t  f  Esprit,  3«  Discoura 


348  Heredity. 

creates  them  ;  and  that  the  opponents  of  heredity  err  when  they 
explain  by  the  external  cause  of  education  what  results  from  the 
internal  cause  of  character.  Their  argument  often  consists  in 
stating  this  dilemma,  which  to  them  appears  decisive  :  Either 
children  do  not  resemble  their  parents,  and  then  there  is  no  law 
of  heredity,  or  they  do  resemble  them  morally,  and  then  there  is 
no  need  to  look  for  any  other  cause  than  education.  It  is  per- 
fectly natural  that  a  painter  or  a  musician  should  teach  his  art  to 
his  son,  that  a  thief  should  train  his  children  to  theft,  that  a  child 
born  amid  debauchery  should  bear  the  impress  of  his  surround- 
ings. 

We  must  do  Gall  the  justice  to  admit  that  he  clearly  saw  and 
proved,  in  the  teeth  of  the  prevailing  prejudices,  that  the  faculties 
which  occur  in  all  the  individuals  of  a  species  exist  in  the  various 
individuals  in  very  different  degrees,  and  that  this  variety  of  apti- 
tudes, propensities  and  characteristics  is  a  universal  fact  common 
to  all  classes  of  beings,  independently  of  education.  Thus,  among 
domesticated  animals,  all  spaniels  and  pointers  by  no  means 
exhibit  the  same  acuteness  of  scent,  the  same  skill  in  tracking,  etc. ; 
shepherd  dogs  are  by  no  means  all  gifted  with  the  same  instinct ; 
racehorses  of  the  same  stock  differ  from  one  another  in  speed,  and 
draught  horses  of  the  same  race  differ  from  one  another  in  strength. 
The  same  is  true  of  wild  animals.  Singing  birds  have  by  nature 
the  note  peculiar  to  their  species,  but  they  differ  from  one  another 
in  the  style,  the  depth,  the  range,  and  the  charm  of  their  voice. 
Pierquin  has  even  discovered  among  horses  and  dogs  imbeciles, 
maniacs,  and  lunatics. 

In  the  case  of  man,  a  few  well  chosen  instances  will  suffice  to 
show  the  part  played  by  spontaneity,  often  only  another  name  for 
heredity,  and  to  cut  short  the  incomplete  explanations  drawn  from 
the  influence  of  education.  The  reader  will  remember  how 
D'Alembert,  a  foundling,  brought  up  by  a  poor  glazier's  wife, 
without  means  or  advice,  derided  by  his  adoptive  mother,  his 
comrades,  and  his  master,  who  did  not  understand  him,  still  vrent 
his  way  without  losing  courage,  and  became  at  twenty-four  a 
member  of  the  Academic  des  Sciences ;  and  this  was  only  the 
beginning  of  his  fame.  Suppose  him  brought  up  by  his  own 
mother,  Mademoiselle  de  Tencin,  admitted  at  an  early  age  to  that 


Moral  Consequences  of  Heredity.  349 

famous  salon  where  so  many  men  of  note  were  wont  to  assemble, 
initiated  by  them  into  the  problems  of  science  and  philosophy, 
refined  by  their  conversation  :  in  such  case  the  opponents  of 
heredity  could  not  fail  to  see  in  his  genius  the  product  of  his  edu- 
cation. The  lives  of  most  great  men  show  that  the  influence  of 
education  on  them  was  in  some  instances  of  no  moment  at  all,  in 
others  injurious,  generally  trifling.  If  we  take  great  captains,  thai 
is  to  say,  the  men  whose  entrance  into  life  is  most  easily  fixed 
because  it  is  the  most  brilliant,  we  find  Alexander  entering  on 
his  career  as  a  conqueror  at  the  age  of  twenty;  Scipio  Africanus 
(the  elder)  at  twenty-four,  Charlemagne  at  thirty,  Charles  XII.  at 
eighteen,  Prince  Eugene  commanding  the  Austrian  army  at  twenty- 
five,  Buonaparte  the  army  of  Italy  at  twenty-six,  etc.  And  the 
same  precocity  in  many  thinkers,  artists,  inventors,  and  men  of 
science,  shows  how  small  a  thing  education  is,  compared  with 
spontaneity. 

We  restrict  education,  as  we  think,  within  its  just  limits,  when 
we  say  that  its  power  is  never  absolute  and  that  it  exerts  no  effica- 
cious action  except  upon  mediocre  natures.  Suppose  the  various 
human  intelligences  to  be  so  graduated  as  to  form  a  great  linear 
series,  rising  from  idiocy,  the  bottom  of  the  scale,  to  genius,  which 
is  at  the  top.  The  influence  of  education  is  at  its  minimum  at 
the  two  ends  of  the  series.  On  the  idiot  it  has  hardly  any  effect : 
unheard  of  exertions  and  prodigies  of  patience  and  ingenuity  often 
produce  only  insignificant  and  transient  results.  But  as  we  rise 
towards  the  middle  degrees  this  influence  grows  greater.  It 
attains  its  maximum  in  average  minds,  which,  being  neither  good 
nor  bad,  are  much  what  chance  makes  them ;  but  as  we  ascend  to 
the  higher  forms  of  intelligence  we  see  it  again  decrease,  and  as 
we  come  nearer  to  the  highest  order  oi  genius  it  tends  towards  its 
minimum. 

So  variable  is  the  influence  of  education  that  we  may  doubt 
whether  it  is  ever  absolute.  It  is  needless  to  cite  facts  from  his- 
tory, which  tells  only  of  men  of  eminence  or  distinction — we  need 
only  appeal  to  every-day  experience.  It  is  not  rare  to  find 
children  sceptical  in  religious  families,  or  religious  in  sceptical 
families ;  debauched  men  amid  good  examples,  or  ambitious  men 
in  a  family  of  retiring,  peaceable  disposition.  Yet  we  are  speaking 


35°  Heredity. 

only  of  ordinary  people,  whose  life  passes  away  on  a  restricted  stage, 
who  die  and  are  forgotten. 

Education  is  a  sum  of  habits  :  among  civilized  nations  it  builds 
up  an  edifice  so  skilfully  contrived,  so  complicated,  so  labo- 
riously raised,  that  we  are  astonished  if  we  examine  it  in  detail. 
Compare  the  savage  with  the  accomplished  gentleman,  and  how 
great  is  the  difference.  The  fact  is  that  six  thousand  years  and 
more  stand  between  the  two.  Many  of  the  habits  which  we  con- 
tract through  education  have  cost  the  race  centuries  of  effort 
Education  has  to  fix  in  us  the  results  achieved  by  many  hundreds 
of  generations.  Millions  of  men  have  been  needed  to  invent  and 
bring  to  perfection  those  methods  which  develop  the  body,  culti- 
vate the  mind,  and  fashion  the  manners.  Consider  what  is  implied 
in  the  words  '  a  complete  education.'  To  know  how  to  walk,  to 
run,  to  wrestle,  to  fence,  to  ride,  and  all  other  bodily  exercises;  to 
know  several  languages,  to  make  verses,  and  study  music,  drawing, 
painting  ;  to  reflect  and  reason ;  to  be  conformed  to  the  customs, 
usages,  and  conventionalities  of  society.  Each  of  these  acts,  and 
many  others,  must  needs  have  become  a  habit,  an  almost  mechan- 
ical mode  of  life  in  us,  and  a  perfect  education  results  from  the 
fusion  of  these  habits.  There  must  needs  have  been  formed  in  us, 
by  many  artificial  processes,  a  second  nature,  which  so  envelops  our 
original  nature  as  to  seem  to  have  absorbed  it  Most  commonly, 
however,  such  is  not  the  case.  It  is  not  rare  in  our  own  times  to 
find  in  families  of  high,  and  even  princely  station,  individuals  over- 
laid with  such  an  education  as  this,  but  it  is  only  a  very  thin 
covering  indeed — a  glossy  varnish  that  on  the  slightest  friction 
scales  off,  and  then  the  true,  that  is  the  brute,  nature  appears  with 
all  its  savage  instincts  and  unbridled  appetites;  in  an  instant  it 
bursts  all  the  bonds  which  civilization  has  imposed  upon  it,  and 
finds  itself,  as  it  were,  at  home  in  barbarism.  We  are  sometimes 
amazed  at  seeing  nations  highly  civilized,  gentle,  humane,  charit- 
able in  time  of  peace,  giving  themselves  up  to  every  excess  so  soon 
as  war  has  broken  out  The  reason  of  this  is  that  war,  being  a 
return  to  the  savage  state,  awakens  the  primitive  nature  of  man, 
as  it  subsisted  prior  to  culture,  and  brings  it  back  with  all  its 
heroic  daring,  its  worship  of  force,  and  its  boundless  lusts. 

As  Carlyle  has  said,  civilization  is  only  a  covering  underneath 


Moral  Consequences  of  Heredity.  351 

which  the  savage  nature  of  man  continually  bums  with  an  infernal 
fire. 

We  must  ever  bear  in  mind  these  facts,  and  be  careful  not  to  be- 
lieve that  education  explains  everything.  We  would  not,  however, 
in  the  least  detract  from  its  importance.  Education,  after  centuries 
of  effort,  has  made  us  what  we  are.  Moreover,  to  bear  sway  over 
average  minds  is  in  itself  a  grand  part  to  play;  for  though  it  is  the 
higher  minds  that  act,  it  is  mediocre  minds  that  react,  and  history 
teaches  that  the  progress  of  humanity  is  as  much  the  result  of  the 
reactions  which  communicate  motion,  as  of  the  actions  which  first 
determine  it 


in. 

We  are  now  in  a  position  to  inquire  into  the  part  which  heredity 
plays  in  the  formation  of  moral  habits.  Our  task  were  easy  enough 
if  the  genesis  of  moral  ideas  and  the  history  of  their  development 
had  been  discovered.  Had  some  one,  taking  for  his  standpoint 
the  doctrine  of  evolution,  shown  through  what  successive  phases 
human  morality  must  needs  have  passed  in  order  to  rise  from  the 
lower  forms  of  savage  life  to  the  higher  forms  of  our  present  civili- 
zation ;  had  the  various  stages  of  this  progress  been  so  marked  that 
we  might  see  their  logical  dependence,  and  understand  why  one 
precedes  and  another  follows,  and  wherein  the  former  is  the  condi- 
tion of  the  latter — we  could  then  readily  discover  the  place  of 
heredity  as  a  factor  in  this  development  Unfortunately,  the 
genesis  of  moral  ideas  has  never  been  traced  with  anything  like 
perfection,  and  it  is  a  work  to  be  attempted  only  by  some  master 
hand.  While  we  wait  for  this  to  be  done  by  Mr.  Spencer  in  his 
Principles  of  Sociology,  we  are  compelled  to  attempt  here  a  coarse 
and  imperfect  sketch. 

In  doing  this  there  are  two  possible  methods.  We  might  pro- 
ceed analytically,  starting  from  current  moral  ideas,  as  now  mani- 
fested in  the  usages,  laws,  and  opinions  of  civilized  nations  ;  then, 
tracing  back  the  course  of  history,  we  would  eliminate  all  sentiments 
of  new  formation,  thus  by  successive  simplifications  reaching 
the  basis,  the  essential  condition  of  all  morality.  Or  we  might 
proceed  synthetically,  starting  from  the  rudest  state  of  society,  and 
Ifi 


352  Heredity. 

then,  with  the  aid  of  anthropology,  psychology,  philology  and  history, 
determining  the  evolution  of  moral  ideas  and  their  steady  progress 
from  the  simple  to  the  complex.  There  is  of  course  a  point  where 
history  fails  us.  History,  being  the  consciousness  of  civilized 
nations,  necessarily  implies  continuity  of  tradition,  whether  oral  or 
written;  and  such  continuity  could  not  be  found  among  people 
without  arts,  without  monuments,  and  whose  records  are  only  from 
day  to  day.  But  where  history  falls  short,  anthropology  may  yet 
serve  as  a  guide. 

Yet  we  will  not  inquire  whether  the  human  race  has  ever  had  a 
'purely  physiological  period.'  It  suffices  for  us  to  begin  our  inves- 
tigation with  that  primitive  epoch  which  we  call  the  savage  state. 
The  savage  is  like  the  child  :  all  travellers  are  unanimous  on  this 
point.  He  is  chiefly  characterized,  psychically,  by  the  exclusive 
predominance  of  sensibility  and  imagination  (under  their  lower 
forms),  and  consequently,  from  the  moral  point  of  view,  by  the 
most  absolute  individualism.  Their  impressions  and  their  ideas 
possess  an  extraordinary  mobility,  which  finds  expression  in  an 
exuberance  of  gesture,  exclamations,  contortions,  and  monkey-tricks. 
They  act  less  with  design  than  by  caprice.  The  portrait  drawn  by 
Dumont  d'Urville  of  the  natives  of  Australia,  answers  in  every 
respect  to  children,  even  in  the  minor  details,  especially  the  child- 
ish pronunciation  of  certain  letters,  such  as  s  and  r.  It  is  impos- 
sible that  they  should  possess  anything  more  than  the  merest 
outlines  of  morality.  As  each  individual  is  at  every  moment 
carried  away  by  violent  and  sudden  outbursts  of  passion,  as  his  life 
is  only  a  whirlwind  of  caprices,  and  as,  in  the  absence  of  reflection, 
there  is  never  a  moment's  interval  between  desire  and  act,  the 
result  is  a  turbulent  and  sanguinary  existence,  without  anything 
like  order  or  reason. 

The  first  progress  is  made  under  the  pressure  of  authority. 
The  wisest,  speaking  as  kings  or  priests  in  the  name  of  a  God, 
or  of  a  supernatural  power — which  alone  has  any  control  over 
those  wild  natures — impose  restrictions  on  this  absolute  liberty 
of  the  individual.  These  ordinances,  though  frequently  violated, 
are  nevertheless  the  first  germ  of  social  justice ;  and  so  soon  as 
some  regard  for  property  is  established  we  discern  the  first  linea- 
ments of  a  civilization.  Such  were,  half  a  century  ago,  the 


Moral  Consequences  of  Heredity.  353 

inhabitants  of  New  Zealand  and  the  Tonga  Islands.  The  former, 
who  were  superior  to  the  average  Australian,  more  thoughtful  and 
more  intelligent,  already  had  clear  notions  about  the  rights  of  pro- 
perty, and  even  about  the  rights  of  nations — they  put  trust  in  the 
word  of  their  enemies.  Theft  was  rare  among  them.  Marsden 
says  that  a  chief  was  angry  with  a  man  who  had  stolen  some  old 
iron,  and  he  gives  other  instances  of  their  honesty.1 

Any  tribe  that  is  incapable  of  rising  to  this  idea  of  justice  and 
of  reciprocal  duties,  or  of  incorporating  it  in  their  manners,  is  fated 
to  perish  by  the  inevitable  logic  of  events.  This  leads  us  to 
estimate  at  its  true  value  a  doctrine  still  largely  diffused,  which 
regards  morality  as  simply  conventional.  The  philosophers  of  the 
eighteenth  century  were  disinclined  to  see  in  it  anything  more  than 
an  artificial  production,  based  on  a  primitive  contract  Before  their 
time,  Pascal  had  advanced  this  theory  in  a  famous  passage,  where 
he  himself  did  but  express  a  thought  previously  uttered  by  Mon- 
taigne: 'They  do  but  trifle  when,  in  order  to  give  certitude  to  laws, 
they  say  that  some  of  them  are  stable,  perpetual,  and  immovable, 
which  they  call  natural  laws.' 

This  scepticism  has  been  opposed  only  by  denunciation  and 
denial,  based  on  vague  proofs.  Perhaps  if  its  opponents  had 
accepted  the  evolution  of  moral  ideas  they  would  have  found  a 
better  answer,  because  that  analysis,  penetrating  to  the  very  basis  of 
morality,  shows  its  nature  and  its  stability.  We  might  say  that 
morality  is  natural,  as  is  proved  by  the  fact  that  it  is  an  absolute 
condition  of  man's  existence,  and  might  establish  our  position 
thus : — man,  considered  as  an  intelligent  being,  can  only  live  in 
a  society ;  this  is  proved  by  the  most  positive  facts ;  in  a  state  of 
isolation  man  is  without  a  mind.  On  the  other  hand,  society, 
even  in  its  simplest  form,  can  only  exist  on  certain  definite  con- 
ditions. Suppose  a  society  whose  members  hold  it  to  be  right, 
or  else  simply  indifferent,  to  murder  and  pillage  one  another; 
where  parents  abandon  their  children,  and  children  maltreat  their 
parents — it  is  quite  clear  that  such  a  society  cannot  subsist;  it 
will  perish  by  a  vice  inherent  in  its  very  constitution.  As  well 

1  For  the  particulars  see  Dumont  d'Urville,  tomes  iii.  and  iv.,  Pikts  Justifi 


354  Heredity. 

might  we  say  that  an  acephalous  or  hydrocephalous  monster  can 
live  and  breed — which  would  be  a  physiological  absurdity.  It  is 
inevitable  that  every  monster  and  every  organism  outside  of  the 
normal  conditions  of  existence  shall  perish ;  and  this  is  true  also 
of  the  body  social.  But  morality  reduced  to  its  essentials — that 
is,  to  those  natural  laws  which  excite  Montaigne's  merriment — 
consists  in  those  essential  conditions  without  which  man  dis- 
appears. Thus,  to  sum  up,  without  morality  no  society,  and 
without  society  no  human  race.  Therefore  we  have  here  no  con- 
vention, and  we  may  truly  say  morality  is  natural,  since  it  is  a 
necessary  consequence  of  the  very  nature  of  things.  Further, 
we  may  say  that  it  is  immutable,  necessary,  imperative ;  not 
employing  these  terms  in  the  vague,  transcendental  and  incom- 
prehensible sense  usually  given  to  them,  but  in  a  precise,  positive, 
and  unambiguous  sense;  for  they  signify  that  morality  is  as  stable 
as  nature,  and  its  necessity  is  that  of  logic. 

Thus  the  idea  of  evolution,  though  it  looks  like  empiricism, 
•leads  to  unexpected  results.  If  we  could  dwell  upon  the  point, 
it  would  also,  doubtless,  give  us  a  little  better  understanding  of 
what  is  meant  by  progress  in  morals.  Usually,  in  treating  this 
subject,  it  is  deemed  sufficient  to  state  that  morality  is  immutable 
in  substance,  but  variable  in  accidents;  which  is  true,  but  vague. 
To  hold,  on  the  one  hand,  that  it  is  wholly  subject  to  change  is 
to  deprive  it  of  all  stability,  of  all  authority,  and  to  deny  what  is 
unquestionable — that  morality  is  inherent  in  the  nature  of  things. 
On  the  other  hand,  to  assert  that  it  is  subject  to  no  change  is  to 
give  the  lie  to  history,  to  mutilate  facts,  to  give  a  partial  expla- 
nation for  a  complete  one,  to  juggle  with  difficulties  instead  of 
resolving  them.  It  is  very  evident  that  the  moral  ideas  of  the 
France  of  to-day  do  not  resemble  those  of  the  Franks  in  the  time 
of  the  long-haired  kings  ;  and  that  no  bishop  of  our  day  would 
judge  the  crimes  of  Clovis  as  did  Gregory  of  Tours,  though  he 
sprang  from  a  saintly  family  and  was  himself  almost  canonized. 

Unfortunately  for  us,  this  investigation  has  never  been  made. 
If  the  invariable  in  morals  had  been  clearly  discriminated  from 
the  variable,  the  primitive  from  the  acquired,  it  would  be  easier  to 
ascertain  the  influence  of  heredity,  for  it  can  act  only  on  the 
variable  element,  which  is  subject  to  the  law  of  evolution.  Much 


Moral  Consequences  of  Heredity.  355 

has  been  said  about  this  invariable  basis,  but  very  little  has  been 
fixed.  Without  actually  attempting  to  do  so  here,  it  is  enough  to 
state  how  the  question  presents  itself  to  us.  In  the  first  place  it 
is  evident  that  if  this  common  basis  exists — if  there  be  a  certain 
number  of  moral  truths  Serving  as  a  foundation  for  all  the  rest, 
however  diverse  and  complicated,  and  as  a  criterion  to  qualify  our 
own  acts  and  those  of  others — then  this  ultimate  law  must  be  very 
general  in  its  character,  and  consequently  very  vague.  Since,  ex 
hypothesi,  it  must  be  found  at  the  root  of  every  moral  act,  present, 
past  and  future,  actual  or  possible,  and  as  consequently  it 
applies  to  an  incalculable  number  of  facts,  it  can  only  be  ab- 
stracted by  a  very  elaborate  process;  and  the  operation  whereby 
we  thus  pose  it  in  abslracto  is,  though  it  has  a  certain  scientific 
utility,  really  artificial.  The  law  is  not  thus  presented  to  us 
simply  and  nakedly ;  we  always  find  it  as  an  integral  part  of  a 
whole.  But  those  ultimate  elements  which  seem  to  lie  at  the  root 
of  every  moral  act,  and  which  abstraction  isolates,  are  these :  seek 
your  own  good — seek  the  good  of  others.  These  formulas  may 
be  thus  translated  :  respect  yourself— respect  others  ;  but  this 
latter  expression  is  more  concrete  and  consequently  less  general 
than  the  other.  These  formulas  alone  appear  to  us  to  be  ultimate, 
because  they  alone  are  natural ;  and  they  appear  natural  to  us 
because  they  are  those  absolute  conditions  of  existence  of  which 
we  have  already  spoken. 

If  this  be  admitted,  we  are,  perhaps,  in  a  way  to  draw  a  suffi- 
cient line  of  demarcation  between  the  invariable  and  the  variable 
in  morals.  These  ultimate  precepts  represent  only  a  very  small 
part  of  the  acts  which  we  call  moral ;  they  are  only  one  element 
among  many.  Every  moral  act,  such  as  is  every  moment  per- 
formed among  civilized  people,  may  be  likened  to  some  very 
complex  compound,  to  some  highly  complicated  motion,  or  to 
some  organic  product.  The  moral  element  proper  enters  into  it 
as  a  component  part,  but  it  must  combine  with  a  great  number  of 
other  elements  to  produce  the  total  act.  This  is  the  reason  why 
it  often  escapes  our  notice.  For  instance,  the  act  of  studying 
mechanics  may  seem  to  bear  no  relation  to  the  two  formulas 
already  stated.  On  reflection,  a  true  relation  will  be  discovered 
between  them.  But  as  this  act  is  highly  complex,  prcsupposing 


356  Heredity. 

knowledge  previously  acquired,  a  certain  mental  aptitude,  a 
special  mental  process,  a  certain  professional  or  other  aim — 
each  of  these  secondary  facts  being  itself  highly  complex — the 
moral  element  is,  as  it  were,  lost  amid  this  great  mass  of  elements, 
which  are  integrated  in  one  single  fact 

Hence  the  element  which  we  have  called  invariable  constitutes 
only  a  trifling  part  of  our  moral  states  and  moral  acts.  The 
variable  element  consists  of  that  sum  of  ideas,  judgments,  ratio- 
cinations, recollections,  passions,  sentiments,  habits,  views  often 
narrow  and  incomplete,  prejudices  and  errors  which  vary  from 
century  to  century,  between  nation  and  nation,  and  between  indi- 
vidual and  individual,  according  to  the  incessant  evolution  of 
the  human  mind. 

By  taking  this  point  of  view  we  see  facts,  apparently  at  total 
variance  one  with  another,  fall  under  one  and  the  same  moral 
formula,  much  as  the  ascent  of  balloons  and  the  fall  of  bodies 
come  under  the  one  law  of  gravitation.  If  I  take  in  a  deserted 
child,  if  I  care  for  and  educate  it,  if  I  spare  no  pains  to  train  it 
to  good  habits,  and  if  thus  I  succeed  in  making  it  an  accom- 
plished man,  assuredly  every  one  will  say  that  my  conduct  is 
worthy  of  praise.  Now  if  in  thought  we  go  back  two  centuries, 
and  imagine  ourselves  in  Madrid  or  Seville  at  the  instant  when 
an  auto-da-fe  is  about  to  take  place,  we  see  the  court  decked 
as  for  a  holiday;  crowds  throng  the  streets,  and  there  is  procession 
of  penitents  and  monks — the  cruel  pomp  is  revolting.  Yet  these 
two  acts,  unlike  though  they  be,  are  reducible  to  one  and  the 
same  moral  idea — do  good  to  others ;  but  in  the  former  instance 
this  idea  is  applied  only  to  true  judgments,  while  in  the  latter  case 
it  is  tangled  in  a  web  of  false  notions,  such  as  an  hypothetical 
belief  accepted  as  certain,  a  right  of  coercion  wrongfully  exerted, 
etc.,  which  eventually  annihilate  the  moral  idea. 

It  may  be  said  that  this  is  to  assign  a  very  small  part  to  the 
moral  element  properly  so  called.  But  the  fact  is  that  this  in- 
variable basis  is  necessarily  very  restricted,  as  we  have  shown. 
What  perfects  it — and  what  varies — is  the  ideas  and  judgments 
that  come  into  association  with  it  Hence  we  conclude  that  there 
is  a  great  deal  of  truth  in  the  much  disputed  adage — Omnis 
pcccans  cst  ignorans. 


Moral  Consequences  cf  Heredity.  357 

This  brings  us  back  to  our  subject,  which  we  seemed  to  have 
forgotten.  If  it  be  admitted  that  the  moral  act  comprises  a  great 
number  of  ideas,  judgments  and  sentiments,  as  has  been  already 
shown  by  the  influence  of  heredity  on  the  development  of  sensi- 
bility and  intelligence,  then  heredity  must  also  exert  a  great 
influence  on  the  formation  of  habits  and  of  moral  ideas — moral 
heredity  is  only  a  form  of  psychical  heredity.  It  will  suffice,  then, 
to  show  briefly  how  heredity  has  contributed  to  insure  the  moral 
conditions  of  the  evolution  of  society. 

It  is  generally  admitted  that  primitive  societies  must  have  passed 
through  three  phases — hunting,  pastoral,  and  agricultural  It  is 
only  with  the  latter  that  civilization  begins. 

In  the  hunter  stage,  which  is  the  condition  of  all  existing  savages, 
communities  live  by  the  chase,  by  fishing,  and  by  war.  This  phase 
is  characterized  by  the  unlimited  development  of  warlike  instincts, 
bloodthirsty  appetites,  and  a  wandering,  reckless  life.  Savages, 
like  children,  are  prone  to  follow  their  sensual  and  turbulent  pas- 
sions. Communities  that  have  been  unable  to  rise  out  of  this 
state,  have  either  perished  or  drag  out  a  miserable  existence  until 
some  superior  race  shall  exterminate  them.  Such  as  have  been 
able  to  submit  to  the  yoke  of  rude  laws,  imposed  upon  them  by 
their  sages,  have  in  time  acquired  less  brutal  manners  and  less 
furious  appetites.  It  is  very  likely  that  in  this  case  heredity  has 
acted  by  accumulation.  The  earlier  generations  submitted  only 
with  great  repugnance  to  laws  which  galled  them  sorely,  by 
restraining  their  most  natural  tendencies.  Yet  they  in  this  way 
acquired  somewhat  gentler  habits,  and  these  habits,  transmitted 
by  heredity,  made  succeeding  generations  more  ready  to  obey  the 
law.  And  thus,  amid  many  exceptions  and  frequent  reversions  to 
primitive  appetites  (phenomena  of  atavism),  new  steps  in  advance 
were  ever  possible,  and  savage  instincts  continually  diminished. 

The  same  is  to  be  said  of  nomad  peoples :  for  instance,  the  Tartars 
and  the  Mongols.  Their  manners  are  less  fierce,  and  their  habits 
more  sociable  than  those  of  the  hunter  tribes,  but  yet  their  taste 
for  an  adventurous  life  detains  them  in  a  low  form  of  civilization. 
Civilization  must  be  attached  to  the  soil ;  it  requires  a  sedentary 
life,  cities,  roads,  individual  property — in  short,  those  fixed  elements 
which  are  its  conditions  of  existence.  The  Turks  and  the  Mant 


358  Heredity. 

chus  have  succeeded,  under  the  influence  of  laws  and  of  heredity, 
in  losing  the  nomad  instincts  of  their  races,  and  in  adopting  the 
civilization  of  the  peoples  they  conquered.  Others,  the  Mongols 
for  instance,  have  shown  themselves  incapable  of  this,  after  their 
hour  of  glory  under  Gengis  Khan  and  Tamerlane. 

Nations  destined  for  social  life  have  early  possessed  the  art  of 
agriculture,  together  with  all  that  it  implies  :  division  of  property, 
agricultural  arts  and  implements,  and  care  for  the  future.  Here 
would  begin  the  really  difficult  and  delicate  part  of  our  task,  and 
this,  for  lack  of  a  scientific  genesis  of  moral  ideas,  we  cannot 
attempt.  It  would  be  requisite  to  show  how  each  progressive  step 
of  civilization  presupposes  new  conditions  of  existence ;  how  to 
those  very  simple  conditions  of  existence  which,  as  we  have  said, 
are  the  groundwork  of  morals,  succeed  conditions  of  existence 
more  and  more  complex,  which  have  rendered  possible  every  fresh 
stage  in  civilization.  Then  we  should  have  to  show  the  part 
played  by  heredity  in  the  adaptation  of  successive  generations  to 
these  new  conditions.  But  we  can  here  merely  observe  that,  the 
primitive  state  of  mankind  being  characterized  by  a  lawless  indi- 
vidualism, the  development  of  sympathetic  tendencies — those  called 
'altruistic'  by  the  positivist  school — becomes  more  and  more 
necessary  in  proportion  as  civilization  increases.  These  tendencies 
certainly  exist,  whatever  may  have  been  said  of  them  by  those  who 
would  reduce  all  our  acts  to  egoism.  They  are  natural,  as  is 
proved  by  psychological  analysis.  The  attempt  has  even  been 
ingeniously  made  to  demonstrate  this  physically,  by  showing  that 
in  the  lowest  grade  of  the  biological  scale,  where  the  sexes  are  not 
distinct,  the  individual  is  restricted  to  egoistic  tendencies  alone  \ 
whereas,  so  soon  as  the  difference  of  sex  appears,  it  necessarily 
brings  with  itself  tendencies  of  a  different  nature,  which  go  beyond 
the  individual.  These  gross  sympathetic  instincts  of  the  lower 
organisms  are  developed  in  proportion  with  the  growth  of  intelli- 
gence. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  there  exist  in  man  natural  sympathetic 
tendencies,  which  are  the  germs  of  those  ulterior  complex  senti- 
ments which  we  call  patriotism,  philanthropy,  devotion  to  a  society 
or  an  idea.  From  what  has  been  said  in  the  preceding  chapter  as 
to  the  genesis  of  these  complex  ideas  and  sentiments,  we  can  form 


Moral  Consequences  of  Heredity.  359 

some  notion  of  the  part  played  by  heredity  in  the  formation  of 
moral  habits,  the  evolution  of  morals  being  really  but  the  evolution 
of  intelligence. 

Heredity,  however,  has  a  reverse  side.  If  by  accumulation  it 
aids  progress,  it  at  the  same  time  preserves  or  recalls,  in  the  midst 
of  civilization,  sentiments  and  tendencies  that  are  by  no  means 
related  to  such  an  environment  We  have  already  given  instances 
of  this.  It  is  perfectly  natural  to  recognize  facts  of  atavism  in 
those  sanguinary  instincts,  those  savage  tastes,  that  insane  and 
objectless  passion  for  wild  pursuits,  that  insatiable  desire  for 
adventure,  which  we  find  in  certain  men  who  are,  as  it  would  seem, 
highly  civilized.  No  doubt  there  is  in  these  vices  such  a  ground- 
work of  power  and  greatness  that  the  utter  suppression  of  them 
would  be  a  weakening  of  the  living  forces  of  humanity;  and  it  is 
therefore  the  office  of  civilization  to  regulate  these  instincts,  not  to 
destroy  them.  It  utilizes  this  troubled  activity  by  directing  it  into 
wild  lands,  against  unexplored  regions.  There,  beyond  the  limits 
of  civilization,  these  men  work  for  civilization.  Those  of  them 
who  remain  within  her  pale,  but  have  the  power  of  adapting  them- 
selves to  it,  are  but  a  curse  to  society,  for  in  them  primitive 
humanity  reappears,  though  its  natural  environment  has  vanished. 

Then  science  verifies  what  many  religions  have  discerned  indis- 
tinctly, and  expressed  after  their  own  fashion.  It  is  a  belief  com- 
mon to  them  that  man  is  a  fallen  creature,  and  that  he  bears  the 
stain  of  an  original  transgression,  which  is  transmitted  by  heredity. 
Science  interprets  this  vague  hypothesis.  Without  inquiring  what 
was  the  original  state  of  humanity,  we  may  confidently  hold  it  to 
have  been  lowly  enough.  Primitive  man,  ignorant  and  idealess, 
the  slave  of  his  appetites  and  instincts,  which  were  simply  the  forces 
of  nature  freely  acting  in  him,  rose  but  very  gradually  to  the  con- 
ception of  the  ideal.  Art,  poetry,  science,  morality,  all  those 
highest  manifestations  of  the  human  soul,  are  like  some  frail  and 
precious  plant  which  has  come  late  into  being  and  been  enriched 
by  the  long  toil  of  generations.  It  is  as  impossible  to  govern  life 
without  the  ideal  as  it  is  to  steer  a  ship  without  compass  or  stars; 
still  the  ideal  was  not  revealed  to  man  all  at  once,  but  only  little 
by  little.  Each  people  has  had  its  own  ideal ;  each  generation 
has  enabled  the  succeeding  generation  to  aspire  towards  a  more 


360  Heredity. 

perfect  ideal,  as,  in  ascending  some  lofty  mountain,  we  take  in  a 
wider  horizon  as  we  climb.  And  during  this  gradual  conquest,  in 
which  humanity  endeavours  to  strip  off  all  that  is  low  and  base, 
primitive  instincts,  which  are  indeed  an  original  stain,  reappear 
every  moment — indelible,  though  weakened — to  remind  us,  not 
of  a  fall,  but  of  the  low  estate  from  which  we  have  risen. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

SOCIAL  CONSEQUENCES   OF  HEREDITY 

IT  would  be  beside  our  subject  and  beyond  the  measure  of  our 
powers  to  examine  here  in  detail  the  social  consequences  of 
heredity.  To  trace  them  through  the  manners,  the  legislation, 
the  civil  and  political  institutions,  and  the  modes  of  govern- 
ment of  various  peoples,  would  require  a  separate  work.  Heredity 
presents  itself  to  us  under  two  forms,  one  natural,  the  other 
institutional.  We  have  studied  the  former  only,  even  so  restricting 
ourselves  to  only  one  of  its  aspects,  its  psychological  side ;  we 
have  but  incidentally  touched  on  the  ground  of  physiology,  in 
order  to  confirm  our  positions.  It  will  therefore  suffice,  in  order 
to  conclude  this  work,  to  show  how  the  institutional  heredity 
derives  from  natural  heredity,  and  thus  to  refer  the  effects  to 
their  cause. 

Every  nation  possesses  at  least  a  vague  belief  in  hereditary 
transmission.  Facts  compel  it :  and  indeed  it  may  even  be  main- 
tained that  in  primitive  times  this  belief  is  stronger  than  it  is 
under  civilization.  From  this  belief  springs  institutional  heredity. 
It  is  certain  that  social  and  political  considerations,  or  even  pre- 
judices, must  have  contributed  to  develop  and  strengthen  it,  but 
it  were  absurd  to  suppose  that  it  has  been  invented.  The 
characters  which  we  have  already  often  recognized  in  heredity 
— necessity,  conservatism,  and  stability — are  logically  found  in  the 
institutions  which  spring  from  it  This  a  rapid  examination  of 
the  subject  will  show.  In  exhibiting  the  part  of  heredity  in  the 
institution  of  the  family,  of  castes,  of  nobility,  of  sovereignty>  it 


Social  Consequences  of  Heredity.  361 

will  be  our  special  study  to  throw  light  upon  a  point  which,  in 
our  eyes,  is  of  great  philosophical  importance — namely,  the  con- 
flict of  heredity  and  free-will 


The  family  is  a  natural  fact.  Numerous  works  both  in  France 
and  abroad  show  this,  and  have  related  the  history  of  the  family, 
described  its  various  forms,  and  arranged  the  moral  relations  which 
subsist  between  its  members.  But  with  this  we  have  here  no 
concern. 

From  the  stand-point  of  heredity — too  generally  overlooked  by 
moralists — it  may  be  said  that  all  forms  of  the  family  are  reducible 
to  two  principal  and  opposite  types,  around  which  oscillate  a  great 
number  of  intermediate  forms.  The  one  allows  a  very  large  part 
to  heredity,  and  a  very  small  part  to  individual  free-will.  The 
other  allows  a  very  large  part  to  individual  free-will,  but  regards 
hereditary  transmission  as  the  exception,  not  the  law.  The  former 
is  the  rule  of  strict  conservatism ;  the  latter  the  rule  of  testa- 
mentary liberty. 

If  we  examine  the  first  of  these  types,  we  find  it  under  various 
forms  in  all  primitive  civilizations,  and  it  rests  on  a  very  firm  faith 
in  heredity.  The  child  is  regarded  as  the  direct  continuation  of 
the  parents ;  and  indeed,  properly  speaking,  between  father  and 
son,  between  mother  and  daughter,  there  is  no  distinction  of 
persons — there  is  only  one  person  under  a  two-fold  appearance. 
If  this  idea  be  applied  to  the  entire  series  of  generations,  we  find 
the  case  to  be  thus : — in  the  first  place  is  a  family  chief,  a  mys- 
terious and  revered  being,  usually  ranked  with  the  gods ;  then  a 
succession  of  generations,  each  represented  by  the  first-born  son, 
who  is  the  visible  incarnation  of  the  first  father,  and  whose  part  is 
essentially  conservative.  He  collects  together  the  religious  beliefs, 
the  traditions  and  the  possessions  of  the  family,  and  transmits  them 
in  turn.  He  may  not  alienate  anything  or  destroy  anything. 
He  can  alter  nothing  in  the  invariable  order  of  succession  which 
wraps  him  round  in  its  fatality.  Under  such  a  regime,  individual 
tree-will  counts  ior  little,  while  heredity  is  supreme.  This  is  a 
pantheistic  organization  of  the  family;  heredity  being  the  in- 


362  Heredity. 

variable  and  indestructible  ground  whereon  the  ephemeral  shadow 
of  the  individuals  is  thrown,  and  over  which  it  flits. 

In  all  primitive  civilizations,  the  family  came  more  or  less  near 
to  this  type  wherein  heredity  is  everything  and  free-will  nothing.1 
Among  the  Hindus,  Greeks,  Romans,  and  Aryan  peoples  in 
general,  the  family  was  a  natural  community,  having  not  only  the 
same  possessions,  the  same  interests,  the  same  traditions,  but 
the  same  gods  and  the  same  rites.  Religion  was  domestic,  and 
hence  Plato  defines  relationship  to  be  '  a  community  of  domestic 
gods.'  These  gods  were  of  course  worshipped  by  their  own 
family,  in  their  own  sanctuary,  and  on  an  altar  whereon  the  sacred 
fire  was  ever  burning.  No  stranger  could  offer  sacrifice  to  them 
without  sacrilege. 

To  this  necessary  heredity  of  rites,  which  it  was  of  obligation  to 
maintain,  was  added  the  heredity  of  property.  Originally  among 
the  Hindus,  property  was  inalienable.  In  many  Greek  cities  ancient 
laws  forbad  the  citizen  to  sell  his  plot  of  land.2  In  Greece  and 
in  India  succession  was  from  male  to  male  in  order  of  primo- 
geniture, and  only  at  a  late  period  in  history  was  any  share  allowed 
to  the  younger  sons,  or  to  the  daughters.  It  is  probable  that 
primitive  Rome  in  like  manner  accepted  the  law  of  primogeniture. 

It  is  equally  instructive  to  notice  that  testaments  were  intro- 
duced at  a  late  period,  at  the  time  when  the  state  and  the  fafnily 
had  broken  away  from  the  immobility  of  inheritance,  in  order  to 
give  freer  play  to  individual  action.  Thus,  according  to  Fustel  de 
Coulanges,  ancient  Hindu  law  knew  nothing  of  testaments.  The 
same  is  to  be  said  of  Athenian  law  prior  to  Solon.  At  Sparta 
testaments  do  not  appear  till  after  the  Peloponnesian  war ;  and  at 
Rome  they  do  not  seem  to  have  been  in  use  before  the  law  of  the 
Twelve  Tables.  This  allows  to  them  the  force  of  law :  Uti 
e^assil  (paterfamilias)  super  pecunia  tutelave  sua  rei,  ita  jus  esto. 

The  rule  which  subordinates  the  individual  to  heredity,  by 
making  the  conservation  of  property  obligatory,  exists  in  a  more 
or  less  perfect  form  in  the  great  families  of  Sweden,  Norway, 
Denmark,  and  Scotland ;  also  over  a  large  portion  of  Germany, 

1  On  this  subject  see  Fustel  de  Coulanges,  Le  CU6  Antique,  and  Le  Play,  La 
Keforme  Sociale,  ch.  ii. 
1  Aristotle,  Politics,  ii.  4. 


Social  Consequences  of  Heredity.  363 

particularly  in  Hanover,  Brunswick,  Mecklenburg,  and  Bavaria. 
In  Russia,  among  the  nomad  tribes  of  the  Ural,  the  Caspian,  the 
lower  Volga,  and  the  Don,  with  the  exception  of  personal  pro- 
perty— limited  to  clothing — everything  is  possessed  by  the  com- 
munity, and  the  heads  of  families  cannot  alienate  anything. 

At  the  other  extremity  we  find  the  opposite  type  of  testamen- 
tary liberty,  where  the  individual,  instead  of  being  the  slave  of 
heredity,  is  its  absolute  master,  and  may  at  will  establish,  restrict, 
suspend,  or  do  away  with  it  Here  the  freest  play  is  accorded  to 
free-will,  and  heredity,  in  place  of  being  the  rule,  becomes  the 
exception.  Thus  it  is  not  surprising  that  this  rule,  unknown  to 
primitive  peoples,  is  propagated  and  extended  in  proportion  as 
we  depart  from  nature  and  her  fatalistic  laws.  It  is  found  in  its 
most  perfect  form  in  the  United  States  of  America,  and  under  a 
restricted  form  in  England,  in  various  German  States,  and  in  Italy. 
As  we  have  seen,  it  made  its  appearance  at  an  early  period  in 
ancient  Rome. 

We  need  not  here  inquire  whether  testamentary  discretion  has 
drawbacks.  It  is  certain  that  if  in  France  legislation  is  adverse 
to  it,  the  reason  is  lest  it  should  be  abused ;  and  when  we  observe 
the  evident  tendency  of  those  who  demand  it  to  go  back  to  the 
ancien  regime,  we  can  but  believe  that  it  would  there  be  attended 
by  disastrous  consequences.  It  is  with  testamentary  as  with  all 
other  liberty — in  order  to  possess  it  a  man  must  be  worthy,  and 
know  how  to  use  it. 

It  will  be  observed  that  the  two  opposite  rules  of  which  we 
have  spoken  imply  two  different  views  of  property;  the  one  in 
which  property  exists  completely,  the  other  in  which  it  hardly 
exists  at  all.  Under  the  rule  of  testamentary  discretion,  owner- 
ship  is  absolute  and  without  limit;  property  forms  part  of  the 
individual,  who  disposes  of  it  as  of  himself. 

Under  the  rule  of  obligatory  conservation,  ownership  is  reduced 
to  usufruct.  And  since  under  the  first  arrangement  heredity  has 
no  place  in  right,  since  it  emanates  wholly  from  free-will,  and  as 
under  the  second  it  always  exists  in  right  and  in  fact,  being  the 
law,  we  are  again  face  to  face  with  the  same  antinomy;  and  we 
may  conclude  that  in  the  organization  of  the  family  there  has 
ever  existed  an  inverse  proportion  between  the  power  of  heredity 
and  that  of  free-will. 


364  Heredity. 


IL 

The  family  is  the  molecule  of  the  social  world.  So  soon  as  it 
is  constituted  society  may  take  its  rise.  Families  unite,  associate 
together,  amalgamate,  and  are  perpetuated  by  thus  commingling: 
the  body  social  is  the  result  of  this  fusion.  After  it  has  passed 
out  of  its  embryonic  phase — the  hunter  and  the  nomad  states — 
and  when  the  first  forms  of  civilized  life  are  beginning  to  be 
produced,  then  heredity  appears  as  a  social  and  political  element 
in  the  institution  of  caste. 

Caste  is  the  result  of  various  causes — difference  of  race,  con- 
quest, religious  creeds — but  everywhere  its  groundwork  is  the 
belief  in  heredity.  Caste  is  exclusive  :  there  is  no  entrance  into 
it  except  by  birth ;  no  art,  no  merit,  no  violence  avail  to  bursr 
open  the  doors  of  caste ;  it  reigns  supreme  over  the  destinies  of 
the  individual.  Here  we  find  heredity  invested  with  its  constant 
characteristics,  viz.,  conservatism  and  stability.  Nothing  is  more 
stagnant  than  nations  that  have  accepted  caste. 

In  India  we  find  the  ideal  of  this  arrangement,  for  nowhere  else 
is  it  more  firmly  grounded,  more  compactly  constituted,  or  more 
minutely  regulated.  Moral  heredity,  its  natural  basis,  is  explicitly 
recognized  in  the  sacred  laws  of  Manu. 

'  A  woman  always  brings  into  the  world  a  son  gifted  with  the 
same  qualities  as  he  who  begat  him.' 

'  We  may  know  by  his  acts  the  man  that  belongs  to  a  low  class, 
or  who  is  born  of  a  disreputable  mother.' 

'  A  man  of  low  birth  has  the  evil  dispositions  of  his  father,  or 
of  his  mother,  or  of  both — he  never  can  hide  his  descent.' l 

Hindu  law,  as  all  are  aware,  admits  four  original  castes :  the 
Brahman,  born  from  the  mouth  of  Brahma;  the  Kshatriya,  sprung 
from  his  arm ;  the  Vaishya,  from  his  thigh,  and  Sudr  from  his 
feet  '  The  priestly,  the  military,  and  the  commercial  castes  are 
all  regenerate ;  the  fourth,  or  servile  caste,  has  only  one  birth.8 
There  is  no  fifth  caste.' 

1  Manava  Darma  Shastra,  book  x. 

'  Ibid,  book  x.  ch.  iv.  According  to  the  Hindu  creed,  to  attain  to  supreme 
felicity  (Nirvana),  one  must  be  born  again  successively  into  the  noble  castes,  in- 
cluding that  of  the  Brahmans.  The  latter  complacently  tell  of  a  devout  king 


Social  Consequences  of  Heredity.  365 

The  Brahman  has  for  his  inheritance  science,  contemplation,  the 
meditation  of  the  mysteries,  the  care  for  divine  worship,  and  the 
reading  of  the  sacred  books.  He  is  recognized  by  his  staff,  by  the 
cord  he  wears  over  his  shoulder,  by  the  girdle  around  his  loins, 
but  still  more  by  his  complexion,  which  differs  from  that  of  the 
other  castes ;  for  as  travellers  tell  us,  a  Brahman  who'  is  a  some- 
what black,  and  a  Pariah  a  somewhat  white,  are  regarded  as  mon- 
strosities, and  in  no  other  caste  are  there  handsomer  women  or 
prettier  children. 

The  Kshatriya  is  destined  for  active  life,  he  is  soldier  or  king  ; 
but  he  owes  submission  to  the  lord  of  all  castes,  the  Brahman,  a 
duty  which  he  has  not  always  discharged. 

The  Vaishyas  practise  the  manual  arts,  agriculture  and  com- 
merce; they  support  the  priest  and  the  noble,  who  pray  for  them 
or  fight  for  them. 

In  the  lowest  grade,  the  only  virtue  of  the  Sudr  is  resignation. 
Devoted  to  servile  labour,  and  treated  with  contumely,  he  knows 
no  life  but  that  of  privations,  but  he  has  a  faint  glimpse  of  salva- 
tion in  the  distant  future. 

Thus  each  has  his  place,  his  environment,  to  which  he  is  im- 
prisoned by  his  birth.  He  may  not  aspire  higher,  neither  may  he 
marry  outside  his  own  caste.  The  time,  however,  had  to  come 
when  these  four  primitive  divisions  would  no  longer  suffice. 
Though  the  law  proscribes  and  anathematizes  extra-caste  marriage, 
still  passion  and  the  chances  of  life  were  necessarily  stronger  than 
the  law;  hence,  besides  the  four  pure  castes,  others  have  arisen, 
and  these  the  laws  of  Manu,  while  pronouncing  them  impure,  still 
condescends  to  regulate.  It  would  be  tedious  to  enumerate  these 
hybrid  classes ;  for  as  was  to  be  expected,  the  development  of  insti- 
tutions and  the  progress  of  civilization  have  produced  an  endless 
variety  of  crossings.  Thus,  half  a  century  ago  there  were  no  less 
than  four  classes,  subdivided  into  twenty  others — and  this  simply 
among  the  Brahmans  of  the  south.  Among  the  Sudr  there  are 
about  a  hundred  and  twenty,  which  may  be  reduced  to  eighteen 

who  aspired  to  the  Nirvana,  but  who,  like  any  other  person,  had  to  obey  his 
law,  and  to  give  up  the  practice  of  the  austerities  by  means  of  which  he  was 
striving  to  obtain  the  miracle  of  a  transformation  impossible  in  the  case  of  a 
Kshatriya. 


366  Heredity. 

principal  classes.  But,  as  Prosper  Lucas  observes,  '  these  non- 
race  classes — all  alike  excluded  from  the  sacrifices,  and  destined  to 
exercise  the  vilest  functions — have  no  more  value  in  the  eyes  of 
Hindus  than  horses,  cattle  or  dogs  without  pedigree  would  have 
in  the  eyes  of  an  Arab,  a  farmer,  or  a  huntsman.' 

In  all  these  subdivisions  the  only  point  which  interests  us  is  the 
part  assigned  to  psychological  heredity.  It  is  very  considerable 
indeed.  According  to  Hindu  belief,  the  father's  influence  pre- 
ponderates in  the  procreation  of  the  children ;  hence  a  marriage 
beyond  caste  on  the  part  of  the  mothers  is  looked  on  as  far  more 
criminal  than  that  of  the  fathers.  When  a  Brahman  woman 
marries  a  Sudr,  the  chandal  (or  cross-breed)  born  of  their 
union  '  is  the  most  infamous  of  men.' 

It  is  curious  to  observe  that  the  law  rests  on  heredity  in  assign- 
ing appropriate  occupations  to  the  impure  castes.  While  admit- 
ting the  preponderance  of  the  father  over  the  mother,  it  looks  on 
the  cross-breed  as  deriving  from  both.  Thus,  a  child  born  of  a 
Brahman  and  a  Vaishya  woman  will  practise  medicine,  a  profession 
the  practice  of  which  is  in  one  respect  a  liberal  pursuit,  while  in 
another  respect  it  approaches  the  manual  arts.  The  son  of  a 
Kshatriya  and  a  Brahman  woman,  will  be  at  the  same  time  a 
horseman,  in  reference  to  the  warrior  habits  of  his  father,  and 
a  bard  or  singer  like  the  Brahmans.  The  sons  of  a  Kshatriya 
and  a  Sudr  woman,  will  be  hunters  like  their  fathers,  but  their 
game  will  be  serpents  and  animals  that  dwell  in  caves. 

It  is  plain  that  this  legislation  has  been  skilfully  elaborated  and 
deduced  from  a  single  principle — heredity.  Nowhere  else  is  the 
institution  of  caste  so  firmly  grounded  or  so  complete.  It  is,  how- 
ever, found  in  a  less  perfect  form  under  all  primitive  civilizations 
— among  the  Assyrians,  the  Persians,  and  the  Egyptians,  who 
reckoned  seven  classes  according  to  Herodotus,  five  according  to 
Diodorus  Siculus.  It  was  found  by  the  Spaniards  in  Peru ;  in 
grades  above  the  commonalty  were  the  Curucas  and  the  Incas. 
The  latter,  whose  skulls,  according  to  Morton  (Crania  Americana ), 
'give  evidence  of  a  decided  intellectual  pre-eminence  over  the 
other  races  of  the  country,'  constituted  the  high  nobility. 

We  may  even  say  that  universally,  in  all  nations  who  have  risen 
above  barbarism,  we  find,  if  not  castes,  at  least  classes,  which  con- 


Social  Consequences  of  Heredity.  367 

stitute  the  mitigated  form  of  caste.  The  class  is  not  as  exclusive 
as  the  caste.  Though  birth  and  heredity  are  its  groundwork,  and 
though  it  is  natural  to  a  privileged  order  that  it  should  close  its  ranks 
against  the  new-comer,  entrance  is  still  possible ;  merit,  energy, 
sometimes  even  chance,  are  strong  enough  to  break  down  the 
barriers.  History,  moreover  shows  that  class  assumes  every  pos- 
sible form,  being  sometimes  inviolable,  like  caste,  anon  reduced  to 
very  slight  differences  for  the  sake  of  distinction. 

The  political  institution  of  classes  is  found  among  the  Greeks, 
the  Romans,  and  Germanic  nations.  Perhaps  even  we  may  dis- 
cover in  the  beginnings  of  their  history  some  vestiges  of  caste.  In 
Rome,  at  least,  the  distinction  between  patrician  and  plebeian  was 
very  sharply  drawn  at  first,  and  among  the  Germans  between  the 
freeman  and  the  slave.  Indeed  the  institution  of  slavery,  which 
was  universal  in  ancient  times,  formed  among  all  peoples  at  least 
two  classes,  based  on  heredity,  and  brought  about  the  fact  that  all 
ancient  communities,  even  the  so-called  democracies,  were  in 
reality  aristocracies. 

We  may  compare  with  castes  and  classes  hereditary  professions, 
which  are  but  the  same  thing  under  another  form.  It  is  even 
probable,  as  Lucas  says,  '  that  the  heredity  of  professions  is  the 
primitive  type,  the  elementary  form  of  all  institutions  based  on  the 
heredity  of  the  moral  nature.  Capacities  are  at  first  distributed 
naturally ;  man  follows  his  instincts,  no  less  than  the  animal,  the 
family  no  less  than  the  species.  Practice  produces  habit,  habit 
produces  art,  and  acquaintance  with  an  art  gives  an  interest  in 
it :  nature  and  education  concentrate  more  and  more  a  given  art  in 
a  certain  family,  the  common  belief  regards  the  art  as  belonging  to 
that  family;  in  course  of  time  come  institutions, religions,  conquests, 
which,  in  the  place  of  a  fact,  traditional  but  free,  substitute  an 
obligation,  and  in  place  of  the  spontaneous  will  of  the  father,  or 
the  instinctive  dispositions  of  the  child,  set  up  the  will  of  the  law, 
the  conqueror,  or  the  priest.' 

Here  no  doubt  we  must  assign  a  large  measure  of  influence  to 
education,  to  external  agencies — heredity  is  not  all,  yet  it  is  much. 
If  any  one  doubt  this,  let  him  remark  how  in  ancient  times  certain 
professions  of  a  purely  moral  nature,  which  necessarily  presuppose 
definite  psychological  conditions,  were  hereditary,  and  he  will  see 


368  Heredity. 

that  this  heredity  cannot  be  altogether  explained  by  external  causes, 
by  family  traditions,  or  by  secrets  kept  and  transmitted. 

Thus  in  Grecian  antiquity  medicine  was  originally  cultivated  by 
a  few  families.  The  Asclepiadse,  or  family  of  ^Esculapius,  called 
themselves  the  descendants  of  that  god.  They  practised  their  art 
in  the  Asclepia,  and  founded  the  schools  of  Cnidos,  of  Rhodes, 
and  of  Cos — Hippocrates  was  the  seventeenth  physician  in  his 
family. 

The  art  of  divination,  the  gift  of  prophecy,  that  high  favour  of 
the  gods,  was  by  the  Greeks  supposed  to  descend  generally  from 
father  to  son.  This  belief  prevailed  in  Homeric  times  :  Calchas 
was  descended  from  a  family  of  soothsayers. 

The  heredity  of  priesthood  is  found  among  many  peoples  who 
have  not  known  caste  distinctions.  It  is  seen  in  Mexico,  in  Judaea, 
where  the  tribe  of  Judah  alone  supplied  the  priests,  and  even  in 
Greece.  In  the  latter  Country,  where  the  religion  was  essentially 
local,  and  each  city  had  its  own  gods,  we  find  in  most  of  the  towns 
some  sacerdotal  family — at  Delphi,  the  Deucalionidae  and  Bran- 
chidse ;  at  Athens,  the  Eumolpidae,  and  so  on. 

The  conclusion  to  be  drawn  from  all  this  is  plain,  that  heredity 
is  a  law  of  nature  from  which  a  people  frees  itself  in  proportion  as 
it  grows  in  civilization.  If  we  take  one  after  another  all  the  primi- 
tive civilizations,  India,  Persia,  Egypt,  Assyria,  Judaea,  Peru, 
Mexico,  Greece  and  Rome,  we  shall  often  find  in  their  earliest 
period  the  institution  of  caste,  and  of  hereditary  professions,  and 
always  that  of  classes.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  we  notice  how  among 
very  highly  civilized  nations — that  is  to  say,  those  as  far  removed 
as  possible  from  nature — the  institution  of  caste  and  of  hereditary 
professions  is  quite  impracticable,  and  how  even  classes  have  dis- 
appeared; if  we  observe  the  advance  toward  liberty  more  and  more 
marked  through  the  transformation  of  castes  into  classes,  and  the 
abolition  of  classes,  as  also  by  the  change  from  the  heredity  of 
professions  to  corporations  and  to  freedom  of  occupation;  if, 
furthermore,  we  remark  how  the  influence  of  heredity  is  at  first  held 
to  be  absolute  (caste),  then  relative  (class),  finally,  though  perhaps 
wrongly,  as  somewhat  weak  (the  present  period),  we  cannot  but 
admit  that  these  facts  disclose  to  us  a  curious  antagonism  between 
heredity  and  free-will 


Social  Consequences  of  Heredity.  369 


Heredity  is  a  law  of  living  nature,  a  biological  law  of  destiny 
and  necessity,  like  physical  laws — a  principle  of  conservatism  and 
stability.  Hence  it  is  that  so  soon  as  civilizations  have  attained 
any  growth,  in  accordance  with  the  law  of  progress,  of  which  varia- 
tion is  the  essence,  there  arises  a  struggle  between  these  two 
principles,  and  then  either  progress  must  overthrow  caste,  as  in 
Greece,  or  caste  hinder  progress,  as  in  India. 

From  this  antagonism  between  heredity  and  free-will  flow  some 
weighty  consequences.  We  will  state  these  in  the  conclusion  of 
this  work,  when  we  shall  be  able  to  generalize  the  facts  more  fully. 
We  will  now  examine  the  relations  between  heredity  and  nobility. 

in. 

Nobility,  whether  we  accept  or  reject  it,  has  its  natural  causes. 
It  is  the  result  of  the  original  inequality  of  talents  and  characters. 
History  shows  that  though  it  has  assumed  various  shapes,  in 
different  countries  and  at  different  periods,  it  has  always  and 
everywhere  rested  on  a  conscious  and  intentional  selection,  con- 
solidated in  an  institution;  this,  at  least,  is  what  it  has  wished  to 
be.  With  the  exception  of  China,  where  nobility  is  conferred  on 
principles  the  very  reverse  of  those  prevailing  elsewhere,1  we  find 
this  distinction  always  based  on  heredity.  In  the  ancient  east 
(India,  Persia,  Egypt,  Assyria,  etc.)  where  the  rule  of  castes  pre- 
vailed, we  do  not  find  nobility  in  the  modern  sense  of  the  word — for 
though  nobility  is  often  called  a  caste,  the  two  things  are  in  reality 
incompatible.  Nobility  is  impossible  either  in  a  community  so 
simple  as  to  be  included  in  three  or  four  divisions,  or  in  a  very 
mixed,  very  active  community,  such  as  that  of  the  United  States. 
But  the  social  state  of  the  east  resembled  the  symbolic  ladder  of 
the  worship  of  Mithra,  each  of  the  seven  degrees  of  which  was  of 
a  particular  metal  and  answered  to  a  special  initiation  into  the 
infinite  mysteries  of  the  universe.  Each  man  was  born  in  his  own 
degree,  of  iron  or  silver,  lead  or  gold,  as  the  case  might  be,  and 

1  In  China,  when  the  sovereign  confers  a  title  of  nobility  on  a  subject,  that 
title  ennobles  the  ascendants,  while  the  descendants  remain  commoners.  This 
anomaly  is  explained  by  the  great  importance  attached  by  the  Chinaman  to  the 
cultus  of  his  ancestors  ;  indeed,  he  scarcely  knows  any  other  religion  than  this. 


3  ;o  Heredity. 

there  he  must  remain :  the  caste  absorbed  the  individual.  The 
westerns  lengthened  out  this  over-short  ladder,  and  increased  the 
number  of  degrees,  and  \ve  might  even  say  that  in  many  countries 
this  process  has  neutralized  itself.  Between  these  two  extremes — 
the  seven-stepped  ladder  on  the  one  hand,  and  on  the  other  the 
almost  inappreciable  gradient  of  modern  times — stands  the  true 
period  of  nobility,  Rome  and  mediaeval  Germany. 

The  great  families  which  were  to  be  perpetuated  for  cen- 
turies by  heredity  arose  in  many  ways,  of  which  history  alone  can 
give  the  full  details.  Some  conquering  race,  inferior  in  numbers, 
superior  in  force,  often  formed  a  privileged  class,  and  held  the 
vanquished  down — such  were  the  Normans  in  England,  the  Incas 
in  Peru,  the  Franks  in  Gaul.  The  latter  were  the  only  nation  that 
possessed  the  '  terre  salique,'  '  alleu '  or  '  franc-alleu  ' — hereditary 
domain,  which  became  later  the  fief.  They  were  ennobled  by  the 
very  fact  of  conquest.  Oftener,  nobility  was  conferred  by  the 
prince,  in  recompense  for  some  brilliant  action.  There  were  also 
certain  charges  and  functions  that  gave  nobility,  and  even  some 
kinds  of  commerce.  Nobility  was  either  transmissible  or  intrans- 
missible, personal  or  territorial,  of  the  gown  or  of  the  sword;  in 
short,  there  were  so  many  denominations,  varieties,  distinctions, 
and  categories,  that  an  author  in  the  last  century  who  tries  to 
classify  them  reckons  more  than  sixty. 

But  whatever  its  origin,  nobility  was  always  hereditary.  This  is 
its  first  law.  It  must  perpetuate  itself  from  its  own  resources;  it 
must  have  a  past  history,  and  must  preserve  its  memories  and  its 
traditions.  In  the  state  it  represents  stability.  This  character  of 
continuousness  and  permanence,  which  is  the  essence  of  heredity,  is 
also  the  essence  of  nobility.  It  has  therefore  always  been  careful 
to  keep  itself  pure;  this  is  its  first  duty.  '  Nobility,'  says  the  Comte 
de  Boulainvilliers,  '  is  a  natural  privilege,  incommunicable  by  any 
way  other  than  that  of  birth.'  There  is  no  greater  stain  on  cha- 
racter than  to  act  in  a  manner  derogatory  to  birth.  To  derogate 
from  nobility  is  to  deny  ancestry  and  to  ruin  descendants ;  it  is 
to  break  the  golden  chain  and  to  let  them  fall  down  below  the 
commonalty,  into  a  category  apart — to  make  them  outcasts,  for 
whom  society  has  neither  name  nor  place.  Hence  those  genea- 
logical trees,  so  carefully  drawn  and  blazoned,  extending  back* 


Social  Consequences  of  Heredity.  371 

wards  through  the  a^es.  Hence  anxiety  about  alliances,  always  an 
important  matter,  not  only  for  the  German  baron,  who  required 
in  his  wife  six  quarterings  of  nobility,  but  also  of  the  Inca,  who 
married  his  sister  in  order  to  perpetuate  the  race  of  the  Sun. 

*  Nobility,'  says  Dr.  Lucas,  '  in  the  primitive  vigour  of  its  insti- 
tution, made  it  a  point  of  honour  not  to  mingle  its  blood  with  the 
blood  of  other  classes.  In  its  minor  alliances  it  scrutinized  as 
minutely  the  purity  of  pedigree  as  the  Arabs  in  Africa,  or  the 
members  of  jockey  clubs  in  our  day,  with  their  eyes  on  the  French 
or  English  stud  books,  scrutinize  the  pedigree  of  their  horses.' 

To  us  it  appears  clear  and  unquestionable  that  nobility  is  every- 
where founded  on  the  idea  of  heredity.  The  first  step  towards  its 
institution  is  the  hypothesis,  distinctly  expressed  by  some,  indis- 
tinctly perceived  by  others,  that  all  kinds  of  worth  are  transmissible; 
that  a  man  inherits  from  his  ancestors  courage,  regard  for  honour, 
loyalty,  no  less  than  lofty  stature,  robust  health,  and  strong  arms. 
Bon  sang  ne  pent  mentir — Blood  must  tell.  Our  old  feudal  poems 
delight  to  represent  cowards  and  felons  as  bastards,  unworthy 
scions  of  a  great  race  that  have  soiled  their  blood.  The  brave 
spring  from  the  brave,  and  love  to  proclaim  their  genealogy.1 

Hence  an  illustrious  writer  of  our  day  attributes  to  the  belief  in 
heredity  a  far  too  unimportant  part  when  he  says  :  '  The  true  idea 
of  nobility  is  that  it  originates  in  merit,  and  as  it  is  clear  that  merit 
is  not  hereditary,  it  is  easily  shown  that  hereditary  nobility  is  an 
absurdity.  But  this  is  the  universal  French  mistake  of  a  distribu- 
tive justice,  with  the  state  holding  the  balance.  The  social  reason 
of  nobility,  regarded  as  an  institution  of  public  utility,  was  not  to 
recompense  merit,  but  to  call  forth,  and  render  possible  and  even 
easy,  certain  kinds  of  merit.' 2  The  author's  stand-point  is  no  doubt 
somewhat  different  from  our  own,  since  he  considers  more  par- 
ticularly the  utility  of  nobility  as  an  institution,  not  its  legitimacy 
as  a  consequence;  but  we  still  hold  that  belief  in  the  heredity  of 
merit  is  the  groundwork  of  nobility,  and  that,  like  every  belief  that 
is  living  and  unshakable,  it  has  survived  all  the  attacks,  criticisms, 
and  reverses  it  has  sustained  from  experience.  In  our  view 

1  See  Homer's  poems,  which  have  so  much  analogy  with  our  feudal  world. 
8  Renan,  La  Monarchie  Conslilntionelle  en  France,  p.  25. 


372  Heredity. 

nobility  is  the  result  of  two  factors — the  idea,  whether  true  or  false, 
of  a  certain  merit  above  the  common,  and  the  opinion  that  this  merit 
is  transmissible.  Undoubtedly,  from  the  altogether  ideal  point  of 
view,  the  institution  of  nobility  may  be  considered  an  excellent 
one.  To  choose  only  the  best;  to  keep  intact  the  selections  made, 
and  from  the  cradle  to  fashion  them  by  tradition,  precept,  and 
example;  to  care  for  them  as  we  care  for  a  choice  and  rare  hot- 
house plant  embedded  in  rich  mould — to  do  this  would  be  to  prac- 
tise strict  selection,  with  education  added.  But  this  is  only  a 
dream,  as  may  be  easily  shown. 

First,  as  regards  its  origin ;  nobility,  while  assuming  to  be  a  select 
class,  has  never  been  any  such  thing,  save  in  a  very  restricted 
sense — that  it  fostered  the  warlike  virtues.  It  had  everywhere  its 
rise  in  that  period  of  the  youth  of  nations  when  the  imagination 
had  no  other  ideal  than  the  hero,  no  other  cult  than  hero-worship, 
where  the  only  virtue  is  honour,  the  only  trade,  war.  Later,  in 
more  advanced  ages,  it  was  seen  that  the  pacific  virtues  have  also 
a  nobility  of  their  own — that  an  artist,  a  man  of  science,  an  in- 
ventor, belong  also  to  the  chosen  class ;  but,  apart  from  the 
nobility  of  the  law,  that  aristocracy  which  it  was  attempted  to 
establish  under  the  title  of  'literary  nobility,'  or  'spiritual  nobility,' 
was  never  in  any  way  to  be  compared  with  the  warrior  aristocracy 
— perhaps  because  it  was  soon  perceived  that  genius  is  not  so 
easily  transmitted  as  courage.  Hence,  the  selection  which  served 
as  a  basis  for  nobility  was  both  very  incomplete  in  principle  and 
often  very  unsuccessful  in  fact.  The  only  aristocracy  that  has 
practised  this  selection  on  a  very  liberal  scale,  while  it  has,  in  the 
words  of  Macaulay,  become  '  the  most  democratic  aristocracy  in 
the  world,'  is  at  the  same  time  the  only  one  in  the  wprld  that  has 
continued  to  be  both  powerful  and  respected.1 

If  selection  is  open  to  question,  the  dogma  of  hereditary  trans- 
mission is  no  more  stable.  We  have  seen  that  heredity  is  a  law 
of  animated  nature  ;  that  under  purely  ideal  conditions  it  would 
lead  to  the  continuous  repetition  of  the  same  types,  the  same 
forms,  the  same  properties,  the  same  faculties ;  but  in  that  most 

1  In  the  House  of  Lords,  of  the  four  hundred  and  twenty-seven  lay  peerages 
only  forty-one  are  of  date  prior  to  the  seventeenth  century. 


Social  Consequences  of  Heredity.  373 

complex  elaboration  whence  results  the  living  being,  so  many 
laws  are  superimposed  on  one  another,  intersect  one  another, 
strengthen  and  neutralize  one  another;  so  many  accidental  facts 
intervene,  often  so  as  to  confuse  and  destroy  the  whole,  that  the 
resemblance  of  children  to  parents  is  never  more  than  approxima- 
tive. Experience  alone  can  decide  whether  this  is  sufficient  or 
insufficient,  whether  the  law  has  been  stronger  than  t.he  exceptions, 
or  the  exceptions  than  the  law.  But  to  submit  nobility  to  the 
control  of  experience  and  to  discuss  its  title  at  each  accession 
by  birth,  would  amount  in  fact  to  its  suppression.  But  even  if 
we  admit  that  the  law  is  stronger  than  the  exceptions,  and  that 
the  physical  and  moral  qualities  of  the  ancestors  are  transmitted 
to  the  descendants,  there  remains  nevertheless  another  shoal  on 
which  the  institution  of  nobility  must  wreck  itself — the  enfeeble- 
ment  produced  by  heredity. 

'  The  citizens  of  the  ancient  republics,'  says  Littre',  '  were  never 
able  to  maintain  themselves  by  reproduction.  The  nine  thousand 
Spartans  of  Lycurgus's  time  were  reduced  to  nineteen  hundred  in 
the  time  of  Aristotle.  The  people  of  Athens  were  often  com- 
pelled to  recruit  their  numbers  by  the  admission  of  foreigners. 
Nor  has  the  course  of  things  been  different  in  modern  times.  All 
aristocracies,  all  close  corporations  that  fill  up  their  ranks  solely 
from  among  themselves,  have  suffered  gradual  losses  which  would 
have  caused  a  certain  reduction  were  it  not  for  the  additions  made 
from  time  to  time.  There  is  not  in  Europe  a  single  national 
nobility  the  majority  of  which  dates  from  considerable  antiquity.'1 

Benoiston  de  Chateauneuf,  in  a  curious  Memoire  statistique  snr 
la  dttree  des  families  nobles  en  France,  shows  that  the  average 
duration  is  not  more  than  three  hundred  years.  He  finds  the 
causes  of  this  in  primogeniture,  consanguineous  marriages,  and, 
above  all,  war  and  duelling.  We  must,  however,  believe  that 
the  fact  is  regulated  by  more  general  causes,  for  the  same 
author  admits  that  his  researches  into  the  extinction  of  mer- 
cantile families  and  those  of  the  lower  classes  have  led  to  the 
same  results.  Of  four  hundred  and  eighty-seven  families  admitted 
into  the  citizenship  of  Berne  between  the  years  1583  and  1654, 

1  De  la  Philosophie  Positive,  1845. 


374  Heredity. 

less  than  half  (two  hundred  and  seven)  remained  at  the  end  of  a 
century,  and  in  1783  there  remained  only  one  hundred  and  sixty- 
eight,  or  one-third.  Of  the  hundred  and  twelve  families  con- 
stituting the  federal  council  of  the  canton  of  Berne  in  1653,  there 
remained,  in  the  year  1796,  only  fifty-eight.1 

'  The  degeneration  of  the  race  in  noble  families/  says  Moreau 
of  Tours,  '  has  been  noted  by  sundry  writers.  Pope  remarked  that 
the  noble  air  which  the  English  aristocracy  ought  to  have  worn 
was  the  one  thing  they  did  not  at  all  possess ;  that  it  was  a 
saying  in  Spain  that  when  a  grandee  was  announced  in  a  drawing- 
room  you  must  expect  to  see  a  sort  of  abortion;  finally,  in  France, 
any  one  who  saw  the  men  that  constituted  the  higher  ranks  might 
suppose  that  he  was  in  presence  of  a  company  of  invalids.  The 
Marquis  de  Mirabeau  himself,  in  his  Ami  des  ffommes,  speaks  of 
them  as  pygmies,  or  withered  and  starved  plants.'  We  have 
already  endeavoured  to  determine  the  causes  of  this  physical 
and  mental  degeneration,  by  showing  that  heredity  is  a  force  ever 
contending  against  opposite  forces,  that  it  has  its  own  struggle  for 
life,  and  that  in  each  generation,  even  when  victorious,  it  comes 
out  of  the  contest  much  weakened  by  its  losses. 

We  have  now  seen  the  difficulties  which  criticism  based  on  ex- 
perience might  bring  against  nobility  considered  as  a  natural  fact 
We  need  not  here  inquire  into  its  value  as  an  institution.  It  is 
certain  that  its  influence  has  not  been  always  evil,  and  that  it  has 
indeed  'called  forth  certain  kinds  of  merit'  But  such  is  the 
condition  of  human  affairs  that  we  must  overlook  much  evil  where 
a  little  good  is  done.  Man  is  so  small,  that  in  order  to  become 
great  he  must  cease  to  be  himself — he  must  be  blotted  out,  sacri- 
ficed in  the  interest  of  an  idea,  a  caste,  a  corporation,  a  country,  a 
lineage  which  he  shall  represent  Thrown  into  the  infinity  of 
time,  like  a  waif  on  the  boundless  ocean,  he  seeks  some  stay  for  a 
longer,  less  ephemeral,  and  yet  perishable  life.  This  is  presented 
to  him  by  nobility.  Who  can  tell  how  many  vulgar  souls  have 
been  upheld  and  uplifted  by  the  thought  of  their  ancestry !  Many 
a  man,  as  he  has  contemplated  in  some  vast  and  silent  hall 
the  portraits  of  his  forefathers,  unimpassioned  witnesses  of  his 

1  Memoire  de  VAcadeinie  des  Sciences  Morales,  vol.  v. 


Social  Consequences  of  Heredity.  375 

deeds,  must  have  felt  the  heroic  breath  of  those  distant  ages, 
whose  extinct  thoughts  become  conscious  in  him;  he  has  been 
possessed  with  the  instincts  of  his  race,  and,  strengthened  beyond 
the  measure  of  his  own  lowliness,  he  has  been  uplifted  to  their 
height 

Those  communities  which  have  accepted  the  heredity  of  virtues 
and  of  merit,  and  who  have  seen  fit  to  consecrate  this  belief  by 
the  official  institution  of  nobility  must  of  course  have  also  ac- 
cepted the  heredity  of  vices  and  of  criminal  tendencies.  Hence 
we  have  races  that  are  accursed,  unclean  castes,  proscribed 
families,  and  the  crimes  of  the  father  visited  on  the  children 
and  the  grandchildren.  History  teaches  that  the  further  we  go 
back  into  antiquity  the  more  widespread  is  this  belief,  and  the 
more  numerous  are  the  institutions  and  laws  that  give  expression 
to  it 

In  China,1  when  a  man  has  committed  a  capital  crime,  a  minute 
inquiry  is  first  made  into  his  physical  condition,  his  temperament, 
his  mental  complexion,  his  prior  acts ;  nor  does  the  investigation 
stop  at  the  individual — it  is  concerned  with  the  most  inconsiderable 
antecedents  of  the  members  of  his  family,  and  is  even  carried  back 
to  his  ancestry.  This  is  in  our  view  to  do  full  justice  to  heredity. 
But  in  the  case  of  high  treason,  or  when  a  prince  is  assassinated, 
this  same  people,  establishing  an  unfair  solidarity  between  father 
and  children,  prescribe  'that  the  culprit  shall  be  cut  up  into  ten 
thousand  pieces,  and  that  his  sons  and  grandsons  shall  be  put 
to  death.'  The  Japanese  laws,  it  is  said,  include  in  the  punish- 
ment the  parents  of  the  culprit 

The  infliction  on  the  children  of  the  punishment  due  to  the 
parents  is  very  common  under  the  Mosaic  law.  The  whole  human 
race  inherit  Adam's  guilt,  and  suffer  the  penalty  of  the  original  sin. 

In  the  Middle  Ages  the  Jews,  an  object  of  loathing,  restricted 
within  their  Ghetti,  feared  and  at  the  same  time  despised  by  all, 
paid  the  penalty  of  their  forefathers'  guilt — the  unheard  of,  the 
unique  crime  of  having  killed  a  god.  This  is  the  most  striking 
instance  afforded  by  history  of  a  brand  of  reprobation  and  infamy 
hereditarily  transmitted.  The  barbarous  codes  that  sprung  from 

1  Gazette  des  Trilmnaux,  31  Dtcembre,  1844. 
17 


3  76  Heredity. 

Germanic  customs  likewise  accepted  the  heredity  of  guilt  and 
punishment,  and  decreed  a  general  proscription. 

It  is  astonishing  to  find  this  doctrine  clearly  expounded  and 
reasoned  out  by  a  respectable  and  judicious  Greek  writer,  born  in 
very  enlightened  times.  Plutarch,  in  his  essay  on  the  Delays  of 
Divine  Justice,  after  a  very  strong  argument  showing  that  the 
family  and  the  state  form  a  true  organism,  declares  that  '  the  fact 
that  divine  vengeance  falls  upon  a  state  or  a  city  long  after  the 
death  of  the  guilty,  has  nothing  in  it  that  is  contrary  to  reason. 

'  But  if  this  is  the  case  with  the  state,  it  must  also  hold  good  of 
a  family  sprung  from  a  common  stock,  from  which  it  derives  a 
certain  hidden  force,  a  sort  of  communion  of  species  and  of  quali- 
ties, that  extends  to  all  the  individuals  in  the  line  of  descent 

'Beings  produced  by  generation  are  not  like  the  products  of  art 
What  is  generated  comes  from  the  very  substance  of  the  being 
that  gendered  it,  so  that  it  derives  from  the  latter  something  that 
is  most  justly  rewarded  or  punished  on  his  account,  inasmuch  as 
this  something  is  his  very  self. 

'  The  children  of  vicious  and  wicked  men  are  derived  from  the 
very  essence  of  their  fathers.  That  which  was  fundamental  in  the 
latter,  which  lived  and  was  nurtured,  which  thought  and  spake,  is 
precisely  what  they  have  given  to  their  sons.  It  must  not,  there- 
fore, seem  strange  or  difficult  to  believe  that  there  exists  between 
the  being  which  begets  and  the  being  begotten  a  sort  of  occult 
identity,  capable  of  justly  subjecting  the  second  to  all  the  conse- 
quences attending  on  the  acts  of  the  first' 

If  we  put  in  practice  these  conclusions  of  Plutarch  we  arrive  at 
frightful  consequences. 

To  sum  up,  we  have  found  a  perfect  correspondence  existing 
between  effect  and  cause.  Nobility  is,  like  heredity,  a  conserva- 
tive, permanent  force  that  tends  to  immobility.  But  both  are 
restricted  within  limits  determinable  only  by  experience.  The 
institutions  of  modern  nations  appear  more  and  more  to  accept 
this  result,  and  to  disregard  all  heredity  save  that  which  verifies 
itself.  Bentham,  we  think,  expressed  a  growing  opinion  when 
he  said  to  the  Americans  :  '  Beware  of  an  hereditary  nobility. 
The  patrimony  of  merit  soon  comes  to  be  one  of  birth.  Bestow 
honour,  erect  statues,  confer  titles;  but  let  these  distinctions  be  per- 


Social  Consequences  of  Heredity.  377 

sonal.  Preserve  all  the  force  and  all  the  purity  of  honours  in  the 
state,  and  never  part  with  this  precious  capital  in  favour  of  any 
proud  class  that  would  quickly  turn  their  advantages  against  you.' 

IV. 

There  still  remain  a  few  words  to  be  said  on  the  relations  of 
natural  and  institutional  heredity,  with  regard  to  sovereignty.  Here 
again  we  find  the  same  contrast  between  heredity  and  liberty,  and 
between  the  belief  of  ancient  times  and  the  opinion  of  the  modern 
world. 

Originally,  sovereignty  concentrated  in  the  hands  of  one  man, 
the  king,  was  absolute.  Being  supreme  head,  he  was  regarded  as 
of  a  nature  high  above  all  other  men,  and  as  the  peer  of  the  gods. 

'  The  earliest  traditions  represent  rulers  as  gods  or  demigods. 
By  their  subjects,  primitive  kings  were  regarded  as  superhuman  in 
origin,  and  superhuman  in  power.  They  possessed  divine  titles, 
received  obeisances  like  those  made  before  the  altars  of  deities, 
ond  were  in  some  cases  actually  worshipped.  If  there  needs  proof 
that  the  divine  and  half-divine  characters  originally  ascribed  to 
monarchs  were  ascribed  literally,  we  have  it  in  the  fact  that  there 
are  still  existing  savage  races  among  whom  it  is  held  that  the 
chiefs  and  their  kindred  are  of  celestial  origin,  or,  as  elsewhere, 
that  only  the  chiefs  have  souls.' 1  At  a  later  period  it  was  deemed 
sufficient  to  regard  kings  as  of  divine  race,  descended  from  gods. 
Such  were  the  Incas  of  Peru.  This  opinion  still  holds  in  the  east, 
and  notably  in  China. 

It  is  easy  to  see  that  so  long  as  this  belief  existed,  heredity  must 
have  been  the  ground  on  which  the  sovereign  power  rested. 
Sovereignty  being  divine  in  its  origin  could  only  be  transmitted  by 
birth.  Hence  the  important  part  played  by  hereditary  transmis- 
sion in  the  history  of  royal  houses,  traces  of  which  are  still  found 
in  the  theory  of  divine  right 

Modern  ideas  of  the  principle  of  sovereignty  are  the  very  oppo- 
site of  this  doctrine.  The  dogma  of  the  national  will  having 
displaced  the  dogma  of  the  royal  will,  the  idea  of  a  necessary 
transmission  of  the  sovereignty  by  way  of  primogeniture  is  now 

1  !  Icrbert  Spencer,  first  Principles,  §  2. 


378  Heredity. 

thought  mere  nonsense.  The  consequence  is  that  all  civilized 
peoples  either  have  abolished  hereditary  power — as  is  the  case  in 
republics ;  or  only  admit  it  as  a  part  of  the  machinery  of  govern- 
ment— as  is  the  case  in  parliamentary  monarchies.  And  in  this 
latter  case  the  thing  accepted  is  not  the  permanence  of  inherit- 
ance, but  the  usefulness  of  machinery. 

The  question  of  heredity  as  a  political  institution  has  been  fully 
discussed.  Its  partisans  and  its  opponents  have  never  been  able  to 
agree,  for  the  simple  reason  that  they  have  never  looked  at  it  from 
the  same  side.  It  is  very  easy  to  attack  heredity  as  a  natural  fact, 
and  it  is  very  easy  to  defend  heredity  as  an  institution. 

Facts  prove,  say  its  opponents,  that  neither  genius,  nor  talent, 
nor  even  uprightness  and  rectitude  are  hereditary;  why  then  allow 
power  to  fall  into  unworthy  hands  ?  Besides,  this  sovereignty  by 
right  of  birth  tends  to  make  princes  proud,  indolent,  ignorant,  and 
incapable.  They  might  have  added  that,  as  we  have  seen,  it  is 
proved  by  facts  that  even  among  the  most  highly-gifted  races 
heredity  tends  to  enfeeblement,  and  that  in  the  struggle  for  life, 
and  while  battling  with  difficulties,  it  crumbles  away,  so  to  speak, 
in  its  course.  We  must  also  bear  in  mind  what  has  already  been 
said  concerning  the  extinction  of  noble  and  royal  families,  their 
ascending  movement  towards  their  apogee,  and  their  subsequent 
inevitable  decay. 

Its  partisans  make  answer  :  Though  mind  may  not  be  trans- 
mitted, traditions  are,  and  this  is  a  sufficient  social  result  The 
object  of  heredity  is  to  introduce  into  the  state  an  element  of 
conservatism  and  stability.  Without  it,  talents,  time,  and  strength 
are  wasted,  simply  in  winning  place ;  with  the  aid  of  institutional 
heredity,  a  man  is  placed  at  once  in  the  rank  he  deserves.  Take 
the  case  of  the  Earl  of  Chatham,  a  simple  cornet  in  a  regiment, 
and  the  son  of  a  widow  who  had  but  a  very  scanty  income :  he 
attained  to  power  only  at  the  age  of  forty-eight  But  his  son,  the 
illustrious  Pitt,  had  the  advantage  of  a  very  careful  education,  and 
was  considered  a  prodigy  at  the  age  of  twelve.  He  entered  Par- 
liament as  early  as  the  law  allowed,  when  he  spoke  gained  the 
ear  of  the  house,  and  at  twenty-three  became  Prime  Minister. 
This  is  the  history  of  every  great  family,  and  this  perpetuation  of 
honours  is  of  advantage  as  well  to  the  state  as  to  the  individual 


Social  Conseqitences  of  Heredity.  379 

Without  discussing  these  opinions,  we  may  say  that  in  fact 
heredity,  considered  as  a  political  institution,  is  tending  to  dis- 
appear. The  idea  of  a  right  of  sovereignty  transmitted  by  birth 
finds  but  few  adherents  now,  and  it  is  commonly  maintained  only 
on  the  ground  of  utility.  The  same  is  to  be  said  of  that  conserva- 
tive body  found  in  nearly  every  state  under  various  names — such 
as  House  of  Lords,  of  Seigneurs,  or  of  Peers,  Senate,  etc.  Inherit- 
ance, which  was  its  original  groundwork,  has  been  abolished  nearly 
everywhere.  The  English  House  of  Lords,  which  is  justly  held 
to  be  utterly  at  variance  in  this  respect  with  modern  tendencies, 
does  nevertheless  admit  elective  members.  Thus  Scotland  is 
represented  by  sixteen  elective  peers,  and  Ireland  by  twenty-eight. 

In  proportion,  then,  as  we  recede  from  primitive  times,  the  politi- 
cal importance  of  heredity  grows  less.  And  if  we  hold,  with  the 
majority  of  thinkers,  that  the  ideal  towards  which  society  must 
tend  is  the  establishment  of  a  political  rule  wherein  the  individual 
shall  possess  the  largest  possible  liberty,  and  the  government  the 
least  possible  measure  of  power;  where  the  liberty  of  each  shall  be 
limited  only  by  a  like  measure  accorded  to  all — the  only  duty  of 
government  being  to  enforce  respect  for  this  limitation — in  such  a 
government  the  heredity  of  power  would  have  no  meaning,  the 
sovereignty  being  reduced  to  police  duty.  Here  again  we  en- 
counter the  same  antinomy — the  maximum  of  free-will  coinciding 
with  the  maximum  of  heredity. 

We  will  close  with  a  few  remarks  on  the  whole  question  of  the 
consequences  of  heredity. 

All  progress,  or,  to  speak  more  precisely,  all  development,  pre- 
supposes evolution  and  heredity.  Without  the  former  there  is  no 
change;  without  the  latter  there  is  no  fixity.  But  the  action  of 
heredity  has  its  limits.  As  we  have  seen  in  the  physiological 
introduction,  deviations  tend  to  disappear,  and  after  a  few  genera- 
tions the  reversion  to  the  primitive  type  is  complete.  In  the  moral 
order  there  are  facts  of  the  same  nature — as,  reversion  to  the  savage 
life  and  to  nomadic  instincts,  and  the  descent  of  certain  highly- 
gifted  families  to  the  average  level. 

The  opposition  between  these  two  kinds  of  facts,  and  the  con- 
tradiction in  saying  on  the  one  hand  that  heredity  produces 
departure  from  the  original  type,  and  on  the  other  hand  it  leads 


380  Heredity, 

back  to  it,  is  only  apparent  Reversion  takes  place  when  the  race 
is  left  to  itself.  It  does  not  occur  in  a  race  which,  by  the  long- 
continued  action  of  natural  or  artificial  instrumentalities,  has  been 
adapted  to  its  new  surroundings.  For  every  being,  physical  or 
moral,  the  condition  of  existence  is  a  harmony  between  itself  and 
its  moral  or  physical  surroundings.  For  every  being  the  essential 
characteristics  are  those  which  are  entirely  in  accord  with  its 
circumstances ;  accidental  characteristics  are  those  which  are  more 
or  less  so.  Consequently  the  former  are  stable,  as  being  sustained 
from  within  and  from  without ;  the  latter  are  unstable,  because, 
though  sustained  from  within,  they  are  opposed,  or  at  least  not 
sustained,  from  without  Reversion  to  the  physical  or  mental 
type  is  therefore  the  result  of  natural  laws,  and  by  no  means  of  a 
mysterious  power  or  occult  influence. 

But  if  the  natural  or  artificial  surroundings  favour  the  fixity  of 
the  acquired  character,  and  make  it  a  habit — for  heredity  is  only  a 
specific  habit — it  then  becomes  a  second  nature,  which  is  so  firmly 
grounded  in  the  original  nature  that  it  cannot  be  distinguished 
from  it  Heredity,  which  seemed  divided  against  itself,  comes  into 
agreement  with  itself,  and  two  cases  apparently  contradictory  fall 
under  one  law.  Other  characteristics,  however,  cannot  be  fixed, 
and  they  appear  but  for  a  moment 

If  this  be  understood,  it  is  interesting  to  see  how  a  contemporary 
philosopher  infers  from  the  two  laws  of  heredity  and  of  evolution 
the  future  progress  of  the  human  race.  At  the  conclusion  of  his 
Principles  of  Biology,  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer  ingeniously  shows  that, 
in  virtue  of  natural  laws,  civilization,  the  cause  of  which  has  been 
an  excess  of  population,  must  result  in  a  diminution  of  population. 
These  considerations  are  so  closely  bound  up  with  the  consequences 
of  psychological  heredity  that  we  shall  be  pardoned  if  we  state 
them  here  in  detail. 

As  the  perfectness  of  a  being  consists  in  its  more  and  more 
complete  adaptation  to  its  environment,  it  is  logical  to  infer  that 
all  the  progress  of  humanity  will  consist  in  an  adjustment  of  this 
kind.  But  by  what  means,  and  by  the  development  of  what 
faculties  ? 

'  Will  it  be  by  the  development  of  physical  strength  ?  Probably 
not  to  any  considerable  degree.  Mechanical  appliances  are  fast 


Social  Consequences  of  Heredity.  381 

supplanting  brute  force,  and  the  progress  of  social  life  has  but  little 
influence  on  bodily  vigour. 

*  Will  it  be  by  the  development  of  swiftness  or  agility  ?  Probably 
not     In  the  savages  they  are  important  elements  of  the  ability  to 
maintain  life ;  but  in  the  civilized  man  they  aid  self-preservation 
in  quite  a  minor  degree,  and  there  seems  no  circumstance  likely 
to  necessitate  an  increase  of  them. 

'  Will  it  be  by  development  of  mechanical  skill  ?  Most  likely  in 
some  degree.  Awkwardness  is  continually  entailing  injuries  and 
deaths.  Moreover,  the  complicated  tools  which  civilization  brings 
into  use  are  constantly  requiring  greater  delicacy  of  manipulation. 
All  the  arts,  industrial  and  aesthetic,  as  they  develop,  imply  a 
corresponding  development  of  perceptive  and  executive  faculties  in 
men — the  two  necessarily  act  and  react 

*  Will  it  be  by  development  of  intelligence  ?    Largely  no  doubt. 
There  is  ample  room  for  advance  in  this  direction,  and  ample 
demand  for  it     Our  lives  are  universally  shortened  by  our  igno- 
rance.    In  attaining  complete  knowledge  of  our  own  natures,  and 
of  the  natures  of  surrounding  things,  we  shall  better  understand  tiie 
conditions  of  existence  to  which  we  must  conform. 

'  Will  it  be  by  the  development  of  morality,  by  a  greater  power 
of  self-regulation  ?  Largely  so :  perhaps  most  largely.  Right 
conduct  is  usually  come  short  of  more  from  defect  of  will  than 
defect  of  knowledge.  To  the  due  co-ordination  of  those  complex 
actions  which  constitute  human  life  in  its  civilized  form,  there  goes 
not  only  the  pre-requisite — recognition  of  the  proper  course;  but  the 
further  pre-requisite — a  due  impulse  to  pursue  that  course.  A 
further  development  of  those  feelings  which  civilization  is  develop- 
ing in  us  must  be  acquired  before  the  crimes,  excesses,  diseases, 
improvidences,  dishonesties,  and  cruelties,  that  now  so  greatly 
diminish  the  duration  of  life,  can  cease. 

'  No  more  in  the  case  of  man  than  in  the  case  of  any  other 
being,  can  we  presume  that  evolution  has  taken  place,  or  will  here- 
after take  place,  spontaneously.  In  the  past,  at  present,  and  in  the 
future,  all  modifications,  functional  and  organic,  have  been,  aie 
and  must  be  immediately  or  remotely  consequent  on  surrounding 
conditions.  What,  then,  are  those  changes  in  the  environment  to 
which,  by  direct  or  indirect  equilibration,  the  human  organism  has 


382  Heredity. 


been  adjusting  itself,  is  adjusting  itself  now,  and  will  continue  tc 
adjust  itself  ?  And  how  do  they  necessitate  a  higher  evolution  ol 
the  organism  ? 

'  Civilization,  everywhere  having  for  its  antecedent  the  increase 
of  population,  and  everywhere  having  for  one  of  its  consequences 
a  decrease  of  certain  race-destroying  forces,  has  for  a  further  con- 
sequence an  increase  of  certain  other  race-destroying  forces. 
Danger  of  death  from  predatory  animals  lessens  as  men  grow  more 
numerous.  Though,  as  they  spread  over  the  earth  and  divide  into 
tribes,  men  become  wild  beasts  to  one  another,  yet  the  danger  of 
death  from  this  cause  also  diminishes  as  tribes  coalesce  into  nations. 
But  the  danger  of  death  which  does  not  diminish,  is  that  produced 
by  augmentation  of  numbers  itself — the  danger  from  deficiency  of 
food.  Manifestly,  the  wants  of  their  redundant  numbers  constitute 
the  only  stimulus  mankind  have  to  obtain  more  necessaries  of 
life ;  were  not  the  demand  beyond  the  supply,  there  would  be 
no  motive  to  increase  the  supply.  .... 

'  This  constant  increase  of  people  beyond  the  means  of  subsistence 
causes,  then,  a  never-ceasing  requirement  for  skill,  intelligence,  and 
self-control — involves,  therefore,  a  constant  exercise  of  these  and 
gradual  growth  of  them.  Every  industrial  improvement  is  at  once 
the  product  of  a  higher  form  of  humanity,  and  demands  that 
higher  form  of  humanity  to  carry  it  into  practice.  The  application 
of  science  to  the  arts  is  the  bringing  to  bear  greater  intelligence 
for  satisfying  our  wants ;  and  implies  continued  progress  of  their 
intelligence.  To  get  more  produce  from  the  acre,  the  farmer  must 
study  chemistry,  must  adopt  new  mechanical  appliances,  and  must, 
by  the  multiplication  of  processes,  cultivate  both  his  own  powers 
and  the  powers  of  his  labourers.  To  meet  the  requirements  of  the 
market,  the  manufacturer  is  perpetually  improving  his  old  machines 
and  inventing  new  ones ;  and  by  the  premium  of  high  wages 
incites  artisans  to  acquire  greater  skill.  The  daily-widening  rami- 
fications of  commerce  entail  on  the  merchant  a  need  for  more 
knowledge  and  more  complex  calculations ;  while  the  lessening 
profits  of  the  ship-owner  force  him  to  build  more  scientifically,  to 
get  captains  of  higher  intelligence,  and  better  crews.  In  all  cases, 
pressure  of  population  is  the  original  cause.  Were  it  not  for  the 
competition  this  entails,  more  thought  and  energy  would  not  drily 


Social  Consequences  of  Heredity.  383 

be  spent  on  the  business  of  life,  and  growth  of  mental  life  would 
not  take  place.  Difficulty  in  getting  a  living  is  alike  the  inceative 
to  a  higher  education  of  childaen,  and  to  a  more  intense  and 
long-continued  application  in  adults.  In  the  mother  it  induces 
foresight,  economy,  and  skilful  house-keeping;  in  the  father, 
laborious  days  and  constant  self-denial.  Nothing  but  necessity 
could  make  men  submit  to  this  discipline ;  and  nothing  but  this 
discipline  could  produce  a  continued  progression. 

'In  this  case,  as  in  many  others,  nature  secures  each  step  in 
advance  by  a  succession  of  trials,  which  are  perpetually  repeated, 
and  cannot  fail  to  be  repeated,  until  success  is  achieved.  .  .  . 

'  The  proposition  at  which  we  have  thus  arrived  is,  then,  that 
excess  of  fertility,  through  the  changes  it  is  ever  working  in  man's 
environment,  is  itself  the  cause  of  man's  further  evolution;  and  the 
obvious  corollary  here  to  be  drawn  is,  that  man's  further  evolution, 
so  brought  about,  itself  necessitates  a  decline  in  his  fertility. 

'  That  future  progress  of  civilization,  which  the  never-ceasing 
pressure  of  population  must  produce,  will  be  accompanied  by  an 
enhanced  cost  of  individuation,  both  in  structure  and  function, 
and  more  especially  in  nervous  structure  and  function.  The 
peaceful  struggle  for  existence  in  societies  ever  growing  more 
crowded  and  more  complicated,  must  have  for  its  concomitant  an 
increase  of  the  great  nervous  centres  in  mass,  in  complexity,  in 
activity.  The  larger  body  of  emotion  needed  as  a  fountain  of 
energy  for  men  who  have  to  hold  their  places,  and  rear  their 
families  under  the  intensifying  competition  of  social  life,  is,  other 
things  equal,  the  correlative  of  larger  brain.  Those  higher  feelings 
pre-supposed  by  the  better  self-regulation  which,  in  a  better  society, 
can  alone  enable  the  individual  to  leave  a  persistent  posterity,  are, 
other  things  equal,  the  correlatives  of  a  more  complex  brain  ;  as  are 
also  those  more  numerous,  more  varied,  more  general,  and  more 
abstract  ideas,  which  must  also  become  increasingly  requisite  for 
successful  life  as  society  advances.  And  the  genesis  of  this  larger 
quantity  of  feeling  and  thought,  in  a  brain  thus  augmented  in 
size  and  developed  in  structure,  is,  other  things  equal,  the  correla- 
tive of  a  greater  wear  of  nervous  tissue  and  greater  consumption  of 
materials  to  repair  it  So  that,  both  in  original  cost  of  construction 
and  in  subsequent  cost  of  working,  the  nervous  system  must  become 


384  Heredity. 

a  heavier  task  on  the  organism.  Already  the  brain  of  the  civilized 
maruis  larger  by  nearly  thirty  per  cent,  than  the  brain  of  the 
savage.  Already,  too,  it  presents  an  increased  heterogeneity, 
especially  in  the  distribution  of  its  convolutions.  And  further 
changes  like  these  which  have  taken  place  under  the  discipline  of 
life  we  infer  will  continue  to  take  place. 

'But,  everywhere  and  always,  evolution  is  antagonistic  to  pro- 
creative  dissolution.  .  .  .  And  we  have  seen  reason  to  believe 
that  this  antagonism  between  individuation  and  genesis  becomes 
anusually  marked  where  the  nervous  system  is  concerned,  because 
of  the  costliness  of  nervous  structure  and  function.  In  another 
place  was  pointed  out  the  apparent  connection  between  high 
cerebral  development  and  prolonged  decay  of  sexual  maturity, 
the  evidence  going  to  show  that  where  exceptional  fertility  exists 
there  is  sluggishness  of  mind,  and  that  where  there  has  been 
during  education  excessive  expenditure  in  mental  action,  there 
frequently  follows  a  complete  or  partial  infertility.1  Hence,  the 
particular  kind  of  further  evolution  which  man  is  hereafter  to 
undergo  is  one  which,  more  than  any  other,  may  be  expected 
to  cause  a  decline  in  his  power  of  reproduction.  .  .  . 

'  The  necessary  antagonism  between  individuation  and  genesis 
not  only,  then,  fulfils  with  precision  the  d  priori  law  of  main- 
tenance of  race,  from  the  monad  up  to  man,  but  ensures  final 
attainment  of  the  highest  form  of  this  maintenance — a  form  in 
which  the  amount  of  life  shall  be  the  greatest  possible,  and  the 
births  and  deaths  the  fewest  possible.  This  antagonism  could 
not  fail  to  work  out  the  results  we  see  it  working  out.  The 
excess  of  fertility  has  itself  rendered  the  process  of  civilization 
inevitable;  and  the  process  of  civilization  must  inevitably  di- 
minish fertility,  and  at  last  destroy  its  excess.  From  the  beginning, 
pressure  of  population  has  been  the  proximate  cause  of  progress. 
It  produced  the  original  diffusion  of  the  race.  It  compelled  men 
to  abandon  predatory  habits  and  take  to  agriculture.  It  led  to 
the  clearing  of  the  earth's  surface.  It  forced  men  into  the  social 
state;  made  social  organization  inevitable,  and  has  developed  the 
social  sentiments.  It  has  stimulated  to  progressive  improvements 

1  For  details  see  Spencer's  Biolozy,  §§  346,  366,  and  367. 


Contusion.  385 

in  production,  and  to  increased  skill  and  intelligence.  It  is  daily 
thrusting  us  into  closer  contacts  and  more  mutually-dependent 
relationships.  And  after  having  caused,  as  it  ultimately  must, 
the  due  peopling  of  the  globe,  and  the  raising  of  all  its  habitable 
parts  into  the  highest  state  of  culture ;  after  having  brought  all 
processes  for  the  satisfaction  of  human  wants  to  perfection ;  after 
having,  at  the  same  time,  developed  the  intellect  into  complete 
competency  for  its  work,  and  the  feelings  into  complete  fitness 
for  social  life — after  having  done  all  this,  the  pressure  of  popula- 
tion, as  it  gradually  finishes  its  work,  must  gradually  bring  itself 
to  an  end.' l 


CONCLUSION. 

WE  now  sum  up  all  that  has  been  said,  in  order  to  get  a  general 
view  of  our  subject  There  are  two  ways  of  reaching  a  conclusion : 
either  we  may  restrict  ourselves  to  the  facts,  or  we  may  strive  to 
attach  them  to  some  probable  hypothesis  ;  we  may  limit  ourselves 
to  experience ;  or,  starting  from  experience,  we  may  endeavour  to 
reach  beyond  it  In  the  first  case,  heredity  is  regarded  as  a  law 
of  life,  of  which  the  cause  is  the  partial  identity  of  the  con- 
stituent elements  of  the  organism  in  parent  and  in  child.  In 
the  second  case,  it  appears  to  us  as  a  fragment  of  a  far  broader 
law,  a  law  of  the  universe,  and  its  cause  is  to  be  sought  for  in 
universal  mechanism.  We  will  examine  the  question  according 
to  both  of  these  methods. 


Let  us  first  look  at  it  simply  from  the  stand-point  of  experience. 
To  this  end  we  need  but  review  what  has  already  been  said  in  the 
course  of  this  work. 

As  regards  specific  characteristics,  heredity  comes  before  us  with 
the  evidence  of  an  axiom,  for  it  is  without  exception.  In  the 
physical,  as  in  the  moral  order,  every  animal  necessarily  inherits 
the  characteristics  of  its  species.  An  animal  which,  per  impossibile, 

1  Spencer's  Biology,  §§  372—376. 


386  Heredity. 

should  possess  with  the  organism  of  its  own  species  the  instincts 
of  another,  would  be  a  monster  in  the  psychological  order.  The 
spider  can  neither  have  the  sensations  nor  perform  the  actions  of 
the  bee,  nor  the  beaver  those  of  the  wolf.  Just  so  in  one  and  the 
same  species,  whether  animal  or  human,  the  races  preserve  their 
psychical,  precisely  as  they  do  their  physiological  characteristics. 
Finally,  as  regards  man,  there  is  not  one — even  of  those  varieties 
of  the  same  race  which  we  call  peoples — that  does  not  present 
permanent  moral  characters,  when  we  consider  the  sum  of  the 
individuals. 

Under  the  specific  form,  then,  mental  heredity  is  unquestionable, 
and  the  only  doubt  possible  would  have  reference  to  individual 
characteristics.  We  have  shown  from  an  enormous  mass  of  facts, 
which  we  might  easily  have  made  larger,  that  the  cases  of  indi- 
vidual heredity  are  too  numerous  to  be  the  result  of  mere  chance, 
as  some  have  held  them  to  be.  We  have  shown  that  all  forms  of 
mental  activity  are  transmissible — instincts,  perceptive  faculties, 
imagination,  aptitude  for  the  fine  arts,  reason,  aptitude  for  science 
and  abstract  studies,  sentiments,  passions,  force  of  character.  Nor 
are  the  morbid  forms  less  transmissible  than  the  normal,  as  we 
have  seen  in  the  case  of  insanity,  hallucination,  and  idiocy. 

Having  got  at  the  facts,  the  next  thing  was  to  interpret  them,  by 
ascertaining  their  laws.  Here,  in  the  inextricable  tangle  of  con- 
flicting causes,  we  reach  only  a  theoretic  determination  of  the  law. 
In  practice,  however,  we  can  establish  a  few  empiric  formulas 
which  enable  us  to  class  the  facts  tolerably  well.  Thus,  heredity 
is  either  direct  or  indirect;  now  it  passes  from  parent  to  child, 
now  again  it  must  be  referred  to  some  remote  ancestor.  We  have 
endeavoured  to  show  how  the  phenomena  of  atavism,  or  of  rever- 
sional  heredity,  may,  not  inaptly,  be  compared  to  alternate  gene- 
rations in  lower  species;  and  how,  at  all  events,  those  phenomena 
may  serve  to  give  us  a  correct  idea  of  heredity  and  of  the  stubborn 
tenacity  of  its  laws. 

Passing  from  the  laws  to  the  causes,  we  have  carefully  avoided 
all  researches  into  ultimate  reasons,  and  the  only  hypothesis  we 
have  judged  admissible  with  regard  to  the  immediate  cause  of 
heredity  is  this  :  psychological  heredity  has  its  cause  in  physiolo- 
gical heredity,  and  this  in  turn  has  its  cause  in  the  partial  identity 


Conclusion.  387 

of  the  materials  constituting  the  organism  of  both  parent  and  child, 
and  in  the  division  of  this  substance  at  reproduction.  Heredity 
is  really,  therefore,  partial  identity.  Thus  we  have  been  enabled, 
precisely — topographically,  as  it  were — to  define  the  position  of 
our  subject  with  reference  to  all  other  psychological  studies. 
Heredity  belongs  to  the  science  of  the  relations  between  the 
physical  and  the  moral;  it  is  one  form  of  the  influence  of  the 
physical  over  the  moral ;  it  is  therefore  a  fraction  of  one  great 
branch  of  that  science. 

The  study  of  consequences  led  us  to  practical  questions. 
Heredity  transmits,  preserves,  accumulates.  Is  the  result  of  this 
to  create  intellectual  and  moral  habits — that  all  progress  prepares 
further  progress,  all  decadence  further  decadence  ?  Two  solutions 
occurred  to  us  with  regard  to  the  general  consequences  of  heredity, 
the  one  radical  and  hypothetical,  and  the  other  positive.  The 
first,  which  attributes  to  heredity  a  creative  part,  explains  thereby 
the  very  genesis  of  our  faculties ;  the  second,  which  attributes 
to  it  the  conservative  part,  explains  thereby  the  development  of 
our  faculties.  We  accepted  the  first,  as  any  bolder  solution  seemed 
premature. 

The  question  of  the  consequences  appeared  to  us  to  be  really 
dominated  by  this  general  law,  which  is  verified  by  experience — the 
transmission  of  any  acquired  modification.  When  the  fact  of 
mental  heredity  shall  be  better  known  ;  when  our  vague  intuitions 
of  this  matter  have  become  evident  truths — then  its  social  import- 
ance, as  yet  hardly  suspected,  will  be  better  understood;  and 
many  a  question  which  it  were  now  idle  to  discuss  will  perhaps 
arise  and  furnish  their  own  solution.  Yet  it  is  hardly  possible  for 
even  the  most  inattentive  observer  not  to  ask  whether,  if  the  laws 
of  psychological  heredity  were  known,  man  might  not  employ 
them  for  his  own  intellectual  and  moral  improvement,  thus  bending 
to  his  own  purposes,  here  as  elsewhere,  the  forces  of  nature.  It 
is  now  some  forty  years  since  Spurzheim  and  others  put  the 
question,  whether  one  day  we  might  not  be  able  to  foresee  the 
intellectual  character  of  children,  the  psychological  constitution 
of  their  parents  being  known,  and  whether  'we  could  not  easily 
create  races  of  able  men,  by  employing  the  means  adopted  for 
the  production  of  different  species  of  animals.' 


388  Heredity. 

A  categorical  answer  is  impossible  at  present  Hitherto  man 
has  thought  more  of  perfecting  other  races  than  his  own,  probably 
from  ignorance  of  natural  laws.  Yet  we  may  affirm,  on  the 
strength  of  an  incontestable  calculation  of  probabilities,  that 
parents  of  superior  mental  ability  are  likely  to  produce  intellectual 
children,  and  that,  however  numerous  the  deviations  and  anomalies 
(and  we  have  seen  that  numerous  they  must  be),  still — since  among 
facts  of  the  same  order,  depending  in  part  on  constant,  and  in  part 
on  variable  causes,  law  must  at  last  carry  the  day — a  conscious 
selection,  carried  on  for  a  long  time,  would  have  good  results. 
But  the  race  so  formed  could  never  be  left  to  itself,  for,  not  to 
speak  of  atavism,  which  would  bring  back  abruptly  mental  forms 
apparently  extinct,  we  know  that  heredity  always  tends  to  revert 
to  the  primitive  type,  or,  to  speak  without  metaphor,  what  was 
acquired  but  recently  possesses  little  stability ;  perhaps,  too,  these 
selected  constitutions  resemble  those  very  unstable  compounds 
which  it  is  very  difficult  to  fix. 

We  do  not  know  what  man  was  originally,  nor  can  we  tell  what 
he  yet  will  be.  But  compare  for  a  moment  the  state  of  nature 
with  that  of  the  highest  civilization.  Compare  the  almost  naked 
savage,  his  brain  filled  with  images  and  void  of  ideas,  with  his 
rude  speech  and  his  fetiches — a  man  associated  with  nature,  living 
her  life,  and  forming  one  with  her — with  the  man  that  is  very  remote 
from  nature,  highly  civilized,  highly  refined — initiated  into  all  the 
niceties  of  art,  literature,  and  science,  all  the  elegancies  and  all 
the  complexities  of  social  life,  and  practising  that  maxim  of 
Goethe,  Strive  to  understand  thyself  and  to  understand  all  things 
beside.  The  distance  between  these  two  extremes  appears  infinite, 
and  yet  it  has  been  travelled  over  step  by  step.  No  doubt  this 
evolution — the  result  of  the  complex  play  of  numerous  causes — is 
not  due  exclusively  to  heredity;  but  we  have  succeeded  ill  with  our 
task  if  the  reader  does  not  now  see  that  it  has  contributed  largely 
to  bringing  it  about. 

II. 

Quitting  now  experience,  though  not  forgetting  it,  we  will 
endeavour  to  trace  back  the  law  of  heredity  to  some  more  general 
law  which  shall  explain  it  Whatever  may  be  thought  of  the 


Conclusion.  389 

theoretic  considerations  which  follow,  it  must  be  borne  in  mind 
that  they  are  independent  of  our  investigations  of  the  facts :  they 
give  completeness  to  the  facts,  but  they  do  not  alter  them.  We 
have  nowhere  confounded  proof  with  hypothesis. 

If  we  except  cut-and-dry  solutions  and  certain  narrow  partisan 
views,  we  may  say  that  contemporary  investigation  in  England, 
France,  and  Germany,  manifests  one  common  tendency — conscious 
in  some  writers,  unconscious  in  others — to  hold  that,  whatever  we 
know,  and  consequently  whatever  exists  for  us,  whether  in  the 
physical  or  in  the  moral  order,  is  reducible  under  one  or  other 
head  of  this  antithesis  :  mechanism  and  spontaneity ;  determinism 
and  free-will. 

In  the  view  of  one  school,  mechanism  explains,  or  will  one  day 
explain,  everything,  and  any  other  hypothesis  does  but  mask  our 
ignorance.  For  another  school,  universal  mechanism  is  only  the 
empty  form  of  existence,  the  totality  of  its  conditions,  not  existence 
itself — the  appearance  of  things,  not  the  reality.  They  cannot 
conceive  of  a  mechanism  without  a  primum  movens  to  give  it  im- 
pulse and  vitality.  The  absolute  determinism  of  phenomena  is 
incontestable;  the  end  of  all  science  is 'to  study  it;  the  office  of  all 
science  is  to  ascertain  it;  the  progress  of  the  human  mind  to  detect 
it  where  all  seems  fortuitous  and  lawless.  Every  science  must 
accept  determinism — at  least,  so  far  as  regards  its  empiric  conditions 
— its  constitution  as  a  science  depends  on  this.  Even  those  sciences 
which  most  resist  it  will  be  compelled  to  accept  it.  We  have 
applied  this  principle  to  psychological  phenomena  under  a  peculiar 
aspect,  that  of  hereditary  transmission — for  heredity  is  one  form 
of  determinism.  Mental  activity  is  subject  to  divers  laws,  which 
are  but  divers  forms  of  determinism,  of  which  the  most  general  is 
the  law  of  association  or  of  habit  With  this  subject  we  did  not 
concern  ourselves.  From  the  complicated  laws,  each  one  of  which 
performs  its  part  in  binding  on  us  the  yoke  of  necessity,  we  have 
selected  one.  It  now  remains  for  us  to  show  that  it  is  in  fact  a 
form  of  mechanism. 

In  the  order  of  physico-chemical  phenomena  it  is  universally 
admitted  that  everything  may  be  explained  by  emotion  and  its 
transformations,  and  that  consequently  the  most  absolute  deter- 
minism reigns  in  the  inorganic  world. 


390  Heredity. 

With  regard  to  vital  phenomena  there  is  no  such  uniformity  of 
opinion.  Many  hold  that  the  harmony  of  the  functions  which 
support  life  in  plants  and  animals  cannot  be  merely  the  result  of 
the  general  laws  of  motion,  and  that  it  necessitates  the  hypothesis 
of  some  principle  distinct  from  the  organism  and  subject  to  different 
laws.  It  cannot,  however,  be  denied  that  all  these  vitalist  explana- 
tions have  a  provisional  character,  that  they  yield  daily  to  mechanical 
explanations,  and  that  it  looks  as  though  eventually  their  only  stay 
would  be  our  ignorance.  Furthermore,  inasmuch  as  the  quantity 
of  motion  in  the  universe  is  invariable,  the  hypothesis  of  a  force 
possessed  of  the  power  of  creating  motion,  of  suspending  it,  and 
varying  it,  is  full  of  difficulties  and  contradictions.  Hence  the 
conclusion  which  meets  us  at  the  end  of  all  our  scientific  researches 
is  that '  we  are  warranted  in  bringing  life  under  the  laws  of  inor- 
ganic matter,  though  there  are  some  special  processes  peculiar  to 
life.'  (Claude  Bernard.) 

There  is  still  less  disposition  to  admit  determinism  in  the  order 
of  psychological  phenomena.  Yet  whatever  progress  has  been 
made  by  experimental  psychology  during  the  past  forty  years — real 
progress,  though  as  yet  but  little  known — consists  in  the  investiga- 
tion of  laws — that  is  to  say,  of  invariable  simultaneousness  and 
succession — in  other  words  of  determinism.  So  recent  is  this  study, 
so  little  has  been  done,  compared  with  what  remains  to  do,  that 
psychological  determinism  necessarily  finds  many  opponents  and 
few  adherents.  Yet  it  is  contrary  to  all  logic  to  hold  that  this 
category  of  phenomena  is  not  subject  to  determinism.  In  the 
first  place,  perception,  which  is  the  necessary  starting-point  of  all 
conscious  mental  activity,  is  subject  to  physical  and  physiological 
laws  with  which  we  are  partially  acquainted ;  and  we  have  seen 
that  every  sensation  is  resolved  by  analysis  into  slight  motions. 
In  the  next  place,  intellectual  activity  (judgment,  reason,  memory, 
imagination)  is  governed  by  the  great  law  of  association  or  of 
habit,  which  is  evidently  only  a  form  of  determinism.  Finally,  as 
regards  even  the  voluntary  act,  we  have  seen  that,  besides  being 
subject  to  the  law  of  habit,  which  reduces  it  to  automatism,  since 
it  is  always  determined  by  motives,  it  always  enters,  as  far  as 
regards  its  empirical  conditions,  into  the  web  of  universal 
mechanism. 


Conclusion.  39 1 


It  would  still  remain  for  us  to  show  that  social  and  historical 
phenomena  are  not  exempt  from  determinism;  but  it  is  impossible 
to  do  this  here  in  a  satisfactory  manner.  We  may  simply  observe 
that  it  is  the  necessary  consequence  of  all  that  has  been  said. 
History  results  from  the  action  of  nature  on  man,  and  of  man  on 
nature ;  but  if  nature  is  subject  to  determinism,  and  man  no  less  so, 
the  resultant  historical  and  social  development  cannot  escape. 

Thus  we  find  necessity  everywhere — at  the  beginning,  in  the 
middle,  and  at  the  end  of  all  things.  It  is  almost  superfluous  to 
show  that  heredity  is  only  a  form  of  it  If  vital  actions,  in  their 
production  and  in  their  evolution  are  subject  to  determinism,  and 
if  physiological  heredity  is  bound  up  with  organic  heredity,  is  it 
not  plain  that  hereditary  transmission  is  one  of  the  causes  that 
introduce  mechanism  into  mental  activity,  and  which  introduce 
nature  into  the  domain  of  free-will  ?  We  have  seen  that  in  practice 
— that  is,  in  the  moral,  the  social,  and  the  political  order,  free-will 
loses  what  heredity  gains.  The  totality  of  the  motions  which, 
according  to  mechanical  laws,  determine  an  organism  to  be,  and  to 
be  in  such  a  manner  rather  than  in  another,  determine  indirectly 
the  mental  constitution,  which,  as  regards  its  empiric  conditions,  is 
bound  up  with  that  organism. 

Heredity,  therefore,  is  a  form  of  determinism ;  but  what  distin- 
guishes this  from  all  other  forms  is,  that  it  is  a  specific  deter- 
minism— the  habit  of  a  family,  a  race,  or  a  species.  'The  disposition 
possessed  by  the  living  economy  to  follow  the  directions  previously 
impressed  upon  it — that  tendency  to  repetition  whence  often  results 
the  apparently  spontaneous  reproduction  of  certain  phenomena — 
is  inherent  in  the  organization;  it  is  by  it  that  animals  are  led  to 
imitate  themselves,  that  is,  to  repeat  what  they  have  previously 
done ;  and  this,  too,  leads  them  to  imitate  their  ancestors.'  (Du- 
trochet.)  In  other  words,  nothing  that  ever  has  been  can  cease  to 
be;  hence,  in  the  individual,  habit;  in  the  species,  heredity.  This 
it  is  which  fixes  us  in  the  indestructible  series  of  causes  and  effects, 
and  by  this  our  poor  personality  is  connected  with  the  ultimate 
origin  of  things,  through  an  infinite  concatenation  of  necessities. 
Heredity  is  but  one  form  of  that  ultimate  law  which  by  physicists 
is  called  the  conservation  of  energy,  and  by  metaphysicians  uni- 
versal casuality. 


392  Heredity. 

But  it  is  difficult  to  admit  that  everything  is  reducible  to 
mechanism.  To  us  it  seems  impossible  to  see  in  mechanism  any- 
thing else  than  the  sum  of  the  bare  conditions  and  purely  logical 
possibilities  of  existence :  so  that  to  accept  mechanism  is  to  accept 
the  form  instead  of  the  reality.  We  firmly  believe  that  wherever 
there  are  facts,  of  whatever  kind,  there  is  determinism ;  that 
wherever  there  is  determinism  there  is  science ;  and  that  science 
can  neither  go  beyond  determinism  nor  fall  short  of  it  But  is 
there  not  beyond  science  a  something  that  does  not  come  under 
its  law,  high  above  all  that  science  can  know,  by  processes  peculiar 
to  it  To  do  away  with  it  would  be  a  contradiction,  to  explain  it 
would  be  only  to  offer  an  hypothesis.  It  is  impossible  alike  to 
deny  and  to  determine  it,  for  it  comes  to  us  at  once  as  necessary 
and  as  unknowable.  At  most  we  can  only  say  that  this  unknown 
is  the  reality  that  lies  concealed  beneath  psychological  determinism 
— the  end  towards  which  the  vital  processes  tend  in  every  being, 
and  the  obscure  tendency  which  is  manifested  even  in  the  absolute 
determinism  of  inorganic  matter. 

This  supreme  antithesis  between  free-will  and  mechanism,  which 
underlies  the  antithesis  of  science  and  art,  of  the  individual  and 
the  general,  is  insoluble  to  us. 

At  times  we  are  inclined  to  believe  that  all  reality  is  in  the 
person,  that  perfection  consists  in  the  most  complete  individuation, 
and  that  the  general  is  but  an  ephemeral  form  of  existence,  pro- 
duced by  what  is  common  to  the  individuals ;  that  beneath  the 
veil  of  universal  mechanism  there  exists  in  nature,  as  it  were,  a 
dispersed  thought,  which  is  unconscious  of  itself  in  inorganic 
matter,  seeks  itself  in  the  animal,  and  finds  itself  in  man. 

At  another  time  we  are  inclined  to  the  belief  that  individuality 
is  but  the  transitory  product  of  the  interaction  of  eternal  laws; 
that,  lost  in  a  little  nook  in  the  universe,  the  best  thing  for  us  is 
to  regard  personality  as  an  illusion,  and  to  look  with  disdain  on 
our  griefs,  which  are  so  vain,  and  on  our  pleasures,  which  are  so 
brief,  to  enter  into  communion  with  nature,  and  share  in  the 
imperturbable  serenity  of  her  laws. 

At  times,  too,  we  are  disposed  to  think  that  this  supreme  anti- 
thesis might  be  resolved  without  sacrificing  either  free-will  to 
mechanism,  or  mechanism  to  free-will;  that,  were  we  to  occupy  a 


Conclusion.  393 

higher  stand-point,  we  should  see  that  what  is  given  us  from  without 
as  science,  under  the  form  of  mechanism,  is  given  us  from  within 
as  aesthetics  or  morals,  under  the  form  of  free-will. 

In  our  opinion,  the  progress  of  the  present  and  of  future  sciences 
will  enable  us  better  and  better  to  state  this  antinomy :  it  were  rash 
to  hope  for  its  solution. 


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Fourth  edition,  with  numerous  Additions.     With  Illustrations.     8vo. 
Cloth,  $5.00. 

"The  first  edition  of  this  work  was  published  in  the  year  1870.  The  work 
has  been  twice  revised  for  the  press  in  the  interval,  and  now  appears  in  itf> 
fourth  edition  enlarged  to  the  extent  of  nearly  two  hundred  pages,  including  a  full 
index." 

"This  interesting  work — for  it  is  intensely  so  in  its  aim,  scope,  and  the  abil- 
ity of  its  author — treats  of  what  the  scientists  denominate  anthropology,  or  tho 
natural  history  of  the  human  species ;  the  complete  science  of  man,  body  and 
soul,  including  sex,  temperament,  race,  civilization,  etc."— Providence  Press. 

PREHISTORIC  TIMES,  as  illustrated  by  An- 
cient Remains  and  the  Manners  and  Cus- 
toms of  Modern  Savages. 

Illustrated.     Entirely  new  revised  edition.     8vo.     Cloth,  $5.00. 

The  book  ranks  among  the  noblest  works  of  the  interesting  and  important 
class  to  which  it  belongs.  As  a  resume  of  our  present  knowledge  of  prehistoric 
man,  it  leaves  nothing  to  be  desired.  It  is  not  only  a  good  book  of  reference,  but 
the  best  on  the  subject. 

"  This  is,  perhaps,  the  best  summary  of  evidence  now  in  our  possession  con- 
cerning the  general  character  of  prehistoric  times.  The  Bronze  Age,  The  Stone 
Age.  The  Tumuli,  The  Lake  Inhabitants  of  Switzerland,  The  Shell  Mounds.  The 
Cave  Man,  and  The  Antiquity  of  Man,  are  the  titles  of  the  most  important  chap- 
ters."— Dr.  C.  K.  Adams  s  Manual  of  Historical  Literature. 

ANTS,   BEES,  AND  WASPS. 

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"This  volume  contains  the  record  of  various  experiments  made  with  ants, 
bees,  and  wasps  during  the  last  ten  years,  with  a  view  to  test  their  mental  con- 
dition and  powers  of  sense.  The  principal  point  in  which  Sir  John's  mode  of 
experiment  differs  from  those  of  Hnber,  Forel,  McCook.  and  others,  is  that  he 
ban  carefully  watched  and  marked  particular  inserts,  and  has  had  their  nests 
under  observation  for  long  periods — one  of  his  ants'  nests  having  been  under 
constant  inspection  ever  since  1874.  His  observations  arc  made  principally  upon 
ants,  because  they  show  more  power  and  flexibility  of  mind  ;  and  the  value  of  his 
studies  is  that  they  belong  to  the  department  of  original  research." 

"  We  have  no  hesitation  in  saying  that  the  author  has  presented  ns  with  the 
most  valuable  series  of  observations  on  a  special  subject  that  has  ever  been  pro- 
duced, charmingly  written,  full  of  logical  deductions",  and.  when  we  consider  his 
multitudinous  engagements,  a  remarkable  illustration  of  economy  of  time.  As  a 
c  •ntribtition  to  insect  psychology,  it  will  be  long  before  this  book  finds  a  par- 
allel."— London  Atherxxum. 


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VL 

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"  Professor  Bain  is  not  a  novice  in  this  field.  His  work  is  admirable  in  many 
respects  for  teacher,  parent,  and  pupil."— Philadelphia  North  American. 

"  A  work  of  great  value  to  all  teachers  who  study  it  intelligently." — Boston 
Advertiser. 


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